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C H A P T E R  I
CANAL AND BRITISH TRADE INTERESTS 
(1854 -  1875)
H is to r ic a l  Background*
Tii© O-ld Trade Routes to Tho Hast and B r i t a in rs 
Share In The Eastern Trade* • •
Attempts to R evolution ise the Way to The East 
v ia  Egypt* Tho Development o f the •Sites -  
Alexandria  Overland Route and B r it is h  In tereata#
I I I
The . B u ild ing  ...of the Suey .panel*
Reasons f o r  B r i t is h  Opposition to  the Canal 
Project#
•B r it is h  Investors and the Finance o f the 
Suck .Canal*
The Opening o f the Canal and the Early  
D i f f ic u lt ie s *
Growth of B r it is h  In te re s ts  in  the Canal* and 
the Purchase of the Egyptian Governm ent*3 
Holding o f Suea Canal shares*
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND .
The Old Trade Routes to the Bast. and B r i t a in 1^  Share 
in  the Eastern Trade*
Before the d iscovery  o f  the Cape route to, the East 
by the Portuguese in  1498 the Eastern trade was ca rr ied  
across one (o r  another) o f  the three great overland routes  
which e x is ted  at that time* These were from Aleppo v ia  
the Euphrates V a lle y , from Damascus v ia  Jedda and from 
A lexandria  or Damietta v ia  the N i le  V a lley  to the Red 
Sea* As these routes were a l l  w ith in  the dominions o f  
the Ottoman Empire, they functioned s u ita b ly  fo r  th e ir  
own trade  coming from d if fe re n t  parts In  Eastern Europe 
and the M editerranean* B esides, these routes channelled  
the trade o f  the M editerranean seaports which* concluded 
f r ie n d ly  o r, sometimes, cap itu la tio n s  agreements w ith  
the P o rte . On the other hand, the merchants o f the 
Western Seaports o f Europe were at a disadvantage under 
these cond itions* By the overland routes they were 
r e la t iv e ly  at a g rea te r d istance from the East* Thus 
besides the cost of tran sporta tion  and the time spent 
on the journey they had to  pay more t o l l s  to a l l  the 
countries through which they had to pass to  reach  th e ir  
f i n a l  d estin ation s in  the East* Moreover, th e ir  trade  
was very r isk y  because o f the u n frien d ly  a tt itu d e  o f
SECTION I :
the Ottomans towards them*
The d iscovery  o f the Gape route th ere fo re  marked 
a new era in  the trade o f the Western European coun tries.
I t  enabled them to overcome the enormous d i f f i c u l t i e s  
which were h ith erto  encountered in  c ro ss in g  vast areas  
w ith in  the t e r r i t o r ie s  o f the Ottomans* For a long  
run ana lysis  th is  was not, however, the most important 
change in  the s itu a t io n *  I t  might be argued that the 
most s ig n if ic a n t  change which re su lted  from the opening 
up o f  th is  new sea route was that the European merchants 
trad in g  w ith  the East could now depend e n t ir e ly  on sh ips * 
to carry  th e ir  trade over the whole journey* Apart 
from being saved severa l inconvenient transshipm ents, 
they no lon ger had to depend on dom esticated animals 
to  carry  th e ir  goods* Ships th ere fo re  gained favour  
as a means of transport fo r  Eastern d estin ation s and 
since they were fa s t e r  and more raaneeuverable, over 
such long journeys, the d iscovery  o f the Cape provided  
a new incentive fo r  Eastern  trade* For the same
(1 ) France made her f i r s t  agreement w ith  the Ottomans 
in  1535. S ixty  nine years elapsed be fo re  England 
a lso  accepted the conditions o f the Ottomans in  
order to dim inish the d i f f i c u l t i e s  which faced  
her merchants trad in g  in  other Ottoman dominions*
. 2 *
( X )
reason p r io r it y  in  Eastern trade has been given ever 
since to  the maritime powers# The Portuguese p layed  
the g rea te st ro le  in  the trade with the East; f o r  about 
a century mainly because o f  th e ir  m ercantile su p e r io r ity  
(a t  sea )#  L a te r the Dutch and the E ng lish  took th e ir  
p laces , fo llow ed  by the French# Mo s t a t is t ic s  e x is t  
to fu rn ish  us w ith  a p ic tu re  of that time, and to show , . 
the dec lin e  in  the volume o f  East-W est trade which used  
the overland routes# However, the fa c t  i t s e l f  can be 
proved by comparing the importance o f the M editerranean  
seaports w ith  the A t la n t ic  seaports , be fo re  and a ft e r  
1498, as regards Eastern trade# The f i r s t  depended.on
1 ' v * ■«
the overland rou tes b e fo re 81498 and a f t e r  that they  
continued in  th e ir  attempts to maintain and develop ,
: . . ( 2 )
them as a counterpoise to  the Cape route# N evertheless  
th e ir  trade w ith the East d ec lin ed  r e la t iv e ly  to that of 
the A t la n t ic  seaports which on the strength  o f th e ir  sea 
power managed to  appropriate  f o r  themselves the l i o n 1a 
share in  th is  trade# Many w rite rs  t r a d it io n a l ly  pointed
( 2 ) # • • • “a ft e r  the d ec lin e  .of the Venetian Republic had 
set in ,  i t  was the French, by means o f the fr ie n d ly  
re la t io n s  which they e stab lish ed  at the Sublime Porte, 
#.#.who e s tab lish ed  an almost undisputed monopoly o f  
o f the Overland Eastern trade* Successive French 
governments, fo r  p o l i t i c a l  as w e ll as fo r  economic 
reasons, se t great sto re  by the maintenance ,and 
development o f  the overlard  rou te  as a counterpoise
to the Gape ro u te 11......... pages 4-5  -  The Making o f
the Suez Canal# J# Marlowe.
to the fa c t  that the A t la n t ic  sea ports were geograph­
i c a l ly  favoured more than the M editerranean sea ports  
when they come to  exp la in  the changing importance of 
the countries trad in g  with the East since the d iscovery  
o f the Qape rou te* C erta in ly * such an explanation  
must be given i t s  weight* but not a t  the expense o f  
other and more important fa c ts  such as the wealth o f  
the countries and th e ir  maritime power* France, fo r  
instance* had sea ports on the A t la n t ic  as w e ll as on 
the Mediterranean and her trade w ith  the East* when the 
Cape rou te  was d iscovered  was la rg e r  than that o f any o f  
the A t la n t ic  sea ports* But her importance was d ec lin in g
r e la t iv e ly  in  th is  trade by th* emergence o f s tron ger sea
•• ‘ "  - ■ ' (3 ) . . ‘ 1
powers* According to an estim ation of the e a r ly
1850 fs the volume o f the Eastern trade was in  the reg ion
of 2 m illio n  tons* o f which 1*4 m illio n  tons were B r i t is h .
The Dutch conducted *3 m illio n  tons w hile  the French
trade constitu ted  only *1 m illio n  tons* I t  is  more
than l ik e ly  that a l l  the E nglish  and the Dutch trade
(4 )
went by the Cape route and thus* at le a s t*  85$ o f
(3 ) Estim ation by two Frenchmen* M* Bande add M. Chemin 
Dupontes -  quoted by Edinburgh Review. v o l . 103,
1856 -  in  a paper on the su b je c t . The^figure which 
was estim ated fo r  B r it ish  Eastern trade agreed more 
or le s s  w ith  the ta b le s  presented to Parliam ent and 
those published  by the E* In d ia  and .China A sso c ia tio n .
(4 ) The English  trade w ith  the East d id  not, use the 
overland route to any s ig n i f i c a n t ,degree be fo re  the 
establishm ent o f A lexandria -Suez ra ilw a y s .
of the Eastern trade  was a l lo t e d ,  by the f i r s t  h a lf  
o f  the 19th century, to Western countries ca rry in g  
th e ir  trade by sea* .
Attempts to R evo lution ise the Way to  the East v ia  
Egypt * The Development o f the Suez-A lexandria  
Overland .Route and B r it is h  In te re s t s .
During the 18th and 19th centuries as p o l i t i c a l  
and economic r iv a l r y  w ith  England was in c reas in g ly  
growing in s id e  France, the French thoughts turned  
always to  the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  a shorter way to  the 
East as the main so lu t io n  fo r  recovering  th e ir  o ld  
la rg e  share in  i t s  trade* Among d iffe re n t - p ro jects  
to th is  end the idea  o f l in k in g  the Had Sea and the 
Mediterranean by a d ire c t  canal fa sc in a ted  the French* 
As regards the B r it is h ,  the Cape route continued to  
s u f f ic e  fo r  the transport of th e ir  goods but it  no 
longer functioned s a t i s fa c t o r i ly  fo r purposes o f  
communications* The in creasin g  number o f the B r i t is h  
tradesmen, o f f i c i a l s  and so ld ie rs  in  B r i t a in ^  Eastern  
co lon ies requ ired  more e f f ic ie n t  means o f communication 
I t  was r e a liz e d  that Falmouth might be reached from 
Calcutta in  le s s  than two months, the journey from  
Calcutta to Suez tak ing 30 days and that from Suez 
to A lexand ria  tak ing s ix  days* This was only h a l f
the time spent in  the voyage around the Cape o f  Good 
Hope* Gradually* th ere fo re* during the f i r s t  h a lf  
o f  the 19th century B r i t is h  mail and passenger t r a f f i c  
abandoned the Cape route and traversed  the Suez overland  
route in  th e ir  way to  the East* . B y  the 1850 *n, the 
importance o f the overland route -  v ia  Suez -  was 
increased  by the establishm ent o f a regu lar, se rv ice  
by the P* & 0 . Co* (P en in su la r and O rien ta l Co*) m ail 
boats between Asian  ports and Suez* and by the completion  
of the Suez-C a iro -A lexan dria  ra ilw ays  -  1857*
However* in  add ition  to the m all and passenger 
t r a f f i c *  s te a d ily  in c reas in g  quan tities  o f  some va luab le  
a r t ic le s  which B r ita in  imported from the East (such  as 
Indigo* s i l k  and s i l k  p iece goods whose value was 
approxim ately ££0G-£I*G0G per ton ) oame by the Suez 
overland route* I t  was w idely b e lie v ed  during the 
1850 fs that the completion o f the Suez-A lexandria  
ra ilw ay  would r e s u lt  in  d iv e rt in g  the great stream o f  
Eastern trade from the* Cape route to  the Hod Sea* 
N everth e less , In  s p ite  o f quick t ra n s it  and low  
f r e ig h t  charges fo r  the use of the ra ilw ays  th is
(b)
m s un rea lized * 'Hie necessity  of two transshipm ents, 
at le a s t ,  en~route discouraged the trade  in  bulky  
a r t ic le s ,  and these continued th ere fo re  to  use the  
Caps route to the Bast*
"  7*
(5 ) Chatterton, B*K*, d escribed  the Suez overland  
route be fo re  the construction  o f the ra ilw ays  
between Su e z~ Ca i r  o~ A lexand ria• • *He s a id * * *•*
"The P* ,and 0* Co* h ad **• to land th e ir  passengers  
at A lexandria  and boats and camels had to be .
. employed u n t i l  the Suez port is  reached” •* * *
”l t  waa a com plicated journey, f o r  th is  
overland  route  was mostly an over water rou te .
By,means of Mahmoudieh Canal the passengers  
and goods were sent from A lexandria  to the 
Hilo-, whence they proceeded by steamer to: . |ft
Cairo* From there they' t r a v e lle d  through > |§g
the desert to  Suez, „• 3#000 camels had ,to  ff|
be employed fo r  tran sp o rtin g  a s in g le  . . f l
• steam er’s'; loading;., \every package' had to •
be sub jected  to  throe separate t ra n s fe rs  ; 
and the inconvenience was indeed considerab le” * -
Therefore i t  was b e liev ed  in  B r it a in  that . ^
the ra ilw ays  would- so lve the p ro b le m s (ch a tte rto n ,e .k # 1  
involved  in  the Suez overland route* \ (steamships and" their!
However i t  i s  very l ik e ly  that t h e (story» p* 1]L5) *
ra ilw ays between Stiez and A lexandria '
helped ...very much the trade:, o f  M editerranean Vj&j!
countries -to develop since they were vSI|j
dependent on the Suez overland rou te* . J i
THE TOILPING OF TUB StfBg CANAL.
Reasons fo r  B r it is h  Opposition to the Canal P ro je c t ,
The idea  o f connecting the Red Sea and the .
/ ’ ‘ ■ y ' :  ‘ ; . , v ‘v : ' ^
M editerranean, through the Isthmus o f Sues* in  order  
that Egypt could be trave rsed  by a nav igab le  waterway
was not a new one* H is to r ic a l  evidence 3 hows that
•. • ' . . . . .  ( 6 ) ; *• vi-. . -
i t  goes back to very  ancient times* Several canals  
were dug in  d if fe re n t  tim es, perhaps between 1887 8*0* 
and 841 A*D* to  l in k  the two seas in d ire c t ly  through the 
N ile *  The canal was dug, then a llow ed  tc  f a l l  in to  
d isu se , and then i t  was re-opened at d i f fe r e n t  times
depending on the need o f the Egyptian trade and the
(6 ) Home H is to r ia n s . suggest that the e a r l ie s t  canal was 
. « dug -under' thePharach  Semusart 1887-1849 B .0. and ;
then more than three centuries la t e r  under’ Darius, 
the Persian  Ruler 521-485 B*C, However th is  was 
stronger evidence to p ^ v e  the opening up o f  a 
canal, which connected the Red Sea and fit he <c> 
M editerranean in d ire c t ly  through the eastern  
branch o f the N i le ,  under Ptolemy I I *
285-245 B .C *,under Trajan the Roman Rule 
96-117 A.D* and then under Amr Ibn B la ss , the 
Moslem Ruler 641 A*.D* None of the e a r l ie s t  .
canals had perhaps been used fo r  more than a 
century except the la s t  one that was cut d u rin g  
the. Moslem ru le *  I t  had remained u n t i l  776 and 
then was blocked by the order o f one o f  the  
Abbaaid Caliphate in  o rder to  h inder the  
transports between Egypt and A rabia  fo r  
p o l i t i c a l  reasons* .
trade which took p lace between the o ld  trad in g  seaports  
East and West o f Egypt, By the 19th century the idea  
o f  the canal was rev ived  by Napoleon a f t e r  h is  conquest 
o f  Egypt, The idea  o f  a d ire c t  l in k  between the Red 
3ea and the Mediterranean in te rested  Mm so that he 
brought w ith  Mm a m ission o f  French engineers, headed 
by Charles Le Pere a d istin gu ish ed  French engineer, to  
examine the p o s s ib i l i t y .  Their repo rt to Mm was 
d isappo in tin g , fo r  they b e lie v e d  the le v e l  o f  the Red 
0ea to  be h igh er, about 50 fe e t ,  than the M editerranean
so that the id e a ,o f a nav igab le  canal was im practicab le ,
f « * - -  . . 4 #
Mohammed A l l , a vigorous man o f bo ld  id ea s , who ru le d
Egypt a f t e r  the French Army w ithdraw al, financed  fre sh
research  on the Sues Canal p ro jec t* I t  has been
frequen tly  argued that i t  was h is  French fr ie n d s  who
urged Mm to do so* However at a la t e r  stage h is
engineers ceased, t h e ir  research  when he lo s t  M s
enthusiasm and abandoned the idea on pu re ly  p o l i t ic a l  
(7 ) 1
grounds • /
(7 ) Mohammed A l l  b e lie v e d 'th a t  i f  a canal were constructed, 
e ith e r B r ita in  or Prance would attempt to  co lon ise  
Egypt*
In  1854 De Lesseps succeeded in  ga in in g  a "firm ans1 
from the Viceroy o f Egypt, to  provide fo r  an In te rn a tio n a l  
company known as the "Compagnie C u lv e rse lle  du Canal 
Maritime de Suez"# The "firm ans" or the Concession  
charters rr ovlded that the canal works were to  be 
executed at the cost o f  the company, but a l l  the 
fo r t i f i c a t io n s  were to be in s t a l le d  by the Egyptian
• j* * • - •
government alone* Besides, the Egyptian .government 
undertook to  supply the labourers  to  the company and 
the wage ra te  was determined at 1 s h i l l in g  to la*&  4d« 
d a ily *  De I*esseps who was a personal fr ie n d  o f the 
Egyptian V iceroy had, th e re fo re , obtained not only a
business contract but a ls o  some generous g i f t s  to
. : • * ' (8 )  
s ta r t  the work fo r  the p ro jected  canal* From
1854 u n t i l  the work on Suez Canal was completed
De Lesseps faced  strong opposition  from the successive
B r it is h  governments towards hia p ro je c t . But, having
succeeded In  f u l f i l l i n g  the numerous cond itions that
would a llo w  work to  begin  he strove  u n t i l  he accomplished
i t *
(8 ) Bee texts o f the f i r s t  and the second Concessions 
o f  the Suez Canal in  A* W ilson -  The Suez Canal, 
p* 173-179,
11.
I t  can e a s i l y  be recogn ised  that the 19th Centuryfs 
pioneers of the Idea o f  a Suez Canal were almost without 
exception Frenchmen. As I t  has been exp la ined , they  
were a l l  convinced that such a canal, by reducing the  
fr e ig h t  charges o f the Eastern voyage, and by making 
M a rse ille s  nearer than L iverpoo l to C a lcu tta , would 
elim inate the B r i t is h  monopoly which had ex isted  in  
the East fo r  centuries and would enrich  France. Ihese  
hopes o f the French ra is e d  a fe a r  in  B r ita in  that the 
Canal p ro jec t might w e ll  serve F rance!s in te re s ts  in  
the Eastern markets. Whether o r not such hopes were 
to be r e a lis e d  they in s t ig a te d  what was probably  the 
f i r s t  B r it is h  opposition  to  the Canal p ro je c t . But, 
although France was nearer to  the mouth o f  the suggested  
canal, i t  was undoubtedly a mistake to presume that  
th is  fa c t  alone would g ive  her the a b i l i t y  to break  
the B r it is h  m onopolistic s itu a t io n  in  the Eastern  
market. Such an enormous d iffe re n c e  which ex isted  
between the volumes o f B r i t is h  trade and French trade  
with the East, by the 19th century, could not be 
a ttr ib u ted  e n t ir e ly  to the long voyage to the East 
and h igh  fre ig h t  charges in  the absence of a Suez;
Canal. I t  must be emphasised that B r it a in  had le d  
the in d u s t r ia l w orld  from the time o f the In d u s tr ia l  
Revolution up to  that date* B r i t a in 1s in d u s t r ia l is t s
were expanding th e ir  business f a s t e r  than th e ir  
European competitors and i t  was the B r it ish  consumers 
who were en joying the h ighest and a r i s in g  standard  
o f l iv in g .  Ho wonder th ere fo re  t hat B r i t is h  imports 
o f raw m ateria ls and fo o d s tu ffs  from the East and 
th e ir  exports thereto  (and in  g en e ra l B r i t is h  imports 
and exports ) grew f a s t e r  than those o f  any other
European nation. In  add ition , B r ita in  a t that time
. ' ' . . ’ (9 )
had the strongest merchant f l e e t  in  a l l  the w orld ,
and th e re fo re , the B r it is h  sh ipping took the la rg e s t
part o f the w o rld 's  carry in g  trade . Thus, i f  the
Suez Canal p ro jec t could shorten the sea ro u te  to the
East, cheapen transport and f a c i l i t a t e  trade in  genera l
(9 ) P.H * i l l  . .
Shipping o f the U.K. in  re la t io n  to  world shipping
World ' B r it is h World B r it is h
S a i l S a i l Sfcaam St eara
M il l* !# % o f  the M i l l# ! * % o f  the
■ Tons. World Tons _________World .
18 SO 5*81 38# 2 #02 . . - '15.0
1840 9 #01 27 #8 • 37 ■ 24# 3'
I860' 14 #89 28 #2 1#7I .20*3
1870 18*90 35#5 3*04 36*3
I t  would n ecessa rily  be advantageous to  B r ita in  more 
than any other European country trad ing  with the East*
The fe a r  that France or any other M editerranean countries : 
would challenge B r it a in  in  her dominance in  the Eastern  
market was sometimes, th ere fo re , re je c te d . Gladstone 
( i n 'a  Parliam entary debate in  1858 on the Suez; Canal) 
argued that the new sea route to the East would c e rta in ly  
f a l l  w ith in  the con tro l o f  the strongest maritime power 
in  E u ro p e ... .and what could that power be but B rita in?
He accused the government o f opposing a scheme on the  
fa ce  of I t  b e n e f ic ia l  to mankind on very flim sy  p o l i t ic a l  
grounds. As a b e lie v e r  in  a free  com petitive world he 
asked the government to' "regard  the Suez Canal as a 
commercial p ro je c t , as such le t  i t  stand or f a l l " * .
One important point must be added to the above 
argument, that I s  about the. fu tu re  o f B r i t is h  entrepot 
trade which served countries East and West o f Suez*
In fa c t  the growth o f th is  trade had p a r t ic u la r ly  
depended upon the favou rab le  geograph ica l p o s it io n  o f 
the B r it is h  Is lan d  as long as the Cape route remained 
the highway to the East* The fu tu re  o f B r it is h  entrepot 
trade was, th e re fo re , s t i l l  questionable* I f  agSuez 
Canal would stim u late  the d ire c t  trade between the 
Mediterranean re g io n  and the Blast, B r it is h  entrepot 
trade which h ith erto  served them might not Increase
as ra p id ly  as i t  had done p rev iously  or i t  might w e ll dec line
" . • ■ • - .t
But to many minds i t  was hard to  b e lie v e  that a Baez 
Canal w&uld stim ulate  the d ire c t  trade o f the m ajority  
o f  the M editerranean countries* I t  was doubted that  
A u str ia  or I t a ly  whose requirements o f Eastern products 
were very sm all, coq ld  embark in  d ire c t  trade w ith  the 
East no m atter 'to  however great an extent the trade  
route to  the East was shortened or cheapened* .An 
a r t ic le  on the sub ject -  published  in  Edinburgh Review  
1856 -  expressed w ell, th is  argument but i t  must be 
mentioned here that the whole an a ly s is  o f  the w r ite r  
had depended on the id ea  that the Suez Canal would 
b rin g  about a s l ig h t  reduction in  the cost o f  transport  
so that neither the structu re  nor the volume of the 
East^West trade  would to a ffec ted * Ihus u n t i l  they  
developed th e ir  need fo r  Eastern  products or th e ir
a b i l i t y  to export anything to  the East, they would
\
f in d  it  f a r  cheaper to re so r t  to  London, the g rea te st  
emporium 'of Europe *
Had the B r it is h ,  by that tim e, been sure of th e ir  
country*a a b i l i t y  to meat the r iv a l r y  o f  other European 
countries in  the Eastern markets whether the highway 
to the East was around the Gape o f Good Hope or v ia
the Suez Canal one might ask «  why, then, the* s u cces s iv e
, >» /
B r it is h  governments had fu r io u s ly  opposed the Canal 
pro ject?  Most o f  the w rite rs  on the su b jec t argued  
that the mala reason fo r  the B r it is h  opposition  was 
th ere fore  " p o l i t i c a l11 * Ihey argued that i t  was
the Suez Canal p ro je c t  on the su rface , but under the
surface  I t  was the French d e s ire  to  co lon ise  Egypt
and then td pursue fu rth e r  adventures in  A fr ic a  and
in  the East which warned the B r it is h  government,
in sp ired  i t s  fe a rs  and motivated i t s  opposition  to the  
(1 0 ) , 
pro ject#  Hence the B r i t is h  government saw that the
form ation o f  a "French!1 company to carry  out the Suez
Canal p ro jec t was a s te p  in  a new French co lo n ia l
expansion in  the E ast.
Although th is  argument helped to  exp la in  the
s itu a t io n  as it  was seen and as p o l i t i c a l  documents
concerning the d ispute over the Canal p r o je c t  might
re v e a l, i t  overrated  the s ig n ific a n c e  o f the so c a l le d
" p o l i t i c a l  reason " behind the ;B r it ish  government
opposition# I t  is  c le a r 'th a t  the opposition  to what
was thought a new French im peria l expansion in  the East
was a measure to protect B r i t a in 's  p o l i t i c a l  as w e ll as
economic in terests , in  that part o f  the world#
15#
(10 ) The alma of Bonaparte 's  Egyptian exped ition , as 
o f f i c i a l l y  d e fin ed  by a secret decree,, included  
the conquest o f Egypt ard the exc lu sion  of 
English  from a l l . t h e i r  possessions in  the East. 
He was a lso  to have the Isthmus o f  Suez cut 
through to  assure the fre e  and’ exc lu s ive  
possession  o f  the Red Sea to France#. ##•#
Rose-^ J.Hf L ife  o f  Napoleon. ■ .
See also  Marlowe -  .The Making o f  the Suez 
Canal -  Chapter I .
The measures taken by the B r i t is h  government in  
i t s  opposition  were, th e re fo re , intended (1 ) e ith e r  
to  destroy com pletely the Suez Canal p ro ject as long
t U l  ,
as i t  was operated by a French company, or (2 )  to  
reduce the power o f the French company to the minimum 
by a llo w in g  them to d ire c t  only the management o f the  
techn ica l and commercial a c t iv i t ie s  o f the Canal p ro ject  
and. th is  would be achieved by withdrawing from them th e ir  
r ig h ts  over the Canal zone and over free  Egyptian labour  
or (3 ) to de lay  the com pletion o f the p ro jec t u n t i l  ah 
in te rn a tio n a l agreement could be reached to  guarantee  
equal r ig h t s  to a l l  the maritime powers# ,
At the beginn ing the opposition  o f the B r i t is h  
government to the Canal p ro ject was r e la t iv e ly  mild#
I t  was b e lie v e d  that the construction  of a sea le v e l  
canal was te c h n ic a lly  im possible# In  January 1856 
a group o f le ad in g  engineers from B r ita in  and other 
p r in c ip a l European coun tries , who were employed by 
De Lesseps to  survey the Canal p ro je c t , repo rted  that  
the Suez Canal p ro je c t  was not te ch n ica lly  im possible#  
Later De Lesseps was able to  s ta r t  the work and to  make 
continuous progress# • Accordingly  the B r it is h  -• •
(11 ) The French shares constitu ted  207,111 out of • 
a to t a l  400. ,000, and the management was to  
a very great extent French.
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governm ents opposition  to  the Canal p ro ject grow to
a clim ax. The B r i t i s h  were quite alarmed at the
poss ib le  success o f the Canal p ro je c t , even i f  i t  were
. , ( I S )
regarded as be ing  a remote p o s s ib i l i t y ,  l o t ,  however,
because o f the advantages which a shorter way* to the
East might g iv e  to France o r other M editerranean
coun tries , but because o f  the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  France
c o n tro llin g  the flow  o f Eastern t r a f f i c  some time in
the fu tu re  through a monopoly possessed by the Suez
Canal Co#
By 1864 an agreement was reached between the 
B r it is h  government and De Lesseps and the long d ispute  
between them was brought to  an end# The Suez Canal Co* 
agreed to  abandon i t s  claims of fr e e  labou r in  re tu rn  
fo r  compensation of 84 m illio n  francs# Secondly a l l
(1 2 ) The B r i t is h  government’s opinion was a ffe c te d  by 
Robert Stephenson, the great B r it is h  engineer, 
who examined the Isthmus of Suez and judged that 
the construction  o f  a sea le v e l canal was 
te ch n ica lly  Im possible* L ater, i t  was b e lieved  
that the Canal p ro jec t was "p h y s ic a lly  im possible  
except at a p ro h ib it iv e  co st ; I f  undertaken i t  
can only be f o r  p o l i t i c a l  reasons" (From Lord 
Clarendon, then Secretary o f State fo r Foreign  
A f fa i r s  to the French Ambassador in  B r ita in  « 
W ilson* A* Suez Canal Chapter I I ) .  The cost o f 
the p ro jec t was expected to  r i s e  from 8 m illion  
s t e r l in g  estim ated by De Lesseps to something 
in  the reg ion  o f IS  or even 20 m illio n  «  
M lnbur^h_ Rev lew f Yo l* 103 f 1856 ~ and i t  was 
an tic ip a ted  that Da Lesseps would never be ab le  
to get such  a la rge  amount o f c a p ita l to 
accomplish h is  p ro ject#
. ' . la,
lands on the isthmus covering 600,000 hectares and the  
fre sh  water and a l l  su bs id ia ry  canals and the navigation  
r igh ts  thereon were lik e w ise  to  be abandoned fo r  46 
m illio n  franca*., ( f t  was the Egyptian government which  
was to pay these amounts in  com pensation)*
‘Ihe agreement reduced the a c t iv it ie s ,  o f the. Canal 
company to pure ly  techn ica l and commercial a c t iv i t ie s  
since i t  prevented the company from acqu irin g  any 
p o l i t i c a l  power o r  lo c a l  in flu ence  over the lands 
surrounding the Suez canal* Ihe agreement th ere fo re  
had im p lic it ly  secured the n eu tra lity  of a new sea route  
to the East which might prove o f r e a l  Importance in  
fu tu re*
B r it is h  Investors and the Finance off- the Suez O&nql* 
ihe opinion o f  the business c i r c le s  in  B r ita in  
was doubtless more favou rab le  to  the Canal p ro je c t  
than that o f the government* More than ten years  
befo re  De Lesseps obtained the f i r s t  firmans fo r  a 
Suez Canal, Arthur Anderson, the Chairman o f  the 
P* & 0* Go* ( in  1841) urged Palmerston to support the
Suez Canal p ro je c t*  In  1855, the Canal p ro je c t was
(13 ) He a lso  suggested that the Canal might be b u i lt
by a p riv a te  company under the p o l i t ic a l  guarantee 
o f the great powers* Palm erston»s rep ly  to such 
a s u g g e s t io n , i f  any, la  not known* Jenks, 
p«5QQ-5Q4 “the m igration  of B r i t is h  C ap ita l •
rece ived  in  .B ritain  w ith sympathy when De Lesseps v is it e d  
London in  an attempt to  p lace  the p ro je c t be fo re  the 
B r it is h  people themselves* The P* & 0* Co* ignored  
the o f f i c i a l  a t t itu d e  o f the government and showed 
every sympathy fo r  the p ro jec t o f the Suez Canal* The 
East In d ia  Co* a lso  adopted a k ind ly  a t t itu d e . The 
steady development o f t ra n s it  trade hy the Sues overland  
route had c e rta in ly  favoured  any attempts to  re v o lu t io n ize  
the way to  the East*
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However, the B r it is h  people d id  not attempt to  
a s s is t  the Suez Canal p ro je c t  in  a p o s it iv e  way* And 
when De Lesseps opened his su bscrip tion  l i s t s  on 
November 1858, there were no ap p lica tion s  from B rita in *
The fo llo w in g  exp lanation  might w e ll account fo r  the 
reason why the B r i t is h  investors re fra in ed  from sharing  
in  the finance o f  the Suez Canal*
Undoubtedly p u b lic  opin ion in  B r ita in  was la r g e ly  
in fluenced  by the o f f i c i a l  a tt itu d e  o f the government 
and by the reasons behind th is  a ttitu d e* Many investors  
became u n ce rta in  o f  any p o ss ib le  engineering success in  
the Canal p ro je c t*  Just be fo re  the su bsc rip tion  l i s t s  
were opened, D is r a e l i  viewed the Suez Canal p ro ject in  
the House o f Commons as 11 the most f u t i l e  attempt and 
t o t a l ly  im possib le  to be c a rr ie d  out"* Other B r it ish  
in vesto rs  might have accepted such a r is k  as was
invo lved  in  the Suez Canal p ro je c t , but they wore qu ite  
aware that they must not finance  a p ro ject which would
' X
be favo u rab le  to France but p re ju d ic ia l  to  t h e ir  own 
country as Palmerston once declared  in  the House o f  
Commons«
A lso  i t  was argued that the Suez; Canal p ro ject  
would f a i l  as a commercial p ro je c t , even i f  i t  would  
be p o ss ib le  to  be caxrried out tech n ica lly * In  an 
a r t ic le  published  by De Lesseps, the w r ite rs  argued  
that the volume o f trade  w ith  p laces Fast of Egypt had 
increased  from^ apx^roximately one m illio n  tons in  184X 
to 4 m illio n  in  1851 and then to about 16 m illio n  by the 
middle o f the 18501 s • By the time tho Canal would be 
completed, they argued, the la t t e r  estim ation  would be 
f a r  exceeded* They foresaw  that the trade in  bulky  
raw asateria ls  and fo o d s tu ffs  produce o f  In d ia  and 
other Eastern t e r r i t o r ie s  would f in a l ly  form a part o f 
the Eastern t ra d e . This would be the outcome o f much 
lower fr e ig h t  charges which would re su lt  from tho opening 
of the Canal. Besides Australian  trade  w ith  the 
mother country which was in creasin g  a t a c o lo s sa l ra te  
would a l l  depend on fctoeKSuez Canal route* F in a lly ,  
they argued that the Suez Canal route would not only  
be a highway fo r  the trade  between Europe and the East 
but a lso  fo r  the American trade w ith China; fo r  the
20*
la t t e r  would c e r ta in ly  adopt the new sea rou te  which 
would he e a s ie r ,  sh o rter and s a fe r  in  comparison w ith  
tho route by Cape Horn# ‘fru ly  many aspects o f th is  
argument were r e a l i s e d  a ft  o r the opening o f the Canal,
hut the estim ates fo r  the; volume o f Eastern  trad e  were
(14 ) • • '• ‘ . ,
very much in fla ted #  Xhe w rite rs  o f the a rt ic le s -th em ­
se lves  f e l t  that the estim ate o f 16 m illio n  tons was
too h igh  and they d ip lo m atic a lly  x* educed that t o . 6 m illio n
(15 )
in  a la t e r  step  in  t h e ir  argument* Of these 6. m illio n  
they estim ated that at le a s t  5 m illio n  tons would use 
the Suea Canal immediately a f t e r  i t s  open ing  (which  
would make an income of SO m illio n  francs per annum 
i f  every ton was charged 10 fran c s )#
(14) See page 4 & F#HY (3 )#
(15 ) flhe w rite rs  of the A r t ic le s  sa id * *♦ lfA$ however 
we are addressing ourse lves to  the commercial 
world ard have to convince a l l  minds, even the 
most tim id , we should f i x  on a f ig u r e ,  and that 
the f ig u re  should not s t a r t le  anyone, . We have 
adopted 4 m illia rd s  of fra n c s , answering to  6 
m illio n  tons which according to  what we have been 
showing is  w ithout doubt a lready  exceeded at 
present or c e r ta in ly  w i l l  b e fo re -th e  c lo se  o f
. the undertak ing11* .From A rt ic le s  published  
by De hesseps be fo re  November 1858,
- As tills argument had very much exaggerated the
volume o f Eastern trade and consequently the expected
pro fits  from the Suez Qanai project immediately a fte r
its  completion, it was vulnerable to criticism  and i t
was righ tly  shown to be a type of commercial propaganda*
In addition the opponents of the Canal project argued
that the Australian t r a f f ic  would not use the Suez Canal
route* They maintained that the small saving in distance
by the Suez Canal in the particu lar case o f Australia
would be Insu ffic ien t to induce a change in the
trad itional Australian route particu larly  when that
, (1 6 ) . 
was characterised with its  favourable winds* Up to
that time sea-borne trade was carried by sa ilin g  vessels,
therefore seasons of voyages, the time spent in them
as w e ll as tho route which had to be followed through-*
out any voyage were determined by the winds*
* . v ‘ •
(16) The distance saved by the Suez Canal route from
London to Melbourne was 555 nautical miles and
this obviously represented a small gain, in
comparison with 4,595 nautical miles to be
saved in  the London-Bombay voyage and.'5*581
nautical miles in the London-IIong Kong voyage*
(See also Table 8 ) .  Therefore, there was s t i l l
a chance le f t  to the ^wind" to determine the
route to Australia as long as sa ilin g  vessels
would carry the B ritish  trade*
More important in the argument against the Canal 
project was that which concerned the use of the 3xmz 
Canal as such* I t  was reported by some o ffic e rs  
appointed by the East India company that the conditions 
of navigation in the Rod Sea were very unfavourable fo r  
sa ilin g  vessels* On the-other hand the ir report.showed 
that ifthe a awe;, circumstances which render the Rod Sea so 
unsuited to navigation by s a i l  are most advantageous to
U 7 > .
steamers** fhus the prospects of a Suez Canal depended 
at least in  part, on the future competition between 
steamers and sa ilin g  ships* Supporters of the Suea 
Canal project in B rita in , who were mainly e m p lo y e d  b y  
De Lesseps, challenged the report of the East India 
Company about navigation in  the Red Sea but they did
(17) In reasoning that, the o fficers  o f the fiast India 
Go* said in their report. * * ffThe straightness of 
the middle channel, its  depth and freedom from 
shoals are a l l  that can be desired* Its  
narrowness prevents there ever being a serious 
swell in  i t ,  and the ligh t airs Ghat prevail 
during 9/lOths o f the year are most favourable 
(to steamers), while a vessel going tern knots 
an hour may*safely despise a current o f one . 
knot in  whatever direction it  may be flowing1* * 
Navigation in  the Gulf of limb a particu larly  
was described as impossible for a s a i l in g  
vessel mainly because of the violent and 
almost continuous northerly winds which 
prevail there*
not achieve much since they could not base th e ir  
argument on such a, strong foundation as did their  
opponents * Later they made an attempt to.throw  
doubts on the future of sa ilin g  vessels# In a 
pamphlet published on the subject in 1856, the w riter  
argued that the use o f steamers and s a ilin g  ships with 
screw was ris in g  steadily  in oceanic voyages and he 
prophesied that at the la te s t , by the middle of the *
1870*8 any ships dependent on sa ils  alone would not be 
freighted for long voyages# By that time, the steam 
tonnage was actually growing at a faster rata than s a i ls ,  
but only because it  had started from an almost zero leve l 
before the 1820!s, and a fte r  a l l  i t  s t i l l  represented by 
tho end of the 1850 *a a very small proportion of the 
tota l world tonnage of shipping (See Table in F#M *(9)). 
Moreover the early  steamer*s bo ile rs  consumed a large  
amount of fu e l. .Propulsion by steam required so much 
bunker coal that l i t t l e  cargo space was le f t ,  and for 
this reason, steamers wore not useful fo r  goods t r a f f ic  
and their use was lim ited to passenger and mail t r a f f ic .  
This being the situation , the opponents o f  the Canal 
project could not anticipate that the Suez Canal would 
channel any goods t ra f f ic *  As regards mail and 
passenger t r a f f ic ,  the Canal would be in serious 
competition with the Sue ^ A lexandria railways which 
were doing the same job and which the B ritish  govern** 
ment favoured*
The Opening o f  the Canal qnd the E arly  D i f f ic u lt ie s  
The Early  F in an c ia l Troubles of the Canal Company and 
Their Repercussion .
By the middle of the I860 !a the Canal work was very 
rap id ly  progressing -  see diagram 1. However as the 
work was carried cut in conditions more d if f ic u lt  than 
had at f i r s t  been v isualised  the costs accordingly were 
going up over the o rig in a l estimate of 200 m illion francs 
and the company was running short of cap ita l. By 1867 
the company f3,oated 353,555 bonds of 500 franca, issued 
at 300 redeemable in 15 years and carrying a 5% rate of 
interest. Perhaps the need for further finance had 
caused some pessimism with regard to a possible commercial 
success for the Canal project so that the bonds proved 
unattractive and war© only sold a fte r  the French govern­
ment guaranteed them. In November 1869, the Sues Canal 
was f in a lly  opened. Until the Canal was cut it  had 
boon necessary to extract 74 m illion cubic meters of 
rubbish some of i t  dry but mostly requiring to be dredged. 
The tota l cost of the project stood at 453,645,000 franco 
in tho companyrs balance sheet fo 31st December 1869* 
Against the expectations of the Sues Canal*a 
projectors, the opening of the Canal did not Immediately 
revolutionise the way to the Bast. The aggregate tonnage 
of ships navigating the Canal in 1870, instead of being
8 5 .
DIAGRAM ( l )  .
( sourcesSues Canal Publications)
26
Q u i n q u e n n i a l  s t a t i s t i c s  o f  e x c a v a t i o n  a n d  d r e d g i n g  
c a r r i e d  o u t  f o r  t h e  d i g g i n g ^  m a i n t e n a n c e  a n d  i m p r o v e m e n
o f  t h e  S u e z  C a n a l
• m .
at le a s t  3 m illio n  tons as they estim ated, was under 
half a m illion. During XB71 Canal t r a f f i c  rose by 
about 75^ to reach 761,000 tons* Thus receipts were 
smaller than expenses by 9,8 m illion francs in XB70 
and by 2,7 m illion francs in 1871 and the company fa ile d  
to pay dividends or even the minimum of 6^ on shares to 
shareholders who naturally were expecting returns on 
their investment as soon as the Canal was opened,. 
(according to the promises given to them), The price  
of the Suez; Canal 500 f  share obviously reflected  the 
poor state of t ra f f ic  and consequently dropped to 278#88f 
in 1870 and than to 208,X3f in 1871,
Two reasons were mainly responsible fo r the small 
volume of t r a f f ic  in the Suez Canal immediately a fte r the 
opening. F ir s t ly , the work of tho Canal was not yet 
complete as i t  had been hitherto projected owing to the 
shortage o f cap ita l which the company faced during the 
1860 fs. Many portions had not been deepened to tho 
projected minimum of 28 feat and in some places the 
curves in  the channel had been performed, so abruptly 
as to render navigation dangerous. These arxl also  
other works, as for example signa lling  arrangements 
along the line of the Canal, were not fin ished neatly 
and had boon executed vary speedily in the hope that 
the opening of the Canal as early as possible would 
provide the Company with funds necessary fo r the fu l l
• * • 28* 
completion of the work* Secondly, and more important, 
the Sues Canal route proved to be entire ly  unsuitable 
fo r  navigation by s a ilin g  vessels* Thus sa ilin g  
vessels which in 1870 represented 81$ of world shipping 
could not benefit from the shortening of tho way to the 
East* Steamers on the other hand were s t i l l  mainly 
used Ibr mail and passenger t r a f f ic  or fbr goods t r a f f ic  
in  3hort voyages*
Besides, the 10 franca per ton dues, whether 
traversing ship was in cargo or in b a lla s t , ware 
considered heavy and deterred a number of steamship 
owners from using the Canal route*
In 1871 Be Lesseps, who previously used a l l  his 
inte lligence and diplomatic s k i l l  to challenge the 
B ritish  governments opposition to Ms project, and who 
struggled to solve obstacles of every kind in order to 
perform his gigantic project, fe lt  incapable of solving  
the financial problem of Ms Company* I t  seems that 
he was quite uncertain that the Su©a Canal would make 
any profits in the near future so that he suggested that 
Brita in  might purchase it *  He rea lised  the importance 
of B ritish  shipowners to the Canal since the f i r s t  year 
and h© c lea rly  expected that B rita in  would welcome the 
offer* Later, however, he changed his suggestion and 
recommended that the Suez; Canal might be purchased 
co llective ly  by the maritime powers for £12 m illion plus 
annual payments of 10 m illion francs to the shareholders*
The Porte and Khedive Ismail of Egypt re jested such a 
aiiggestlon but favoured, however, Be Lesseps * f i r s t  
o ffe r  to Britain*
Gladstone, then Prime M inister, had always seen 
no reason why B rita in  should not gain from the Suez 
Canal whether i t  was owned by her or by any other ration* 
Thus, Gladstone *s Cabinet treated the matter of the
purchase of the Canal on purely financia l grounds and
,  *(
refused the offer# This’ was the attitude of the B ritish
government not only towards the purchase of the Canal
but also towards any sharing in the control of the Canal
Company, in spite of the fact that some British  o f f ic ia ls
recognised, In their reports, that the Canal might well
assume a great deal of importance to the B ritish  interests
(IB )
East o f  Suez In the future#
It  seeraa that the plight of the Canal Company 
besides the decision of B rita in , the main user. of the
(18) Lord Farrar, the President of the Board of Trade, 
suggested that the Canal should be placed under 
international control# ^Complications and 
d if f lc u lt ie s ^ , #he said,*"would be endless so 
long as th is great highway of nations remains 
in the hands of a private company”# However no 
action was taken by the L iberal Government# 
General Stanton, then Consul at Cairo, urged 
Gladstone to purchase the Canal as the Porte 
and the Khedive suggested* Wilson*. R*~ The 
Suez Canal* 0*45-46. ........... ~ ’
Canal, to  at axil neutra l towards I t ,  fo rced  De Lesseps
to adopt arb itrary  measures In dealing with his 
financia l p light* Perhaps delpying B ritish  ships 
navigating the Canal aid hindering them in different  
occasions ard on various excuses was meant to be a sort 
of warning to B ritain  to change her neutral attitude 
and attempt to share in the company as w ell aa in 
solving its  financia l problem* De Lesseps also started  
to think of easing the problem by raising the dues*
By a rt ic le  17(3} o f tho Second Concession Charters of 
the Suea Canal, the Company was given the righ t to levy  
dues on passengers and vessels traversing the Canal 
within a lim it of 10 francs ?,per tonneau de oapaolte 
de navires et per tote de passenger5** Being unable to  
vio late  the ooneession terms openly by ra is in g  the dues 
over 10 francs, Lesseps adopted a now way in computing 
the shipping tonnage by which the dues were actually  
raised but ind irectly* At the beginning the new 
system was not opposed by any user* However, soon 
the Canal users rea lised  that it was to increase dues 
levied upon the ir ships* B ritish  shipowners in 
particu lar rea lised  that the new system penalised them 
by about 30$ over the old system of measurement*
Be Lessep-s 1 new system of measurement was applied  
in March 1878 and a fte r that time the Porte, the o f f ic ia l  
grantor of the.Suea Canal1a firmans, received many 
protests from shipowners using the Canal and from the 
B ritish  government who represented the interests of over 
70$ of the shipowners# During the second h a lf of 1872 
the Important step in the Canal dues was taken when the 
Port© decided to invite the principal maritime powers to 
send delegates to a conference in Constantinople in order 
to settle  the matter# By Decembex* 1878 the conference 
decided to hold the B ritish  ^MQoraGra" system of measur­
ing gross tonnage capacity but with some modifications 
to the effect that there should be no discrimination  
against any user of the Canal# The conference also 
considered the. importance of solving the fin an c ia l 
problem of the Canal Company and so it  had been decided 
to allow them to levy a surtax of 3-4 francs per bon, 
as long as the shipping tonnage using the Sues Canal 
was less than 2 m illion  tons# After that the surtax 
would be decreased by 50 centimes fo r every 100,000 
tone increase in t r a f f ic ,  so that the surtax would 
oeaae entire ly  when the tonnage reached 2*6 m illion tons* 
Be Lesseps refused to accept tho new system of 
measurement but with regard to the surtax he proposed 
that i t  should be maintained until the shareholders tod 
been recouped for their outstanding debt and t i l l  the 
net revenue of the Company reached 8$# Yet la te r  the
38.
Canal Company was compelled (by use of fo rce ) to observe
(19)
the new system of measurement and dues*
The Growth of B ritish  Interests in the Canal«
Tho End of the financia l Troubles of the Canal Comoanv.
In the f ir s t  two years B ritish  t r a f f ic  constituted 
66% and 71 % of the tota l t r a f f ic  of Suez Canal, followed  
by French t r a f f ic  19$ and 18$* The th ird  user was 
Austria-Hungary whose portions were *4$ and 5$ in 1870 
and 1871 reaps ctively* Hone of the B ritish  mall t r a f f ic  
to and from the .East went by the Sues Canal until 1874 
because mail contracts p? ovided for overland transit by 
the Su a & ~ A xa ndr I  a railways*- A fter 1874 some of the
B ritish  mail t r a f f ic  used the Canal route but not t i l l
*c.
88 were a l l  mails carried through it*
During 1878 Suez Canal t r a f f ic  rose by 81$ 
recorded a to ta l of 1*4 m illion tons* This undoubtedly 
furnished some bright anticipations for the .future of the 
Canal and consequently the 500f Suez Canal share price  
rose to 555*13f from Its  very low level which it  had 
hitherto recorded* It  was sometimes argued that the 
end of the Franco-German war was the main factor In 
affecting  the Canal t r a f f ic  in 1878* This argument 
however cannot be supported by any strong evidence* 
Besides, It  was B ritain  whose t r a f f ic  rose b y ’94$ in  
this particu lar year and‘ thus represented 74$ ch,   v
(19) See W ilson , H* The Suez Canal, p. 60-63
- .£f  ill   ;_ -:y-' ■_....
o f the to ta l t r a f f ic  instead, of 71$ in 1871. By 1874
the Suez Canal t r a f f ic  reached 2*4 m illion tons, of;>-:^ .,'
t.S K -J  -
wM/chI.Snuvere conducted by B rit ish  shipowners* The 
reason for the new prosperous situation was the rapid  
growth of steam tonnage which de fin ite ly  espoused the 
Canal route and abandoned the Cape route in the journey 
to or from the East* I t  would he explained la te r  how 
the opening of the Suez Canal which sa iling  ships could 
not use had weighted the scale decisively in the steam­
sh ip ^  favour so that their design was improved and 
their proportion in world shipping tonnage increased* 
Britain , which was increasing her merchandise f le e t  of 
steamships fa ste r  than any of her foreign competitors, 
began to rea lize  how important the Suez Canal route would 
be to her .lastern trade in the .future* M more tolerant 
attitude was therefore adopted, at la s t , towards Be 
Lesseps* With the consent of the B ritish  government 
a slower x-ate of reducing the 5f surtax, over the dues, 
was conceded to Bo Lesseps, who in turn agreed to spend 
a m illion francs a ye ax' on improving the services of the 
Canal*
By 1875 it  was certain that the Canal had passed 
its  worst* In that 5/ear the to ta l t r a f f ic  using the 
0anal reached approximately 5 m illion tons and thus the 
Canal Company was enabled to pay a f i r s t  dividend o f 5$ 
on the Capital Stock, while setting aside funds fo r
, - ^  ? I  ^  ^ A *'« \> :
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Suez. Canal Shares♦
By 1875 i t  seemed c e rta in  that Ism ail Pasha, the 
Khedive o f  Egypt,.was threatened w ith  bankruptcy*
• He had to  f in d  between 5-4 m illio n  s t e r l in g  to pay
,<nM■y>?&
f.  \r• >^ ■;
*■' ■ i V* i_ •■ p* l’ *l *v* . .-. s .* ‘ ji ’*'*< • ^
’! / ! • : v' l interest fdue  ^ onCsome! ’ ‘: b f h is fo re ig n  debt before  the !  ,
I , ' .
1st December* ,, That wa3- h is  fs itu a t i on.!^ On pr e v .io u s^ t !^ '>
occasions h e had; a Ira os t'j exhaus t ed a I l f  Int ern all; s our cos^ * -itW' ^  ; - v ■ifj*’4. &
!X '.K N c lV f doubtfas 'to' h is f ab ility^^to f pay^  ^ them b ack *: \The only ■ 51 ;
f ;v ./ iff-/' ■ -f ;■ : "
; ' f . property wM eh remained^unmortgaged now was the 176,602' f
shares o f  the Suez Oanal he ld  by the Egyptian government 
* rr\ +-.bfl vrbAri'ivtt- q+:fiT»hA '^ to think o f  using them fo r
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By that time the' value j o f these Canal s h a r e s ;; w a s
■y' I f ' 7■ ■ r
r is in g  continuously  and, th ere fo re , two French banking  
houses, the "C red it F o n d e r11 and the "Societe  G eneral",
1 appro ached the Khedive fo r th e ir  pur chase* The Brifclish
knew about 
ness o f the m
Cabinet fs op in ion  was d iv ided* However,5 on 17th :
November D is r a e li  -  the Prime Minister; -  in structed  h is
';‘f 'I  '*f -IV; '-v! f
,£16m* were spent on the Suez Canal* , A* W ilson,
TABLE- I »
THE SUEZ CAHAL 500 f r ,  SHAH}*] * PRICES,3.870 -  19,23.
3 5 #
Ye ax*
fr ie s  :ln 
Franca. Xaar
Price in  
terancs
1870 872.86 1897 3,233.97
3,583.371871 208*13 . 1898
1872 365.13 1899 3,620,95
1873 434*93 1900 3,508.32 -
1874 422*19 1901 3*713*67 
3,923.571875 674.05 19021876 i 701.S3 , 1903 3,904.70
1877 677.87 1904 4,209.501878 751.73 :■ 1905 j 4j 481^14
1879 7,24.40 1906 4,471.30 
4,552*31 !1880 1,075.80 19071881 1,975.95 1908 4*445.94
1882 2,537.24 1909 4,748*28 ■
1883 2,372,01 1910 5*330.90,
5,545*561884 1,967.70 1911
1085. 2,035.39 1912 6,107.00 
5,414*57 
4,336,72 . 
4,179*50
1886
1887
2,094,43-. r 1913
2,011.04 . 1914
1888 8,16B.l0 1918
1089 ‘ 2,296,09 . - 1916 4,338.12
1890 2,348,48 V'- ‘ 1917 4,444.40 
4,987.26-; 
5,779*4Xx .
1891 2,660.34 1918
1892 2,712.88 . 1919
1893 2,674,01 1920 e/as i.o lx .
1894, . 2.861,82 • 1921 5,981,87k
, 1895 3^24-9 iflO • 1922 .. 6, 395,30k ;1896 '3,547*48 • 1923 8,638*84
• V, _ A . . .
■ \  - • 
x Dcpraiciabad Franca.
Source : The Suez Canal Company,Annual B u lle tin .
Consul General in Cairo to do Ms boat to provent the
f a l l  of the Egyptian government *s holding of Suez shares
into French hands and ”to intimate that Hex* Majesty fs
Government are disposed to purchase i f  satisfactory  terms
can he arranged**
It  is  true that the Suez Canal had not by that time
yielded any immense advantages to the B ritish  Eastern
trade but a s  i t  has been explained, it  was the time
when many people began to re a lis e  that the . Canal route
could bo of a considerable importance sometime in the
future * 'the French attempts to possess more shares in
the Suez Canal therefore renewed the fears of B rita in
* 4( 2 1 ) 
that such route might be monopolized by France*
On the 26th of November 1876 the ^London limes5*
conveyed the news of the .purchase to the public which
received i t  with enthusiasm* However the.opinion of
the sophisticated po litic ians* especially  those who
deeply believed in a free competitive world* was
to ta lly  d ifferent* I f  the B ritish  shipowners were.the
main users o f the Canal that was because of Britain*s
superiority at sea and its  strength in the world economy*
And i f  B rita in  would face any u n ju stifiab le  actions
towards her interests not hi rig could restore the balance
(21) In this context Lord Derby* then Secretary of. State
fo r Foreign  A f fa i r s *  to ld  the French Charge d*a f f a i r s
* • liIxx any case .*we w i l l  do our utmost not to le t  
an undertaking on which so many o f our interests  
depended be monopolized by fo re  ign ore11. *
except the use o f B ritish  m ilita ry  power* They 
wondered, therefore, what would the acquisition of 
44$ of the Suez Oaml Company’s shares add to such a 
situation? They could not imagine any good reason fo r  
the purchase.of the shares and they viewed it  therefore  
to he a mere involvment in Egypt and in general a rev iva l 
of the Imperial sp irit#  On the 27th November the 
^Economist11 devoted the leading a rtic le  to discussing 
the financia l prospects of the shares and the fin anc ia l 
impact of their purchase on the money market in London* 
They concluded that the operation was quite correct i f  
i t  was considered merely aa a commercial investment *
The value of the Suez shares was continuously r is in g  
(So© Table, l i )  and although the purchased shares were 
alienated from the ir income for 19 years (the Khedive 
gave up his right to receive the ir income for such a 
period as a sort of help to the Canal Company), the 
Khedive had agreed to pay'a '5$ annuity to the B ritish
i
government for such a period which would amount to 
to ta l payment of £2*4 m ill* In so fa r  as tho money 
market was concerned the payments of £4 m ill* -  the. 
purchase price * to the Khedive of Egypt was having a 
minor impact since they would be used for paying his 
debts most of which wore owed in London or' Paris# In 
their follow ing a rtic le s  on the subject, the “Economist" 
gave more attention to the more important question of
the wider economic and p o lit ic a l impact of - the purchase 
of tho Khedive’s shares of the Canal* In fact, by that 
timo it  was by no means clear how the Canal1s. shares 
acquired by Britain  would entail any advantages fo r  her 
interests East o f Suez* There was a doubt whether the 
holder o f a deferred coupon share would have the right 
to vote in  a shareholders r meeting or not, Even i f  
that was put aside, B rita in , by the acquisition of 44$ 
of the Canal shares, did not obtain more.than 10 votes 
in the Company’s to ta l voting power* The statutes•hf^hhe 
company a lloted  one vote fo r  every 05 shares but no 
shareholder could have more than 10 votes* .
More Important was the fact that the stake of the 
B ritish  government in the Canal, particu larly  a fte r  
buying shares with deferred dividends, was in  conflict  
with tlm interests of other shareholders* * While the
' ' S ' S .
British  govs^rnment would be concerned about Britain  *s 
Eastern trade and banco it  would endeavour to maintain 
the Canal id 'good order, by devoting enough revenue fo r  
deepening and widening i t ,  and also by reducing the dues 
paid by shipowners, the rest of shareholders would re ject  
such a policy since i t  would give them less profits *
In other words, it  was the long run po licy  which Britain  
would work fo r , to help the growth of her Eastern trade, 
that would consequently reduce the annual dividends of
other a b^roholdors and cause their anger* Aa the 
majority of the shareholders were French, many 
commentators predicted that such a situation  would 
eventually ra ise  p o lit ic a l troubles between Britain  and 
France, and they wondered whether the price of securing 
the way to Indian commerce was worth the serious p o lit ic a l  
complication between the two oountrioaJ.'
In the Parliamentary debate on the purchase o f the 
Suez Oatial a liar as, Gladstone led the opposition against 
the government* He Condemned the B ritish  govorntnent for  
having 11. *awakotiad the French r iv a lry  in Egypt and so 
fa r  endangered not secured the route to la d la11» Gladstone 
also added that the ifhcdlva would not be able sooner or 
la te r  to  pay the annuity to B rita in , a matter which would 
bring Britain  into disagreement With.him and which would 
disturb the road to the la s t  much further#
nevertheless D israe li succeeded in obtainingH Vr
Farll&montL'a approval: on th®. pn&clim® of the aliaras of 
tho 8vm& Canal* hatw* to also auaoo^dod In  getting 
roasoh&hlo from to lm  a#pa m  fcha British
government* *& share in tto oontrol of fcto Canal# Tim 
British governments m® given tlm right to nominate 
three British directors. on tho Board .of the aorap&ny*
(Later the nutator of B ritish  diroefcorsi waa farther 
inoroasod)* toaid©» whiah tho voting rights of tlm 
tfm m ®  which had toon acquired# were tostored* ‘
Between 1875 and 1888 the British  involvment in 
Egyptian a ffa irs  was ever growing* On the surface 
it  was the e ffect of the interest of B rita in  as a 
shareholder in tho Canal Company tout in fact i t  was 
the result of the Suez Canal and its  rap id ly  r is in g  
value to the B rit ish  trade in the East,
In July 1888 the B ritish  government alleged that 
Ahmed Oratol, the M inister of War, who led an armed 
revolution against the ruling family in Egypt, was 
intending to block the Canal in order to socure that 
no foreign country would send them m ilitary help toy . 
the way of the Suea Canal* On such an excuse B ritish  
troops moved from Malta and from other B r it ish  bases near 
Egypt and occupied i t ,  in order to protect the highway to 
Britain  fs Eastern Empire *
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THE GROWTH OB" BRITISH TRADE IB THE EAST BEFORE THE 
OPENING OF THE SCFEZ CANAL IN 1869*
APPENDIX ( A ) .
H istorical note on the growth of the B ritish  Empire 
and the B ritish  Trade in the East.
The Opening of the Suez Canal and Imperial Expansion 
in the last quarter of the 19th Century*
42. v
Tho Growth of B r i t is h  Trade in the East Before the*  . II IIUIIHIW   I ■•»' H I«W»IW» i m*0*mm>ii*U
Opening of the Suez Canal *
I ntroductions ' '
Throughout th is  Chapter, Chapter 4 and Part I I  in  *
th is  research  p ro je c t  the growth o f B r ita in »s  trade in
the East w i l l  be examined through the development of that
(1
portion  which was conducted with her Eastern Em pire(E.B) 
There are  s e v e ra l reasons fo r  making th is  choice yet 
most s ig n if ic a n t  o f them is  the importance which th is  
trade had occupied in  B rita in *s  to ta l trade  w ith  the 
E ast, see O’ab le  (2 ) t In  fa c t ,  by the la t e  1850 *s 
B rita in  possessed and governed or protected  almost a l l  
the Eastern t e r r i t o r ie s  w ith  which she had traded  as 
independent countriest or fo re ign  co lon ies before/the  
19th century. . The re s t  o f the Eastern world had e ith e r
r i
f a l l e n  under B r it is h  in flu en ce  or had.:, a very minor 
fo re ign  trade by that tim e.
In  th is  Chapter the development o f B r it is h -t ra d e  
w ith  E.E* during the f i f t y  years which preceded the ’ 
opening of the Suez Canal has been reviewed in  order
nil* l »■— wifriiiiiw. uH.'iii.iinini mWi ini-»mi—> wwwwltM .ft*n» Win jiw. m i
(1 ) In  th is  re search  p ro je c t  B rit ish .E a s te rn  Empire 
includes a l l  B r it is h  Dominions, Crown Colonies 
and P rotectorates ly in g  geograph ica lly  to the • 
East o f Buea. See also  Appendix (A ).
The Importance of the Eastern Colonies to  B r it a in 1a 
.Eastern Trade.
T A B L E  ( 2 )  •
Figures are given  In  m illion s of Pounds S te r lin g
' 1855-59 ' 
.Ifflfi,....Exp,
1860-64 
Imp., Exp.
1865-69 
Im p ....Ex p ,
B*Eastern Colonies 25.5 28,7 49.1 35.2 51*4 39.4
Other T e r r ito r ie s  
East o f  Suez. -
9 .2 1.7 12.9 4.2 12.1 9.1
Total 34.7 30.4 62.0 39.4 63.5 48.5  
-- -----------
(Basic data obtained from Parliamentary Accounts And Papers) 
to estim ate the importance o f the main fa c to rs  which
a ffe c te d  th is  development be fo re  as w e ll as a f t e r  1869*
However, the a tten tion  in  th is  review  has been e sp e c ia lly
devoted to the la s t  twenty f iv e  years or so p rio r  to
1869* During that period a new trade p o lic y , I . e . ,
f r e e  trad e , was o f f i c i a l l y  adopted by B r ita in  and a l l
her Crown co lon ies* Free trade p o licy  was maintained
a lso  fo r  another 60 years a f t e r  the opening o f the Canal
and the growth o f  B r ita in  fs trade w ith  her Empire was
o ften  in te rp re ted  in  i t s  l i g h t .  I t  is  th ere fo re
important to ua to  assess  the in fluence which fre e
trade had on the growth o f B r i t a in fs trade w ith  her
E .E . be fo re  1889* Indeed without, going through th is
step  i t  w i l l  not be p o ss ib le  to s in g le  out the ro le  
played by the opening o f  the Canal in  the growth o f  
that p a r t ic u la r  trad e .
I t  must be recogn ised  that the extension o f the 
B r it is h  r a le  in  the E ast, i t s e l f ,  had exerted a power­
f u l  in flu en ce  on the B r it is h  E.E, trade ( i . e . ,  B r i t a in 's  
trade with her Eastern  Dominions and co lo n ie s ) be fo re  
and a ft e r  1869. Doubtless w ith  B r it ish  adm in istration  
and the ap p lic a t io n  o f B r it is h  laws In  tho co lon ie s ,  
B rit ish  merchants f e l t  s u f f ic ie n t ly  secure to expand 
th e ir  business and to  develop the s iz e  o f  the in te r  
Im perial trade# Moreover they were ab le  (In  con trast  
w ith  the native merchants o f  the co lo n ie s ) to  manage 
and finance la rg e  s c a le  trade between home and the  
colon ies# C ap ita l flow ed  from B rita in  Into the  
co lon ies e a s i ly  to b u ild  up a new p ro fit a b le  trade or 
to a s s is t  in  beginn ing new p lantations or to  construct
roads and canals# B r it ish  in vesto rs  f e l t  that th e ir• ■ ’« * , , x
money should be as sa fe  in  the co lon ies as i t  was in  
. ‘ (2 ) * / ‘
B rita in#  Furthermore the B r it is h  government i t s e l f
a s s is te d  in  the c o lo n ia l development through grants and
loans# I t  must be expected that the continuing e ffe c t
W»  'MW ■» nmmmmmu mtm— mmmm u  .11   ■.  m i 1.
(2 )  Hash, E#L# Short Inqu iry  in to  the Nature o f our 
P ro fita b le  Investment** ~ London 1881#
o f a l l  these economic fo rces  which were n a tu ra lly  
fo s te red  by B r i t is h  im perialism  had tended always t>6 
provide fo r  automatic growth In the B r it ish  B*B* trade* 
However, the period  between 1757 and 1833 was ch arac ter­
ised  by m al-adm lnistrabion  o f India# The reason fo r  th is  
was that the B r it is h  government had expected that the 
East Ind ia  Company would be ab le  to d ire c t  su c c e ss fu lly  
the p o l i t ic a l  l i f e  o f Ind ia  as w e ll as i t s  o r ig in a l  
commercial In te re sts*  That proved to be Im possible  
in  a period f u l l  o f  wars, c i v i l  d iso rd ers  and constant 
co lo n ia l expansion# The Company was lo s in g  g radu a lly  
i t s  In te re st  in  develop ing the co lon ia l trade In  In d ia  
and other B r it is h  Eastern t e r r i t o r i e s ,  as a s u f f ic ie n t  
revenue was guaranteed to  i t  through the adm in istrative  
task* In  1833 the monopoly o f the East In d ia  Company 
was, th e re fo re * broken com pletely, and th is  fa c t  sub­
sequently tended to  stim ulate the growth o f B r it is h  
(3 )
Indian t r a d e *? , ,
(3 )  nA company that m aintained armies and re t a i le d  te a ,  
that ca rr ied  a sword in  one $*nd and a led ge r in  the 
other, was a con trad ic tion , and bad she traded w ith  
success would have been a prodigy*. I t  was im possible  
fo r  her to  pay that a tten tio n  to  d e ta i ls  that Is  
ind ispensab le  to  the carry ing  on o f commerce w ith  
advantage*K MacOulloch* D ictionary  o f Commerce* p .535 
(1837)* However a complete re v is io n  o f the B r it is h  
c o lo n ia l p o lic y  ard adm in istration  in  Ind ia  was not 
e n t ire ly  f e l t  u n t i l  a f t e r  the Indian  Mutiny, when a 
more energetic  and acceptable p o lic y  w ith  regard  to  
the economic development o f Ind ia was inaugurated*
See Straohey* J * . The End o f  Empire* p*54*
Britain  changed as fo llow s, in  the ten years follow ing
, (4 )
the cessation of the East India Company*
Imports of the principal a rt ic le s  from India into
Cotton (in  m ill. l b s . )
Linseed (in  bushels)
Kice (in  ewts.)
Indigo (m ill, lb s * )
Pepper (m ill* lb s . )
Sheep’s wool (m ill, lb s . )
Coffee (including Ceylon) 
( In mi H  i lbs •) ,
2,163
179,370
6.3
7.2
3,721
5.7
1843.
65
64,024
334,689
5.9
3.6
1,916,129
13.8
Preferentia l t a r i f f  agreements between Britain and 
her Empire had a lso  a sign ifican t role in the development 
o f the inter-im perial trade until the 1840’s For 
example,-from 1825 to 1842 the duties on coffee coming 
from B ritish  colonies had been 6&, 9d* or 1/- pdr lb . ,  
according to the particu lar group of possessions from 
which it  was imported -  while foreign coffee was charged 
per lb . . From 1787 to the 1840’s v^hite sugar that 
came from B ritish  plantations was charged £1.9/- per cwt. 
while that which came from other foreign soutf6.es r: had to
(4) Ref* Porter, Progress of Nation., p . 750.. 2nd ed ., 184 7, 
or Knowles, The Economic Development o f the B ritish  
Overseas Empire, p .307. See also this la st reference 
p .301-2,304-12. .
pay £2.5,6d. per cwt, "By meana o f the p re fe re n t ia l
ra te  accorded to  raw sugar imported from B r it is h
posaeaaiona raw sugar from a l l  other sources had. been
■ (5 )
excluded from the country u n t i l  1844. S im ila r ly  in
the B r it is h  C o lon ies, the imports of goods o f fo re ign
o r ig in  non^iinperlal produce -were e ith e r  p roh ib ited
or discouraged by* h igh  duties wfalle B r i t is h  produce and
manufacture e ith e r  entered fr e e  or at very low duty*
Very important, a lso  was the im perial, preference that
1 .- * * * 1 " ?«» ' *' . ,  
ex isted  w ith  regard  to  the carry ing o f goods between
the co lon ies  and B r ita in  and other fo re ig n  countries*
N av igation  ac ts , customs regu la tio n s* trade
* .. "  * ' :
p o lic ie s  and the charters o f c o lo n ia l companies a l l  
combined to em ure th at B r it ish *  or c o lo n ia l sh ips* 
should be used in  carry in g  the in te r  ^ im peria l trade*
They a lso  p rov ided  that fo re ig n  countries would not 
trade d ire c t ly ; w ith  the co lon ies by n ecess ita t in g  that 
almost s ill the products o f  the co lon ies had to  be brought 
f i r s t  to B r ita in  and there  unloaded be fo re  they could be 
redespatohed to  th e ir  f i n a l  destination * B r i t a in !s 
imports from her co lon ies  had th ere fo re  been r is in g  to
s a t i s fy  not only home requirem ents but a lso  those o f ,
?r
other fo re ig n  countries,* . S im ila r ly  whenever the
" , ‘V '
 - “ T - r r - T  t t t  n r f T T T T  ~ t i t e  - j u r n m  r <: |iiT ^  j V  i n r i m  y . r  i s  m i '  ir  j j i .  . .nr  .il  j » i. ,  j i i ‘ ‘ qjij.ju i u j!  . juri 1 *  '
(5 ) ^ubtatlon  * Parliam entary- Papers 1903 BXVIi: -^ lo te s  
on former p re f ererit i a l  duti es in  the XJ.K*,fl' (p* 449 
in  th is  re fe re n c e )*
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co lon ies needed any fo re ig n  produce or manufactured 
item i t  was B r ita in  which f i r s t  procured i t  fo r  them# 
Hence B r it is h  entrepot trade between her co lon ies  and 
the re s t  o f the w orld  was s te a d ily  growing throughout# 
During the 1830 fs w ith  a rap id  development of the 
Free fra&e movement in  B r ita in ,  the atmosphere was 
becoming in c rea s in g ly  unfavourable to  im peria l preference  
and to  the co lon ies themselves *C o lon ia l p o licy  was 
frequen tly  attacked on the grounds that B r ita in  could  
have pursued her trade w ith  the co lon ies without any 
need to  ru le  them and. invo lve  h e r s e lf  in  expenditure on 
wars and c i v i l  d iso rders  in s id e  them* B r ita in  was the 
c h ie f s e l le r  In  the markets of her co lon ies because o f 
her a b i l i t y  to produce cheaply the manufactured goods 
which were demanded* I t  was a lso  claimed that the 
expenditures on the co lon ies could not be ju s t i f ie d  i f  
i t s  in ten tion  was meant s o le ly  to secure the supply of 
the C o lon ia l produce as i t  was p oss ib le  fo r  B r ita in  to  
supply h e r s e lf  cheaply with s im ila r  produce from e ls e ­
where# Furthermore B r it is h  co lon ies  were unable,, by 
that tim e, to supply more than lim ited  amounts o f  
B rita in *s  in c reasin g  requirem ents o f  food stu ffs  and 
raw m ate ria ls . As regards wheat and raw cotton, fo r  
in stance , although B r it is h  North America and Ind ia  
supp lied  the mother country w ith a proportion  o f her 
requirem ents the major part came from other fo re ig n
countries, such as 0 .3*A. for wheat and cotton and 
German States and Bus s i a for wheat# Also in the case 
o f raw wool imports the largest amounts* by that time* 
were supplied by the German states rather^than Australia, 
India and South Africa# Imperial preference was viewed 
by the free trader therefore as being based only on a 
narrow nationalistic  outlook, resu lting  in nothing but 
the restric tion  of B ritish  foreign trade to the lim ited  
c irc le  of Colonial trade*
With the triumph of the policy of Free Trade in the 
fo rtie s  the bulk o f Colonial preference was gradually  
swept away# By 1851 lmi& r i a l  preference was reduced 
to nil# Navigation Acts were also abolished in 1849 
and foreigners were now free to trade d irec t ly  witjt, 
and participate in the shipping t r a f f ic  o f, the B ritish
i
Empire#
With the dawn of free  trade policy the Australasian  
colonies, of the Eastern Empire, were given self-govern ­
ment and enabled to forra their own trading policy# 
Meanwhile other B ritish  colonies in the East' were forced  
to fo llow  the trade policy on which the mother country 
had decided#
Hie Povelopmaot of B r i t a in ’ s Trade w ith  M r  .Baa tarn
Empire. from the Adoption o f Free Trade t i l l  the
(6 )Qpenln/t of the Suez C a n a l.1 1
I *  Importa. ; . .
A* -  Trade Development A ffec ted  by F&otora Other th^n 
% Trade. P o lic y #
O f  the main a r t ic le s  which B r it a in  imported from
her Eastern Empire t e x t i le s  raw m ateria ls were not
favoured  by any p r e fe r e n t ia l  duties# Imports o f the
cheap A u stra lian  wool s ta rted  to  r i s e  very r a p id ly  during
(6 ) In tho second h a lf  o f the 19th century and in  the  
e a r ly  years o f  the 3Gth, much was sa id  and w ritten  
on the serious in flu en ce  o f  the trade p o licy  of 
various fo re ign  coun tries  and B r it ish  Dominions and 
Colonies on the development o f  B r i t a in ’s trade w ith  
them* “The f r e e  trad e rs  have claim ed, as a r e s u lt  
o f the f r e e  trade p o lic y , the t o t a l  movement o f 
trade which has shown on the whole a strong upward 
tendency, and s p e c ia l ly  the periods o f great  
p ro sp e rity , exp la in ing  the periods o f depression  , 
by other causes outside the sphere o f trade policy#  
Their opponents, on the other hand, have made fre e  
trade  answerable fo r  the periods o f depression , and 
a ttr ib u ted  those o f p ro spe rity  to  other causes*
Our d iscu ss ion  must have a lready  shown that both  
conceptions are  f a l s e ,  and re s t  on an exaggerated  
estim ate of what a trade p o licy  can do* f> guoha .C. J, 
Trad* P o licy  o f Great B r ita in  and her Oolonlea 
s^nce 186Qy p *159. “The d iscussion  in  the fo llo w in g  
pages o f th is  Chapter i s ,  p a r t ly , planned so as to  
contribute towards a genera l understanding o f  the  
p o ss ib le  e f fe c t  o f the trade p o lic y  on B r it a in ’s 
trade w ith her B*E* befo re  1869* The d iscu ssion  
in  Chapter 4 w i l l  show that the revo lu tio n  o f  
Eastern Transport which fo llow ed  the opening o f 
the. Canal and the su b s t itu t io n  o f steamship fo r  
s a i l in g  sh ip , had s ig n i f ic a n t ly  changed the e f fe c t  
of the trade  p o licy  o f various parts o f B .E *, on th e ir  
trade w ith  B rita in *
' "  • • . 50.
and a ft e r  the 1830 fa . By the e a r ly  fo r t ie s  the ch ie f  
su p p lie rs  o f that f i b r e  to B r ita in  were the German S tates, 
fo llo w ed  by A u s tra la s ia  then by South America and In d ia ,  
The Germans by then supp lied  a quantity  o f wool which 
was la r g e r  than that supp lied  by both aus tra lasJ  a and 
Ind ia  put together. Diagram (2 )  shows c le a r ly  how that 
s itu a t io n  changed In  the ’ la te  1840 fs ,  so that 1*1, , with  
the la rg e s t  quantity  coming from A u s t ra lia ,  became the
most Important source fo r  supply ing B r ita in  with wool,
■ Y- " '
This was due to the success which th e  Australians achieved  
in  r a is in g  th e ir  raw wool output fa s t e r  than other nations  
and at low er c o s ts .
Imports o f cotton from Ind ia  s ta rted  to  r i s e  
fo llo w in g  the American War o f 1812 when that war cut o f f  
the supply  o f  cotton from IT,S.A, A ce rta in  lim ita t io n ,  
however, was imposed on the growth o f  that trade since  
In d ia  could on ly  produce the short s tap led  grades o f  
cotton . N everth e less , there was a steady r i s e  in  the 
imports o f  cotton from Ind ia  u n t i l  the la te  1880*s
» ’ • • * i’ .
because o f the in creasin g  portion  which B r ita in  
re -expo rted  to  the Europeans who were b u ild in g  up th e ir  
t e x t i le s  Industry , Again during the American C iv i l  War 
o f the 1860*a the B r i t is h  cotton industry became short 
o f raw cotton, B r ita in  th ere fo re  had to  encourage the 
expansion o f cotton p lan tations in  Ind ia  and to  Increase
IMPORTS OP RAW WOOL INTO U.K ( I 84O -  I 913 )
DIAGRAM ( 2 ) .
her imports from thorn* Boo Diagram (3 ) on the expansion ^  
o f  cotton imports from Ind ia  and the re s t  o f the Eastern  
colonies (o ve r 95% v/aa supp lied  by Ind ia  on ly ) between 
1864 and 1869# The quinquenlal averages o f  cotton imports 
from In d ia  in to  B r it a in  during 1855-59* 1860^64 and 1865-69 f
were 1*6 m illion s  cwt.# 3*5 m illion s cw t*, and 4.8 m ill-io n s i
■ '• ■ ’ . m
*
cwt* # re sp ec t iv e ly *  |
The high p ric e  o f raw cotton during that period  
encouraged a very  rap id  increase in  the cotton area in  
Egypt. Egyptian cotton proved to be long stap led  and f
o f a q u a lity  b e t te r  than the American v a r ie ty  and so was* *
purchased by B r ita in  and other European countries in
J '£
add ition  to the Indian cotton* A fte r  the cotton famine >|
passed# B rita in  re so rted  again to  the purchase o f  American
cotton but she a lso  began to buy an in creasing  quantity  f.
o f Egyptian cotton which meant correspondingly  sm alle r • 
Imports o f  Indian cotton* This change must be considered
’ - tA
when an exp lanation  is  sought fo r  the dec lin e  In  B r it is h  :y|
$
imports o f Indian cotton a f t e r  the 1860fs*
■
‘ ' Jute had f i r s t  been imported from  Ind ia  in  1795# Jj
as a su b st itu te  fo r  hemp which was mainly brought in  3
from Russia# but fo r  t echn ical reasons i t  was im possib le  |
to make any use o f  i t *  In 1833 Dundee’s m ills  worked I
■ '
th is  new f ib r e  su c c e ss fu lly  f o r  bags and sacks* In the
years that fo llo w ed  th is  industry  was expanded s l g n i f i c -  if
■ • « •■ ;* j
an tly  in  Scotland, as. the machinery used fo r  spinning f
5 2 .  « -
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ju ts  was developing te c h n ic a l ly .  During the 1850'a and 
the 1860's im portation o f Indian jute was .further stim­
u la ted  as the demand f o r  bags and sacks was growing 
ra p id ly  with the growth o f  g r a in  trade in  the Western 
World, : ' . .
An,examination o f  the B r it ish  s t a t i s t i c s  shows that  
the ,quantity  o f  s i l k  imported into B r i t a in  from ,Ind ia  
declined  d r a s t i c a l ly  during the 1850's and the 1860 's. 
The contemporary w r ite rs  explained th is  d ec lin e  as being  
due to  the growth of French imports o f s i l k  from Ind ia  
during the pe riod . I t  was true that France s ta rted  to  
increase hex’ d ire c t  imports of Indian  s i l k  a f t e r  the 
adoption of fr e e  trade  and the bu ild in g  o f  the Suez- 
Alexandria  ra i lw a y .  However th is  was not the correct  
exp lanation . In  fa c t  the d ec lin e  o f Indian s i l k  coming 
in to  B r i t a in ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  since the m id-1850's, was 
r e a l l y  only an apparent dec line  due to  a f a i lu r e  on 
the part o f  the o f f i c i a l  s t a t i s t ic s  to p lace under the  
Indian account the la rg e  part o f th e  s i l k  trade which 
then began to  depend on the Egyptian overland route.
In Table S the r e a l  s i tu a t io n  o f  the Indian exports o f  
s i l k  to  B r ita in  can be r i g h t ly  seen.
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Indian tea was a lso  one o f  the a r t i c l e s  which 
had not rece ived  any p r e fe r e n t ia l  treatment during the  
period  o f  protection ism . Tea p lan ting  had only been 
commenced in  Ind ia  -  in  Assam -  in  1334 and for* years i t  
showed no commercial success. Perhaps th is  was mainly 
due to  the competition o f  the cheap China tea which was 
h ab itu a lly  p re fe rred  on the B r i t is h  market* In 1854 
Ind ia  exported 386,221 lb s  o f  tea to  B r i t a in  while the 
t o t a l  quantity o f  tea  imported in  that year was 85,792,032 
lbs# In the years that fo llow ed  the B r i t i s h  market 
absorbed s te a d i ly  in creas ing  amounts o f  Indian tea  whose 
ta ste  and strength B r i t i s h  consumers began t o , admire*
By 1889 India  exported to  B r i t a in  11*241 m il l io n  lb s  
o f  tea* However when th is  quantity is  compared w ith  
t o t a l  imports o f tea  in  the same year 139*223 m illion  
l b s ,  i t  w i l l  be r e a l iz e d  that the competitive pos it ion  
of the Indian tea  in  the B r i t i s h  market was s t i l l  
r e la t iv e ly  weak*
B. -  The E ffe c ts  o f  the Removal of Im perial Breffereiice*
The r e s t  o f  the. main a r t ic le s  which B r i t a in  imported 
from her 1*1* were sp ic e s ,  o i l  seeds, in d igo , r i c e ,  skins  
and h ides , co ffee  and sugar* A l l  these a r t ic le s  were 
given, p r e fe r e n t ia l  treatment in  the B r i t is h  customs 
be fo re  the adoption o f f r e e  trade* How the imports of 
these commodities were a f fe c te d  by the new trade p o licy  
can not e a s i ly  be judged in  some cases w h ile  the
‘S-;’ ^r-V^ C/ ss
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.A -in fluence  in other cases was quite ev ident* Co lon ia l
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sugar had for long-been s tron g ly  protected; in tlie B rit ish
market from the^  competitiph of; f or eigh grbwhvsugar* In
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By July 1851 import duty on a l l  sugar coming t o 
B rita in  from co lon ia l end non-co lon ia l plantations, was 
:f ix ed  at \ one rate., i t  should b e ; borne/ in- mind that
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In d ia 1 s . .sugar axports to  B r i ta in  were only commenced in
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’ .B/;' ytheB1830 ’sx a f t e r  the ^ p re h ib it io n 'o f  theys lave  trade  hadx^
/ a ffe c ted  the s la v e  grown sugar* Cheap labour wae
; a v a i la b le  In Ind ia  and B rita in  was o f fe r in g  a strong
preference to the c o lo n ia l  sugar In her market* J 
. • In the .years that fo llow ed  1846 the competition of
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y v the s la v e  grown sug;ar was so powerfu l that it  had lowered
; . sugar p rices  considerab ly* Diagram (4a ) shows' how
' . imports of sugar from India were subsequently a ffected*
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B r ita in  were con s ide rab ly  a ss is ted  by protectionism  
they were bound to be a ffe c ted  a lso  by fre e  trade  
■;y measures,xy (Diagram (4b ) ) * ; B r i t is h  et^fe^etlca.k^
m,. fel;>S0[
x.show tliat the quantity  of indigo Imported from India;/
during the quinquennial periods 1855-64 had remained
constant at an average of *06 m il l io n  cwts* and then
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declined  to *05 m il l io n  ewts* in  1865-69* Using the 
s t a t i s t i c a l  evidence a v a i la b le  I t  can be estimated that  
re -exports  o f indigo out o f  these quan tit ies  were *05 
m illion  cwta* per annum during 1855-59 and then the 
average declined  t o *04 m il l io n  ewts* per annum daring  
1860-64* The l a t t e r  average was a lso  held  duringA ‘ " '
1865-69* The change in  B r i t a i n fs r e - e x p o r t s o f  indigo  
could be accounted f o r  by the development o f  the Suoz- 
A lexandria  route since the m id - f i f t i e s  which f a c i l i t a t e d  
the trade in l i g h t e r  and c o s t l i e r  a r t ic le s *  This* in  
combination with the f r e e  trade po licy* hbiped the growth  
of the d ire c t  trade in  the case o f ind igo  between Ind ia  
and some European coun tr ies• Nevertheless the low 
average o f  net Imports o f  indigo during the s ix t ie s  s t i l l  
needs some explanation* This might be found in  the 
r e la t iv e  dec line  in  the production 0f  cotton t e x t i le s  
in  B r i ta in  during the cotton famine which ce r ta in ly  
a ffe c te d  the demand fo r  indigo  which was mainly used  
as a cotton dyes t u f f  * . . \
*■ For most o f  the. other a r t ic le s  which the B*E* 
supplied  to B r i t a in  we would f in d  that th e ir  trade  
f ig u re s  showed a continuous r i s e  throughout the period*  
B r ita in  *s imports from K*E* had la rge ly , inoreased  
during the period  under rev iew  and in  p a r t ic u la r  during  
the e a r ly  1860*8 because o f the dramatic r i s e  of cotton
15.8 34,4 52.6
.8 1*9 1*9
1.5 2*8 3*5
1.9 1*6 1.1
*1 *9 *4
5*4 7*5 11*9
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In 1864 imports from SUB* t o t a l le d  £72*1 m il* ,  a l e v e l
which was not reached again be fo re  1888* Throughout,
India remained the la rg e s t  source of raw  m ate r ia ls ,  in  
JiUE*, fo r  B r ita in *  Bor example, the imports from India  
t o t a l le d  £12*7. m il* ,  and £55*3 m il* ,  out of £21*0 m il* ,  
and ,£52*6 m il* ,  t o t a l  B r i t i s h  imports from K*B* in  1855 
and 1869 re sp ec t iv e ly *  A u s tra la s ia  fo l lo w e d  Ind ia  in  
importance* With the steady development o f wool Imports, 
to ta l  imports from A u s tra la s ia  rose from £4*5 mil* in  
1855 to £12*2 mil* In  1869* During the ea r ly  1850»s 
and t i l l  1857 M auritius fo llow ed  India and A u s tra la s ia  
in  importance, yet by the la t e  I8601 a i t s  s itu a t io n  
had d e te r io ra ted  to be the f i f t h  among various parts  
o f  BUB* That wa3 p a r t ly  a ttr ibu ted  to  the dec line  in  
sugar imports from th is  Colony and p a rt ly  because of
imports from India (see 'fable (4 ) )*
the rap id  growth o f B r i t a i n i m p o r t s  from Ceylon and 
the S t ra its  Settlements* See a lso  Table H o .(4 ) f o r  
tho growth o f  imports from B*E, between 1855 and 1869.
Against the expectations o f  thd p ro tec t io n is ts  
the adoption o f  f r e e  trade  p o licy  had not in  i t s e l f  
exerted  any m ateria l in fluence  u p o n .B r ita in 1© share 
in  the export trade  o f  E.E* U n t i l  1869, and in sp ite  
o f  f r e e  trade , European coun tr ies , ra ther than B r ita in ,  
were unable to  develop th e i r  d irec t  imports from B.E.
The share of European countries in  Indian exports in  
1870 was only about 7$, while in  the case o f  A u s tra lia  
such share d id  not even re a c h  2% in  the reapective  year .  
See a lso  the share o f  European countries and U.S. in  the 
export trade o f New Zealand, the S t ra its  Settlements, 
Ceylon and Mauritius in  1870, in  the same Table*
European countries  maintained, th e re fo re ,  th e ir  
dependence on B r i t a in  f o r  the Eastern goods which they  
requ ired* The best example to g ive here would be the 
s itu a t io n  o f the cotton trade during the s ix t i e s  when 
the supply o f  American cotton was cut o f f  from B r ita in  
and the continent o f  Europe. B r i t i s h  merchants without 
any so rt  o f im peria l preference g iven  to them In Ind ia  
were ca rry in g  almost the whole cotton produce o f  the 
colony and re -exp o rt in g  a la rge  proportion  to  the 
European coun tr ies , sea Table (5 ) ,  ,
J
v
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h i  f a c t  B r ita in ,  n o t o n ly  m ain ta ined  h e r  r e - e x p o r t
trade of E«B*s jpro&uao but bad further developed it
considerably' during tho period under review#.' The
figures which it was poaeiblo to ‘obtain la estimating
tho value of British-re-exports of 1*1% produce1 ecm 
. , ( 7 ) '
well support this conclusion* Table (6)
(7) Method nmd In estimating- the values of .re-export a 
of S*E*a iroduea la explained In Appendix C -  
Chapter 4*
, ™3hff (5 ) * .
Per cent o f G enera l Imports o f  Cotton*
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859 
......iB60 _ _
%
12 . 
13 
12 
13 
12 . 
15
1861 22
1862
1863
43 The Cc 
36 Import
1864 27 came 1
1865 28
1866 25
1867 24
1868 22
1869 20 .
1870 15 i
Declared Value o f Cotton-'Impdrts^
The data are compiled from s t a t i s t i c a l  Abstract o f 0*11* 
published  annually  in  Parliamentary Papers fo r  the 
respective  years* " * -
TABLE
Be-.gxporta o f Eastern 3;;mplra Produce, Estimated
*
1853
1860
1861
1864
1865
&  « »
6*6
1868
7.0
6 ,2
7*.C
8*7
12*2
18,4
24.3
22.4 
!,5  
.7
15.5  
17 ,®  
17.0
1870
1871
A * i 'l... . ■ A; !___ f.
% ' o f  * 
t^ SSSBLf,
23*4
24*0
2 6 .5  
29.7 
32*3
38*8
37*8
31*0
36*8
30*5
34*7
32*3
I'o
1 See explanatioxi fo r  
the method used in  
631imatlng thea e 
f ig u re s  in  Appendix 0 -  
Chapter 4* - '  •
<_!JL_
XI* -  The Development o f  B ritish  Exports to E>Er(1855-1869) 
During the period in question, main a rtic le s  in  
B ritish  exports to EUB., arranged by importance, consisted 
o f cotton, piece goods, cotton yarn, apparel and haber­
dashery, iron and stoo l, hardwares and cutlery, machinery 
and coal* It  was in the f i r s t  two of these a rt ic le s  
that the growth had been most marked throughout the .
period, with the exception of the early 1880fs.
Considering the period 1855-1869 we would find  that 
exports of cotton piece goods to EVE# increased from 
500*988 rail* yards in 1856 to 1,071*858 mil* yards in 
1859* During the f i r s t  half of the 1880*s the d rastic  
increase in raw cotton prices was immediately re flected  
in the prices of the fin ished manufacture, and conse­
quently exports to B*EU f e l l  to 584*59! mil* yards In 
1864* With the gradual return of the American cotton 
to the world market, export prices of B rit ish  cottons 
declined from about 8d* per yard in 1884 to about 4d. 
per yard in 1868, and, with that, exports o f cotton 
goods to B*S. x’os© once again* Yet, the previous leve l 
o f 1859 was not recovered before 1871* Throughout, India 
represented the largest market fo r B ritish  cotton goods* 
Out of 1859,!s exports she took 888^805 mil* yards and 
in 1889 she obtained 888*391 mil* yards out of 808*787 
rail* yards of cotton goods exported to HUB# Ho doubt
Free Trade, contributed greatly  to this large increase
( 8) . 
in the imports of B ritish  cottons into India* JB&ports
of cotton yarn, to E*E, followed more ox* less the same
trend* Yet prices of yarn did not decline as fast as
those o f the piece goods, anf thus we find  that exports
of yarn in 1869 were s t i l l  considerably under the ir leve l
of 1859, i*e * , 89*910 mil* lbs in 1869 compared with
55*055 mil# lbs in  1859* Again, India was the largest
consumer o f cotton yarn, as she obtained 59*656 mil*
lba of B ritish  yarn in  1859 and 88*410 mil* lbs in 1869*
Throughout, Australasian market represented the
largest market fo r  B ritish  apparel and haberdashery,
and then the Indian market followed in importance*
Exports of apparel ar& haberdashery to Australia
increased in value from £408,460 in 1849 to £1*871
rail* in 1859, but subsequently grew at a slower ra te ,
moat probably J, owing to the increase in the import duties
in some of the states* To Hew Zealand, exports of .
( 8 ) Ho doubt the adoption of free  trade policy in India 
had hastened the destruction of her old hand cra fts*
At the same time, under the new circumstances, India 
was not re a lly  given any chance to build  up immediately, 
and fo r  many years, modern tex tile s  factories ainoec 
her market became widely open to the strong competition 
of Manchester*s cotton industry*
1%'M: the rednotion in duties in India, to accomplish
apparel increased  from £27,413 in  1849 to £491,635 
in  1866 and then the ra te  o f growth was s l ig h t ly  slowed  
down in  the three years ending with 1869* Exports o f
apparel to  In d ia , a f r e e  trading colony, increased
throughout the period  but at a slower ra te  than that
o f t o s t r a la s ia *  They grew from .£116,014 in  1849 to
£248,828 in  1864 and then they dec lined  to £124,185
in  1869. In the re s t  of <E.E. the increase in exports
o f  apparel was most remarkable except in  the la s t  few  
* ; (9)
years o f  the period  under rev iew .
Exports of iron  and sted to Ind ia , grew from . 
35,025 tons 1x1 1849, to  201,577 tons in  I860, and then 
they dec lined  a f t e r  that and were only 33,485 tors in  
1864. Since then they began to r i s e  once aga in , but by 
1869 they were s t i l l  5,767 tons lower than they were at
I860,. Exports of B r i t i s h  iron  and 3 tee l to  A u s tra l ia  
and Hew Zealand grew almost without any in terrup tion  
throughout, except during the ea r ly  I86 0 !e, ard t o t a l le d  
116,832 tons in  1869# To the rest  of E.-E*, B r ita in  
exported very  small amounts, compared w ith  those which
( 9 )  Ho s t a t i s t i c a l  data could be obtained on the 
quan tit ies  or the export prices o f a p p a re l  and 
haberdashery* Thus we can not determine. whether 
the d ec lin e  in  exports o f these p a r t ic u la r  
manufactures to K.E. in ,the  la te  I8 6 0 fs was 
a re su lt  o f  a f a l l  in  quantity or in  p rice*
' (10 )
had been exported to Ind ia  or to A u s tra la s ia *
Exports o f iron  and s too l to the la s t  two mentioned 
parts o f  E*E« were in  fa c t  very c lo se ly  co rre la ted  to  
the b u ild in g  o f  ra ilw ays which had been c a r r ied  In  th e ir  
inlands at a f a s t  rate  during the I85 0Ts and then was 
slowed down in  the 1860*s» Tot, the p a r t ic u la r ly  lower  
f ig u r e s  of* exports  o f  B r i t ish  iron  and s t e e l  to In d ia ,  
A u s tra la s ia  and the r e s t  o f  E .B . ,  during tho e a r ly  
I860 *s was probably due, a ls o ,  to the r i s e  In average  
export p rices*
B r it is h  exports o f  machinery to  Ind ia  v/ere r i s in g  
with the development o f  cotton m ills  around Bombay, 
jute m ills  around Calcutta , r i c e ,  f l o u r  and o i l  m ills  
in other parts o f the country, during the la te  1850 is 
and tho e a r ly  186o!s .  Between 1855 and 1889 exports  
oti machinery to Ind ia  averaged about £.481 mil* per 
annum* Considering tho period  in  question, into quin- 
querma, we s h a l l  f in d  that tho highest exports o f  
machinery to Ind ia  were made during 1659^X888 when the 
annual exports averaged £*874 mil* In A u s tra la s ia ,  
exports o f  machinery was c lo se ly  linked  with the
*Tv^ nf-viWE i*^  ip mi*.n n»i w*»i<r i»  In* * * * ! *  nn* i >'ihi* iiii» i i iH t i i * iw » * < * » * » .Mi*  rnwgi
(10 ) In 1889, B r i t a in  exported to E«E« 335,771 tons 
o f iron  and s t e e l  goods, out o f them 312,442 
were ta lon  by In d ia  and A u stra la s ia  and 
23,329 tons were d is t r ib u te d  In  the r e s t  o f  
E *E ., Hong Kong and the S t ra its  Settlements, 
both were entrepot t rad e  cen tres , had 17,127 tons.
6.5*
w il lin gn ess  of tho s e l f -g o v e rn in g  colon ies to b u i ld  
th e ir  own industries#  During 'the f i f t e e n  years 18554X889 
exports o f  machinery to A u s tra la s ia  averaged £#211 per 
annum, which was very  high when compared with, the above 
f i g u r e  of In d ia , i f  the s i 210 o f  population in  each of 
those two parts of E#B. was considered#
, The value o f B r i t i s h  exports to  Ind ia , Ceylon and 
the S t ra its  Settlements rose s l i g h t ly  from £6#5 mil* in  
1842-48 to £6.6 mil# in  1847-51, and then i t  rose at a 
f a s t e r  ra te  to reach £15*9 mil* in  1855-59, and £25*3 mil* 
In 1885-89# Out of the form er f ig u r e s  the share of Ind ia  
was £14#4 rail# and £20#8 mil* in  1855-59 and 1885-89, 
re spect ive ly *  In A u s tra la s ia ,  B r i t a in  developed her 
exports from £1*1 m illions  in  1842-48 to £11#2 mil* in  
1855-59 and then to  £13*3 mil# in 1885-89* Exports 
to M auritius were, g en e ra lly  speaking, growing at a 
much s low er ra te ,  and furthermore by 1885-69 they had 
dec lined  and averaged ,:£# 5 mil# which was lower by £*X 
mil* than the average of 1880-64, Exports to Hong Kong 
although not growing s te a d i ly ,  Increased from £*4 mil# 
in  1855 to £2.3 mil# in  1889* 800 a ls o  Table (7 ) *
Thus throughout the pex\iod under rev iew , and In  
sp ite  o f  the dramatic growth in  exports to  A u s tra la s ia ,  
Ind ia  represented the la rg e s t  market fo r  B r it ish  
manufactures In  E#E*
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‘U n t i l  1869, and In  3 pit© of the abandonment of
im peria l preference* European countries , other than
B r ita in ,  were unable to  develop th e ir  exports to  ,B*B*
The r e la t iv e  importance o f European countries in  the
import trade  of B*E* was even le s s  s ig n i f ic a n t  than
the s itu a t io n  which they had obtained in  i t s  exports *
In 1870, only 1.5$ of Indian imports, 1*6% o f  A ustra lian
imports, 5*4$ of the S t r a i t ’s imports and none o f  low
Zea land fs imports were obtained from the continent o f
Europe. In  the same year, 64*9$ o f Ind ian  imports,
64$ o f A ustra lian  imports, 58$ o f  Hew Z ea lan d ’s imports
and 25*6$ o f  the S t ra it s  Settlem ents’a imports were
obtained from B r ita in *  Tho growth of B r i t i s h  re -expo rts
( 11 )
o f  fo re ign  produce, mainly from Europe, could a lso  be 
taken to in d icate  that the continent o f Europe- had to 
r e ly ,  throughout, on B r ita in  to s e l l  th e i r  manufactures 
in  E.E* In d ia ’s' imports o f  fo re ig n  producei and 
manufactures through the mother country, although  
almost stagnant .in the e a r ly  1860’a, were in  1865-69 
higher by 44$ than they had been in  1855*59* Be*exports 
of fo re ig n  produce mid manufactures to the S t ra i t s  and 
to  Hong-Kong, both entrepot centres, had grown at a 
f a s t e r  r a te  than in  the case of India*. However, in
6 8
(11 ) See Foot Hote Mo. 50, Chapter 4*
the case of Australasia, re-exports of foreign  
manufactures declined from about £1.8  mil* in 1856 
to about £1 mil* in 1869.
"t
Conclusions:
It  lias been shown that, during; the period under 
review, B ritain  had developed her imports from B.E. 
at a considerable rate . When these imports were broken 
down into imports fo r  home consumption and others fo r  
re-exports, wo saw that the growth of the la tte r  portion 
tended always to be faste r* TJae growth of re-exports of 
E.EMs produce was a lso  considerable when compared with 
that o f B rit ish  re-export trade in general* Britain*a  
re-export3 which were o rig in a lly  obtained from 1*E* 
represented 29*5$ ard 36*1$ of her re-export trade in  
1855 and 1869 respectively*
As regards exports, i t  has also been shown that 
Brita in  had succeeded in expanding her market in 
various parte of B*'E* fhe increase was most marked 
in the case of Australasia , in sp ite of the b e lie f  
in protectionism* This Increase was made possible  
by the rapid r is e  in the Income of the Australasian  
colonies, as their exports, particu larly  to B rita in , 
were progressively growing and also as a resu lt 'of 
the discovery of gold mines* In addition to that
• • . 89.
i t  should he borne In mind that tie loans and grants 
which these colonies obtained had contributed In 
ra isin g  their Imports from Britain*
Wo have also soon that B rita in  was able bo main­
tain her monopolistic share in the lb reign trade of 
various parts In here E * E *, in spite of the abandonment 
of imperial preference and Navigation Acts. In fac t , 
most of tho European countries were restric ted  in the ir  
direct trade with the East by the long journey around 
the Cape of Good Hope and by their small sea carrying 
capacity* At the.same time, as has previously been 
explained, B rita in  was favoured by her geographical 
situation and by her maritime superiority, in her 
trade with the East* (Phus, the abandonment o f imperial 
preference could not change the role which Britain  
played in the foreign trade of E*E* On the contrary, 
under ouch transport conditions and with the Influence 
o f free  trade policy (not only in E#E* but also in  
Europe) B ritain  had managed to develop rapid ly her 
re-export trade between £'*B. and Europe*
Nevertheless, tho non-existence of the problem 
of tram port fo r the B ritish  merchants trading with 
the East, in  the centuries that separated tho discovery 
of the Gape route from the opening of the Suez Oanal, 
must not preclude the probability  that transport 
d if f ic u lt ie s  had lim ited the ra te  of growth and the
70*
ultim ate s iz e  of the Eastern, trade* Freight charges 
fo r  the Eastern  journey were quite heavy and in order
to overcome the ir handicap the trading ports in the 
Bast had to o ffe r  the ir wares at a very low price* 
Hence, fo r example, India or Australia  could not export 
wheat to B rita in  because their export prices had to be 
kept very low indeed to overcome both heavy freight  
charges and on a rr iv a l to compete in  tho B ritish  market 
with the American and European wheat. The growth in 
the trading o f cheap te x t i le  raw materials was also  
lim ited by the, same factor* In addition to that, it  
must be borne in  mind that the long time spent in bhe 
journey from the East had prohibited a l l  trade in the 
fresh  food stu ffs  of B*E. v
Transport d i f f ic u lt ie s  had also lim ited the growth 
of the export trade to tho Baat, as w i l l  be shown in 
the discussion of Chapter 4#
HISTORICAL NOTE ON THE GROWTH OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 
Aim Tip BRITISH TRADE IN THE EAST,
THE OPENING OF THE SUES CANAL AND IMPERIAL EXPANSION 
IN THE LAST QUARTER OF THE 19£h CMTUBT*
Tile re a l foundation of the Brit lab. trade in  the 
East goes back to 1600 when the East India Company 
was established. Tho Company was given an absolute 
monopoly of B ritish  trade in a l l  the lands situated  
between the Cape of Good. Hope and Gape Horn* The 
chief categories of B rit ish  imports from India 
consisted mainly of indigo, a dye s tu ff which was 
required by the tex tile  industry, raw s i lk  and s i lk  
piece goods, ivory, sa lt petre and. sp ices. Cotton 
goods were also carried  by the merchants of the 
Company from India partly, to be exchanged fo r  spices . 
from the Spice Islands and fo r tea and s i lk  goods from 
China, and partly  fo r  B ritish  and European consumption*
During the f i r s t  h a lf  of the 18th century the 
position of the British  traders in India was becoming 
Increasingly insecure because of the breaking up o f 
tho Moghul Empire and the increasing activ ity  of the 
French, By that time tho B ritish  were conducting 
the largest part of t he trade between the Eastern 
and Western hemispheres an! they fe lt  that force
must be used to secure their present and future 
business in terests. The victory acM eved at the 
battle  of Plassey in 1757 was the starting point in 
the h istory of the B ritish  rule In the Bast*
The major extern ion o f the B ritish  influence in 
India, and generally in the East, began during the 
Napoleonic wars# I t  was again a measure attempting 
to secure B ritish  trade therein against the r iv a lry  
of the .French* By 1805 North and West Bengal, Mysore, 
Tanjore, Surat, and the Carnatic were a l l  possessed by
* V *
Britain* Furthermore, Ceylon, a Dutch Colony, and 
Mauritius, a French Colony, were added to the B ritish  
Empire in 1810* Ceylon*a trade consisted mainly of 
spices, oilseeds and coffee, while Mauritius owed Its  
importance to its  geographical situation as a port o f 
ca ll on the way to India and also because of its  sugar 
trade*
In 1819, S ir  3* Baffles purchased ff Singapore n 
for the Bast India Company from the ru le r of lohore 
and in the follow ing years steady B ritish  expansion 
was taking place in the Malay Peninsula* Singapore 
was known fo r its  excellent harbour and it s  entrepot
trade# Singapore with other islands in the Malay
/
Peninsula, spec ified  together la te r  as nthe Straits  
Settlementsu were supplying B rita in  with large  
quantities of various kinds of apices*
In  1839, M on  was conquered, by B r ita in *  Arabic  
gum and small amounts of -frankinoence, ivory and 
ooffee came from th a t ,part of th© Empire* During the 
1840 Ts Hong Kong, Sarawak and Labuan v/ero, added to. the 
Eastern Empire* The importance of Hong Kong was due1d 
its  being a depot fo r the export of cheap Chinese 
labour and an outlet for tho trade of Southern. China*
The history of the B ritish  colonisation of 
Australasia Is. of a particu lar interest* In  the 
beginning the early  settlements in Mew South Wales and 
Tasmania were arranged by the B ritish  government and 
consisted of convicts and their guards* For several 
years the government incurred the costs of these 
settlements and gained no pro fits until 51 tho island  
penetration began in Mew South Wales when the gap 
through the. mountains on to the plains was discovered 
in 1813* which enabled tho development of m illions of 
aheap in  the in te rio rn ( P* 12« .Eoonomic Dov©lobment of 
the Overseas Empire* Knowles) * After this economic
feature of Australasia emerged more B rit ish  people 
found an incentive to migrate into the new lands, and 
the business of sheep breeding was further developed*
It  can be said that only than tho rea l establishment 
of Australasia had begun*
Farther expansion of the B ritish  ru le  in India 
came in the second quarter of the 19th century and 
continued u n til the end o f the 1850*0* During ;t hat 
decade Assam, Sind, Fuhjab and Oudh were a l l  conquered 
and added considerably to the British  inparia l trade 
in the Bast*
That, then, was the situation  of the B ritish  
Eastern Empire before tho building o f the Sum Canal* 
The opening of the Canal not only altered the trade  
routes to the Bast but also changed the economic 
importance of tho whole Eastern hemisphere* As she 
had acquired Gape Town, St* Helena, Ascension and 
Mauritius, mainly because they were the moat important 
ports of c a ll on the way'to India, B ritain  was anxious 
now to possess new colonies on the Eastern Coast of 
A frica in order to guard the new highway to her .Empire 
in the Bast* Thus Egypt was conquered -  as i t  has 
been described in  Chapter 1# Later the Sudan and 
Somaliland were a lso  taken by Britain* However, 
setting aside the case of Egypt the extension of the 
B ritish  rule on the Eastern Coast of A frica  was not 
so le ly  desired for guarding tho Eastern trade* The 
great shortening of the route -  from B rita in  -  to 
soma cQuntetes such as Sixdan, Somaliland, Sansibar 
and Kenya and the fact that they are now situated on 
the way to the rest of the East gave a powerful
stimulus and a new value to their1 foreign trade#
Ho doubt also the expectations of finding r ich  mineral 
resources in their lands had enhanced their desirab­
i l i t y  to the B ritish  im perialist# The rise, o f the 
imperial sp ir it  in Europe must also be considered when 
examining B r ita in fs imperial policy in the East ~ 
after 1870# The opening up o f a short route to the 
Eastern markets had certain ly attracted the attention  
of the European countries, ~ also, towards the region 
situated East of Suez (and particu larly  to Eastern 
Africa which had not boen occupied yet by any power 
by that tim e). This r is e  of im peria listic  thinking 
in Europe succeeded in further arousing the imperial 
sp ir it  inside Bx»itain In spit© of the b e lie f  in a free  
trade policy* It  was rea lized  that i f  she did. not 
want these trop ica l areas in the East, somebody else  
did. At the peak of the European imperial expansion 
Britain  decided to be the most active |)ower and in?:carv­
ing up the African lands in  the la st  quarter of the
f
19th century she added more g litte r in g  jewels to her 
Empire than any other European participant. ( Bee W*
The opening of the Suez Canal, with the help of 
other economic forces which revolutionized the conditions 
of transport and communications between the Bast,and 
the West., had also exerted indirect influences on
B ritish  colonial expansion in the In te rio r of their  
Eastern colonies* During the 19th century the 
British  colonial growth depended mainly on moving 
inland from a coast lino  or a port to control the 
hinterland# This process was considerably hastened 
and.secured in the laat quarter of the 19th century by 
the rapid construction of railways. A correlation  
between railway construction in the B ritish  Eastern 
colonies during that period and the expansion, o f their  
foreign trade consequent upon the opening of the Canal 
is  quite apparent and is  demonstrated in Chapter 4, 
Fart I  by relevant s ta tis t ic s*  As regards Australia  
and Hot Zealand, the influence of the cutting of the 
Suez Canal on the amount o f B ritish  emigration la also  
quite clear* Doubtless cheap transport and a more 
convenient journey played a role in increasing the 
number of the B ritish  emigrants to the new lands in  
the Blast* The fo llow ing is a quotation from a le tte r  
written by the manager of tho Union Bank of Australia
'  i i  . . . > vin Sydney in June 1885*«»***"ThoImmigration department 
here also u t ilis e s  the Canal by having government 
emigrants forwarded to this colony by large stoma 
vessels through the Suez Canal, instead o f the long- 
sea route via  the Cape in s a ilin g  ships to the groat 
benefit in  healthy comfort and morality to the| 
emigrants”. .
(This quotation la from Habino,. ..J* mfhe S ta tis t ica l
Story of the ;.8uez Canal” * Journal of Royal St at is .  
Soc. 1887). Sea a lso1 tho accompanying* Table for 
immigration to Austra lia  and Hew le a l and via  the 
Suez Canal*
TABLE A - l
.via.the Suez? Canal*
1878
,1879
1880
1881
1883
1883
1884
1885
1886
6,865 
5,367 
9 ,770 
30,863 
31,430 
33,373 
33,388 
34,318
3,509
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THE Of M ING OF THE SUEZ CANAL AND THE REVOLUTION 
OF EASTERN TRANSPORT.
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THE INFLUENCE OP THIS OPENING OP TUB STJ1Z 
CANAL UPON THE COST OF EASTERN TRANSPORT. 
SECTION I I ;
THE COST OB’ USING THE SUEZ CANAL. 
APPWDIX B; ,
ST AT ISTICAL TAB LSS.
The Influence of the Opening of the Suez Qanal upon 
The Poet of the Eastern Voyage. (18S9~I91o)v '
During the period. 18&9-1913, froIglhi rates in the
Eastern route f e l l  heav ily* The opening of the Suez;
Canal was one of the main forces behind this phenomenon
and it  is intended in  th is  Chapter to estimate approx-
(1 )
Imately its  influence.
Section X;
mad© possible by the bu ild ing up of the Canal between 
ports West and East of Suess, It  w i l l  be noticed that 
the distance saved in the case of /Australia and Mew 
Be aland was comparatively much leas important.
(1 ) Bee Appendix B, Table No. (B - l )  fo r the f a l l  in
fre ight rates of some a rtic le s  transported from 
Eastern ports in the B rit ish  Empire to the U.K. 
compiled from E.A.V. Angler. F ifty  Years T Freights 
( 1869-19X9 ) . Angler Brothers * Id1 eight Report fo r  
1870- stated that ^The past year has been.character^ 
ised by low or average rates of freight in most 
trades* The principal agents in the Huetuations 
experienced have'been the adaptation and develop­
ment o f the Suez; Canal x*outa (steamera drawing 
20 feet having passed through safe ly ) to India 
and China* opening a wide scope for at earn t r a f f ic  
to the East, and superseding the sa ilin g  tonnage 
by which the trade was previously hold; tho 
great continental war, and the generally disturbed 
state of p o lit ic s 11. See also the Economist1 
Supplement. Commercial History and Keviavn of 
Marc F 1871, 1872, 1873, 1874 and 1875,. fo r the 
immediate e ffect of the opening of the Canal on 
fre igh t rates and steamship building in .B ritain*
so.
TABLE ( 8 )
The Relative Advantages (in  point of mileage)of the 
Suez Canal and the Gape Route* .
By- * By Distance "Saving
Journey Capa Canal Saved i
Maufcioa! . M iles .
London -  Bombay 10,667 6,274 4,393 41.2
** ** Madras 11,880 7,513 5,987 35.2
n -  Calcutta 11,900 8,083 3,817 32,1
Liverpool - Calcutta 11,600 7,900 3,700 32.0
London - Singapore 11,740 8,326 3,414 28.8
0 -  Manilla 18,900 9,700 3,800 25.0
11 -  Hong Kong 13,180 9,799 3,381 25.6
m -  Aden 10,800 4,700 5,600 54.0
- Adelaide 11,780 11,100 680 . 5.8
n -  Melbourne 18,140 11,685 t*** tm5 DO 4.6
n -  Sydney 18j 690 12,146 .545 4.3
'* -  Wellington 13,610 15,065 565 4*1
M arseilles -  Melbourne 11.600 9,400 8,200 18*0
u -  Saigon 18,000 7,200 4,800 * 40.0
?f -  Bombay 10,400 4,600 5,500 50*0
Hamburg -  Yokohama 14,800 11,500 3,300 22.0
•ysRRVWWW*
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To demonstrate the r e la t io n  e x is t in g  between
the saving in distance and the saving in the costs of 
the voyage we would consider the follow ing example of 
the voyage between Liverpool and Calcutta* The*distance 
saved between these two porta was equal to 32%, and our 
question is  how large was the saving in time consequent 
upon that* Normally, a sa ilin g  vessel had to spend, 
on average, about twelve weeks in this journey via  
the Cape .route* Yet, that type of vessel did not 
gain more than a very t r i f l in g  saving in time by using 
the shorter route* That was due, as previously explained, 
to the prevailing ligh t  wind in the Had Sea during moat
o f the year* To such an extent, therefore, the saving
» • ■
in the distance could only o ffe r  a s ligh t saving in  
time and when the Canal dues were considered, the cost 
of the voyage by using the longer route was, moat 
probably, lower. The distance between London and 
Bombay was reduced by 41$, but s t i l l  there would not 
be any sign ificant a lteration  in the above conclusion*
In Table (9 ) i t  can be seen that the number of sa ilin g  
vessels that navigated the Canal was en tire ly  unimportant 
in any year* Steamers, on the other hand, as it  has 
been explained in Chapter 1, used the Canal immediately 
after Its  opening* Conditions of navigation in the 
Red Sea wore most suitable to them* Furthermore, the 
now rout© offered more coaling stations at shorter
Beacyifition o f  Vessels Passing the Suez Canal 1876*>1886
ffAKLE t9)
Year
Merchant
Steamers
.Steamers . 
Xfcana ports.
Sailing  
Vessels ,
fe sta l
Packets
1'otal *; 
ino l. 
Others*
1876 1,048 5 315 1,457
:«1877 1 , 264 39 6 298 1,663
1878 1,0639 75 85 6388 1,593
1879 1 , 038 55 X 6398 1,477
1880 1,554 54 ■ «*. 363 ‘ 2,026
188 X 2,010 48 1 448 2,727
1888 2,561 134 501 3,198
1883 2,498 54 • ,i 586) 3,307; -
1884 2,455 . 96 - 614 3*234 ’
1885 2,514' t 357 o 580 3,624
1886
*
. 2,858 . 117- o& 614 . . 3,100
Reference*
Suez G'anal Publications
in terva ls , and that* helped steamers considerably since 
the majority of them were not f it te d  for long voyages 
because of the huge amounts of coal they had to carry 
by that time* The speed of d ifferen t kinds of steamers 
by then* varied considerably* for while some of them 
could not outrace a well b u ilt  clipper* the.,fas tost 
ships did 2000-2500 sea miles pe r  week*
f
The saving in time consequent upon the Having in
• i
the distance between Liverpool and Calcutta by 58$,
and the substitution of steam for sa il*  depended*
therefore* on the type of'steamer used in the voyage*
For the fastest steamer o f the time* there was a
I S )
fe as ib le  saving in time of about 67$* since that was 
able in average to spend only about 4 weeks betv/een the 
two ports via the Sues; Canal* On the other hand one
finds in the early lite ra tu re  on the subject that some
!
other kinds of steamers spent about 8 weeks in the 
voyage being considered, v ia  the Canal* instead of 
the usual twelve weeks taken by a sa ilin g  vessel fo r  
the same distance but operating on the Capo route* 
Broadly speaking* It. coixld be concluded that the 
shortening o f the distance by 58$ was followed by 
greater saving in time* I .e .*  it  probably varied  
between 35$ and 67$. That was the situation  
immediately a fte r  the Canal was opened fo r  navigation* 
but by the raid 1870 hi it  was evident that most of the
f
( 8 ) These percentages are related to tlio .o rig ina l t im e  
sp en t in  th e  exam ined  jo u rn e y  by a s a i l i n g  v e s s e l
y d - ^ - v i f t  th e  Qane r o u t e *  • ,:• p J . v & - . r £ ,  -.rf
steamers were able to spend only 4 weeks In the voyage 
from B rita in  to India* .
Dux' task, now, is  to find out the saving in tho
cost of the voyage consequent upon the saving in  time,
bearing in mind that while steamers operated in these
days at high costs, because of their considerable
consumption of fu e l, sa ilin g  vessels did not pay for
their propellant power* However, this question would
be impossible to answer with any precision since the
amount of data which 1 obtained on th is particu lar
point is neither su ffic ien t nor precise to any extent*
A rough estimation might, however, be ventured and
could be of some help* According to early literatu re
on tho subject the Sues Canal dues of 10 franca per
ton deterred many steamers from using the Canal route
(3) " ' ,
in the years 1869**1873* Might it  be suggested, there-*
fo re , that the immediate reduction to the coat of the
Eastern voyage was, generally speaking, around 10, francs
per ton so that It  was o ffset sometimes by the ,duos?
This argument is summed up in Diagram (5 ) * Also, in
the ligh t of the diagram an attempt is  made to
distinguish the influence of the Canal from that of
technical development in shipbuilding, on the cost
of the Eastern voyage * In fact i t  is  important to us
(3 )  Be© Chapter 1*
84 ou
DIAGRAM ( 5 ) .
f
to distinguish  between the ro les  played by these two 
factors because some w riters on the subject tended 
sometimes to overestimate the influence of technical 
development in shipbuilding upon the revolution of 
the Eastern transport in the late  19th century*
The horizontal axis in the diagram measure a time, 
and the unit used fo r  measurement is the year* The 
vertica l axis measures costs, of a certain voyage 
between a port East of Suez and another West of Suez, 
in rea l terms* Let us assume that t prices « 100*
St
The coat of the voyage would be defined so as to 
contain v a riab le ' costs plus a certain p ro fit  margin, 
and this would hold whether the vessel used was a 
steamer or a sa ilin g  ship* However, i t  w ill  be 
assumed, throughout, that pro fits and a l l  costs which 
do not change d irectly  with technical development in  
shipbuilding industry would remain constant at the ir  
leve l o f t a * Hence, the cost of the journey, via the 
Gape route, by a sa ilin g  ship which depends exclusively  
on wind fo r  its  propellant power is at t a or at any 
other year equal to aq and repr as exited in the diagram 
by the straight line G-* We sh a ll consider now a 
certain steamship whose design corresponds to the 
technique evolved in shipbuilding industry u n til t a 
and denote it  by f,A‘w* Let us add to this that A 
travels at a speed equal to x miles/week# At t
steamer A, is  incapable o f sharing* with sailing..ships*
direct t r a f f ic  between the two ports* i f  the Gape
route is  to bo depended upon, since at a speed of
x  miles/week and with Its  rate of fu e l consumption
the journey coats ma which is greater than dr..by mq*
However* at t the Sues Garni is  cut and the di stance * a
between tho Western port ahd the Eastern port is  
shortened by z%$ so that i f  the Garni route is  to be 
depended upon tho cost o f  the voyage by A w i l l  be equal 
only to ap* On the other hand, the Canal route o ffers  
no advantage to sa ilin g  vessels and therefore they w il l  
continue to make tho examined voyage at a cost equal to  
G* uaon is smaller than Q by oq, but as * the Canal 
Company decides tOhJSapose dues equal to D»qd'> the 
building of the Canal has just enabled A to stand on
equal footing with sa ilin g  vessels at t  , i*e# ,ao4hsd,’ . * ■ , a
Toti tho gain is  remarkable, since it  means that 
steamer A is enabled to estab lish  its  services, and 
also that any technical development in its  design in
the periods following, t would consequently be neta ■ . ■
gain over s a i l  and lower freights would be feasible#
Mow before we proceed in our analysis, we sh a ll 
temporarily assume that the Canal dues remain constant 
at a rate equal to D throughout# - .
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■ Through te c h n ic a l developm ent in  s h ip b u ild in g  
in d u s try  the cost of the voyage in quest.ion by steam ­
sh ips v ia  th e  Canal is  s u c c e s s iv e ly  reduced by th e  end 
o f  each  y ea r*  so th a t th e cu rve r e p re s e n t in g  i t  o v e r  a 
number o f  yea rs  ta k es  the shape o f  a s lo p in g  l in e  M* 
The f r u i t s  o f t e c h n ic a l  developm ent £ can be measured 
by ta k in g  th e d i f f e r e n c e  between the s t r a ig h t  l in e  OH 
and Adding th e  Canal dues in  g n j  y e a r  to  M, th e  , 
curve s h i f t s  upwards to l  jf + p w h ich  i s ,  as shown in
, ■ - • ( 5 )
th e  d iagram , lo w er  than G f o r  any yea r a f t e r  t  •
(4 )  About th e y e a r  1858, E ld e r  began equ ip p in g  steam ers 
w ith  a new. ty p e  o f  e n g ln e , the n ove l fe a tu r e s  in  
which were th e use o f steam at g r e a t ly  in c rea sed  
p ressu re , compound c y l in d e r s ,  and s u r fa c e  con den sers , 
v The en g ine succeeded in  econom ising the use o f  f u e l ,
i  • e * , c o a l consumption wasj reduced from  4-4^ lbs# 
to  3 - lb s  p e r  in d ic a te d  horse power, and made i t  
no lo n g e r  necessary  fo r  steam ers t o  c a r ry  la r g e  
q u a n t it ie s  o f  f r e s h  w ater#  The f i r s t  A t la n t ic  
steam er t o  be f i t t e d  w ith  th e  new en g in e , compound 
expansion  en g in e , was "H o lla n d ” o f  th e  n a t io n a l 1 
L in e  in  1889* L a te r  E ld e r Ts eng ine was im proved 
and th e  t r i p l e  expansion  engine was e v o lv e d *
By th e  la s t  named improvement c o a l consumption 
was redu ced  t o  1*28 lb s # ,  per in d ic a te d  horse 
power# The success o f  the new en g in e  caused a 
la r g e  number o f  steam ers, which o r i g in a l l y  were 
f i t t e d  w ith  compound eng ines t o  be t r i p l e d  d u r in g  
th e  18801s and the 18901s# F u rth er improvements 
came In  1905, when quadruple expansion  en g in es  
were b u i l t  and began to  be f i t t e d  in to  A t la n t ic  
steamers#. Again  th ese  saved more c o a l par 
in d ic a te d  horse power# M eanwhile, in  1894,
"P ea rso n ” , in v e n ted  th e  tu rb in e  engine w h ich  
saved  about 20$ to  30$ o f  c o a l consumption#
F or y e a rs ,  how ever, th e  economies of th e  
en g in e  were not ob ta in ed  when worked a t  a 
speed  s u ita b le  f o r  she c a r ry in g
\the merchandise*... Xetf about '1910. th is  
problem was solved* The theory that over a long  
period major changes a re  fe a s ib le  only through  
the accumulation of a la rg e  number of improvements, 
in stead  o f  being a re su lt  o f  a s ing le  revo lu tionary  
invention (Mathews-foR*Ct>The Trade Cyc le . p«%0-74) 
would be adopted here* Hone of the s e v e ra l  
improvements in  the design o f steamships was, o f  
i t s e l f ,  o f major importance, besides the actual  
appearance o f  aimy of them was l i t t l e  heeded during  
the same year and was ra th e r  d is t r ib u te d  g radu a lly  
over a number of years . I t  i s  assumed, th e re fo re ,  
In  d ia g * (5 )  that no downward sh if t s  would occur to  
M, or M, in  any s in g le  year* = Further,., M and M are 
drawn as s lo p in g  s t r a ig h t  l in e s ,  instead  o f being  
drawn in  curve shape, fo r  purposes o f  s im p lic ity  
a nd expos 1t i  on *
(5 ) B a il in g  vesse ls  would be , th e re fo re ,  fo rced  
to accept le a s  and le s s  p ro f i t s  i f  th ey (wanted 
to maintain th e ir  business in  the^examined journey, 
i . e . ,  G would s h i f t  downwards to  M  D le v e l*  
However, even tua lly , they would not be able to  
work at a loss  and would be compelled to withdraw 
th e ir  se rv ices*
The Important point which diagram 5 emphasises is  
that although the reduction  in  the cost o f the voyage, 
fo r  any year between t^ anci i s  macie p o ss ib le  by 
techn ica l p rogress , i . e . ,  *  F -  ^  B, I t  i s  owed
e n t ir e ly  to the use o f  the sh o rte r  route . This can
be simply explained by considering the curve M
instead  of M 4 £>• I t  can be seen th at, fo r  any year
between t  and t  , w ith  the same amount o f techn ica l  
a c
progress in  sh ipbu ild in g  assumed, steamers are unable 
to  p a r t ic ip a te  In  the se rv ing  o f t r a f f i c  since M >  G 
throughout•
However, once t i s  reached steamers would be
c
capable o f reducing the co st  of the examined voyage 
and, hence, o f competing e f f e c t iv e ly  w ith  s a i l in g  
vesse ls  even in  the absence o f a short route between 
the East and the West, i . e . ,  assuming that there are 
only two curves, M and G, in the diagram where M <  0
: ' ' 1
in  any year a f t e r  t^* Thus i t  can be said  that a f t e r
t the annual reduction  in  the cost o f the Eastern  c
voyage is  a l l  due to techn ica l progress in  sh ip ­
b u i ld in g  industry . Furthermore as the diagram shows, 
the d if fe ren c e  between M 4 D and M is apt to d isappear  
in  some years , s ince  M is steeper than M and a lso  
because of the assumption which we made of -constant 
dues. Let us assume fo r  a while that no dues are
charged fo r  using the Sues Gan&l end th ink o f  the
,, ct,v , . Z  sind M as a subsidy given todifference between M J
steamers us ing  the shorter  rou te . Because M tends 
to he steeper than. M> the subsidy Is  constantly  
reduced with te ch n ica l  progress# In other words, 
as techn ica l progress reduces the working costs of  
steamships and increases th e i r  speed, the reduction  ' 
in  the cost of the voyage consequent upon the short­
ening o f the distance becomes le s s  and le s s  important. 
How I f  constant dues equal D are imposed, that would 
work in  e f fe c t  as a tax  o f  a p rogress ive  rate  aga inst  
the described subsidy and would, at some period , o f f - • 
set i t  completely, and a f t e r  which point iff + D would 
be g rea te r  than M* I t  Is  important, th e re fo re , to 
reconsider the assumption o f  constant dues.
Ihe re su lt  o f  a r i s e  in D can e a s i ly  be v is u a l is e d  
In the l ig h t  o f  the above ana lysis#  On the other hm  d ,  
a reduction in  D can be made at d i f fe re n t  re g re ss iv e  
ra te s  ard one o f  them can be f ix e d  in  such a way as 
to leave a ce rta in  constant gain fo r  steamers using  
the sho rter  route# 'Ihe a b i l i t y  o f  the Suez Canal 
management to do that would c e r ta in ly  depend on the 
flow  o f  t r a f f i c  between ports East and West o f  Suez, 
the sm aller the trade tak ing p lace between them, the 
le s s e r  the a b i l i t y  to reduce B, and the quicker the
_  <6> difference between M + L and M would disappear*
At any rate , i t  can be conceived that M must touch
M ■flD, In some years in the very long run, as D w il l
never be reduced below a certain minimum which would
cover costs of maintenance and improvements, of the
Canal as well as other expenditures*
The above analysis deals in general with one
journey between a port East of Suez and another West
of Sue25* We must be care fu l therefore to rea lize  that
the reduction in costs, consequent upon the shortening
of the distance and the substitution of steam fo r  s a i l ,
d iffered  from one case to another* The maximum gain,
as fable ( 8 ) shows, was in  the journey between London
and Aden, where by the way of the Suez Canal 54$ of
the distance was saved* I f  this case is represented
on diagram (5 ) we would find that,from the d ifferencea •
between M and M 4 D is  considerable and the e ffect of 
constant dues equal to I) is less fe lt  as technical 
progress reduces the cost of the journey* On the
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( 6 ) This analysis assumes that the size of the
commercial ship grows without any restrictions * 
However, there are of course some lim itations 
imposed by the size of trade and also by the 
depth and the width of the harbours of the 
trading countries* These la tte r  can not 
always be changed with ease and sometimes 
costs involved in harbour improvement 
projects amount to very high sums*
other hand, the minimum gain , in  terms o f  distance
saved, was obtained in  cases o f journeys to  ports
o f  A u stra lia  and New Zealand* Since the Canal dues
were much the same in  th is  case as in  other cases,
i t  was im possible  f o r  steamships to e s ta b l ish  th e ir
se rv ices  between B r it ish  ports and Austra lian  ports
(7 )  V
v ia  the Canal f o r  many years a f t e r  1869* There was 
an exception, however, in  the case o f  passenger t r a f f i c *  
Steamers carry ing emigrants and other passengers to  
A u s tra l ia  used the Canal rou te  from the ea r ly  1870, 
as they p re fe rre d  to  pay more fo r tho-vshorter a n d 'more 
convenient journey*
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(7 )  HAfc the outset A u s t ra l ia n  t r a f f i c  through the 
Canal increased  much more s low ly  than Asian  
t r a f f i c *  i t  d id  so because the..very nature 
of the A ustra lian  passage (w ith  I t s  great  
d istance , favou rab le  winds and the d i f f i c u l t y  
o f obta in ing coal su p p lie s )  encouraged sh ip ­
owners to  continue using s a i l i n g  v e s se ls ,  
unsuited  fo r  the Canal route , on the A ustra lian  
run long a f t e r  they disappeared elsewhere*
In  add it ion , the ac tua l d istance saved, which 
v a r ied  according to  intermediate ports ,  
courses made, season of the year anti c la ss  
o f  v e s s e l ,  was not very g rea t ,  and the saving  
in  time had to  be balanced against the expense 
o f passing through the Canaltf* •*• P *7 * ,
The Suez Canal aid the A u stra lian  Economy, 
Woodruff and McGregor* ~
However, tho saving in time in  the A ustra lian  
voyage was, as in  other cases, much more s ig n i f ic a n t  
than the saving in  the d istance consequent upon the 
cutting  of the Suez Canal* Thus while the d istance  
saved by the Canal from London to Melbourne or to 
Sydney or to W ellington  averaged a l i t t l e  over 4$ 
the time saved was, by the mid 1 8 7 0 over  45$ in
the outward journey from B r ita in  and over 55$ in the
^ ( 8 >homeward journey# The above argument dea lt w ith  the  
ro le  which the Canal played in reducing the co st  of 
the Eastern voyage# Neverthe less , although th is  f a l l  
In costs was very notable and considerab le , i t  would 
be impossible to measure quantitatively i t s  -influence  
in  reducing f r e ig h ts  charged by shipping firm s±
93*
(8 )  In 1877, the B r i t i s h  steamer ^Lusitan ia1 passed  
through the Canal on her voyage from Adelaide
to London, making the passage in  fo r ty  in stead  
of the usual one hundred days taken by s a i l in g  
vesse ls  us ing  the Cape% The Suez Canal and 
the A ustra lian  Economy”* P. 8* The journey  
from A u s t ra l ia n  to B r i t is h  ports took
in  genera l something; out 65 days, and the 
outward journey from B r ita in  took about 75
days by s a i l in g  v esse ls  using the Cape route.  
(Edinburgh Review. V o l .105. 1856. An a r t ic le  
on the Sues Canal)Y The actual time spent 
in  the journey va r ied  a f t e r  that according  
to d i f f e r e n t  fac to rs  as mentioned in Footnote ( 7 ) .
f i r s t l y ,  because of -the*, inadequacy o f s t a t i s t i c a l  ... .
■ .• ” - : ! v C  ' .V .'K * ' . y y f  ' • ’ • : - C : . " -  ' . M
in form ation, and, secondly, -because the in fluence
of other forces which a f fe c te d  ra tes  o f f re ig h t  in
the Eastern  rou te , during the same period , can not e a s i ly  c
be iso la ted *  . ; - . ; W • • "• ; .
rIhus, i t  i s .  intended in the fo l lo w !  ng d iscussion
to in v e s t ig a te  two main po in ts ; f i r s t * the in fluence
of the favourable  conditions which the opening/of the
Suez Canal had created fo r  s teamships on the degree o f
competition between shipping firms t rad in g  w ith the ' ■/.
. East, and the extent to which that had led  to  reduction
in  f r e ig h t  r a te s ;  and secondly, the importance of other
fo rces , ra th er than the Suez Canal, whicii a f fe c te d  f re ig h t
ra tes  in  the Eastern  route during the same period ,
1869-1915 • . ' /  . . .  .
The Ocean Steamship Company had business in  China
and the Far E a s t ; as e a r ly  la s  1866* - f  The steamers o f  "■ ///ffi.
the company were to fo l lo w  a route round the Cape,
c a l l in g  at M aurit iu s , Penang, Singapore, Hong Kong
and ending the voyage at/Shanghai. fThe cargo oa,pa c ity
o f  moat; of the steamers employed In  th is  run was in  the
region  o f 5,000 tons and the time they spent was .
estimated at. 77 /days, in  the outward journey from
L iverpoo l,  while the homeward journey took about 84 , r .
days. A w e l l  b u i l t  c l ip p e r  o f  a cargo capac ity  o f  .
1,000. tons, and with f a i r  wind took on average about '
90 days from Foochow t o London, b u t . o rd in a r i ly  a . /
. ’ ’•* ’ • ' " • ’ 9 4 .  •
clipper took betw een  120 and 150 days an such a 
voyage * In sp it e of these advantages in speed and 
in carrying capacity the Ocean Steamship Company, the 
only steamship company which established direct trade 
with the East before the opening of the Canal, had t o 
figh t a b it te r  battle  fo r  survival* They had to 
o ffe r  lower rates of freight to shippers, i f  these 
were to be persuaded to use the new type of vessel, 
and, yet, they could not do that with any ease as 
their working expenses were ‘ re la tiv e ly  high* In 
1666 the Company charged t?** ,a  rat© of £6 plus 10fa 
.per ton of 40 cubic feet on outward cargoes* a rate 
which sa ilin g  vessels could quite easily  undercut*
On tho homeward voyage the rate varied according to 
sa ilin g  ships rates but were Invariably higher* * *9 * 
(Although the Compary^* *• improved both the outward and 
homeward time between 1866 and 1869 by making adjust­
ments to the sa ilin g  schedule, i t  was not u n til the
opening of the Sues; Canal that any appreciable d i f fe r -  
 ^ (9)
enoer: was made to the length of the voyage*9
The old established situation o f sa ilin g  vessels 
trading with the East, v ia  the Capa route, was not 
however 11 icely to be weakened immediately a fter the 
opening of the Canal* Merchants s t i l l  trusted the old
95*
(9 )  11 Blue Funnel9, p*24* Hyde> F*E*
type of v e s se l ,  Instead o f steamers, to  c a r ry  th e ir
trade* Thus, w h ile  a few steamers were chartered, f o r
the r i c e  ports immediately a f t e r  the opening o f  the
Canal, most of them could not, yet, o f f e r  a l l  the
f a c i l i t i e s  o f s a i l in g  sh ip s . Besides, the r i s e  in
wages of seamen, in  coal p r ic e s ,  and in  the Canal
dues had m ate r ia l ly  added to the working expenses o f
steamers and o f f s e t  some o f the advantages which they
obtained from the Canal* Yet steamship owners fought
b i t t e r l y  to capture business from s a i l in g  v e s se ls *
They undercut ra tes  of f r e ig h t  in  expectation o f  la r g e r
business, bu t , most probably , they achieved lower
p r o f i t s ,  than those which s a i l in g  v e sse ls  made, when
they d id  th is *  For the year 1871, the”Economist""
reported  that goods had been ca rr ied  by steam to
Calcutta  on terms sca rce ly  s u f f ic ie n t  to pay cost o f
( l o )
taking on board, stowage and d e liv e ry *  Hor were 
1872 and 1873 good years f o r  steamship owners, in  
genera l. As a ru le  fre ig h ts  had been low, whereas a 
r i s e  in  p rice  of coa l -  from J#81 per ton in 1869 to 
£1*045 in  1873 -  s t i l l  added to  th e ir  expenses*
S a i l in g  v e s s e ls ,  th e re fo re ,  succeeded in  these few  
years in  hold ing t h e i r  own or even achieved remuner­
a t ive  fre ig h ts  In the 'Eastern run*
(10 ) The ^Economistu* Commercial H istory  and Review, 
f o r  the year 1871* The E con om ist* March 1872
9 6 .
j
However, the booming conditions which the opening
of the Canal created for steamships did much to
(1 1 )
accelerate their production* favouring in particu lar  
the build ing of steamers with la rger capacity, f it te d  
with compound engines and capable of navigating a l l  
kinds of water* In .1870 B ritish  shipyards bu ilt  
219,438 steam tonnage against 99,898 tons of s a i l ,  
and in the follow ing three years they b u ilt  917,948 
tons of steam against 200,044 tons of a a il*  .although 
production o f steamships was slowed down in 1874 and 
1875, it  was again resumed at a higher rate throughout 
the period# 3uoh a rapid rise  in the production of 
steam tonnage, mainly, by that time, fo r  B ritish  and 
European shipping companies trading with the East, was 
only expected to increase competition and to force down 
fre igh t ra tes . Sailing  vessels, unable to match steam­
ship companies in reducing freight charges, started to 
withdraw from serving the Eastern trade, except that 
of Australasia where the direct gain from the Suez
97*
(IX ) 8,ee reference given in Footnote No, (1 ),  Bee 
also, Olapham. J.ih wAn Economic History of 
Modern Britain* 1850-1886» , p, 72, 214 and 215. 
Scfrgeht.A .J.’ ffs0awaya of the Empire,f, on t he 
influence of Suez Canal on the substitution of 
steam far s a i l , , Walter, M.S. ,  ^Britain Xester-  
day and Today", p“ 144-145-146,, BOTfley,, Atii,
1 Foreign Trade in the 19th Centuryn. p. 89-94 
i ia l lb e rg .  ..c ff i.j " ; "The Suaz" Canal1*. Appendix A . ,  
and Hoskins. Il.Lf«" B r i t is h  .Routes to Ind ia . . 
Chapter x t f l l l ,  " * “ ”    “ ‘
Canal was comparatively much a mallei' and alao where
other circumstances s t i l l  favoured t h e i r  use,
they crowded, g rad u a l ly ,  to  operate on the A u stra lian
i
•passage* s a i l in g  vesse ls  * se rv ices  were very much
( 12 )  , • . 
cheapened* Almost u n t i l  the la t e  1920!s f r e ig h t
charged by s a i l  s e rv in g  tho A u s tra lian  trade with the
* * . .
West,by the Cap ro u te ,  remained lower than those
. (13)
charged by steamships, ; ,
98.
(12 ) “The Suez Canal and tha A u stra lian  Economy**. p. 5*
(15) In  the la t e  1920 fs s a i l i n g  vessels were chartered  
fo r  about 10/- per ton le s s  than steamships*,
V i l l i  era * A*. I * , “Falmouth fo r  Orders w, p *x ix  •
A lso from Lord Brasaoyy Government Housef 
Melbournen V i c t o r i a . l o K|1^ M i^^O ham b^laSh in July 
27, 1896, P*.P*< 1897, Vol.LX*, X^arliamentary Papery* 
tifIhe f r e ig h t s  from Great B r ita in  and Europe vary  
so g re a t ly ,  however, w ith the seasons o f the year  
that i t  I s  almost im possible to  g ive  anything l ik e  
a f a i r  average* When the vesse ls  requ ired  to  take 
away our produce are s a i l in g  from England, Germany 
or France to  load  in  V ic to r ia ,  f r e ig h ts  are very  
low, and f o r  dead weight or bulky goods are  
sometimes merely nominal* Heavy m ateria ls have 
been brought both from Germany and Great B r ita in  
f o r  as l i t t l e  as 6/- per ton In s a i l in g  v e s se ls ,  
and at a s l i g h t ly  g rea te r  f r e ig h t  in  steamship.
On the other hand, when there  i s  l i t t l e  return  
cargo, f r e ig h t s  on the same c lass o f  goods are  
as high as 50/- per ton in  s a i l in g  sh ip s , and 
considerab ly  more in  steam ers*w
Although the competition between at earn and s a i l  
le d  to  a considerab le  f a l l  In f r e ig h t  ra te s ,  that which 
was growing, at the same time, among steamship firm s  
trad in g  w ith  the Bast, v ia  the Canal, was remarkably  
vigorous and had fu rth e r  cheapened th e i r  s e rv ie e s *
The h is to ry  o f the P. & 0, Company and Holt Js Company 
(the Ocean Steamship Company) -  the two companies which 
employed steam in  th e i r  trade w ith  the Bast be fo re  1889 •  
reveals the dramatic f a l l  in  th e ir  incomes during the 
1870fs because o f the r i v a l r y  of the new steamers v&iich 
were b u i l t  p a r t ic u la r ly  f o r  the Eastern trade, w ith  
su itab le  measurements fo r  t r a n s it  through the narrow  
channel, Apart from the looses vhleh the P* .& 0, Go* 
su ffe red  because o f  rep lac in g  i t s  huge f l e e t s  o f  sh ip s ,  
which wore su itab le  fo r  European waters at one end and 
fo r  the trop ics  beyond Suez at the other^ by ships f i t t e d  
fo r  the through t r a f f i c  v ia  the Canal, tho company had 
to accept much lower ra te s  o f fre igh t  than those which 
were obtainable  be fo re  1869# ”Xn 1888, the Company
9 9 .
(14 } The T# & 0# Co., lo s t  a lso  a l l  her c o s t ly
establishments arid organizations in  Egypt, which 
are connected w ith  the use o f Sue ^ A le x a n d r ia  
overland route# See a lso  losses  which the 
Company su ffe re d  because o f the mail contract  
with  Egyptian ra i lw ay s ,  p. J04 in  th is  Chapter*
ca rr ied  s p e e ie -p a r t ly  go ld , p a rt ly  s ilve r~w orth  nearly
£11 mi 111 0113, and by so doing earned &>out £230,000 in
f r e ig h t ;  but in  1872 ca rr ied  nearly double the amount
o f specie and rece ived  fo r  I t  only £60,000M. “In  the
year be fo re  the Canal opened, the c a r r ia g e  of 46,000
b a le s  of s i l k  brought in  £110,000, but in  1871 an
increased  ca rr iage  of 50,000 ba les  only earned £44,000,
in stead  o f  the £119,000 which would have been rece ived
(15)
at the o ld  r a t e 11.
The s itu a t io n  o f Holt *a Company was more or le s s
the same.* *?lvery re lu c ta n t ly  and a f t e r  every one e ls e
load set us the example ”, .  .wrote A. H o lt , ,rwe reduced
our outward f r e i g h t s 11# By the end o f 1877 the Holt
Company was fo rced  to reduce them as low as 30/- per 
(16)
to n .
I t  was the rap id  ra te  of techn ica l p rogress , that 
took p lace by then, in  sh ipbu ild in g  industry  which always 
put new steamers in  a b e t te r  competitive p os it ion  and 
enabled them to undercut ex ist in g  ra te s  of f r e ig h t .  
Besides, the new outlook which most o f the European 
countries took towards the Eastern trade, a f t e r  the 
bu ild in g  of the Canal, had fu rth e r  in te n s i f ie d  comp­
e t i t io n  among shipping firms operating on the Canal route ,
    vtffM««■?«* ««vi*.i .. iuw i i..»
(15) ^/Hundred-years;vnis-toryi..of the P. & 0 . »  by Cable,
Boyd. published  in  1937, Chapter 23,
(16 ) Hyde, F .E . ,  uBlue Funnel*1.
• 1 0 0 .
During the 1680*8 and the 1880*3 , the opponents of 
the Suez Canal project In Britain  found it  impossible 
to believe that most of the European countries would
be able, or w illin g , to deal d irectly  with the Bast
„ * { 1 7 >”i f n the Canal project succeeded. Yet, the success
and the completion of the gigantic project in ;;1869
had done much1 to stimulate rosy expectations about the
future of the Bast era trade. Also, and unexpectedly,
the commercial success of the Sues Canal necessitated,
and certainly was conditioned by, the replacement o f
a l l  the ships which carried the Eastern trade before
1869 by new steamers. Under these new circumstances,
and motivated by patriotic  reasons too,- Europe an
countries were encouraged to build  up their mercantile
f le e ts  and to develop the ir trade with East of Suez,
B ritish  shipyards played a sign ificant part in bringing
about such change. In 1870 a l l  the steamers of the
.Worth German Lloyds and 60% of the Austruln Lloyds
were of English construction and until the f i r s t  world
war, B rit ish  yards continued to be swamped by European
(18)
orders. European t r a f f ic  In the Suez Canal increased
—WMwtwinfr j.wfr M*wpwmn» mmmuu*«.................... ..........................
(17) See Chapter 1,
(18) See Table Ho, B-S, Appendix B.
1 0 1 .
from 113*000 net tons In 1870 to  1,530*000 net tons
In 1890, Such growth was considerab le , hut It  was
much slower than that of B r it ish  t r a f f i c  during the
same period , From 1890 to 1910 B r it is h  t r a f f i c  was
s t i l l  r i s in g  ra p id ly ,  hut European countries were able
to develop th e irs  at oven  a f a s t e r  ra te .  European
tra ffics  in  the Canal was doubtless  co rre la ted  to the
development o f th e i r  steamship firm s. Diagram (6 )
shows a s ig n i f ic a n t  c o rre la t io n  between the growth o f
the Canal t r a f f i c  o f  eight European coun tr ies  -  France,
Motherlands, Germany, I t a l y ,  Austria-Hungary, Spain,
(19 )
Norway and Russia* -  and the development o f  th e ir  
steam tonnage*
The growth o f  sh ipping firm s trad ing  with the East 
In these countries  was, however, g rea t ly  helped by the 
generous su bs id ie s  which they obtained from th e ir  
governments and which enabled them to  undercut f r e ig h t  
ra te s  and to  charge lower fa re s  to th e i r  passengers*
The H essageries  Mari times rece ived  a subsidy o f  
£180,000 per year from the French government fo r  
carry ing mail to and from the East and tho period o f  
contract was made to  cover 20 years* Besides the  
French government paid to  the Company a considerable
102*
(19) European countries which had t r a f f i c  in  the Suez 
Canal during the period 1869-1913* See a lso  
Table No. B -3 , Appendix B*
M illion s  
o f tons.
DIAGRAM ( 6 ) .
T a-------- -
European t r a f f i c  in  the 
Suez Canal.
s «
Ret steam tonnage o f 
European countries whose 
t r a f f i c  is  represented 
in the diagram. . ^
T «i
U.K t r a f f i c  in the 
Suez Canal*
U.K net steam tonnage.
proportion  o f  the oasts  o f  b u i ld in g  th e ir  sh ips and
undertook to buy the ships i f  f o r  any reason the se rv ice
ceased. The Nord-Deutseher Lloyd rece ived  a subsidy
( 2 0 )
o f £800,000 per year from the German government.
This was a lso  c a l le d  a mail subsidy but from i t s  
magnitude i t  may f a i r l y  be looked upon as a trade  
bonus* Half of the subsidy  mentioned was sp e c i f ie d  
fo r  the A u stra lian  sec t ion  and the other h a l f  f o r  the 
re s t  o f the .East. German ships ca rr ied  goods to the 
Bast at r a te s  10/- to 15/- lower than those from 
L iverpoo l. I t  Is in te re s t in g  a lso  to  add that ra tes  
of f r e ig h t  and fa r e s  fo r  passengers o f  the German 
subs id ised  l in e  were f ix e d  aid con tro lled  by the 
Im peria l Chancellor. The. fo rego in g  were not the only  
companies known to  rece ive  subs id ie s , A u str ia , I t a ly ,  
Belgium and Russia had a lso  paid generously to th e ir  
shipping firms to  he lp  them in  estab lish ing; th e ir  trade  
with the Bast a f t e r  the cu tting  of the Canal*
• 103.
(80 ) These f ig u re s  are obtainable  in  p .p . 1897, V o l.IX ,  
le t t e r s  seat from seve ra l A u stra lian  co lon ies to 
J* Chamberlain in  re p ly  to h is  l e t t e r  to them.
Yet, there was no in d ica t ion , whether they 
rex^osented tho t o t a l ,  or only a portion  o f  the 
subs id ie s  which these French and German Lines  
obtained from th e ir  governments.
While mail services with the East which European
shipping firms performed * v ia  the Canal* had helped
them to obtain generous subsidies from their governments
and enabled them to arrange regular services at lower
freight rates* mail services which the P. & 0* carried
before 1869 with p ro fit  became a d isaster to the company
after the Canal was opened* According to contract
P* & 0* s t i l l  carried mail partly by railways between
Alexandria and Sues and. ff. *the heavy overheads and
onerous conditions of mail service brought P* <k 0*
revenue down by a quarter of a m illion sterling  a year
( 21)
to begin with and by nearly h a lf a m illion by 1878ff.
That situation obviously weakened the competitive 
position of the B ritish  company in the East* and 
although it  was la te r  given a mall subsidy of £85*000 
sterlin g  a year* and also  operated v ia  tho Canal* that 
subsidy was poorer than those given by European govern-* 
mants to their linos in sim ilar circumstances*
Another British  Lino* the Orient Mail Line*-was also 
granted a subsidy by tho government equal to that which 
tho P* & 0# obtained* Apart from these two B ritish  
Lines* B rit ish  shipowners trading with the East had
10 4*
(21) A Hundred Years History of the P, & Q ., by Gable 
Boyd* Chapter 23*
not boan given any assistance from the government 
and they, therefore, had a reason to claim that the 
practice of subsidisation which many European countries 
embarked upon since 1869, and particu larly  from 1896 
to 1901, had complicated, the competitive pattern in 
their trade and a r t i f i c ia l ly  lowered fre ights* In 
answer to their complaints, a select committee was 
appointed by the House o f Commons In 1901 to invest­
igate the matter# Tho Committee could not however 
establish  that subsidisation had affected freights to 
the extent o f lowering them* Yet, the Committee 
believed that the threat to British  ships from 
subsidised European lines vms a re a l one in so fa r  as
the China, Japan and Austra lia  trade was concerned,*
( 2 2 )
The fo llow ing which is a comparison of the 
freight rates charged by d ifferen t lines on drapery 
imported into Y ictoria , shows the ro le  which subsid­
isation  had probd>ly played*
106#
( 22) These rates are for ”the stock of drapery  
warehouse, but may also be considered as 
applicable to a l l  valuable goods requiring  
quick despatch11, P.P# 1897, VoX.LX, p*364.
X. From London via M arseilles to Melbourne, by the 
Messageries Meritimes, subsidised French Line, 35/­
per ton fo r  a l l  goods*
8* From London to Melbourne by the Orient Mail L|Lne# 
subsidised, 40/- per ton fo r heavy goods, 00/- pei 
ton fo r ligh t goods* j
3* From London to Melbourne by the P* & 0* Company
i
Line, subsidised, 45/- per ton fo r heavy goods, 6tf/-
] t
per ton fo r  ligh t goods* jj
4* From London to Melbourne by the Aberdeen Line/
i ;
30/- per ton for heavy goods, 40/- par ton fo r  l i ^ i t  
goods* j
5. From London to Melbourne by the Port lin e , 3d/­
per ton for heavy goods, 48/id, par ton for ligh t ■ 
goods*
8* From London bo Melbourne by Lund *s lin e , 30/­
per ton fo r heavy goods, 40/- per ton for light goods. 
7* From Bremen to Mo lb  our no by the Nord Bout ocher 
Lloyd’s Imperial Service, subsidised 55/- par ton* 
* f * wtaiding into consideration the duration and 
regu larity  of the voyages, the subsidised German and 
French Lines may be considered to be the cheapest, 
especially  as the fre igh t by the la tte r  includes 
carriage from London to M arseilles -  the port of 
departuretl *
107,
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l a  turn now to consider the influence of tho 
attempts which had been mad© during 'the period, 
1889-1913, to re s tr ic t  competition among shipowners 
trading with the East with a view to maintaining 
regu lar rates of fre ight* I t  is not,however, the 
object of this research to investigate the history  
of tho ’’Shipping Rings1* or “Shipping Conferences11,
t
which took place in th is particu lar trade since the 
early 1880’s, but only to find  out the extent to which 
they succeeded in lim iting competition in freights*
Tho idea of the conference was founded and had 
principally  been carried  by B rit ish  shipowners*
Later, mainly during the 1890 ’s and a fte r , some of 
the European Lines trading with the East joined them 
and that had undoubtedly strengthened the conference 
and raised rates o f fre igh t* For example, the, resu lts  
of the agreements between H o lts ’ Company and some 
r iv a l Dutch companies in ,1893 had the e ffect of ra is in g  
fre ight rates on both the outward and the homeward 
cargoes a fte r  they sank considerably to unprofitable  
levels in the previous years a fte r competition*
H o lt ’s had been able to ra ise  rates on fin e  tex t ile s ,  
in the same year 1898, by as much as 7/Sa* to: 10/- 
aad as rates on other goods were also raised, the 
Company’s net p ro fits  for 1895-1894 were nearly
double bhose o f the procoding year. The competition 
of tho shipping firms which rejected the idea of 
maintaining fre ights had often made i t  impossible 
to the conference Linos to stick  to the rates which 
they agreed to charge and bo maintain# The work Of 
the conference did not go, therefore, throughout tho 
period without several interruptions# An example can 
bo found In the B ritish  trade with the Straits Settle­
ments# A fter the opening of the Canal the re lation  of 
the outward to tho homeward trade was changing, more 
tonnage came to be required fox’ the general trade
outward to the colony than was needed fo r  the carriage
(24)
o f its  produce homewards# Competition fo r  homeward
108
(23)
»v«#> % rfi m «*»■; *<«■» ;t«<■ a* *  »■■ >c i.joMtinix •«
(83) ihe increase in Holt*a nets profits in 1894 was
also caused by other factors, mainly tho lowering 
of the Canal duos, the f a l l  in the price of coal 
and the employment o f the cheap Chinese seamen# 
See Hyde. P.B. , The Blue Funnel,
(24) Before the opening of the Suez Canal a large  
portion o f B rit ish  imports from the Straits  
Settlements was re-exported to Europe, but 
a fter that date this situation was changing 
as European countries were increasing their 
direct imports from the East# Meanwhile 
British  exports to the Straits Settlements 
continued to grow a fte r  1869. See also  
relevant parts in Chapter 4. Also, Of, Beggars.
The Effect of the Oponing of the Suez Canal 
on the Trade and Development of Singapore, 
publlahod in ' lour nal o f  the Mai ay an Bra rich 
of the Royal Asia t ic  Society” . Vol# 28, pt #I ,
1955. " ~
low*
cargo was therefor© so keen and except when tonnage 
was scarce, the large merchant In Singapore was 
almost in a situation  to dictate his terms on steam­
ship Lines* In the years 1885-87, conference existed, 
therefore, in the homeward trade from the Straits with 
a view to lim iting competition, hut i t  was discontinued 
from 1887 to 1895 then reconstituted to 1895 whan i t  
broke up again because of competition1 * In 1896 
tonnage v is it in g  Singapore for homeward cargo increased 
enormously so that freight rates were lowered to unpre- 
-cedented leve ls , the rates to Europe were as low as 
5/- for t in , and Q/3d for copra, sago, tapioca, pepper
and other bag goods5* **♦ In 1897 the conference was re -
( 2 5 )  .
established* Sometimes tho conference was threatened
because of disputes between members on the general
policy and when such situations developed, so that
some o f the Lines withdrew, competition returned and
fre igh t rates f e l l  considerably* In his evidence
before the Royal Commission on Shipping, Rings, 1909,
S ir J*L* Maekay, the director of B ritish  India Steam
(26)
Navigation Company reported that 1 in  the course of 
1905 a dispute arose between the P* & 0* Company and
(25) Royal Commission on Shipping Bings, P.B* 1909,
Vol* XLVII, see under the B ritish  trade with 
Singapore* i _
{26} See previous reference, Footnote (23 ), for the
evidence submitted by Sir J» L* Maekay, Q 19678, ‘‘ 
and subsequent*
Hanea Line, in regard to  the right of the P* & 0*
Company to load at Antwerp* The German Lin© withdrew 
from the conference and then a freight war ensued 
between the two linos fo r  freight between Middlesbrough 
and London and Calcutta** •Rates to the East, in  conse­
quence, f o i l  heavily and the conference had to lower 
its  rates11***
It  was very important to the conference, therefore, 
to adopt measures in order to meet the competition from 
outside fitrms* The conference *a firms agreed to carry  
goods from and to the ir r iv a ls 1 main ports at rates 
©qua! to those which the la tte r  would charge* J3ut as 
those r iv a ls  were mainly Europeans this policy was 
unjust to the B ritish  merchants and the data which 
were submitted to the Royal Commission on Shipping 
Rings to prove it  were more than su ffic ien t* For 
example,in 1B99 hardware was carried on conference 
ships from Amsterdam to Java, via Liverpool and Sues, 
at 20/- a ton, while B ritish  hardware carried in tho 
;samo vessels from Liverpool to Java, via Suess, was 
charged 30/- a ton* To give another example, iron  
goods were carried during the 18901s by conference1 
ships from Antwerp to the Far East, v ia  London and 
Sues, at S/~ to 10/- a ton less than a sim ilar cargo 
from London* As regards the carriage of th© East dm  
produce horaewai’ds, Mr. Charles Schle© o f the East India
110*
. (27 )
Ind China section of the London Chamber of Commerce, 
stated that B ritish  ships were carrying Eastern products 
to B rita in  at much M ^xor rates than they did to other 
European countries# Although the conference worked out 
a system or rebate to shippers who kept the ir customary
business to its  lin es , t?net ra tes ’* wore s t i l l  consider­
ably highdr than those which a free fre ight market would 
have regulated during the selected period* In fact some 
B ritish  merchants found it  cheaper fo r  them to ship
their goods to th© East v ia  continental ports and
obtain their Eastern requirements carried by European 
linos outside tho conference* Yet, such oases did not 
develop, simply because the cargo capacity of the 
European ships which re.fu.sod to Join, or withdrew from, 
tho conference could not be su fficient to serve the 
British  trad© with the East beside the ir trade therein* 
Consequently, the conference policy regards the carry­
ing of the British-Eastorn trade was bound to succeed*
m *
(27) See previous reference, Footnote gs, for the
evidence submitted by Mr* Charles Sohlee, Q*B508 
and subsequent*
Conclusions s
The above analysis showed that the employment
fostered and quickened by the Sues Canal* - The
in aoraa detail.* and i t  has been shown that the f a l l  
in the coat of the Eastern journey a fte r 1869 was 
partly  consequent upon technical progress in ship- !
a fte r  the build ing of the Sues Canal* However, the \
\
gain from technical progress in shipbuilding-was only j\
/ 11
rea lised  in practice when the Suez. Canal was used* / 1
Th© latter, particularXy in the short run, would
depend upon the supply of shipping tonnage in the / 
market, the demand fo r shipping services and tho 
degree of competition prevailing in the ra r t e t *  
Looking back to XS69 wo have found out that the 
opening of the Suez Canal had greatly increased the 
supply of the tonnage and th© degree of competition 
in the Eastern run* Th© increase in tonnage came 
through the growth in the number of steamships 
employed v ia  the Suez Canal* Tho increase in the
implications of th is situation have been w rkad out
building m d partly upon the shortening of the distance
However, th© reduction in shipping; costs would 
not necessarily be re flected  in lower fre igh t rates*/
1 1 3 *
degree of competition among shipowners was partly a 
resu lt o f th© Increase in tonnage, which was obviously 
fa ste r than the growth of th© requirements of the 
Eastern trade, and partly because of the unavoidable 
discrimination o f th© Sues Canal rout© against th© 
owners of sa ilin g  vessels who monopolized th© trade 
before 1S69. The la t te r  had to fight; against the new 
steamship firms in order to keep their business* Later 
sa ilin g  vessels owners had to fight for the ir survival 
but they lost the battle In a l l  the routes except that 
of Austra lia  where th© saving In distance by the Suez 
Canal was small* The ncut~throat,f competition between 
steam and s a i l  shipowners resulted in  a-heavy > fa ll In 
freight rates in a l l  Eastern routes including that of 
Australia* Obviously the lower freight ra to s  which 
steamship owners were able to o ffer against their  
competitors reflected, the decrease in the ir costs 
consequent upon technical progress and the use of 
the Suez Canal* Competition among the firms operat­
ing steamships on the Eastern run via the Suez Canal 
m a also  vigorous and resulted In heavy cuts in freight  
rates* Unlike the other case, lower freight ra tes  here 
re flected  the fin an c ia l strength of the Individual 
steamshipping companies and their a b ility  to cut down 
their costs or the ir pro fit margins# In this respect 
the new European steamship firms were favoured by the
generous subsidies which they received from their
governments to encourage their growth. On the other
hand B ritish  shipowners had hardly been given.any
subsidies (except the P. c& 0. ard the Orient Steam
Line). Besides.the B ritish  shipowners suffered from* *
the competition in the Eastern run a fte r the opening 
o f the Canal more than their European competitors 
because i t  was they who owned the largest number of 
sa ilin g  vessels which carried tho Eastern trade before 
1889. This situation  would help to explain why the 
attempts for lim iting  the degree of competition among 
shipping firms had f i r s t  started among B ritish  shipowners 
trading with the East. It has been shown that the work 
of the ”Conference” had succeeded particu larly  a fte r 1890 
nevertheless as many of the European firms trading with
th© East wore unwilling to share with the B rit ish .In  the/
11 Conference11 and continued to servo their countries 
at lower rates of fre ight B ritish  trade with the East 
was bound to be unfavourably affected.
114*
THE COSf OB U8IMG MBS SUBS OMAL. (1873*1913)
Diagram (7) shows that tho Canal dues woa?o radix cod 
between 1873 and 1885* kept at a constant rat© from 
1885 to X908 ar.& then war© reduced again u n til 1915* 
i t  was probably that in the f i r s t  of those iBriods* 
where competition was so intense between shipping 
firms trading with the East* reductions in  dues had 
not added to the p ro fits of steamship owners operating 
on the Canal rout© but were rather re flected  in lower 
fre igh t rates* Yot* the situation  during the early  
X8SQ fa was d iffe ren t from this generalisation, by 
that time Canal t ra f f ic  was r is in g  rather rapid ly  
whilst the conditions o f the navigable channel of the 
waterway had not been much improved since 1869* As a 
resu lt of this factor* and also because o f the deter­
ioration in the services of the Canal p ilo ts* the 
average time spsntt in transiting  th© Canal was notably 
ris ing* Thu.s the re la tiv e  advantages of tho Suoss 
Canal wore reduced and t  his meant that the cost 
involved in using i t  was e ffec tive ly  increased, 
InfOMation on tho subject reveals that some t ra f f ic  
•was deferred from using tho Canal rout© under these
U S .
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In  B r ita in , 'bu ild ing another canal, beside  the  
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/ and Suez*./ The B r it is h  government -  o f w hie h Glads tone •'• v f
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was Prime M in ister -^decided  to sponsor th is  idea and’
reached a n agreement about it w ith .De Lesseps*
rM§
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■ : tbift d a1 a ir i n < •h*r»tjn« 1 h hflhwAtin fcViAr.-hwn .Qua a :":vua a .*>/. • .,/? '
t i l l
... the elay i .t r a n s it  bet ee  the two Seas was 
d iscu ssed ,'an d  there  were many; suggestions of 
, b u ild in g  another Canal to  so lve  i t .  v?9Mr* G ile s ,
-member fo r  Southampton introduced a ,v e ry  p ra c t ic a l §f|p 
. note. Speaking a s 'a n  engineer, he observed  that 
one Canal double the present w id th  would be more 
.. . u se fu l than two harrow ones* The present t r a f f i c
.>..'•; "Of twelve sh ips d a ily  and, the ta lk  o f  the necessity
..■ /' fo r  two Canals was id le *  The-"existing Canal could  
5 i be widened fo r  less ' than.’h a lf  the ,co3t o f  making
- a new channel* ,As to t o l l s ,  from Cape to  Bombay
.. ' /was, 4,450 miles longer than via-;Suez -  Equivalent 
/ at 10 knots to  1 8 ^d ay s . Deducting two and a
: ; h a lf  days t  the; average t ime taken in  making the t  ' ;*W
h'?.-.; t ran s it  .'between'; ’Por.t;;:3ald" ;ard-. Sue z the; ex t i»a
time was reduced to 16 days* The question was 
one o f  figu res*, T r a f f ic  was being driven  away 
:;;/>;/be.caus © i ,<the/,:t oils*/ o f t e n ; c os t; more than; 16 days * ■
:f;;;/: ;3t.aamlhg'*:..*;*?:.n,;>;('wiison, / *T * i  SuezfSa^nali/p*74)* .
•//'' ■/■’•H.. ■ r '■ '^/"f /'i'll .  ^ ;••/':' . . ' ■ '
’.^;That'./was;-; a n int e l l ig e n t  observation* ;;L Y e t . ;it''-.; •
f  v' should .be made c le a r  that b f f l c i a l  Caiial duds did  
. not cost as much as 16 days? steaming* f tta t
c hAnnw bhrl i n  wa.ci ! «  n. n n.<? 1 c\ <vr*«b T «  : -r* 1 ft a '4 rr th  aI .^ appened i  fa c t  as a co sidera le  r i s e  in  t e 
actua l cost of using the Canal  due to  the main-
. a llow  the P i lo t  to board the sh ip  fo r the, t r a n s it *  
This was; overcome by the P ilo t  proceeding in  a % r ./
■ . .. ///-//•-;
- f . ‘ • t'* I'V’Av -;'v ;• v; -/V /•; :•
.. , . . : ; ■' /'/■ t & t s - v///
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sm all boat ahead o f th e  ship and shouting h is  
, in stru ction s  to the Captain on the b ridge*  
Under these circumstances some tra n s its  took 
up to fou r or > f iv e  , days arid some even 10/15 
days * . Obviously that was the main fa c to r  
which reduced the r e la t iv e  advantages o f the  
Canal by that tim e, (See A Hundred Years 
H istory  o f the P, & , by Cable Boyd).
(29 ) For the o r ig in a l agreement between the 
B r it is h  government and the Suez Canal 
Company la  July 1883 see Egypt, No* 17, 
1883, pp ,44 -5 , or W ilson, A . f * , p *65-7.
Tho agreement also designed a programme 1so reduce
transit dues of the Sue a Canal with the increase
in the Company *s pro fits un til a minimum of 5 franca
per ton was reached# Besides? De Lesseps agreed to
diminish pilotage dues gradually and to treat ships
in ba llast d ifferen tly * This agreement, .known la te r
as uLondon Programme*1* was signed on July 1883 and
was not universally  welcomed in Britain* la  the
follow ing months* d issa tis fied  with the agreement^the
^Association of Steamship Owners Trading with the 'East11
contacted tho Oaml Company and succeeded in reaching
•(30)
another agreement by November of the s mm year*
As regards the delays in transit between the two Be as* 
which wore expected to  develop with further expansion, 
of the Saat^Weat trade* the makers of that second 
agreement saw reasonably that it  would either be 
solved by constructing another oam l or by enlarging  
the Sam Canal# As regards pilotage dues* it  was 
agreed to extinguish them entirely  from the f i r s t  
of July 1884* D ifferent treatment for traversing  
ships in ba llast was confirmed# Besides* as In the 
f i r s t  agreement* but on a d ifferen t s lid in g  scale* 
transit dues were also to be diminished as p ro fits
(30) "For the o r ig in a l  agreement between Association  
of*'SteamshiprOwners Trading with hie East” and 
Suess Canal Company see Bgypt* No.5* 1884 
0*3850* o r W ilson* A*T.* pp,82-;85*
1 1 7 ,
x is  %
increased u n t i l  a minimum o f 5 francs per ton was
reached* Most import ant 9 however, the makers o f th©
f i r s t  arrl the second agreements could not fo resee
that the enlargem ent.o f  the e x is t in g  Canal md- the
reduction  o f i t s  dues would prove e s s e n t ia l, - whether
the p r o f it s  o f the company increased or decreased, i f
the costs o f  the Eastern -voyage v ia  the Buns Canal,
th© sh orter rou te , were to  he kept lower than that o f
the Gap rou te , o r , indeed, i f  the Canal route was to
be used as auoh an not*
In  the years fo llo w in g  1883 the n ecess ity  o f
improving the Canal was recognised# Between 1884
and 19X3, 209#887 m il* francs wore spent on deepening
and widening tho Canal in  order that i t  could be used
(81)
by steamers which were growing constan tly  in  a tee*
(31 ) The la rg e s t  steamer which had passed through the 
Canal in  1884 was th e Orient Company fs 8*3. 
l u s t r a ! 1* o f gross tonnage o f  6,685 tons and 
a draught o f 27  f e e t ,  when fu l l y  loaded, w hile 
the maximum depth perm itted , at the tim e, fo r  
ships naviga ting the Canal was >34 fe e t  and 8 
inches * tn  the fo llo w in g  years la rg e r  and 
la rg e r  (a te o ) steamers were b u ilt  in  the U.K* .
The la rg e s t  steamer launched in  II. li# in  1805 
was the "G eorgia” o f 3.0,077 gross tons (th e  
Economist. 1898 Feb# $2) and th© la rg e s t  
steamer 'launched in  1899, xn r*he d* K*, was 
the "Oceanic” o f 17,274 gross tons (the 
Economist, 1900. Feb# 17) Tho Canal Company 
had th e re fo re  to spend an in creas in g  portion  
o f  p r o f it s  on improving the channel, s in ce 
otherw ise business would have been lo s t  to  
the Cap© route#
Navigation by ligh t  during tho night was a lso  
intraduet©d by 1887 and that of i t s e l f  had almost 
doubled the capacity of the Canal and tM s helped 
sign ifican tly  In ending the delay a in transit between 
Sues and Fort Said. With, regard to dues* the propos­
ition  concerning ships in b a lla s t  was carried on by 
tho Canal Company as planned in the 18831 a agreements* 
Dues on ships with cargo were reduced by 60 centimes 
in 1884 but were maintained constant a fte r  that at 
their level of 9*50 francs per ton until 1908, 
although pro fits  of the company had been ris ing  
remarkably since the early  3.8901 a (see fable 10)*
The Canal Company, in fac t, observed neither it s  
agre em ent wi th t he Bri t i  a h g ov err me nt $ nor t he 
agreement reached with the Ship Owners trading with  
the la st  * As explained e a r lie r , constant dues meant,
that a r is in g  wo portion of the cost o f any voyage
( 88)
via  the Suer. Canal was paid to the Canal Company*
(38) The London Chanher o f Shipping pointed out to
the Board of Trade in a le t te r  dated 15th March 
1904 that, **In the year 1883 the proportion of 
Suez Canal Dues to the freight earned was very 
much less than it  is at the present time* A 
vessel taking coal to ports East o f the Suez 
Canal may now have to pay about one half of her 
outward earnings and one-fourth of her homeward 
earnings in  Canal dues alone1** •» Xn the ligh t  
of Diagram (5 ) technical progress was constantly 
reducing the working costs of s toon ships, while 
Canal duos wore maintained at a constant rate 
between 1885 aid 1908*
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Nevertheless# although th© burden o f the OamX dues 
was notably f e l t  over soma periode o f time abeam- 
ships p a r t ic u la r ly  those which served In d ia  and 
other Far .Eastern c o lo n ie s  maintained th e ir  depend­
ence on the Canal throughout the period* I t  is  
ind ispu tab le that the great saving la  the cost o f 
shipping m d the time of the Eastern voyage was the 
prime reason fo r  th is  dependence* Besides* the 
p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  p ick ing up in term ediate fr e ig h ts  and 
passengers was much g rea te r  when steamers trad in g  
w ith  th© East passed bnrough the Mediterranean Boa 
and Sa&z Canal# Secondly* ships paid lower insur­
ance ra te s  when they used the shorter and the sa fe r  
route* T h ird ly , m ail a d  passenger t r a f f i c  p re fe rred  
the us© o f th© Canal* fo r  purposes o f  speed and * 
re g u la r ity *  and as thQj were always very remunerative 
they in d ir e c t ly  subsid ised  the carry ing  o f  merchandise* 
Xn 1903* a f t e r  the dividends pat d per Sues Canal 
share reached 85$* the Canal Company decided to  
reduce tra n s it  dues to  8*50 f r .  per ton and in  the 
fo llo w in g  years two other reductions took place* so 
that duos stood at 6*85 fa?* per ton In 1.913* Whether 
or not such reductions had a ffe c te d  fr e ig h ts  charged 
by lin e s  operating on the Canal rou te can not bo 
determined in  the &> sane a o f s u f f ic ie n t  Inform ation*
At any rate* we must expect that a portion of such
reductions In dues had boon -added to  the p r o f i t s  
o f the shipowners * s in ce  com petitIon between them 
was very  much lowered during th© period*
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*Year«
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3.869
1870
1871 
1878
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880 
1Q8X 
1882 
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888 
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901 
1908
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
191
191;
B ice
Burmaii 
Pep Ton
fcex*
l i i g l lQ  s t  
78/6
100/­
1 0 2 / 6
97/6
87/6
80/-
60/ • 
57/8 
65/«* 
6 5 / «  
88/6 
60/«
47/6 
3^
39/­
38/9
42/6
50/-
40'/-
42/8
38/9
30/«
33/9
30/
O J-v / a  /ovi/ v?
40/­
33/9
28/3 
2 4 / — 
8 5 / -
25/-8? 
25/. 
25/-
84/— 
84/6 
27/6
Lowe st
5 2/ o3 *
6 5 / ­
72/6
88/6
78/8
68/6
6 5 / ­
30/­
40/­
58/8
58/3
47/6
41/3
27/6
87 
50/­
30/-
!M0toP»a«M£p «rcW*tMfeiKXt'cs**b8
C alcu tta
Ton G ilcu tta  
Scale
High© st
100/ ­
98/6
9 5 / -
i
80/- 40/-
35/.“ 60/-
75/- 6Q/~
65/- 40/.“
60/- 45/—
42/6 27/6
37/6 32/6
33/9 27/6
35/- 27/6
60/- 30/-
4:5/ «■» . <30/—
27/6
32/6
00/ "
/ Karacb 
x Freigh
22/6
12/  6
o n Ayo/ a
21/3 
18/6 
15/ - 
83/9
20i/e
23/9
15/­
80/- 
20/« 
16/3 
13/9
3.0/6
17/6
18/9
21/3
27/6
82/6
Scale
Rates
36/o 
40/­
35/3 
30/6 
32/6 
5 0/— 
22/6 
32/6 
37/6 
31/3 
31/3 
25/­
83/9 
21/3 
30/-
0/ o 
20/*
2 0 / ­
24/9
2/6 
36/3
K J & f
18
Calcutta Seal©
bQWQSJ
9 Q / « 
6 0 / « 
90/-
O o ff00 
Ceylon
Ton. Colombo
_    Scale
High©at
100/­
9 0 / -
85/­
80/-
80/­
60/­
60/­
7 0 / -
3£
5 0/ -
45/;
Lowest 
65/
55/­
60/-
75/­
78/6
65/
87/6
*5/0
F3 b /  - 
57/6 
4 5 / -
Mow Scale
37/6
38/6
■3SC "•jtruwrKertfCM/ O 30/-
22/6
32/6 
12/5 
20/­
82/6 
18/6 
12/S 
15/­
22/6 
25/­
81/3 
19/6 
16/3 
17/6 
20/6 
17/­
17/6 
18/9 
12/6 
80/ — 
1 3 / 6  
21/3 
27/6 
20/6
(iV/t
011 Jut® from <Jalcutta 1884
General
. Bombay 
Ton Bombay 
Scale
Highest
65/ 
5 ' 
60/ 
53/9
58/6 
42/6 
40/ »  
50/­
45/­
48/6 
37 ‘/b
Lowest
35/­
52/6
50/­
47/6
42/8
37/6
17/6
Vt A  J  O x ,,
36/3
17/6
17/6
Mew Scale
30/­
30/-
27/8
88/9
31/3
16/3 
17 /6
15/- 
13/-
13/9
g7/g - u,13/9
88/9 17/6
28/6 10/-
20/- 13/-
23/6 10 / *W
18/6 11/6
16/ 0 6/-
18/0 3/ «
30/— 15/-
19/3 14/—
«50 /AXL* 18/6
18/ - 10/-
14/6 8/9
17/6 12/6
19/- 13/-
17 / 10/-
17/6 13/9
13/6 11/“
13/- b/7|
19/6 13/ -
19/9 15/to
19/- 13/6
23/- IS/..
19/- 12/
per to t (20 ci
General
Xaracbl 
Ton Karachi” 
Scale. ... ---
Highest
85/­
55/-
dd/«*
48/6
37/­
47/6
58/3
43/9
40/-
27/6 
<3
88/9
25/­
28/9
28/3 
26/­
25/­
19/6 
81/3 
20/ -  
13/ 6
88/8 
21/­
17/3 
16/ S 
16/6 
19/- 
17/ -  
17/­
18/9 
14/- 
16/­
17/6 
18/6 
26/­
80/71
vts ) a n d
a )1^ *  mean yearly  fre ig h t rates on certa in  goods carried  by steamer:?
from the undermentioned ports to the U.K, and (b )th e  percentage 
^...flUQtuations_in.-SUCh.,rate3...,1900...« .100.  ......     .
| { ;  . ' (a.) Mean Yearly Freight Rates.
' . ( ABPEUDIX B , TABLE B - l .  )  12,4
. iv:
P o rt  I  
whence > 
shipped J
C a lcu tta .
i
\
C a lcu tta . 1 
1
R ic e  P o rts. J a v a . A u s tra lia .
1
N e w  Z e a lan d . J N e w  Z.- Ja i.it ,
C la ss  of 1 
Goods J J u te .
G e n e ra l
C a rg o .
. R ic e .
S u g a r, 
R ic e ,  & c .
F ro z e n
M u tto n ! F ro z e n  M u tto n .
G rc ii. W o o l.
Scale
P e r T o n  
C a lcu tta  
• S cale.*
... ' ------  -
P e r  T o n  
. C a lcu tta  
S cale, f
P e r T o n .f
P e r  T o n  ■ 
J a v a  S cale.*
P e r L b . t P e r  L b .J P e r  L b .J
Y e a r . . «• d . a .  d . s . c l s. d . d . d . c l
41884 ■ 37 0 — T 42 6 2 2  ' $  a n d  £
1885 35 0 38  10 38 11 40 0 2  a n d  1$ $  a n d  J
1886 30 71 * 2 30  114 33 7 33 9 H 14  '
n
«
1887 31 3 31  6 35 84 36 3 * 1 ' 1$  a n d  1 4  . $  a n d  $
.1888 4 5 - 0 34  1 35 2 42 6 18 1 4  a n d  1$ $  a n ti A
1889 37 (5 38  . 5 $ 39 8 47 6 J 1 4  a n d  l j $  a n d  a
1890 29 31  10$ ‘ 33 34 37 . G H 1 4 ,  1$ , a n d  1 $  0 i d
1891 36 3 33  10 fc 36 6 $ 38 9 1 1 4 ,  *1$, a n d  1
1892 23 28  2 $ 28
n
32 1 0 4 . * 1 4 ,  1 ,  a n d  4 (I J,,]d  &  ‘
1893 25 3 25  104 27 1 4 ^ . 31 104 2.. • 8 l i ,  1 ,  a n d  4 A i . . « l  4
1894  . 27 6 28  l i 29 2 $  • 33 9 - • X  8 1 A a n d  4
1895 24 3 23  l j 25 84 28 9 ' }  • 1 ,  •$$, a n d  $ . f  a n d  4
1896 17 6 17  9 19 3 $ . 24 44
n
s 1 ,  a n d  $ a  a n d  4
1897  ’ 23 9 19  11$ 2 0 27 G 01 0 1 ,  $ ,  a n d  4 a  a n d  4  •
1898 30 0 28  2 4 29 6 • 32 6 010 $  a n d  £ k  - .
• 1899 28 1 1• 2 28  8 | 27 1 0 4 31 3
0
1 1 0 $  a n d  4 t V ,  a n d  4
1900 26 3 27  0 $ 28 32 104 01 (5 $  a n d  4
7
TIT
1901 2 2 3 21  3 } 2 2 5 $ 25 104 1a $  a n d  4 »3 ,
1902 20 0 19  2 20 1 0 $ 22 6 1•<5 $  a n d  4 7jl (T
1903 19 4 ^ 19  5 22 1 24 0 1• • ‘A $  a n d  J
a
3
(b.) Percentage Fluctuations as compared with the year 1900.=
..
• .1884 ■ 143 129  • 356  . 320 • 157  -
,■ i
11 • 1885 133 144 137 . 122 • 267 300 157
1
) 1886 117  • 114 118 • ’ 103 222 240 143  ’
I 1887 119 . 1 1 6 . 126 . 110 178 260 157
1888 171 126 124 129 156 220 157
1889 143 142 139 ‘ - 144 178 220 157
1890 112 ‘ 118 * 117 114 222 200 157  : '
‘ 1
1891 138 . 125  * ‘ 129 118 178 200 ' 157
U 1892 88 104 . * 1 0 0 , 100 133 160 129  .
f
i  ' 1893 9G 96 •• 9 5 . 97  . 156 160 129
£r 1894 105 104  • ’ 103 103 156 160 129
' 1 
\ 'I
1895 .92 . SO 90 87 133 137 129  ,
1896 07 66 68 74 111 140 129  ..
\ • 1897 • 90 ■ ■ 74 72 84 100 120 129  *
j 1 1898 114 104 104 99 100 4 100 114
■ 1 1899 1 0 7 ' . 106 98 95 100 1 0 0  .- 129
vvs.» 1900 100 . 1 0 0 100 100 100 * 1 0 0 ‘ 1 0 0
1901 85 • 79 79 79 89 100 86  .
. p
{  i
V ’*
* 1902 76 71 73 •68 89 • 100  ' 100
1 1903 |  74 72 78 ' 73 89
. ? .......
: 100 86
* Rates extracted from circulars issued by Messrs. Angler Brothers, London, 
t  >, ,» „  ,, ' t t, >} »  Cairns, Noble & Co., Nowcastle-on-Tyno.
$ Rates supplied by firms maintaining regular services of vessels in these trades.
1 *SOURCfej PA*UAM6*TAAY 4>APK« , V©k, L*XX IV# »9o5* P. $2* %
AP;.im)IX { Table i i - 1)  U©£s Parliamantar-y Papers
Vol. LXXXIV - 1 9 0 5 , p* 3 3 0
O.iv. Outward Prsl.KM.Ra^^
( (a) th© Mean Yearly Freight Rates on certain classes ol‘ Goods carried 
by Steamships from the United kingdom to the undermentioned Ports 
during each of the SO yearsp 1 8 8 4  to 1 9 0 5 $ and (b) the Percentage 
Fluctuations in such Ratos as compared with the year 1 9 0 0 ,,}
(a) ,  Mean Yearly Freight Rates*
Port t o
v/hich
Shipped
yew &©aland dev/ -Sealand ivew Zealand
Gloss of Fine Rato Medium Rate Rough Rato,
Goods» {Fine fontilea atc *} ( lines j, Spirit a s Seeds, (Furniture, Hardware
etc *)
Seal e For T o n  o f  m Per Ion o f 
4 0  Cubic Foot.4* •
Per Ton of.,. ... '
4 0  Cubic Feet ... 4 0  (^bio Foeti- ...
Year 5  * cl. s • cE. s, d.
1 3 8 4 7 5  0 6 5  0 6 0  0 \
1 8 8 5 3 5  0  to 7 0  0 £ 5 5  0  to 6 0  0 4 5 0  to 5 0  0
1 8 8 6 7 0  0 6 0  0 5 0  0
1 8 3 7 7 0  0 6 0  0 5 0  0
1 8 3 8 7 0  0 6 0  0 5 0  0
1 8 0 9 8 0  0 7 0  0 6 0  0
1 8 9 0 3 0  0 7 0  0 6 0  0
1 8 9 1 4 5  0  to 7 0  0 3 7  6  to 6 0  0 3 0 0  to 5 0  0
1 8 9  2 4 5  0  to 7 0  0  - 4 0  0  to 6 0  0 . 3 5 0  to 5 0  0 H
. 1 8 9 3 4 0  0  to 4 2  6 3 7  6  to 4 0  0 3 0  0 §! 1 8 9 4 4 8  6 4 0  3 3 0  0
1 8 9 5 5 0  0  to 5 5  0 4 0  0  to 4 5  0 3 0 0  to 3 5  0
1 8 9 6 5 5  0 4 5  0 3 5  0
' 1 8 9 7 5 5  0 4 5  0 3 5  0
1 8 9 8 5 5  0 4 5  0 3 5  0
1 8 9 9  
, 1 9 0 0 , . ,,
5 5  0  
5 5 - 0  to 6 0  v
4 5  0
. 1  - ‘ T ‘--  . \ .'£ ' '■ 35 - *
3 5 ..,. 0 ,
- 1 0  ito 4 Q1 ; . 0  1 : ' ' , i ■ ./gsn'
1901 ■
.* ’ * 's’' • 1 - . • .* * , -J ' * *• .A’ \ >'. > . • ■: . < vO" .•
• 6 0  0  ‘
. •' y f "?•*. *;*, . ‘V • _ ’ V, . R’riX «'
-iiv ~ ': ’m
-Vi
4 0  0
1 9  OS.... 6 0  0 4 5  0 4 0  0
1 9 0 3 6 0  0 4 5  0  • 4 0  0
(b ) Percentage Fluctuations as compared with the year 1 9 0 0
1 8 8 4 1 3 0 1 4 4 1 6 0
1 8 8 5 1 1 7 1 2 8 1 2 7
1 8 8 6 1 8 2 1 3 3 1 3 3
1 8 8 7 1 2 2 1 3 3 1 3 3
1 8 8 8 1 2 8 1 3 3 1 3 3
1 8 8 9 1 3 9 1 5 6 1 6 0
1 8 9 0 1 3 9 1 5 6 1 6 0
1 8 9 1 1 0 0 1 0 8 1 0 7
1 8 9 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 3
1 8 9 3 7 2 8 6 8 0
1 8 9 4 7 4 0 9 8 0
1 8 9 5 9 1 9 4 8 7
1 8 9 6 9 6 1 0 0 9 3
1 8 9 7 9 6 1 0 0 9 3
1 8 9 8 9 6 1 0 0 9 3
1 0 9 9 9 6 1 0 0 9 3
1 9 0 0 1 0 0 - 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 9 0 1 1 0 4 1 0 0 1 0 7
1 9 0 8 1 0 4 1 0 0 1 0 7
1 9 0 3 1 0 4 1 0 0 1 0 7
an Kates supplied by a firm maintaining a regular service 
of vessels in the trade.
'I'ABLE (B -  1 )
U.K . Outward. F re igh t Rates
yuea of* ^reipfofc In  Goal Tpada from Wale a to  Bombay 1870-1913
. 186.
Per Ton. or 20 cwt. 1
Year Highest Rate Lowest Rata Average
■ • ‘ M
4
1370 32/- 25/— 28/6
\*r
%
71 30/— 22/- 26/-
7B
73
74 
76
28/­
30/— 
29/—
83/­
24/­
22/-
25/8
87/­
25/6
Compiled from ;jj 
R* A • V*1 Angl ©3?f 
11 F i f t y  Years 1 /|
76
77
78
83/­
24/­
37/6
18/­
17/6
23/-
20/6
80/9;
50/5
Published in  !f| 
London, 1920
79 30/— 25/- 27/- r/||i
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88 
89
27/6 
20/— 
28/— 
19/a
19/6
la / ­
16/— 
24/6 
25/­
21/­
18/6
20/- 
14/ 6 
14/8 
14/6 
14/6 
14/S
12/0
18/6 
14/9 
15/—
8S/0
17/3
18/3
17/­
17/-
16/lJ-
14/S
19/3
21/9
17/10-1
15/9
m. St a t 1 s t! c a l Jg 
.Tables Published;
: by Angler 
1 had only M 
! s ta ted  the '£
-■ h ighest and ,/Jl 
; lowest ra tes *|§ 
quoted during {p  
the course o f 3  
any year* M
91 13/3 8/9 10/—
92 13/— 8/6 10/9 II93 12/- 7/6 9/9 "I
94 18/- S/9 9/4| ■
95 12/0 7/3 , 9/10|96 19/— * / . 11/— 15/— "II- 97
98
20/6 10/S 15/6
*yl
17/6 - 11/- 14/9
CO CO 17/- 11/- 14/6
1900 50/— 14/8 20/9 *■* -s li
01 15/— 9/- 12/-
. 02 13/3 8/3 10/9 m
05 io / — 8/3 9/-
04 10/6 6/- 8/3
r&j
05 11/6 6/6 9/- \ .106
07
12/3
ll/ 6
Q/~
s/—
io/1-i
-'i?!
08 
| 09
14/3
9/9
9/6
7/-
11/ io 'l
8/4$ ' l
1 10 11/- 7/6
f n
9/3 11
i i i
: IS
18/— 
I 15/- 9 ^ 1
10/4-|
12/-
•'7 \
•1lo . 14/6 10/6 12/6
187
cm
i
a
eg.<qfU
cq
N
H
Q
fft
p4
<S|
GO
ft
flj
sp;
rd©
45
0
<D
H
©
©
fJ3
no
W
a
03
&
0)
a'atopf
©
ft
P
5'4
ft
o
CH
*
M*
d
H
43
H
*HH
ro
0
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OS3
d
P
M ’ #’
fco
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da
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$
O
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d
o4*
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a
ft
©
r*0 H ft as rii.p
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ft
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d
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a
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ft
m
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APPENDIX C" -  PRITISH- RE-EXPORTS OF THE-PRODUCE' ' . "■ ^
v : - , OE THE .EASTERN EMPIRE,; * 1855-1913.
:2 : Y v -  .APPENDIX-D -  THE TRADE-POLICY OF EASTERN EMPIRE 
. . , . DURING THE PERIOD 1869-1913, '. -
K'X‘ ‘ 1 * yt « ‘ * * * • . i '*  ^ ' ”<• '• < r% * +‘J i;■ '^ ■ v S*••’ -- *v ,. ?'*'•.  ^4T f' * ' , V V'*^ ' . ' * 'V1
'• -f/';*' •«,, : Vi4’u' v ! w ' ' y ■-•, ..'•',.1 •<
* ' - V
3^1
• ‘>*V, ^..'p.: r\.v’v v .v . :v: . :t:-s
vt>/;■ ‘:v-:' p, i*’. • J" v *• \ -:4c, • ’• »***.;, 1*^1%
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A -  THE DEVELiOPMffl TOP BRITISH IMPORTS FROM
' EASTBiM EMPIRE.,-, (1869 -  1913) .
- <? * • *T
F irs t  t ffhe Development o f the Imports D irected  fo r
  ■ ■ CX) 1 ■ •
Re-Export Purpose*
In  rev iew ing the B ritish/B *B * trade f o r  the period
which ended 1869 in. Chapter 2 -  we saw that imports o f
Indian  cotton fo r  B r it ish  consumption began to  dim inish
ra p id ly  fo r  s e v e ra l reasons from the la te  1860 !s* For
the same reasons such a trend  was m aintained a f t e r  1870*
. • \
A fte r  the opening of the Suez Canal B r i t is h  imports of
Indian cotton f o r  re -ex p o rt  purpose, had a lso  s ta rted  to
(2 )  • • \ : ’ . 
dec lin e* An I t a l i a n  or an Austrian  cotton spinner who
form erly  depended on London or L iverpoo l to get the raw
m ateria l he wanted w ithin fourteen dtfja was now ab le  to
arrange his business d ir e c t ly  w ith  In d ia  and to  obtain
h is requirem ents w ith in  a s im ila r  time* The annual .
report on Indian trad e , as i t  appeared in  the papers
(1 ) See. Appendix "CM fo r  the s t a t i s t i c a l  methods which
I  have used in  estim ating tlie value of B r it is h  - . 
re -exp o rts  o f the produce o f B*E* during the 
period  1855-1913* ,
{2 }  Re-exports of Indian cotton began to decrease h eav ily  
immediately a ft e r  the end o f the A m erican ,c iv il war 
o f the 186.01a * Nevertheless i t  is  the long terra trend  
o f that trad e , i * e . , b e fo re  and a f t e r  the American war, 
which has been taken in to  consideration  when measuring 
i t s  d ec lin e  a f t e r  the opening o f the Canal*
presented to Parliam ent, paid  frequent a tten tio n  to the * 
ra p id  growth o f d ire c t  exports o f cotton a f t e r  1869 to  
France, I t a ly ,  A u str ia , Germany, Russia and other 
European co u n trie s . At the same time the repo rt showed* 
that such a trend had always meant dim inished exports of 
th is  item to  the mother country. The rep o rt s ta ted : ■
”the exp lanation  was that in  England Ind ian  cotton had 
been used in  a decreasing degree s ince  the Indian  m ills  
entered upon e f fe c t iv e  com petition with the Lancashire  
m ills  in  the spinning o f the lower counts fo r i which the  
Indian cotton was mainly used* . What was shipped to  
England was to  a very la rg e  extent re -sh ip p ed  to the .
continent and now. i t  is  go ing d ire c t  to the Continent
. . • . • . .. ' ' ’ (*>  
from In d ia  to  the saving o f f r e ig h t  and other charges*"' * . > . . . ' | v * '
1 3 0 .
(3 )  Parliam entary Accounts and Papers Vol*LXVI,1893« 
A lso  see the Economist* March 11, 1876,f see 
Commercial H isto ry  and Review o f 1875 f o r  a 
paper on 1 the E ffe c t  o f the Suez Canal (1870-74) 
on the Shipping Trade, and on The Commerce 
between Ind ia  and England and Ind ia  and the . 
Rest o f Europe”. This paper was prepared by 
Charles Magniae and read  by him be fo re  the  
Indian  Section o f the Society o f A r t s t bn •
18th F eb ., 1876.
The dec lin e  in  B r it is h  imports o f c o ffe e  was also  
connected w ith  the growth o f d ire c t  exports of that 
item from Ceylon and In d ia  to  Europe a f t e r  1869, 
Furthermore, such d ec lin e  was bound to  happen in  a 
d ra s t ic  manner as the re -ex p o rt  r a t io  of co ffe e  imports 
was as h igh  as 80$ -  or above -  by that tim e. However 
as Ceylon, o f  a l l  the B r it is h  Empire in  the East, was 
the main su p p lie r  o f co ffe e  to  the mother country one 
must be c a re fu l not to a t tr ib u te  the d ec lin e  in  the 
imports o f  th is  item s o le ly  to th© decline o f re -exp o rt  
trade* Hem ilela V a s ta t r ix , a co ffee  d isease  s ta rted  
to attach  co ffe e  plantations in  Ceylon in  1869 and 
subsequently the co ffe e  a rea  in  that colon|r shrank to  
only about 5,000 acres by th© e a r ly  1880»a compared 
w ith  176,000 a c re s :at the beginning o f the tro u b le .
In d igo , and a lso  other kinds o f  dyestu i'fs , severa l 
types of o ils e e d s , s i l k ,  hides and ap ices were a l l  
imported from In d ia , S t ra its  Settlem ents, Malaya, and 
Ceylon to  be mainly re -exp o rted  to the continent of 
Europe* These trad es  were therefore , bound to  be 
a ffe c te d  by the f a l l  in  fr e ig h t  and by other incentives  
which the shortening o f th e  Eastern voyage gave to the
(4 ) Imports o f c o ffe e  from the Eastern Empire were a lso  
a ffe c te d  during the same period  by the growing 
com petition o f B ra z ilia n  co ffee*
1 3 2 .
Europeans to buy th e ir  requirements d ir e c t ly  from the 
(5 )
E ast. This trend was the genera l casef a f t e r  the
opening o f the Canal in  1869, f o r  most o f the Eastern
goods which fo r centuries had con stitu ted  a major part
in  the B r it is h  re -exp o rt t rad e . Imports o f  r ic e  from
the EVE. were a lso  s im ila r ly  a ffa c te d  although to  a
le s s e r  extent* Between 1870 and 1880 imports o f r ic e
rose considerab ly  and out o f  them the re -exp o rted
portion  increased  from 50$ (average o f  1865§69) to 63$
in  1870*74 and then dropped to 61$ in  1875-79, which „
however was s t i l l  r e la t iv e ly  high* During these ten
years r ic e  imports from B*E. (m ainly In d ia ) were s t i l l
su ita b ly , as w e ll as econom ically , c a rr ied  by s a i l  v ia
(6 )  , . . 
the Cape rou te , ra th er than by steamers v ia  Suez.' Thus,
i t  Is  very l ik e ly  that the B r it is h  ownership of a la rg e
s a i l in g  f l e e t  operating  on the Cape route had played a
s ig n if ic a n t  part in  p ro tectin g  th is  p a r t ic u la r  entrepot
trade from the new European competition* A fte r  1880
and u n t i l  1913 imports o f  r i c e ,  by va lue , were d ec lin in g
and meanwhile the percentage which was re ta in ed  fo r
In te rn a l consumption was p ro g re ss iv e ly  growing so that
by 1910-13 re -exp o rt r a t io  o f r ic e  imports was only 24$*
(5 ) Imports o f  co ffe e  from the Eastern  Empire were a lso  
a ffe c te d  during  the same period by the growing 
com petition o f B ra z il ia n  c o ffe e .
(6 )  lfBeturn o f the Board o f Trade1*, Accounts and Papers,
• V o l.LX IV -1883.
Tea was a lso  one o f  the commodities whoso imports 
from In d ia  and other parts o f H.EV, mainly Ceylon, had 
increased  to  a very great extent, throughout the examined 
period , by volume as w e ll  as by va lue . Undoubtedly, 
the success of tea  p lan tations in  Ind ia  and in  Ceylon, 
the continuous expansion of these p lan tations and the 
su b s t itu t io n  o f th e ir  tea instead  o f  Chinese tea in  the 
B r it is h  market were most s ig n if ic a n t  in  exp la in in g  such 
a r i s e  in  tea  imports therefrom . However, the continuous 
f a l l  in  p ric e s  o f Imported te a , except between 1900 and 
1913, was in  part due to the saving in  f r e ig h t  r a t e s .  
Shipments o f tea  from B.K. in to  B r ita in  camevhy the Suez
Canal route from the e a r ly  18701 a and continued to depend
(7 ). \ '•
upon i t  in  the f o i l e d  ng y ea rs • But s in ce  the Suez
Canal had a lso  served  the growth o f the European trade  
with In d ia , B r i t is h  re -exp o rts  o f  tea  to  them were bound 
to d ec lin e . The re -exp o rted  percentage o f tea imports 
dec lined  from 24$ in  1870-74 to 19$ in  the next quin­
quennial p eriod . In  1880-84 the percent ro se  again  to  
23$* but once more i t  s ta rted  to  dec line  and by 1895-99 
i t  was only 14$, 3Tet, the actua l value o f re -exp o rts  
o f tea was r i s in g  throughout due to  the considerab le  
r is e  in  it s  imports from India, and Ceylon.
(7 ) See re fe ren ce  given in  Footnote (6 )
Besides, s in ce  bhe turn  o f  the century, i t  seems that .
the r ic e  in  te a  p rices  toad encouraged the B r it is h  • 
merchants to carry  la r g e r  amounts of te a  from In d ia  and 
Ceylon fo r  re -e x p o rt  t ra d e • Thus w ith  a l i t t l e ,  r i s e  in  
tea  p rices  in  1900-1904, over the average of 1895-99
.t * . 1 • 1 * »
re -exp o rts  o f tea  as a percentage o f tea  im ports, ro se  
to 18$ and w ith  fu rth e r  r i s e  in, p rices i t  increased  
once more to reach  20$*
We now turn to consider th e ,development o f wool imports 
from E*E* which, in  f a c t ,  had taken a somewhat d if fe re n t  
course from the previous cases* Between 1870 and 1895, 
B rita in  increased  her imports therefrom  by 394*158 
m illio n  lb s ,  i . e . , from 136,285 m illio n  lb s  in  1870 to  
580*383 m illio n  lb s  in  1895, and only by 117,670 m illio n  
lb s  from a l l  other p laces , i . e . ,  from 77.326 m illio n  lb s  
in  1870 to  194.996 m il l io n  lb s  in  1895. ‘Kie.'rla rg e s t
1 ' = ■ • • ' ,V \ , ■>-! ■ .'ft'/'
qu an tit ie s  o f  B*E *s wool, and also  o f a 11 B r it is h  wool 
imports {See Diagram 2) were provided by A u s tra la s ia  
where th is  f ib r e  was ir educed at a cheaper cost than 
in  any other p lace in  the world* Such a fa s t  growth 
o f wool imports was, yet, s ig n i f ic a n t ly  owed to the 
success o f the B r it is h  merchants in  in creasing  th e ir  
re -exp o rts *  The re -exp o rted  percentage o f  wool imports 
rose  from 39$ in  1865-69, to  52$ in  1875-79 and then 
to 60$ in  1880-85* l o  doubt B r i t a in !s re -exp o rta  o f  
the cheaper A u stra lian  wool were fu rth e r stim ulated
134 # *
•V.-: j..* >«...**; v. - vv#- K". ,5 V ,t '\'££■*bW W'«C h. , . . . ,  •• r- ■ :• • -. . • ;• ■ ;. ’ . i^m'd
135.
. ‘ ( 8) 
a f t e r  1869 by the f a l l  in f r e ig h t , r a t e s .  I t  w i l l
be borne in  mind that th is  f a l l  In fr e ig h ts  charged  
on the A u stra lian  voyage, although caused by the  
opening o f the Canal, was, fo r  many years, p a r t ic u la r  
to s a i l in g  vessels which used the Gaps rou te , and I t  
was B r ita in  which possessed the la rg e s t  f l e e t  of th is  
type o f  v e s se l. Thus u n t i l  the e a r ly  1890*3 a consid ­
e rab le  amount o f  wool came from A u stra la s ia  to B rita in  
by s a i l in g  v e sse ls  and European countries s t i l l  found i t
M
.T&Vl-.£0’
-st
cheaper to get th e ir  requirements o f th is  f i b r e  through  
. (9 ) .
the B r i t is h  market. Y et, the depe ndence upon the Canal
route fo r  shipments o f A u stra lian  wool was p robably  a 
l i t t l e . e a r l i e r  than fo r  wheat. In the e a r ly  1880*3 
the steamers of the Pi & 0. and Orient Steam Companies 
were t r a v e l l in g  fo r tn ig h t ly  to  A u stra lian  ports v ia  the 
Suez Canal w ith  f u l l  cargo an d passengers and re tu rn ed
:m§,
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to B r ita in  by the same route with f u l l  cargo o f wool and
{10)
other goods such as le a th e r , ta llo w , t in  and copper.
^K?)fSee~ page 224. I n 7J^H.T~Clapham *s *!An Economic ||1
H istory..of M odern .B rita ln . 'ffree frade  ahd^§teel (1850-36)18
( 9 ) . * . t,in  sp ite  of d ire c t  trade between A u s tra lia  and the 
continent o f Europe, the United Kingdom s t i l l  remains 
. the ch ie f entrepot o f  th is s tap le  (w o o l),  w ith  a 
la r g e r  export o f fo re ign  and c o lo n ia l wool than 
b e fo re ” . . . Journal o f  the Royal S t a t i s t ic a l  S o c ie ty . 
Vol * LXI 1898 * Mar ch. An : i r t  l c le  t i t  le d  HTlie '
Recent Course o f ‘Trade,,within the B r it is h  Empire”,
■ by J*A. Baines, :see pages 25 and 40.
v|§
its
(10 ) Rabino, J* ”The S t a t i s t ic a l  Story o f the Suez Canal” , 
in  Journaj o f Royal S t a t is t ic a l  Society  1887.
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In  fa c t  shipments o f wool by steam v ia  the Canal wore
very  u se fu l when ra p id  d e liv e r ie s  were necessary In
London market* 2
D irect steam communications between the continent 
of Europe and A u s tra la s ia  were begun during the 1880 *s 
but there is  no evidence that they represented  any r e a l  
th reat to  B r i t a in ’s e n t re p o t t ra d e  o f A u stra lian  wool 
be fo re  the turn  o f the century* During 1885-89, B r i t a in ’s 
re -exp o rts  of wool, as a percentage o f  imports o f th is ■i’4
f i b r e  f e l l  by 4$, from the high le v e l  o f 1880-84, at
the same time when the subsid ised  French and German steamers--
■ .
in creased  th e ir  shipments o f  wool from A u stra lian  p o rta . \„J
But, there was no change in  th is  s itu a t io n  during 1890-94- ■{*
and B r ita in  s t i l l  re -exp o rted  56$ o f h er to ta l wool '
im ports, mainly to Europe* In  the period  1895-99, the
* , ,- • 
percentage re -exp o rted  o f wool Imports f e l l  by 7$, but
th is  could p a rt ly  be explained by the sm a lle r  q u an tit ie s  3
which B r ita in  imported from  A u s tra lia  because o f the
. . ’ I
severe draughts which destroyed crops, flo ck s  and herds 1 S
’ ' ' '■ <1
and reduced considerab ly  A ustra lian  wool production
Yet, a f t e r  the turn o f the century i t  became evident j f
that European steamship firm s trad ing  w ith A u s tra lia  
v ia  the Canal had somewhat changed the o ld  s itu a t io n  of :f
B r ita in  as the c h ie f entrepot of A u stra lian  wool and by
kt
%
!?
1910-13 B r i t is h  re -ex p o rts  of th is f i b r e  had decreased :§
% • ' . - I
and represented  only 41$ of It s  imports* J
Jute imports from In d ia  were c on siderab ly  stim ulated
during the se le c te d  period  by tho f a l l  in  fr e ig h t  ra tes
as w e ll as by the ra p id ly  r i s in g  demand fo r  gunny bags
which accompanied the r i s e  in  world trade o f^g ra in *
Scot land , the main consumer of ju te  in  B r ita in , took a
quantity  o f  th is  commodity amounting to  about 73,000 cwts 
’ ( i i )  ; f
per week in  the e a r ly  18801 fs# As was the case in  wool
such a huge amount o f ju te  which B r ita in  consumed had no
doubt enabled her to  import cheaply fu rth e r  amounts fo r
re -exports#  The percentages which B r ita in  re -exp o rted
o f Ind ian  raw ju te  rose  from 18% in  1870-74 to 27% in• . • "‘iv' * _s *
the next two quinquennial periods and then to -35$ in  
1885*89# I t  must be mentioned here that such a s t r ik in g  
growth in  B r i t is h  re -exp o rts  of Indian ju te  during the 
twenty years which fo llo w ed  the opening of the Canal
was a lso  accomplished by using s a i l in g  vesse ls  v ia  the
(120 - ,  • ‘ *:& :•
Gape route# Although the re -exp o rted  percentage o f
raw ju te  imports d ec lin ed  s l i g h t ly  to  34$. and 35$ in  
1890*94 and 1895-99, re sp e c t iv e ly , i t  rose  again to  
an average of 37$ in  the r e s t  o f the period# Such a 
r i s e  in  the percentage of Indian ju te  re -exp o rted  during  
th is  la t t e r  period , i# e * ,  in  1900-13 was qu ite  s ig n i f ­
ican t f o r  re -exp o rt  trad e , as gen era l Imports o f t h is  
f i b r e  (from  In d ia ) rose from £4+1 m illions in  1900 to  
-•£9*3 m illio n s  in  1913# Xet, such a r i s e  in  value o f
(11 ) L#C*A# Knowles, Tho Economic Development o f the 
Overseas Empire, page 88# , % t / -
(12 ) See re ference g iven  in  fpote-nofce (6 ) .
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Diagram ( 8) •
Quantities and p r ic e s '( quinquennial averages)of wheat, rubber,jute, 
w oo l,rice ,tea ,m eat,bu tter,co tton ,co ffee ,in d igo ,su gar and t in  imported 
from B rita in ’ s Eastern Empire between 1855 an(  ^ 1913*
•Indian jut© imports was only matched by & very sm all 
one in  terms o f volume* I t  was almost t o t a l ly  due to  
the r i s e  in  ju te  p r ic e s , see Diagram (8 -c )*  Ihe growthi 1 %
o f  ju te  industry  in  In d ia  was an important fa c to r  to he 
considered when exp la in ing  why imports of th is  f ib r e  had 
grown at a much slow er ra te  since the mid • 1880 Ts , in  
sp ite  of a r i s e  in  demand in  B r ita in  ard Europe*
Other re -ex p o rt  trades which B r ita in  succeeded not 
only in  m aintaining but a lso  in  develop ing considerab ly  
during 1869-1913, were those o f t in  and rubber* While 
imports o f these raw m ateria ls showed a very notable
■ t* *. r v - h < • ,
increase  ..during the examined period , re -expo rted  per­
centages were a lso  r i s in g  continuously* Of t in  imports 
in  1870-74, a portion  equal to  24$ was re -exp o rted  and 
by 1910-13 th is  had r is e n  to reach 58$* t Re-exported  
percentage o f  rubber a lso  rose from 3.6$ in  1870-74 to  
about 70$ in  1 9 io il3 *  W ithin E*BU i t  was the S t ra its  
Settlements which mainly supp lied  B r ita in  w ith  rubber, 
while some sm all q u an tit ie s  came from In d ia , M auritiu s ,
Ceylon and Aden* From 1905 B r it is h  s t a t is t ic s  sp e c ifie d  
some q u an tit ie s  o f rubber coming from Sarawak, Bast 
A frican  P ro tec t* , B,H* Borneo and Federated Malay S ta tes ,  
and o f these new sources the la rg e s t  portion  cam© from  
th© la s t ^ r  one* A© regards t in ,  the S tra its  Settlements 
again  provided the la rg e s t  portion  to the mother country ahd| 
jthb'bhwas fo llo w ed  by A u stra lia *  In  a l l  these dominions ..
and co lon ies , but p a r t ic u la r ly  In  the S t ra its  Settlements,
huge amounts o f  B r i t is h  c a p ita l were Invested  in  rubber
p lan tations and in  t in  mining as w e ll  as in  th e ir  export 
; . (13 ) ' J ' .
businesses* Hence, we may fin d  in  th is  s itu a t io n -a n
exp lanation  fo r ' the considerab le  growth o f B r it is h
imports o f t in  and ru bber from these sources ant \ a lso
fo r  the m onopolistic share which the B r it is h  s t i l l  held
in  th e ir  re -exp o rt  trade  in  sp ite  o f the growth in  d ire c t
• ' ■ ‘ -,{14)' ' v -
European trade in  the Bast# .
(13 ) See 0# Pal ah, “Great B rita in *  a Capital Investment in  
In d iv id u a l/C o lo n ia l and Foreign  C ountriesm Journal 
Of. ..R.QJ.aX .Stqtlst^oa; 30£^a.txfc..^ ftn„t.^ J & fX i - P a l a h  - -
a t tr ib u te d  the heavy investm ent•in rubber/p lantations  
in the S tra its  Settlements and in  Federated Malay ' 
States during the e a r ly  years o f the 20th century  
to the development of motor car industry in  B r ita in  
and in  other coun tries* .... ' ■ : ’ . y;
(1 4 ) I t  is  also p robable  that the f a l l  in  t in  f r e ig h t  
ra te s  had stim ulated the demand f o r  th is  oommodity*
I f  we look, at Diagram (8*m) we w i l l  f in d  that the .
average p rices  o f tin  had dec lined  in  fou r quinquennial 
period s ; 1875-79, 1890-94, 1895-99 and in  1910-13. \
Althofc^b. the d a ta  which I  have been a b le  to  obtain
’ on fr e ig h ts  during the period  1869-1913 are very
in s u f f i c ie n t , - th ere  is  some evidence to support ;
the statement that the f a l l  in  p rices  o f t in  
during these p eriod s , and in  p a rt ic u la r  during  
the 1890*3, was p a rt ly  due to the savings in  
f r e ig h t ,  ’ . .
Second* fIhe Development o f  the Imports Conducted f o r  
B r it ish  Consumption*
teade re tu rn s , fb r  the period  under rev iew  showed , J.|j
that B r i t a ln !s Imports f o r  home consumption from Bv$v
• * * ; ’ . , • _ .0
had not only grown as a percentage in  gen era l Imports
from that s o u r c e h u t  a lso  in  abso lute terms* In  most
, '*\§
o f  the cases these imports were stim ulated  by the improved
system of tran sport as w e ll  as by the great f a l l  in  fr e ig h t
■ Jra te s  in  the Baa te rn  route* And, un like  imports which
' * ‘ ‘ ‘ 4.A
came from E*E*- fo r  purposes; of re -e x p o rt , these were not 
hindered by the growth o f d ire c t  European trade w ith
Bast o f Sues a f t e r  the opening o f the Canal* %.■«r
. i !
However, the most s ig n if ic a n t  development in  th is  |
■ - . ' '“i*
respect was that of imports o f wheat, meat, h u tte r and. |
seve ra l other kinds o f  fre sh  fo o d s tu ffs  from B*B. sources. 
Follow ing the g reat f a l l  in  fr e ig h t  ra tes  a f t e r  1869
:-4
A
In d ia  m  d A u s tra la s ia  were enabled to  export th e ir  wheat
J
in to  the B r i t is h  market and to compete aga in st American .'J
' ’ .
and European wheat. The d ec lin e  In  fre ig h t  ra te s  in  the
A u stra lian  voyage, as i t  has beem exp la ined , was mainly
* . . - • ;is?
consequent upon the su b stitu tio n  o f steam fa r  s a i l
• ’I
fo llo w in g  th© opening o f the Canal, and th ere fo re  lower
p rices  o f wheat imported from A u s tra lia  were not n ec essa rily  ; 
co rre la ted  to the use o f the Suez Canal to  the B r i t is h
. . . . 
M arket, O n t il the 1880's  the bulk  o f w heat-o f A u s t ra lia  - i|
and Mew Zealand came to B r ita in  by s a i l in g  v esse ls  v ia  , Ag
Gape Horn and u n t i l  1913 th is  route was s t i l l  considerab ly  
used* Yet the case o f imports o f Indian wheat was 
d if fe re n t *  Prom 1BS9 to  1913 low er fre ig h t  charges* 
and consequently lower p rices fo r  Ind ian  wheat were , 
only obta inab le  in  the B r it is h  marie t when the Canal 
route was depended upon* Further-more* the' Canal enabled  
Indian wheat to be d e liv e re d  in  good condition  in  the 
B r it is h  market* To export it  from In d ia  be fo re  hie days  
o f the Canal meant that i t  had to t ra v e l through the 
t ro p ic s  tw ice andljus wheat was apt to  heat*, the q u a lity  
was l ik e ly  to d e te r io ra te . H ence.it would be expected  
that the o ffic io n o y  o f the Suez Canal in  serv ing  the  
in c reas in g  t r a f f i c  and the Canal dues w ere v e ry  import ant
fa c to rs  in  determ ining the im portations o f  Ind ian  wheat
: :• • . • v .'k* ■ ' ' ( 1 5 )
into B r ita in *  ; When the Board of Trade attempted in  1881 < 
to assess the va lue  o f  the Canal to B r it is h ;\trade i t  was 
sta ted  that a l l  Ind im  wheat came v ia  the|Suez Canal* 
Although there ? are no data to support that th is  dependence 
was maintained u n t i l  1913* there is a very  good reason to  
suppose th is*  s ince  the growing dependence b ft ln d ia n  trade  
with countries West o f Suez on the Canal route was never 
in terrup ted  throughout* 1'xcept fo r  three years during  
the la s t  quarter of the 19th century* O’*S*A* had■ 
p e rs is te n t ly  been the la rg e s t  source from which B r ita in
(15 ) See re fe ren ce  given  in  Footnote (6 ) .
obt ained her requirement a o f wheat and the second source 
was BUS* (the la rg e s t  p ortion  came from In d ia ) or R ussia , 
fo llow ed  by Argentine and B* North America*’ In  the f i r s t  
th irteen  years' o f the 80th century B r it a in  continued to  
buy la r g e r  and la r g e r  amounts o f Indian and A u stra lian  
wheat and the years marked with red  points in  Diagram (9 )  
i  M l  cate those years in  which E#B.# became most important 
source o f supplying, wheat in to  B rita in *  I,t can a lso  be 
seen on the same diagram , that since 18SQ HUB, had 
freq u en tly  occupied the second p o s it io n , those are the
i  ^ ' • \ ‘
years marked with squares, among d if fe re n t  sources from  
which B r ita in  imported her needs o f th is  f o o d s t u f f .
Growth of meat, b u t te r , margarine and cheese imports 
from A u s t ra lia  and Hew Zealand was only made p o ss ib le  in  
the la t e  19th century by th ree fa c to rs ; the development 
o f  te ch n ica l methods o f p reserv ing food by fre e z in g , the 
saving in  the time spent at sea to  A u s tra lia  by using  
the Suez Gana! and by the employment o f  speed ier steam­
ships* Unlike itfieat imports from A u s tra la s ia , fre sh  
foodstu ffs im ports  in to  B r ita in  were th ere fo re  served  
by the Ganal route  from  the beginning*
DIAGRAM (9 ) .
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BRITISH IMPORTS OP WHEAT (1855 -  1913)
* Tota l Imports o f Wheat    ...
*  Imports from India ,
Austra lia  and New Zealand.  ---------
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THE CHANGE IN THE STRUCTURE OP BRITISH IMPORTS 
PROM EASTERN EMPIRE. (1870 -  1913 )
DIAGRAM (1 0 ).
INDIGO 
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*The re la t iv e  importance o f d iffe ren t a r t ic le s  are given in 
terms o f percentages in the to ta l value o f B r ita in 1o imports 
from her Eastern Empire.
conducted mainly fo r  purposes o f  re -exp o rt be fo re  1669#
On the other hand acme a r t ic le s  which had not f ig u re d  
at a l l  In B r l t a in !s imports from 35*B* be fo re  the seventies  
such as meat, bu tte r and wheat now constitu ted  22$, by­
va lue , in  1913# In  a s im ila r  way imports o f fre sh  
vege tab les , cheese, margarine and s e v e ra l kinds o f  gra in s  
had grown in  importance, between 1870 and 1913* Imports 
o f wheat and fre sh  fo o d s tu ffs  were almost com pletely fo r  
home consumption* As the Diagram shows, raw wool s t i l l  
occupied by 1913. a la rg e  portion  in  the va lue  o f t o t a l  
Imports from B#B* * Y e t, such portion  had been highest., 
during the la te  1870 * a and the 1880 *s and then i t  
s ta rted  to d ec lin e  and by 1913 was le ss  than i t  was 
in  1870* Imports o f t in  ^  rubber and te a  which had been  
of minor importance in  th is  p a r t ic u la r  t ra d e  u n t il  the 
1870 fs ,  grew considerab ly  a f t e r  that u n t i l  1913*
Imports o f rubber; had shown a rap id  growth only in  the 
e a r ly  years o f the -20th century, (see  the diagram) while  
th o se ,o f tea and t in  grew s te a d ily  throughout the period#  
S im ilar to the r i s in g  trend o f t in  but to  a le a se r  exten t, 
was the case o f Imports o f lead , copper, z in c  and 
manganese from B*B* to  B r ita in *  A f in a l  conclusion  
drawn from Diagram 10 i s  the case o f raw ju te  o f which 
the importance, in  gen era l imports from B .l*vh ad , b road ly  
speaking, stayed constant throughout#
(These observations made-from Diagram (10 ) fo r  
the changing s tru ctu re  of B r i t a in ’s imports from her 
B*EV can be fu rth e r i l lu s t r a t e d  by the use o f  Diagram (8 )  
which shows the movements of volumes and p rices  p f the 
se v e ra l a r t ic le s  included  in  Diagram (10 )# See a lso  
Tables (1 1 ),  (1 2 ),  and (1 3 )*  As it  i s  c le a r  in  
Diagram (8 ,  j ,  1, k and 1) co ffee  imports s ta rted  to
decline  from 1870-74, cotton from 1880-84, sugar from
1 .  * ’  '  ! ’
1875-79 aid ind igo  from 1885-89# Since the p? ic e s  o f  ,, 
these a r t ic le s ; were a lso  f a l l i n g  considerably--.throughout 
the pe r io d  -  except those of. cotton from 1890- th e ir  ? 
values dec lin ed  in  a b s o lu te .terms# The quantity  o f  
r ic e  imported, as Diagram (8 -e )  shows, was growing 
between 1870-74 an d .1880-84 and then s ta r te d  to  
f lu c tu a te  and by* 1910-13 was again  at the same le v e l  
of 1870-74# • Thus the/decrease in  the portion  which 
r ic e  imports occupied by value in  genera l imports from 
E*E* was not matched by any s ig n if ic a n t  decrease in  
volume a id  was mainly due; to the f a s t e r  growth o f  
imports o f other a r t ic le s *  • /
On the other hand, the quantity o f meat im ported ’ 
from 25.'E* increased  d ram atica lly  from the e a r ly  1880’s 
and by 1910-13 was as much as 27 times the .siz o  o f 
1880-1884# C alcu lated  by value th is  dram atic r i s e  was 
p a rt ly  concealed because o f the trend  which meat p rices  
fo llo w ed  during the period# Butter im ports, as Diagram  
(8 -h ) shows, had almost begun only in  1880-84 and
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averaged about a m illio n  cwts in  1910-13* As p rices  o f  
b u tte r  were f a i r l y  constant u n t i l  the beginning o f the 
century ard then s ta rted  r i s in g  s te a d i ly  u n t i l  1915, bu tte r  
imports by value were in f la t e d  in  such a way as to allow  
them to  occupy a s ig n if ic a n t  place among other a r t ic le s  
imported from 13*HU The volume o f  ju te  imports from In d ia  
grew s te a d ily  between 1870-74 and 1895-99 and then the 
le v e l  of the la t t e r  quinquennium was maintained almost 
constant u n t il 1910^13* Yet, the value o f  ju te  imports 
kept r is in g  a ft e r  1895-99, as ju te  p rices  were advancing  
upwards# In r e la t io n  to other a r t ic le s  imported from TUB#, 
the r i s e  in  the va lue  o f  ju te  had ju st succeeded to main­
ta in  i t s  r e la t iv e  importance around 6$ throughout# The 
considerable r is e  in  the portions o f raw wool between 
1870-74 and 1895-99, of wheat between 1870 ard 1913, was 
supported in  each case by a huge increase in  volume* The 
case of wheat was, however, unexampled as the quantity  
rose from 1*12 m illio n s  cwts in  1870-74 to 85*25 m illion s  
cwts by 1910-13* As diagram (8 -b ) shows, the change in  
the weight o f rubber im ports,, by value, in  genera l imports 
from TUB* -  in  p a r t ic u la r  s in ce  the beginning o f the 20th 
century -  was c le a r ly  a r e f le c t io n  of the r i s e  in  the 
p r ic e s , ra th e r  than a r i s e  in  tho quantity  imported of 
th is  raw m aterial*
Another s ig n if ic a n t  point might be ta l©n from! 
Tables Ho (11 ) ard Ho* (12 ) which fu rn ishes the .dalja of 
diagrams (10 ) and (8 ) .  Xn 1870-74 the quan tity  o f  |he 
most Important a r t ic le s  imported from B#B»; was l8 .5 iS
m illion s  cwts and th e ir  value t o t a l le d  £42,67 m illio n s .
Thus the average, ppic e  o f  each cwt imported from E*B^ at
* : \
.. , * v -.; - * * . u
the beginning o f the period  under review  was about £2^5*
■ ' ■ ' -  V\By 1910-15 the quantity  of the most im portant>a r t ic le d
. . . .  "  . r \\
was about 82*712 m illio n s  cwts and th e ir  value amounted
< ’ • '• . \ \ 
to £89*210 m illio n s* Accordingly  the average p ric e  of\\
each cwt was about £1*4 by t e end of the jariod* The• '■ * “     —  —  ■   * n
• . , .» • •>-. ? I
decline  in  the average value of each cwtrt coming from
E*B# between 1870-74 and 1910-13 by about 40$ was p a rt ly  /1 
a re su lt  o f the d ec lin e  in  general import p ric e s  and parklfy
j *
• \
because of the ra p id  growth In  the imports o f  some bulkjf \
= \ commodities -  e*g# wheat -  and whose trade w ith  E*E» haq \
’ ’* Il
only been commenced in  the e a r ly  1870 *s* To conclude, 1 
the t r a d it io n a l character o f the Import trade  coming frcj>m
* , , . j
B*E* as based on the l ig h t e r  and c o s t l ie r  commodities hftd' !
* i
changed con siderab ly  during that period* ■
General imports from B •E* increased  from an avarag#
Of £51 m in  1865-69 to £59*1 m in  the quinquennial peri/bd
‘ ’ ■ i ■
1875-79 and out o f  th is  r is in g  value re -e x p o rts  were ;
» I
developed at a faster rata than that of net imports*
' j T
Re-exports increased  from an average o f £17*4 m in  186$i-69 
to an averagd o f £24*5 m in  1875-79 ( i * e * ,  a grov/th e
to  41$), and thus as a percentage In g en e ra l lraportis
• • , t
from B.lfi. they ro se  from 33,8$ to 41.7)6. In  1880-^4 
genera l imports ro se  by £11*9 m illions over the average  
o f 1875-79* Out o f  th is  increase  net imports grew a 
ra te  which was s l i g h t ly  M gh er than that which re -exp o rts  
had increased at* so that' the re -exp o rt r a t io  M b genera l 
imports was reduced s l ig h t ly  to 41$* Xn 1885-89 genea^l
imports decreased  by £4*7 m illion s from the average of\\the
. \ \
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previous pe riod  and the d iv is io n  between re -e x p o rts
. . .  . . - ' ' : \\
net imports had almost been maintained at 41$ .and 
(1 7 )
re sp ec t iv e ly *  ,
i \
The spectacu la r growth in  B r it is h  re -exp o rts  of
B*B* *s produce which was achieved during the ten years
fo llo w in g  the opening o f the Suez Canal* and which was / \
almost maintained du ring  the 1880?s was c le a r ly  due to
the r is e  in re *exp o rts  o f  A u stra lian  wool and Indian jutfe*
' .* ' i
tea  and r ic e  (s e e  an a ly s is  o f  the import trad e  by commodity
ia  th© fo rego ing  pages )*  With the exception  of te a  imports
these commodities were s t i l l  econom ically channelled by
the Cape rou te* That s itu a t io n  was obv iously  favou rab le
to the B r it is h  shipowners who. u n t i l  that time possessed
a la rg e  volume o f s a i l  tonnage. The examination o f ;
" - i i
trade re tu rn s  and other a v a ila b le  evidence showed th at
(17 ) The h ighest year fo r  re -ex p o rts *  as a percentage |j 
in  t o t a l  imports from K *B .* was 1885 when they ;i 
represented  45$
B r it is h  trade a lso  gained when the Cape route was depended 
upon in  the 18701a and the 18S0fs ard subsequently B r it is h  
re -exp o rts  of E .B fs iroduoe were fo ste red  and developed* 
Besides, s ince  B r i t i s h  home consumption of wool, ju te  and 
tea  was of i t s e l f  qu ite  su b stan tia l i t  was economical fo r  
B r it is h  merchants in  these *asea to c a rry  fu rth e r  amounts 
fo r  re -exp o rts *  . Meantime, i t  was a lso  s t i l l  economical 
fo r  moat of the European countries whose imports of 
A u stra lia n  wool or Indian tea and ju te  were sm all to
j '
re so rt  to London market to s a t i s fy  th e ir  needs ra th e r  
than conducting a d ire c t  trade  (c le a r ly  at h igher costs  
under these circum stances) with the East.
From the e a r ly  1890*s there were c le a r  signs that 
the sca le  began to be weighed favou rab ly  towards the 
growth of imports which aimed at the s a t is fa c t io n  o f the 
B r it is h  consumers* The s ign ific an ce  of imports o f  wheat, 
meat and bu tter which mainly came fo r  home consumption 
had considerably  increased  by then* Meanwhile, re -exp o rts  
o f cotton , s i l k ,  sp ices and indigo which s ta rted  to  d ec lin e ,  
com paratively, since 1869 had reached much low er le v e ls *
Also re -expo rts  o f  c o ffe e  began to decrease since the 
la te  1870*s ard those o f r ic e  since the la te  1880f3.
B rit ish  re -exp o rts  of Eastern produce to Europe were 
fu rth e r  hindered during that period by the p o licy  o f  
the Conference which ra is e d  the cost o f  sh ipp ing between
152.
B r ita in  and th© Bast at a time whan other European
nations s t i l l  gained from the f a l l  In  fr e ig h t  ra tes
which began a ft e r  1889, However, the t o t a l .v a lu e  of 
re -exp o rts  o f  E,'JDfs produce d id  not dec line  in  abso lute  
terms except f o r  the s econd h a l f  o f  1890 *s when re -e x p o rts  
o f  A u stra lian  wool dec lined  both by volume ahd by value, 
i t  d ec lined  from £27,0 m illio n s , the average o f 1885-89 
and a Is o of 1890-94, to £23,1 m illio n s . As a per cent o f
general imports from B ,B * , i t  dim inished to 84,9^* With
the turn o f tine century re -exp o rts  o f B ,B »s produce s ta rted  
to grow again  to reach m average of £50*7 m illion s in  
1910-18* As a percentage of .general imports th is  t ra d e  
d id  not, however, ach ieve any increase, over the r e la t iv e ly  
low le v e l  which i t  load reached in  the la te  1890 ,s . On 
tho contrary, It d ec lin ed  fu rth e r to be a l i t t l e  over 52/* 
in  1900-1904 and then stagnated, at such le v e l  u n t i l  1910-13* 
I t  shou ld  be noted that the development of re -exp o rts  of 
wool, ju te , t in  and rubber had be on very  s ig n if ic a n t  fo r  
tho trend in th is  p a rt ic u la r  trade d u rin g  the period  
1900-1913,
ihose developments can bo fu rth e r i l lu s t r a t e d  by 
diagrams Ho* (1 1 ) and Mo, (12 ) where the period  from 1865 
to  1889 is included  with the period  under review  fo r  
purpose o f comparison* Bee also diagram No. (13 ) f o r  
the growth of net imports from B*JS* by volume.
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BRITISH IMPORTS FROM EASTERN EMPIRE.
* Total Imports —
*Re-exports
Millions of £ Sterling.
DIAGRAM (1 1 ).
19
13
153 b
^Percentage re-exported out o f B ritish  imports 
from Eastern Empire ff-— —v'
■^'Percentage o f re-exports o f fo re ign  jjroduce and 
manufactures in to ta l B ritish  exports to Eastern 
Empire. ''
DIAGRAM (1 2 );
f 5 3 c
INDEX NUMBER OF VOLUME OF BRITISH NET IMPORTS 
DURING THE PERIOD 1855-1913. 1880=100.
DIAGRAM (1 3 ).
*From a l l  sources —  — *From Eastern Empire (g )
+ Source;A.H.Imlah /Economic Elements In The Pax Britannica,195^# 
-f+Constructed on the hasis o f data obtained from Parliamentary Accounts 
And Papers fo r  the period 1855-1913•
Wh©a the growth o f re -ex p o rts  of E*E fa p? oduce is  
compared w ith  the growth of t o t a l  re -e x p o rt  t rade of 
B r ita in  over the twenty f iv e  years fo llo w in g  1889 we ■
fin d  th a t5 f i r s t l y ,  between 1871 and 1885 re -exp o rts  o f 
E*E *s produce grew more s te a d ily  ard. at a ra te  which was 
considerab ly  h igher than that by which t o t a l  re -export  
trade had increased* Thus as a percentage of t o t a l  r e ­
export trade , re -e xp o rts  o f  E#BTs p? ocluce; grew from 33*7$'
In  1870 to 49 f Of? in  1885* Secondly, in  the f iv e  years 
from 1888 to 1890 re -exp o rts  o f E*Efs produce were developed  
at a sm a lle r  rate  when compared w ith  the gen era l trend o f  
to ta l  re -exp o rt trade and then up to  1895 they were chang­
ing  at almost the same ra te *  I t  can be noticed, however, 
that th© growth of re -exp o rts  of E »E fs produce had 
slackened down in th© period  between 1888 and 1895, that 
in  fa c t  was a s ign  of the change which was m anifest only  
in  the e a r ly  years o f the tw entieth  century* In  the years  
between 1896 and 1908 re -exp o rts  o f B.E *s produce were 
d ec lin in g  as a percent; age in  to ta l B r it is h  re -e x p o rt  trade  
and reached 55*4$ in  the l a t t e r  year*
Y et, th is  trade was again r i s in g  and by 1913 i t  
represented  4!*5$ o f to ta l B r it is h  re -e x p o rts , which was 
higher than the corresponding percentage of 1870 by 7,8$*
See Diagram (14 ) and Table (1 4 )*  Adding to  th is  the fa c t
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DIAGRAM (1 4 ). 
a-BRITISH RE-EXPORT TRADE I 855- I 913.
b_ RE-EXPORTS OP EASTERN EMPIRE'S PRODUCE
AS A PERCENTAGE IN TOTAL BRITISH RE-EXPORTS.
TABLE NO.' 14  
U.Ifg Imports from E.E. 1855-1915
Year General
....... ........... ........
Estimated Re-exports Estimated Met Imports a b
Imxx>rts Bar Cent £ Mil * Ber Cent £ M il. °fo fo
£ E^il.
1855 2 1 .0 29.4 6 .2 *0*6 14.8 29.5 1 2 .1
185^ 27.5 23.9 6.6 7 6 .1 20,9 28.2 14 .0
1857 29*5 24 .0 7 .0 7 6 .0 22,3 29 .1 13 .6
1858 24 .4 25.3 6 .2 74.7 18 .2 26 .7 12 .9
1855 25.5 2 9 .7 7*6 70.3 17 .9 30.0 1 1 .6
1860 26.8 32.3 8 .7 67.7 1 8 .1 30*4 10 ,0
1861 55.1 34.3- • 12 .2 65.2 22 .9 35.4 12 .5
1862 47*5 38.8 ‘ 18 i4 61.2 28.9 43.6 15 .8
1865 64.4 3 7 .8 ‘ 24 .3 62.2 4 0 .1 4Q.3 20.2
1864 72 .1 ' 3 1 .0 f 22 .4 6 9 .0 49.7 42.9 22.3
1865 55*7 ' 36.8 20 .5 63.2 35.2 38.7 16*1.
1866 54*8 ' 30.5 16 ;7 69.5 38 .1 33.4 15 .5
1867 4 4 .1 34*7 15 .3 65.3 28.8 34.4 12 ,5
I 860 49*8 ‘ 3 4 .7 ’ 17 .3 65.3 32.5 36*0 13.2
1869 52.6 32.3 17 .0 67.7 35.6 36.1 14 .3
1870 46 .5 32.3 1 5 .0 67.7 31.5 33.7 12*2
1071 51*7 38.5 19*9 6 1 .5 31.0 32.9 1 1 .8
1872 58*4 35*9 2 1 .0 64*1 37*4 36.0 12 .6
1075 57.1 35.4 20,2 64*6 36.9 36.2 1 1 .7
1874 57*8 38.1 22*0 61*9 35.8 37.9 1 1 .5
1875 60.5 40 .3 24.3 59.7 36.0 4 1 .8 1 1 .4
1876 60 .0 39.8 23.9 60.51 36 .1 42.6 1 1 .3
1877 65*9 36.9 23.6 6 3.1  - 40 .3 44.2 1 1 .8
1878 56.1 45 .2 25.4 54.8 30.7 48.3 9*7
1879 55*0 46 .3 25.5 53*7 29.5 44.5 9.7
1880 64.8 42.4 27 .5 57.6 37.5 43.4 10.7
1881 67.4 42 .I 28.4 57.9 39.0 45 .0 1 1 .7
1882 74*5 4 0 .0 29.7 60 .0 44*6 45.6 12 .8
1885 75*5 40.6 29,.8 59.4 43.7 45.4 12 .1
1884 71*5 40.1 28.7 59.9 42.8 45.6 13 .1
1885 65*5 45 .0 28.6 55.0 34.9 49 .0 1 1 .2  v
1886 6 1 .8 41*9 25.9 58 .1 35.9 46.1 1 2 .2 -  •
.V#v4:fsy^ iMais®mmmsm
► .42,*9 _  12,4
fspsapp
1890
1891
1892 
1895
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902 
1905
1904
1905
1906
1 907
1 908
1909
TGlh
. 72.4 36.7 2 6 .6 63.3 45.8 41.1 12 .9
74*7
71*5
36.5
40.8
2 7 .3
2 9 .1
6 3.5
59.2
47.4
42.2
44.1
4 5 .1
12 .7
1 1 .8
66.5 38.2 25.4 6 1 .8 41.1 4 3 .1 1 1 .9
69*5 37.4 2 6 .0 62.6 4 3 .5 44.8 12.4
70.4
65.O
36*6
33.5
25.8
2 1 .8
63.4
66s 5
44.6
43.2
4 3 .1
38.8
12 .5
11 .2
65.6 37*1 23.6 62.9 4 0.0 39.4 10 .2
66.3 33*7 22.3 66.3 44 .0 36.8 10 .7
73*4 30.2 22.2 69*8 51.2 34.2 12 .2
77*0 33.8 26.0 66.2 5 1 .0 4 1 .1 1 1 , 1
74.0 35*5 26.3 64*5 47.7 36.8 10 .5
70 .9
74*5
32.0
32.6
22*7
24.2
68*0
67*4
48.2
50*1
34*5 
34.8 *
,10 .4
10 .6
04.3 30*6 2 5 .9 6S .4 58*8 36*7 12*2 •
88.8 32.0 28.4 66 ,0 6C.4 36.5 12*4
96.9
1 1 1 .4
34*3
31*7
33.2
35*3
65*7
68.3
63;.7
7 6 .1
39*0
38*4
r: 12 ,2
•5-13 .7
87*7
1 0 1 4
32.2
32.4
28.2
32.8
38*0
67.0
67*6
59.5
68*3
35*4 
35*9 .
•• 1 1 .6  
'•12 ,8
123.6 30.7 69*3 85.6 36.6 ' 14 .9xyxu
1911
1912 
1915
126.6 32.4 4 1 .0 67.6 85.6 39*9 ' jM . O
156.7 33.8 46.2 66.2 9Q.5 4 I . 4 1*4.3
136.2 33.4, 45*5 66*6 9C.7 41 .5 >*•. ' .V
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* See Appendix C fo r  tho method adopted in  eat inn tin g  re-exports and imports 
for hom© consumption which came from E,E, . ;
•f “a" stands fo r  Re-Exports o f Produce o f E.E. from U.K. '
Total Re-export Trade o f U.K. v ' • ‘
“to1* stands for Met imports in to  U.K. from E,E« ; .
Met Imports in to  U.K. from Various Foreign and Colonial sources,
+ "f
th at•general import s, 1 *©•, net imports plus re-export a , 
from E.E* was only equal to 17*7$ of general imports of 
Britain  in 1913, we might- conclude the folloi&ngj in  
spite of the considerable;- change in the structure of 
British  imports from E .E ., during the period- 1B69--1913, 
in favour of the trades that sa t is fie d  the. Britis'h,-con- 
sura or, the growth of B ritain  fs re-export trade V/as 
sign ifioan tly  dependent throughout on E.E. more; than on 
any other foreign or colonial source* And, although th is  
dependence had relatively, declined during the period 1895­
1913, when compared with the. period 1870-189$, it  = was s t i l l  
by the end of the period at a higher leve l than it  had been 
at the beginning: of i t .  \ ' ..
fhe growth of net imports from E.E* in re lation  to the 
growth of imports retained .for hom© consumption in Britain  
is shown in Diagram (16)* i t  can b© seen that the propor­
tion which B*B. had provided for B rit ish  consumption 
varied a ligh t ly  around 11$ and IB * 5$ during a l l  the period 
except in the last s ix  years when it rose to 14$ In average. 
Knowing .thatlB ritain  had remarkably increased her net 
imports, from a l l  fb re iga  and colonial sources, frGra 
£358*8 m illions in 1870 to £859*8 m illions1 in 19X3* we 
might conclude that ; in  spite of the considerable speed 
by which B rita in  pushed up her net imports during the 
period 1870-1913, the importance of B*B* as a source of : 
raw materials and foodstuffs to B ritish  people had kept 
pace with other sources or even increased*
DIAGRAM (1 5 ).
$ = HET IMPORTS PROM EASTERN EMPIRE.
 ....  —    r -r T iiiii I - I -III t ....... — ‘ ---------------------------------------------------- >I1IIL. Uir— I  ■ u n u -t,___
RET IMPORTS PROM ALL SOURCES.
In  the an a ly s is  given In e a r l i e r  pages o f th is  
Chapter I t  has been shown that the ra p id  development o f * 
B r it is h  Imports fo r  home consumption was only made p o ss ib le  
by the cheapening and quickening o f Eastern transport
consequent upon the opening o f the Canal and the employment
(IB )  ’
o f  steamships on that route* Imports o f g ra in  and fr e s h
fo o d s tu ffs  began only under these circumstances* Imports 
o f  raw m aterials were a lso  speeded up by the same fa c to rs  
and were in c rea s in g ly  tak in g  the p lace o f s im ila r  imports 
which came from other sources in  the world* The great  
expansion in  B r it  ish  investment in  new p lan ta tio n s , 
mining industry  and ra ilw ays  in  the p r in c ip a l parts of 33*13* 
had a lso  been of considerab le  importance to  the growth o f  
the in to r -im p© ria l trade* Yet there is  s tron g  evidence 
that th is Investment was p a rt ly  stim ulated by the re v o l­
u tion  o f transport s ince  that had succeeded in  la y in g  
down new foundations fo r  Eastern trade expansion*
Before  1870 B r it is h  c a p it a l  was outpouring to  Europe and 
North America where the ra te  of re tu rn  on productive  
investment was com paratively high* During that time 
only sm all amounts o f B r i t is h  c ap ita l were invested  in  
the Empire* However, in  the la s t  quarter o f the 19th 
century and in the e a r ly  years of tbs 20th century th is  
s itu a t io n  was changing as more c ap ita l than ever cam©
(1 8 ) The In troduction  of te leg rap h ic  communications 
between B r ita in  and. her p r in c ip a l dominions and 
co lon ies in  the East s ince 1870 strengthened the
lin k  between these geograph ica lly  separated  
markets and was c e rta in ly  s ig n if ic a n t  for;;the  
 development o f the In t er-lmpe r i  a l t  rade * ; ^  ?:
to too invested In  Australasia* India* Ceylon* .the. Straits  
Settlement a* Malaya and B rit lad  Bast A frica* te rr ito r ie s  
which wore a l l  situated East of Suess and whose external
Cl
trades with Bur ope and America were showing great-m  pans ion#
( i 9 )  : .
For the amounts of B r i t i s h  c a p ita l  invested in A u stra la s ia *  
Ind ia  and other p r in c ip a l  B r i t i s h  Colonies in  the Bast* 
see R.L, Bash. ' .Short Inqu iry  into uhe Mature-.ofs.Our . 
P ro f it a b le  In vestmenty'hdiodoh^ 1B81 s a , Fa lsh#^ --artoaW • 
B r i t a in ys '■OaPit,^ /\InVestiaefnt in  In d iv id u a l^ C o lo n ia l , 
andxForeim  Oouhtries11"itouri^J^of "koyal-^Stat 1sti c a l  
Society^- September!,19to9. and'. January 1911+CFor the 
increase in  B r i t i s h ' invest me rt in  A u s tra la s ia  .and 
Ind ia  a f t e r  1870 and reasons fo r  i t  s e e ' A#l€» " Oairnoross  
“Home and ...Foreipni Investmentlf 1870-1913 fP u b I f  shed 
In 195S).    ’ ..... ' ■
The Development o f /British Imports from Various.Part a of HUB* 
The Change in B ritish  Shax»e In HUB *3 Export Trade*
The development or British  imports (fo r  re-exporta  
and fo r homo consumption) from various parts', of HUB* 
during the period 1855-1913 is  shown la  diagram (16) *
It  can he seen that total imports from India had averaged 
about <630 millions during the 1870 fs, fluctuated, between 
£30 millions ard £40 millions during the 18801 a and then 
between £25 millions and <630 millions during the 1890 *s. 
However, with the exception of a setback in 1908, to ta l 
imports from India grew steadily from £27*4 millions in *
1900 to M B  * 4 millions in 1913# These changed can partly  
be explained by the movements o f average import prices of 
the principal a rt ic le s  which came from India* These were 
fa l l in g  at a considerable rate from the early 1870 be 
u n til the late  1890*a "when they s ta rted  to  r is e , again*
See Diagram ( 8, a, e, f ,  a id  i )  lor prices o f wheat, 
jute, tea and cotton, .which x^apresented the most important 
a rtic le s  imported from India during 1870-1913* Besides, 
the decline in the value of Indian a rt ic le s  imported into 
Britain during the la te  1880fs and the 1890fs was magnified 
by the f a l l  o f exchange between the Indian rupee with its  
s ilv e r  base, ard the Sterling on the gold standard*
rniW !<iHn*[*»iTri*r ■ .jij-nmwrIrf 1 vr. t- t u'.n r T.nr i ~r ii &i T ■:— tit T.^ fT-Tf-"-^ --- T r* ..........  -f- ---  ----- ---------- --------------- ---
(20 ) Up to the: early 1870 *s ten Indian rupee would exchange 
fo r  one pound Sterling, but from that date onwards 
the rupee sank in value, t i l l  in 1893 it  was a 
fraction of a penny ovor one sh illin g* In ! 1894 
Ind ia j adopted the gold standard and since that time 
to the end of the. period, 1913, the rupee was f a i r l y
stable* _ . . .
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More important* however* in ©xplain ir^  the deve lop -
meat o f imports from Ind ia  was the growth of d ire c t  trade
between Ind ia  and countries  West o f  Suez p a r t ic u la r ly
European countries* a f t e r  the opening o f the Canal*
D irect exports from Ind ia  to Europe* except B r ita in *  and
a lso  to non-Europe an porta in the Mediterranean Sea
(21)
increased  from 6*9$ o f t o t a l  Indian exports in 1870
to 30$ o f  this t o t a l  in  1913* The re stilt o f  that change 
was r e f le c te d  in  the r e la t iv e  dec line  of the proportion  
which B r it a in  took from to ta l  Indian exports* from 54*4$
in  1870 to 25*8$ in 1913* as w e l l  as In the decrease of
8 (22 )
her re -exports  o f  Indian produce to  .Europe*, U*S*A*, 
which a ls o  depended to  some extent on the.Suez Cam 1 to  
to  get her requireipents d ir e c t ly  from Ind ia  in stead  o f  
re ly in g  on B r ita in *  managed to increase her share in  the
(21) See als o Table No* 15 and the note given with I t *
(22 ) No s t a t i s t i c s  were given about the re -expo rt  o f  
Indian produce to  Europe* yet many examples had 
been presented in  the Parliamentary Accounts and 
Papers concerning the Indian trade to • show that  
the decline  in  exports from Ind ia  to B r i t a in  had 
accompanied an increase  in  experts from India to  
the continent o f Europe* See for example, P*,P» 
3,884, Vol.. LXXf or P ,P * .  1892, Vol* h V H I .
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161 (a)
fo Imported from«
(6) Australia
1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1095 1900 1905 1910
United Kingdom 
Europe *
U.B.A*
Others f
64.0 72.9 
1.6  #9 
3.1 2.4 
31.5 2J.8
72.1 74,4 
1,2  5.1 
4.0 5*6 
22.7 14.9
69.2 
8.3 
6.5 
16.0
71.7
7.1
6.0
15.2
61.3
11*3
12,2
15.2
60.2 
11.3 
11.7 
16.6
61.2
11,5
10.8
16.5
(o ) Hew Zealand
United Kingdom 
Europe *  
tr«6«A 
Others v
57.9 63.6
#» m
1.3 2.7 
40.8 33#7
56.5
X
3.9
39.6
69.9
X
5.4
24.7
67.4
X
5.7
26.9
62.4
1.4
6.2
30.0
61.1
3.0
10,0
23.9
60.8
3.8
11.2
24.2
61*6
4*6
8.2
25*6
(d ) S tra its  Settlements .
United Kingdom 
Europe *
U #S #A•
Others *
25.6 19.2 
3.4 3.4
X X
71.0  77.4
26.0
2.3
X
71.7
19.4
2.4
1.5 
76.7
16.0
2,9
1,1
00,0
10.9
2.7
2C
86.4
10.5
5.3
x
84.2
10.2
9.0
1.0 
83.8
10.8
4.3
1.1
83,8
(e ) Ceylon
United Kingdom 
Europe *
U*B*A.
Others *
33.1 26.4
X
29.9
1.1
24.9
X
29.3
X
24.0
• X
27.6
7.6
21.9
6.3
25.8
5*9
( f ) Mauritius
United Kingdom 
Europe *
U*S*A *
Others +
26,3 26.5 
13.8 16.9
17.4
14.5
19.7
I 6.4
27.2
15.6
14.6
11.6
26.3
11.2
26.8
11.8
30.3
12,5
*H* Europe* excluding U#K** and including sometimes nen~European ports 
In the Mediterranean Sea.
+ Others * mainly East of Buess
x Negligible amounts.
fo Exported to*
2ABI33 (15) I ;
Australia
.670
T
161(h)
lose leejg 1890\ 1095 1900 1905 1910
United Kingdom 6.0*3 70.4 80.9 ' 78.3 71.0 '70.6 34.9 47.0
Europe *  x .2 x 4.4 10.7 14.8 10.4 23.9
U.S.A. .2 1,0 .9 4.9 5.1 i . 9  10.4 1.9
Others + 39,4 28.3 18.1 12.4 13.1 l l .6 24.2 27. I
\
50.6
30.4
2.2
16.7
Sett Zealand
United Kingdom 51.6 72,5 75.0 72.0 ' 75.4 82.4\ 77.4  77,2
Europe *  «- *• -  -  x x '• x x
U.S.A. x  1.6 1.7 5.9 5.9 3*7 3.5 4.6
Others+ 48.4 25.9 23.3 22.1 18.7 13.9 19.1 18.2
84.O
1*3
2.5
12.2
S tra its  Settlements
     ;— ^
United Kingdom 20.0 19.1 16.7 21.? 19V4 
Europe* x 4.1 4.7 8.3 7*8
U.S.A. 8.9 5*9 8.6 3*7 6.6
Others* 71.x 70.9 70,0 66.3 66.&
17,4  26.2 20.2 26.9  
9*9 9.7 11.7 13.5
8.0 10.3 12.8 9.1 
64.7 33.8 55.3 48.5
Ceylon
United
Europe*
U.S.A.
Others*
76.4 69.0 68.9 58.3 64.9 74*2 59.3 52.7
2 .1  10.6 9,5 9.0 2.7  1 .5  14.O 17.9
4$* 5
22.5
Mauritius
United & 
Europe*
u*a#A. 
Others +
'3*1
1*2
12*1
5.3
14.1 X I.3
1.5 2.-J
4.X
2*6
9*1
1.6
7.3
x
22*3
x
.total exports of India from 4*3$ in 1870 to 8,4% in
( 2 3 )
1915# nevertheless, it would be noticed:from fable  (15) 
that the share of Western countries, inclading B ritain , 
had decreased by 10*0%! between 1875 and 1918*• fhat was 
due to the rise  in Indian, exports to Austra lia , r ise  in  
tea exports thereto, and to the r ise  in  exports of Indian 
cottons to parts of E*B#, mainly Ceylon and Mauritius* 
and to other places East of Suess*
B ritish  Imports from Australia  and Mew Zealand 
increased steadily  from $14*1 millions In 1870 to £83*4 
millions in 1895 in spite o f  the continuous f a l l  in  prices 
of wool, wheat, t in  and meat, the main a rt ic le s  Imported 
therefrom* Between 1895 rand 1902 imports, from the . 
Australasian dominions were declining owing to the 
drought which visited them in these years and reduced 
their to ta l exports considerably* From 1902 to 1918 
imports therefrom increased at a -very high rate but that 
was partly due to the r is e  In prices o f wool, wheat, tin  
and butter, see diagram ( 8 ,d , a, m and h)* Considering 
the period 1870^193,5 on the whole, we would find: that 
imports from Australasia had been developed at u> much 
fa ste r rate than that by which imports from India were
(28) Before 1919 the number of IX#8* ships traversing the 
Suejs Canal was not by ary  means s ign ifican t, Yet, 
one could find many examples showing that direct 
tra d e  between In d ia  and IX »S* was c a r r ie d  by B r i t i s h  
and European ships using the Canal, from 1870fs 
onwards* P*F* 1888* Vol*bX.Xyh*
Page Number omitted in  error#
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Increased* Hence, the r e la t iv e  importance of Indian  
trade to  tot^L B r i t i s h  Imports from B*B* was consider­
ab ly  reduced du ring  the se lec ted  period*
In  the years between 1889 a id  the e a r ly  1880*8 -  
when d ire c t  steam communications were not yet estab lish ed  
between Europe and A u s t r a l ia ,  B r i ta in  .increased her share  
in  A ustra lian  exports from 60.0$ to  about 80*0$* That 
was mainly r e f le c t e d  in  the very rap id  growth of wool 
Imports, and a ls o ,  but to a le s s e r  extent, In the r i s e  
of imports o f  t i n ,  copper, ta llow  and leather# However, 
with the growth In d ire c t  shipments from A ustra lian  
ports to  Europe, v ia  the Suez Canal, from the XS8Q*s 
onwards, the r e la t iv e  Importance of B r i t a in  in  A u s t r a l i a fa 
export trade  declined# By 1910 B rita in  obtained only  
50*6$ of A u s tra lian  exports , while the share o f  
European countries had Increased, almost from n i l  In  
1880 to 30.4$ In 1910#
In lew  Zealand, however, the s itu a t ion  o f B r ita in  
was d if fe ren t#  The share o f  the mother country Increased  
in  Hew Zea land !s export trade  from 51*6$ in  1870 to  
84*0$ in  1910* Meanwhile the share o f Europe In th is  
trade was almost n e g l ig ib le  tlirou^iout the se lected  
period# The share o f U .3 .A . in  Hew Zealand*s exports  
grew from 1.8$ in  1875 to 5*9$ in  1895 and then i t  
began to  decline#
The rise  In B rita in *s imports from the S tra its
Settlements, from £8.6 m illio n  in 1870 to ,£15.8 
millions in 1913, was indeed most notable. However, 
between 1870 and 1879 imports from the Straits did not 
on the whole achieve any Increase and throughout the 
period fluctuated around an average of £2.8  m illions. 
During those ten years the share of B ritain  in the 
exports of the colony f a l l  by about 3*3$, I . e . ,  from 
80.0$ in 1870 to 16.7$ In 1879, while 'the share of 
Europe in this particu lar trade rose from less chan 
1$ la  1870 to 4.7$ in 1879* The rapid growth of 
Britain*s Imports from the Straits was Interrupted 
during the six  years ending with 1897. Again that was 
met by a f a l l  in the re la tive  importance of the mother 
country in the S tra its* export trade. Nevertheless, by  
the end of the selected j®riod, and In spite of the 
continuous r is e  In the share of Europe in  the Straits*  
exports t i l l  it reached 13.5$ in 1910, the share of 
Britain  in th is particular trade ted exceeded the 
leve l of 1870 by about 7.0$* The S tra its Settlements * 
exports to IT*3.A. increased from £.775 m illion in 1870 
to £3.447 m illion in 1910. Yet the re la tive  importance 
of U.S.A * in the Straits* export trade declined from 
8.9$ in 1870 to 3.7$ in 1885, and although It rose 
la te r  and reached 12.8$ in 1905, it  f e l l  again to 
9.1$ In 1910. It  might b© noticed therefore that
165#
t l t e  f a s t e n  g ro w th  l a  t h e  S t r a i t  a 1 e x p o r ts  t o  B u ro p e
a ft e r  the opening o f  the Bmz Caml hat a ffo o te d  the
r e la t iv e  importance o f the trade w ith  cr*S#A* more than
i t  d id  to that o f B r ita in *
11m v i bo in  the imports from the S tra its  S e t t le *
iwn%&&# p a r t ic u la r ly  during the period  1807*1915* had
mainly omm through the rap id  growth o f' rubber and t in
imports# S im ila r ly # th e  rap id  development of* B r it is h
imports from  the Federated Malay States a f t e r  1909 m a
p r in c ip a lly  due to  the remarkable in crease in  Imports
o f  these two p a r t ic u la r  commodities*
B r ita in fa imports from Hong Kong increased  daring
$
the seven yoara fo l la v ln g  1S7Q t id  then they s te a d ily  
sidelined throughout the r e s t  o f the s e le e tod  period* 
flma* thes increased  from JS*3 m illion  i n  1870 to  J£L*9 
m illio n  In IB?*? and then they - f e l l  >.* ', to  £•? m illio n  
in  1913* {fk e  t &  1 in  imports from th is  co lony %as 
obviously  due t o  the d ec lin e  . in  the imports o f  a i l k  
m d  tea* Imports, o f  ra w ia ilk  from Hong Kong f e l l  from 
159*711 lbs  in  1877 to  n i l  in the la at ten  years, o f the 
s e le c te d  period * Imports o f  tea  therefrom  d ec lin ed  _ 
from 10*974*838 lbs in  1879 to  .only 109 * lbs in  •
i m j • \  .
1913*
( M )  I t  was franca which took over B r ita in *s  s itu a tio n  
in  the s i 11c trs.de o f India and Hong Kong a f t e r  
the opening of the Qanal* Tea from Hong Kong 
was affected by the development of imports from 
India,
—... t ~ ~—~  “ -w TTT':~ • {T77. ~ J.1Z XrX.^  I ".T"Z -y-li iX: /'.'i-VU :*i'
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During the 3.870 !s and the ea r ly  1880*s the Import 
trade with Ceylon was very much influenced by the 
decline in Imports o f coffee * raw cotton a rd spices 
and by the unstable development o f coconut o i l  imports# 
On the whole, B r ita in 1® imports from Ceylon declined 
from £3*5 millions in 1870 to £8.1 m illions in 1886*
The growth of tea imports* from 1888* and of cocoa 
Imports* from 1887* had undoubtedly contributed 
considerably to the growth of B ritish  Imports from 
Ceylon a fte r 1886* t i l l  they amounted to £7*8 m illions
The share o f B rita in  in Ceylon *s exports f e l l  
from 76#4$ in 1870 to 58,5$ in 1885* During the la te  
1880 !s and the early  1890*s Britain  maiaged to regain  
a good deal of her re la tiv e  importance in CoyIon1a 
export trade, so that by 1895 her share had climbed 
to 74*2$* Meanwhile the share or Europe in Ceylonfa 
exports which had reached 9*0$ in 1885* had declined  
to only 1.5$ in 1895* Nevertheless, between 1895 and 
the ©rd o f  the® elected period this situation was once 
again reversed, as the share of the mother country in 
th is particu lar trade had declined by about 28*0$ 
while that o f Europe had risen by 21*0$
18 8*-:
For further explan at ion of the development of 
Britain *0 import a from various parts of c o d
also for the changes in her re la tive  Importanco in 
their export trade in the period 1870-1915* see 
Diagram (16) and fab le ( 15) * I t  viould be noticed 
from Table (IS.) that tha share of B ritain  as w ell as 
that o f Europe in  Mauritius T exporta had* broadly 
apeaking, declined throughout the s elected period* 
That was mainly duo to the decline in Mauritius * 
principal export to the West j namely sugar*
B «* The Development of B rit ish  Exports to ,£»E* . (1969~1913)
Before discussing the effect o f the changes in
freight pat os and the r ise  In Europe m competition in
the Eastern marie t a fte r 1 1889 upon the growth of
B rit ish  exports to BfB .f wo shall recognise two other
factors which influenced the growth of this trade
throughout the period under review#
fir s t s  The t r ado policy of Britain  and B*B# aid its  
(85 ) '
I nfluence: ^
In reviewing the development o f B ritish  exports to
!*B* in the years between the adoption of free trade in
the early 1840 is and the opening o f the Sues Canal in
1869* we have come to re a lise  that the change which f ° H -
.-owed. the adoption of the new trade policy in the
( 28)
Crown Colonies was not by any means fundamental#
Hor was the sort o f protectionism which the Australasian  
self--governing colonies adopted at that time of any 
rea l significance when its  consequences were compared 
with the influence of other economic forces which 
operated during the same period# .
(85) See Appendix wDfl at the end o f this Chapter,
( 86) See Chapter 2,
. 169*
How for the period 1869-1913, with the revolution
which took place in transport and oomxmnications , the
influence o f the trade policy was bound to be more
effective# In B rit ish  colonies in the Bast* some
Industries were growing and were given no protection*
mainly tex tile  industry in India, and the f a l l  in
fre ights charged on the .Eastern voyage added further
advantages in th e ir  markets to the manufactures of the
same industries of B ritain  and of other industria l
countries West of Sue a# More important, however* was
the fact that European merchants were enabled a fte r
the opening of the Canal to estab lish  a good contact
with the East and had thus begun to compote strongly
in every part of E*B* against the B ritish  merchants
who were not given any sort o f preference therein#
Such change in the degree o f competition in
market was indeed very notable and must bo considered
when wo com© to explain the development of Britain  fs 
' (27)
exports to E*E# * We must, however, emphasise that
(27) Soe F# j?» 1897# ?ol#LX% He p lies from various
parts, of tho* llritish^Empira to Mr# J* Chamberlain fs 
despatch,: re la tive  t o .the growth of fo re ign  
compe t it i  on in t ho ir  m arV® t s #
170 *' .
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this analysis should not s t r ic t ly  too applied in the i
case of Australasia* The strong p? otectionisra which 
most of the states therein had developed throixghout /■
j
most of the period was hound to o ffset sqm© of the 
advantages 3 or at'times j a ll-, the ^ adyant ages y ¥ which the 
B ritish  or the European merchants had gained d irectly  i
or ind irectly  from the Suez Canal and from other forces 
that revolutionised transport between them aM  the 
Western world* y
Beoond^ fhe Growth of Exports of O i  aid .the
*.
Bevelopment of its  Import a s :
Diagrams (17) and (18) fo r the foreign trade of •
India, Straits Settlements and Ceylon, show that there 
had been a strong correlation  between the growth of 
exports and the growth of imports of a ach of them 
throughout the period* Obviously, both Imports and 
exports of those colonies, as well as Imports and 
exports of other parts of E ,E ., ware bound to he 
influenced by the forces which quickened and cheapened 
transport and communications between them and the 
Western world, and also by the build ing of roads aid 
railways Inside thorn which fa c ilita te d  the movementa 
goods between the inlands and the ports of shipment« 
Besides, loans and credit f a c i l i t ie s  which B rita in ,
Germany and other European countries were w illin g  to 
extend to E#.£# throughout the period, and tbs n wore
1 7 /  < * >
DIAGRAM (1 7 ).
INDIAN FOREIGN TRADE . 1870-1913.
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DIAGRAM (1 8 ).
A*CEYLON'S FOREIGN TRADE.
B*TIIE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS'FOREIGN TRADE.
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paid  back in terms o f  exports, tad played equal parts
in  the development o f Imports and exports*
Most Important, however, in  exp la in ing  t h e •
p a r a l l e l  growth of Imports and exports o f In d ia ,
*Straits Settlements, Ceylon and other fr e e  trade
B r it ish  colonies in the East was the considerable growth
of the value of exports in  i t s e l f  which was consequent .
upon the revo lu t ion  o f transport* I t  meant la rg e r
purchasing power to the Eastern consumer, and under
the in fluence o f  f r e e  trade p o lic y , n a tu ra l ly  tended
to promote la r g e r  amounts o f imports*
Table (16 ) which is  represented in  diagram (19)
measures the growth of fo re ign  trade of In d ia ,  S t ra its
Settlements and A u s t ra l ia  per head of population in
( 28)
1870, 1880, 1890, 1900 and 1910. The low f ig u re s  
fo r  Ind ia  are s t r ik in g ,  but they are e a s i ly  exp la ined  
by the great density  of i t s  population* On the other  
hand, the ex trao rd in a r i ly  h igh f igu re s  o f t he S tra its  
Settlements were owed t o the great en trepot trade  
which th is  colony had* The f igu re s  o f  A u stra lia  were 
a lso  h igh when compared with those of other countries
(28 ) The years taken f o r  popu lation , when a census 
was made, and f o r  trade  s t a t i s t i c s  are not 
always coincident* Thus s t r i c t  accuracy i s  
not ob ta inab le , but the e rro rs  r i s in g  from 
th is  a re  not l ik e ly  to be s ig n i f ic a n t *
diagram ( 19)•
FOREIGN TRADE PER HEAD OF POPULATION.
I I Z d L
1- Austra lia .
2- India »
3- Tb© S tra its  Settlements.
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( 2 9 )
during the same period#
The figu res of Indian foreign trade support the
conclusion which has been reached above, namely that the
5 • '/
i>iae in tshe income from exports had allowed tile Indian/
consumer, under free trade, to get larger"amounts of 
imports# The f a n  in such income in 1900 was a lso  
accompanied by smaller amount of imports# Again 
the increase in the imports per head of population in 
the Straits Settlements, which was partly..-for re-exports, 
was attributable  to the success of the merchant of this 
colon): in increasing h is income from exports of home \
!
produce as well as exports of the produce of neighbour­
ing ‘territo ries#
(29) For example wo get fo r  1890 the follow ing .figures s
Trade (imports ard, exports)
per head (including Precious
M etals)
[J #iC *
&
21
S
3
D
11
Germany 11 1 11
Frano@ 11 10 10
Belgium 41 15 8
Cape Colony 13 7 7
Canada 9 6 2
IJ»S *4# 6 13 8
Australasia 20 8 4
Ref#, Ooghlan nk S ta t is t ic a l Account' of,,Jdie
Seven Colonlbs of Austa
Sydney, 1892#
175#
As regard^ A u s t r a l ia ,  the f ig u re s  o f Table (1 6 ) ,  
and o f diagram (19 ) show a very d if fe ren t  p icture  
from that of India and the S tra its  Settlements# I t  
seems c le a r  that while d i f fe r e n t  economic forces had 
succeeded in  increasing A ustra lian  exports durlrg most 
of the period  at a ra p id  ra te ,  the strong  protectionism  
which A u s t r a l ia ,  on the whole, adopted at the same 
time had discouraged the Austra lian  consumer from 
increasing  his Imports# Imports and exports per head 
o f population increased  together near the end of the  
se lected  period  when the Commonwealth of A u s tra l ia  
s ta rted  to  move towards a p o licy  of very moderate 
protection*
B r i t i s h  Re-exports o f  European Produce to
' .................... .......( 3 0 )
B r ita in '1 s re -exp o rta  of Europe an goods to  B# 33, •
at the beginning of the period consisted  mainly of 
cotton and woollen t e x t i l e s ,  o f colours which she 
d id  not produce, iron  and s t e e l ,  wine and s p i r i t s #  
The value o f  th is  t rad e  showed a rap id  increase,  
between 1870 and 1885, i » o . ,  from £1#9 m illions  to  
£5#1 m ill io n s ,  almost stagnated during 1885-89 at 
the same le v e l  o f 1880-84, I#o#, at £4#7 m illio n s ,
, 176# .
(30 ) No o f f i c i a l  s t a t i s t i c s  were g iven  with regard  to  
re -exp o rts  of European goods to E*E* Yet, when 
examining the s t a t i s t i c s  of U#K?s re -exp o rts  to  
E#J3#, we would c le a r ly  r e a l i s e  that most of the  
a r t ic le s  were o f  European orig in#  Severa l other 
Ind ications can be f  outd in the Parliamentary  
Accounts and Papers to support such conclusion# 
Some other a r t i c l e s ,  such as tea and r ic e  were 
obviously  o f  Eastern o r ig in ,  but they had been 
re -exported  from B r ita in  to  B#E# N everthe less ,  
these oases were o f  a very minor importance in  
the re -expo rts  of fo re ign  and c o lo n ia l  produce 
to E#E# F igures adopted in  th is  an a ly s is  to  
ind icate  the re -exports  of European produce 
and manufactures to  E#E, cannot be however 
s t r i c t l y  accurate#
This point would a lso  r a is e  a p o s s ib i l i t y  that 
some amounts of B#Efs produce were re -exported  
back to  them, for instance Indian tea to  
A ustra lia#  But again  th is  might be neglected  
as almost a l l  of B#B *a produce were re -exported  
to Europe and America*
declined during the 1890 *s and then increased from 
£5*1 millions in 1899 to £3*6 millions in 1915* *
The alow growth o f the trade during the la tte r  half 
of the 1880 !s and during the 1890 fs was mainly due to 
the decline in re-exports, by value, of textiles  and 
iron and a tool goods* On the other hand, hie increase 
In the value of th is re-export trade a fte r  1900 was 
vary much helped by the growth of re-exports of wine 
and sp ir its*  I t  is very important to add hero that 
Britain  developed her re-exports of fo re ign  produce 
and manufactures to Australasia faster than she did  
with tha rest o f  E#B* Besides the share o f Australasia  
waa throughout the period la rger than that of the rest  
o f B*B., see diagram (80)*
Since B rit ish  export trade with Australasia was 
in particular 1® bb dependent on the Sues Canal fo r  a 
cons Icier able part of the selected period, i t  would 
be ju s t if ia b le  to affirm  the conclusion which has 
previously been reached about the importance of the 
Gap© route to B r ita in rs intermediate ro le  between the 
East and Europe before as well as a fte r  1869»
Re-exports o f foreign produce to B#B* are shown 
In diagram (21) in re lation  to B r ita in fs to ta l export 
trade to it*  It  is  clear that th is  trade was consider­
ably loss significant than that which Britain derived

from her import- trade w ith  B*B** see a lso  diagram (2 2 ) ,  
fo r  comparison* I t  ia not su rp ris in g  th e re fo re  that 
the changes in  the s itu a t io n  o f B r i t a in ’s re -exp ort 
trade to  B#EU during the . period  had only been o f a 
minor s ig n ific a n ce  to  the value and t o  the structu re 
o f 'her t o t a l  exports thereto# A f in a l  remark about 
the change in B r i t a in ’ s in term ediate ro le  between E#E* 
and Bur ope maj be drawn from diagram 122)* This shows 
that in  s p ite  o f the la rge  d if fe re n c e  in  value between 
the two re -exp ort trad es , which depended om B r i ta in ’ s 
imports and exports w ith  B*E* f these had changed at 
c lo s e ly  corresponding ra tes  throughout most o f the
i
period  under review# In  the l ig h t  o f  the ana lysis  
given  in  th is Chapter that s itu a tion  may ha explained 
as fo llow s?  (1 ) Both o f these re -exp ort trades- were 
a ffe c te d  to the same extent by the fa c to rs  which changed 
B r ita in ’ s in term ediate r o le  bat wo on B*E* m-& Europe# ' 
ihua during the 1870 hi both re -exp ort trades gained 
considerably from the opening o f  the Sues Oanal* . 
w h ils t European com petition  in  the Bast was s t i l l  
underdo vo lope cl# A f t e r  the 1870 ’ a* but p a r t ic u la r ly  
since the la te  1880 ’ s, B r i t a in ’s in term ediate trade  
between the Bast and Europe was se r iou s ly  reduced by 
the r is e  o f d ir e c t  trad© between these reg ion s*
$
va
(2 ) During and a fto r  the 1880*3 a steep  dec line  In
these two re -export  trades was checked by the notable
r i s e  in  re -expo rts  of A u stra la s ian  wool to Europe and,
on the other s id e ,  by the increase in  re -expo rts  of
European manufactures to A u stra la s ia  which was r e la t iv e ly
much loss  dependent on Sueau (3 )  A fte r  1895 both
re -exp o rt  trades (as  shown in  the diagram) showed a
continuous increase by va lue  because they la rg e ly
consisted  o f groups o f commodities which were very
h igh ly  p riced  a hi whose trades between E*B* end Europe
were stim ulated  by fu rth e r  increases in  p rices  during
the period  1895*1913* however, the increase  in  the
values of these re -expo rt  trades  had only maintained,
or ra is ed  s l i g h t l y ,  the lower proportions which they
had occupied in  B r i t i s h  imports m d exports w ith  E*E*
(31)
since the la t e  1880»s*
179*
(51) Xt w ll l^ b e  noticed in  diagram (22 -b ) that the 
curve (¥ )  dec lined  slower than ( e )  during 1885­
1894 and developed f a s t e r  during 1900-1915*
That was due to B r i ta in *s  a b i l i t y  to develop  
her re -exp o rts  o f tea, ju te ,  rubber and t in  
(bes ides  wool) ir re sp e c t iv e  o f  European 
competition in  Eastern trad e *  (See e a r l i e r  
pages in  th is  Chapter) and these developments 
were not matched by s im i la r  increases in  
re -expo rts  of European manufactures t o  the ■
Far East*
• 180*
EfcPQffts of B r i t i s h  Manufactures to B-.E*
In diagram (23 ), B ritish  exports, by value, to 
33,B* in 1870 are measured in terms of commodity. I t  
can be seen that to ta l cotton manufactures, I  * e * , cotton 
piece goods and cotton yarn, had occupied something l ik e  
6X?<> in the value o f B ritish  exports to E,S* In 1870* 
India was the largest consumer of these particu lar  
manufactures as she alone took 784*928 m illion  yards 
and 27,023 lbs out of 1,049*810 m illion yards of cotton 
piece goods and 41*181 m illion lbs of cotton yarn 
exported by Brita in  to the different parts of B*13*
Next to cottons were exports of iron and steel manu­
factures?* Again, the largest portion, I*© *, 830,144 
tons out of 387,440 bons, was taken by India* B ritish  
exports o f iron and steel manufactures to Australasia,
In the same year, to ta lled  75,835 tons* Australia  and 
lew 2©aland together took the largest proportions of 
woollen tex t ile s , apparel aid haberdashery, and hard­
wares and cutlery exported by Britain  to E*E* Of 
machinery exports, which represented 1 , Q% in to ta l 
exports to B*B* in 1870, India fs share was £288,841 
while that of Australasia was £301*594* The figu re  
of exports of British machinery to India in 1870 was, 
however, lower than the average of 1887-89 aril also  
lower than that of m y  year during the period 1870-74*
DIAGRAM (23)
THE CHANGE IN THE STHUCTURE OP BRITISH 
EXPORTS OP HOME PRODUCE AND MANUFACTURES 
TO EASTERN EMPIRE. 1870-1913;
OTHER. ;'COMMODITIES. ;
APPAREL &ETC. 
MACHINERY. .
IRON & STEEL
WOOLLENS5 ' !• 
COTTON YARN
.COTTON PIECE GOODS.
Between 1870 end 1913 British  exporta of cotton
manufactures* exclusive of cotton yearn* Increased
from £68*787 m illions to £110.595 m illions* and of
them the a Imres of s*E* were £18*590m.and £58*804^ *
respectively* Considering the period on the whole*
it  can he seen that B rita in  was able to expand the
market for her cotton manufactures in E*B* fa ste r  than
she did in other foreign and colonial markets* By
volume* exports of cotton piece goods increased almost
without my interruption t i l l  1888 when they reached
£*448*605 m illion yards* Average export prices f e l l
from 3#9cL per yard in 1870 to 2*5d* per yard in 1886*
Such a considerable f a l l  was a log ica l consequence of
the continuous f a l l  in prices o f raw cotton and of the
further introduction o f coat reducing technique in
Manchester*s cotton Industry* Tbo considerable decline
in fre igh ts charged on the journey to the East added to
the f a l l  in prices* and undoubtedly strengthened the
competitive situation  of the British merchants trading
with :i*E# against the growing Indian cotton Industry*
Only from 1881 to 1885* and in spite of the attempts
of the shipping rings t,o s ta b ilise  fre igh t rates* net
(32)
fre igh ts charged on Manchester*s piece goods to
IIiii'ii'miijiiwpii.il | » * » mum . 1 mm* * * * * * * * u«h«**w>*r»■«*■>»*»—_** > » » ik»b.*iiw*.u.iWm!
(32) See Ohaptor 3*
Bombay docpoaaed from 33/- to 19/3d# per ton o f 40
cubic fo o t , Ho doubt, a lso , th© reduction in the
import duties o f  India in 1878 aid, their complete
abolition  in 1888 contributed to the large  increase
in exports of cotton piece goods therein* In Victoria
the largest consumer o f B r it ish  cottons among Australasian
states, the item remained duty free until .1878 vifaen a
protective t a r i f f  was imposed. Yet, in  the f i r s t  few
years a fte r the t a r i f f  there was not any considerable
decline in imports o f B ritish  cotton piece goods* ,
Hevertholesa, t i l l  1897, exports of cotton piece
goods to B*E* ware only fluctuating around the high
leve l which had oeen reached, in 1888. The explanation
fo r  that can not be found in the movement of prices,
as these c ontirxuod to deolire until they reached the ir
lowest point, during the selected period, In 1898, l*e „ ,
2/ 2d. per yard* Her was the explanation that the
European and the American competitors had succeeded
by that time in expanding their exports o f cottons to 
\
B*l* at the expense o f the British# Manchester^ 
cottons were more fam iliar to the Eastern consumer 
and sa t is fied  him, and for a sim ilar quality  neither 
the Europeans nor the Americans were able to o ffe r  
sim ilar prices* Austria, Ita ly  ard Germany which 
started in developing their market in B*B* a fte r  1889, 
had only succeeded In exporting very small amounts of
cottons into the Indian market, ch ie fly  of colours 
which Manchester did not mmufacture* I t  must be 
added hare that the competition o f the Indian cottons 
industry did not assume any seriousness t i l l  that time, 
since it s  capacity was only su ffic ien t to supply a 
small portion of the Eastern market# In point of 
fac t, the stagnation in exports of cottons to BUI# 
during the period 1888-1897 could only b© interpreted  
by three factors j f i r s t ly ,  the serious decline in the 
value of the Indian rupee which led to a considerable 
f a l l  in the purchasing power of the Indian consumer in 
the 'world mar Bet* The same analysis would apply equally  
well to other Eastern colon!os whose currencies were 
based on s i lv e r !  secondly, the increase in import 
duties in India, 1894, and in several states in 
Austra lia ! th ird ly , the rise  in freight rates* The 
shipping conferonce succeeded in the period 1885-1894 
in ra is in g  rates of freight on Manchester piece goods 
shipped to  India* The president of Manchester Chamber 
of Commarco presented, to the Hoyal Commission on 
Shipping- Rings -  1909 ** much evidence to show that 
the conference rates in those years were much higher 
than those charged by shipping firms which were outside 
the conference* In the late 1880»s and t i l l  1895, 
the rates offered to Bombay merchants by Lines outside
the conference fo r  sh ipp ing  cotton piece goods from
Manchester, v a r ied  by one s h i l l in g  or one s h i l l in g
and sixpence over 20/«* per ton of 40 cubic f e e t ,
Meanwhile, the rate  which the conference f ix e d  f o r
doing the a ana job was SO/- per ton and only because
of the pressure of the competition from outside
steamers the conference was forced to o f f e r  to r  ©turn
about 35/- per ton to those who f u l l y  supported the
(33)
conference l in e s *  See also Table (17) For cotton
goods going to Hong Kong during the e a r ly  1890*8, the 
ra te  o f  f r e ig h t  taken by the conference steamers from 
Manchester via L iverpoo l and the Suez Canal was 57/Sd* 
During the same period cotton goods shipped via  Bremen- 
which was not under the in fluence of the conference -  
and the Canal, were charged a ra te  which varied  by a 
few pence around 50/- per ton. Much more s t r ik in g  
than that were the r a t e s  which the conference accepted  
fo r  shipments o f U *S*A fs pieoe goods* Steamers from  
New York to China, to Shanghai or to Hong Kong, d ire c t  
or with transhipment at L iverpoo l, v ia  the Suez Canal, 
charged a ra te  of 25/- to, 26/6d* per ton fo r  cotton  
goods cargo* The conference for purpose o f compet­
i t io n  accepted the ca rr iage  of American cotton goods 
lQr...             —   . —   -
(33 ) Royal Commission on Shipping Rings, , P* B* 1909 
Vol. XLVII, see Q.S15 and subsequent to Mr*
Edward Henry Langdon, President o f  the . 
Manchester Chamber of Comma rce*
mBLS HO* 17
ihe Conference^ through Hates o f h e igh t on BLece Goods 
From lynches ter to Bombay per ton Of 40 cubic fee t*  *
1881 -  1910
1 8 5
le t  Freights
s# D.
1881 33 0
1882 33 0
188? 20 11
1884 19 3
1885 19 3
1886 24 9
1887 24 9
1888 27 6
1889 27 6
1890 27 6
1891 27 6
1892 23 8
1393 23 a
1894 23 8
1895 20 10*8
1896 19 6*6
1897 19 6*6
1898 19 6*6
139 9 19 6*6
1900 19 6*6
1901 19 0*6
1902 do* it
1903 do* n
1904 do* <1
1905 do 11
1906 18 6*6
3.907 do #
1908 do it •
1909 do 11
1910 do 11
} Higher than
} free market
} rates of
) fre ight.
*  IL’hese were net rates o f fre ig h t# !« * • »  Actual Hates charged by 
the conference a fte r  deduction o f returns* I t  was only those 
who fu lly  supported the conference lines who obtained such rates#
PAPA supplied by the President o f the Manchester Chamber o f
Commerce in his minutes o f evidence before the Royal Commission 
on Shipping Rings 1909* F*P* XLVTI* 1909*
to CM no s© p o rts ,  v ia  L iverpoo l and Suez, at the a am©
ra te s ,  1*0*, pat d 7/6d* to the A t lan t ic  steamer from
Hew York a id  accepted only 17/6d* fo r  the journey from
Liverpoo l to China* In  other words the American cottons
tod to pay sob© th ing  about 56/Sd* to 40/- per ton lo se
than the English  cottons when shipped teg ether from
(34 )
L ive rpoo l to China# In such a way tl.S, exports o f  
cotton t e x t i l e s  to Hong Kong Increased considerab ly
i ■
since the e a r ly  1890 *s* This fa c to r  in  add ition  to  
the wide preference which ex is ted  in Hong Kong fo r  
the co lours  o f the Europe an and American cottons could  
represent a s ig n i f i c a n t  exp lanation  f o r  the f a l l  in  
B r i t is h  exports o f cotton manufactures between 1885 
and 1889, and then th e ir  continuous f lu c tu a t io n s  a t  
lower leve ls  throughout the re s t  of to e  se lec ted  period*  
During the la te  1890*s and for the r e s t  of the 
period , the s itu a t io n  of the Indian rupee was improving* 
Tbs Indian import duty was r e - f i x e d  at a lower l e v e l ,  
i# e * ,  3|$ ,  in  1896* Average p rices  of B r i t i s h  cotton  
s ta r ted  to  r i s e  s t e a d i ly  and by 1913 they stood at 
3/3d* per yard* However, during th is  period , i * e * ,  
from the mid 1890*3 u n t i l  1913, the conference l in e s  
could  not maintain the high ra te s  of fre igh t  wMch 
they t r i e d  to e s t a b l i s h  in  the previous ten years*  
"Bombay Native Piece Goods Merchants’*, threatened
(34 ) See p*331, Hong Kong *s re p ly  to Mr* Cton bar la in  *s 
despatch of November 1895, with regard  to the.
growth of fo re ig n  competition in  the colony*
A g , p t  i m » k - ;
the conference firms that they would make contracts  
with other a hipping firms which were o f fe r in g  to carry  
Manchester cotton goods at lower rates o f f r e ig h t *
The conference y ie ld ed  to the threat a id  made an 
agreement w ith  Bombay cotton merchants by which the 
ra tes  o f the Free market had nearly been adopted w ith  
no a lte ra t io n s *  The "n e t” ra te s  of f r e ig h t  fo r sh ip ­
ments of Manchester cottons to Bombay declined  s te a d i ly  
from S3/8d* in  1894 to 18/6d* per ton o f 40 cubic fe e t  
In 1910* I t  seems that th is  f a l l  in  f r e ig h t  ra te s  
In add it ion  to the r i s e  in  the purchasing power o f  the 
Indlm  consumer, w ith the r i s e  in the rupee, had 
prompted la r g e r  amounts of cotton exports to India*  
in sp ite  o f the r i s e  In prices* B r i t i s h  exports of 
cotton piece goods to  India t o t a l le d  3*057*351 m illion  
yards In 1913* la r g e r  by 938*951 m illion  yards than the 
l e v e l  of 1886*
As regards  the in&laa cotton industry , there were 
some signs o f  a rap id  development during, and a f t e r ,  
the 1890»s* The Industry was favoured by cheaper raw 
m ateria l, cheaper labour m d  by proxim ity to the market* 
jfet, it  was c l e a r ,  at that time, that the Indian m ills  
were only ab le  to  manufacture the coarser type o f  
cottons* Besides* the fre e  .entry o f  cotton goods 
which continued u n t i l  1917, was no doubt slowing the  
development o f  the Indian industry* Nevertheless*
Ind ia  managed during  the period  to expand her exporta
of cotton p iece gooda to Qeylo$, to M auritius and a lso
to seve ra l  other p laces In the East and that fa c to r
I t s e l f  m s one o f the reasons behind the very slow
progress o f  B r i t is h  exports of cottons to these p laces
(35 )
since the mid 1880’s# B r i t a in ’s exports  o f  cotton ' 
piece goods to A u s tra la s ia  w eres  caree ly  developing  
a f t e r  the 1880 ’s *  The h igh  protection  which was assumed 
there in  discouraged the growth of Imports from the  
mother country as w e l l  as from other fo re ign  countries  
and B r i t is h  co lon ies*  As regards  the S tra its  Settlements 
aid Hong Kong, there  was a good reason to  b e l ie v e  that 
the high ra te s  of f re igh t  which the conference s t i l l  
imposed on B r i t i s h  trade  with these co lon ies had worked 
against the expansion o f cottons exports to them*
Bee diagram (34 ) fo r  fu rther I l lu s t r a t io n  to the 
exports o f  cotton goods to  E*E* between 1855 and 1915*
The exports of cotton yarn to B,B* developed from
! '
27*342 m illion s  of lb s  in  1388-70 to 50*844 m illion  lb s  
In  1878-80* In r e la t io n  to to ta l  exports  of yarn , the 
amounts which B r i t a in  d is tr ibu ted  in  B*E, represented  
about 22$ In the la te  1880’s and about 30$ in the la t e
   «        -I.     . ... ........ i mi., .in   in  
(35 ) Exports of Indian cotton goods increased  s te a d i ly  
from 12,995 yards In 1867-71 to 80,847; yards in  
1892-98* i t  is  possib le  however that some o f
these amounts were re -exp o rts  of E nglish  co ttons. 
See Fuchs. C*J* The Trade Po licy  of Great B r ita in  
and her Colonies since  1860 f . paces' 286-387
188*
jtylf F | - H —  {.!••■! ^  ; :  !'• j i ' i t j i r }  :  
U^ 'AVERAGE EXPORT PRICES OF-; 
BRITISH COTTON PIECE GOODS
TOTAL EXPORTS OF 
BRITISH COTTON PIECE 
G 00D3.. \ji4  :■ >  A ».
BRITISH COTTON PIECE 
GOODS .EXPORTED TO /  
E.E. I  | A k f
EXPORTS TO,INpJA ONLY
I M P I
{wh'-SV,- i
r i > ; h ; . 's
t o r ; . } .
' -V '% m r
' i iVitfv 
A i t!s;; 
188 cl ( •.
im'i ji u i
? ■ h I 
;$ f| :!•:>
\ - Tl■&/.. ' !■ ' / ,i-i i-, , • Ii.±l
/ • ,
l.y. J A:
( 0 jr» ^v NB Ndv . *o , v  ****f , k tjl * 1i, * 'I '
 _ ______________ ______ j i . M x iM _  ^  _______
A  £,. |< I  , . 8 . , , - g  . «  |  |  I- ' * •**. •**' • J iJ r . » j „ j. . . . . * \ . v. f
Diagram ( 2 4 ) •
i < •Ip? ; 1; ifef
il> L:S4
£1 -10,000 : |
m ' J M I
1870fs* The considerable f a l l  in  average export  
prices  of cotton yarn , mainly because o f  the d e c l in e  
In raw cotton p r ic e s ,  mcX in  fre ight ra te s  were 
undoubtedly the reasons behind the very rap id  Increase  
in  exports cf th is  manufacture to E*E* during the 1870’s# 
Although exports of cotton yarn to E#.E* continued to  
increase during; the 1880’s ,  averaged 59*546 m illion  lb s  
in  1886-90, th e i r  rate of increase was now s low er Whan 
compared with that of t o t a l  B r i t is h  exports o f yarn*
A fte r  1890, except fo r  1910-13, exports o f yarn  to 
E*E* were s t e a d i ly  dec lin ing  and by 1913 they were 
nearly  equal-: to  th e ir  l e v e l  o f 1870. D14gram (25) 
would c le a r ly  show that exports of cotton yam  thereto  
had been s e n s it iv e ly  co rre la ted  throughout the period  
to average export p r ic e s .  Indian m ills  ware in creas ing  
th e ir  output of yarn at a rapid  r a t e  and were o f fe r in g  
competitive p r ic e s  to the cotton manufacturers in  
Ind ia  and, g e n e ra lly ,  in  the East* There would be ,  
th e re fo re ,  good reason  to b e l ie v e  that changes in  
f r e ig h ts  during the xeriod , in so f a r  as they were 
r e f le c t e d  in  p rices to Indian im porters, were Important 
to the growth o f  B r i t is h  exports o f yarn to India*
B r i t is h  exports  o f  cotton yarn to hie S t ra its  
Settlements and to  Ceylon were a f fe c te d  by the  
competition o f  the c o lo u r fu l  European yarn* In the 
S tra it s  Settlements the dyed yarn o f Swiss manufacture
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was Increasing i t s  hold on the market and in 1895 
n e a r ly  30$ of the dyed yarn imported Into the colony  
was of Swiss o r ig in *  The co lour o f  the yarn was 
almost e n t ir e ly  red  and was not obta inable  from B rita in *  
Besides, the p r ice  of the B r i t i s h  yarn was at le a s t  
higher by 4 d o l la r s  per lb  than the best Swiss yarn* , 
A lso ,  the l a t t e r  a r r iv e d  to the S t ra it s  v ia  Europa an . 
ports at  a lower ra te  of f r e ig h t  than the B r it ish *  
in  Ceylon the t o t a l  value of yarn imported in  1884 was 
253,799 Hs«, none o f which was of fo re ign  o r ig in *  In  
1889, GeyIon imported cotton yarn at the value o f  166,228 
Es* o f  which 65,880 Ra* were o f  Austrian  o r ig in  and the 
r e s t ,  am in ly  from the mother country* Exports of yarn  
from Austria  represented B r i t i s h  yarn Imported in to  
A u str ia ,  dyed there  and re -exported  to  Ceylon from 
Trieste*. This had never been the case be fo re  the  
opening o f  the Suez Canal*
The development o f B r it ish  exports o f  iron  and ■ 
s t e e l  manufactures to B*E* Is shown by cpantlty In  
Diagram (2 6 ) ,  lb r  the years 1855-1913* Comparing the 
two periods 1855-69 and 1870-1913, It  can c le a r ly  bo 
seen that the r a t e  of growth was much fa s t e r  in  the 
l a t t e r  period* A lso ,  when the growth o f  this' p a r t ic u la r  
trade , i * e * , iron  and s t e e l  manufactures to E*E ., is  
measured in  r e la t io n  to the growth of B r i t i s h  exports
I" ''ii:■ I
I-: \
•, '' i ’
•' .•; :'i v  V  •,. . 'V i 'U -  i'il‘11 T j ^ t t f n  l Y  P
'■• *•!' : ' i  . i ‘\, .? . '• \'i."Oy ■ rrl'f ’ i - - V.T \ hi /'t* 'i‘i • i f  T i f ” :C :7.b if-'H- r* .*:♦*! ,fhrl•*• .* * ;-.:ij;;.!ir!.:}^ t{i »i;i,-r VlTHi^ N V.
(•; . I f  h i  t :-s i . h  i'i p- !*.< .*,5 ■ • !
! •' i , : i ' 1:1,. . ■ *'j.j* jji VJ 
Ii ,t
i f i ' c i h l j J V
111*
• i : - J r.f ‘Mil *
;■■■! •■( r-i!" iil 'iy .
■«. !: ! .
. 1',. ’ i j. ; A hi •
t. ■ •< ‘:jl;- Ijil* ' M l '
1 S' , : • ; ,«' ' u - '.< , . t, „ .u. J.; .
;.!••■■| '-I Ml I h.
- :* >■ ' I-,:-1 . '.5 L-­/' t *. i ■ 1 1 • | • ’ } ■ I • -t I'1' I !1.” ‘ h.h L I- , i f  !»'
* ! .ini iff
•hhit• r jil>! I
i'-Ul
h;'if
r i-v!
111-
i f , , :
\i !!]hi:
;'l!h ,
Jitei.i
f ' ’VJj m m  
m x " h i i s f i i i
■ • M H; j- •( f , •'•••*i * -y n i.j , r,], 11 h j  a »;. 4
.. lit',.:;1 n*h{T’r4:'%
-  - f f
I fin
:ji »* h:i
« '* F 1 I ji f .ihho' r::fSi 1.1 ( I f  
j.vj. ift.Ah,i..1. J t - j f i .
•r.. rM .i / n -
t : I : : i. v-y,'!
. ■ . -h i ,i-li
■iij;:.!)
f. i.’Hrrr
s !
DIAGRAM ...‘i;
* '.j i
J st
■ liP:!
j: h
lit S!']N' Tt!” : i!,. t!!| .
“Ti l  ' If 
,• )K\
h 'i - ' * I - ' rI i »*.!<. .'h.-'i, I - f I- {j.jh
•! S i f r f ! :  
,t. , *r .* ■ r  -St i'i
< ■» i-f [' v.
:m4"U ),•>! ;hhh r. ;}.’ •; jii ''I,
■,:;f! ii” i.}■.■ u-; in ?
 ^Milr iln i •'
'X-?
hrlfi
VH<-
J
Tafj
•«s
: '/EXPORT PRICES 'AND QNANTITIES”-'!' • i1;|' ilji ' 
’ OP IRON AND STEEL EXPORTED FROM.If.3fC,H:i .
i >i! i?i >
’ ■ m
i M m
l l i•' I 1 < r. f
of Iron add a to o l  manufactures, during the period
1870-1913, we wouM f in d  that the former had been
considerably  fa s t e r *  The share of E*E* in B r i ta in *s
exports of iron  and s t e e l  manufactures increased from
18$ in 1870 to 35$ in  1913* Of the value o f B r it ish
exports to E*E*, exports of Iron and s te e l  accounted
fo r  7*7$ in  1870 and by 1913 i t  stood a t  14*5$*
Between 1873 ani 1884 exports o f  iro n  anil s te e l  to
A u stra la s ia  were la r g e r  than those to In d ia , .b u t  fo r
the re st  of the period , i * e * ,  u n t i l  1913, the s itu a t ion
was almost the reverse  of that* The huge increase in
exports o f  iron  and s tee l to  B*B. a f t e r  1870 can only
be exp la ined  by the great expansion In ra ilw ay  bu ild in g *
Nearly  4000 miles o f  ra ilw ays  ware open in  Ind ia  by
1870, oyer 9000 miles by 1880 and nearly  17,000 miles
by 1890. The s itu a t io n  in  A u s tra lia  was a lso  s im ila r
to that, Mien only a l i t t l e  over 1000 miles o f  ra ilw ays
were b u i l t  by 1870, then there were more than 3,500
(36 )
miles in  1880 and more than 9,000 in  1890. Mew 
Zealand had 1,250 miles open in 1880 and nearly  2,000 
in  1890* Railways had a lso  been expanded in  Ceylon 
and in other parts of E*E* throughout the period*
(36 ) These f ig u re s  are  taken from Glapham. J.H. 
tfAn Economic H istory of Modern B r i t a in1 
1850-1886. p *213-214.
There bad always bean various motives behind the 
b u i ld in g  o f  ra ilways in  these d i f fe re n t  parts o f HUE# 
yet, there would not be any d ispute that the purpose 
o f  carry in g  the t rade was o ften  the most s ig n if ic a n t  
one# By th is  fa c to r  the p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  a new ra ilw ay  
l in e  was f a i r l y  measured and, consequently, the w i l l i n g ­
ness o f the f in a n c ie rs  to provide the requ ired  c ap ita l*  
fo r  executing the scheme was determined# When the 
Indian government wanted to b u i ld  ra ilw ays  during the 
1850 !s and the I8 6 0 1 a, mainly f o r  purposes of f ig h t in g  
re g ion a l famines ard spreading law and order in  the  
Indian continent, i t  had to r a is e  the necessary funds 
through the pub lic  debt and to award grants to ra ilw ay  
companies* On-the other hand, a f t e r  1870, B r i t i s h  
c a p ita l  w i l l in g ly  poured into In d ia , at an unpreced­
ented r a t e ,  to finance ra ilw ay  p ro je c ts ,  c lea r ly , ,  
because o f  the. new prospects fo r  the growth of the 
Indian external trade a f t e r  the opening of tbe Ganal
and the development o f steams hipping and te leg rap h ic
(37 )
communications between India and West of Suez#
(37 ) Bee Qairnoroas. A*K» ’’Home and Eo re lpcn lnvestment. 
187Q -I915T~p7188,189.190,192 a id  193, f o r  B r i t i s h  
c a p it a l  invested in  ra ilw ays in  Ind ia  arid in  
A ustra lia  a f t e r  1870* A lso dashff R«L# nA- Short 
Inqu iry  Into the Mature o f Our P ro f i t a b le  Investment 
See Knowles. h£0»A». The Economic Development o f  
the B r i t i s h  Overseas Empire** p.330*331,534 and 
335 fo r  the r e la t io n  between In d ia ’s fo re ign  
trade and ra ilw ay  bu ild ing*
• 192#
To emphasise th is  fa c t  w© might add that most of
the newly e s tab lish ed  ra ilw ays in  Ind ia  a f t e r  1870
• (38)
were in  the wheat d i s t r i c t s *  The North-Western
ra ilw ay  system in  the Tunjab lead ing  down to Karachi
became one o f the most important g ra in  lines : o f the
world* In  A u s t ra l ia  and New Zealand the b u i ld in g  of
ra ilw ays a f t e r  1870 was in fluenced by the growth of
exports of wheat, wool aad farm products, such as
meat, bu tte r  and cheese which p a r t ic u la r ly  needed -
quick tran sp o rt ,  B r i t i s h  c a p ita l  w i l l in g ly  helped ,
in b r in g in g  about the development o f  ra ilw ays  in
A u s tra la s ia  as i t , d i d  bn In d ia , The f a l l  in  f r e ig h t
ra tes  o f  the Eastern route a f t e r  1889 was bound to be
p a r t ic u la r ly  s ig n i f ic a n t  fo r  a l l  heavy goods, such as
Iron and s t e e l ,  and to  f a c i l i t a t e  the growth o f th e ir
exports , Unfortunato ly , I t  has not been p oss ib le  to
obtain any data on f r e ig h t s  charged on iron  goods which
were shipped to Eastern ports during the 18701 a .
From 1884 to  1893 ra te s  on iron  shipped from Welsh
ports to Madras d ec lin ed  from 23/- o r  24/6d, to  15/-
(39) •
or IB/6d per ton,
(38) See Fuchs,, G, J, “The Trade Po licy  o f 0, t Bid ta in  
and her Colonies since 1860% p,28£U See 'a lso  ' 
how the Canal stim ulated the exports of Indian 
wheat, in  th is  Chapter,
(39 ) Supplied by Angiler, K,A-,V« fy5Q Years * F re ights  
1889-1919, See Appendix ' '
1evert ho less , during the se lected  period , European
countries succeeded in  developing th e ir  exports to E#E#
much f a s t e r  than B r ita in  did# European p r ices  o f  iron
and s te a l  were, .frequently lower then those which. B r i t i s h
iron  and s t e e l  fetched  in  the Eastern market# Besides
European goods w r e  shipped to the Eastern; marl® t at
lower ra te s  o f f r e ig h t ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  during the 1890 *s,
fo r  reasons exp la ined  before# The s t a t i s t i c s  of the
Indian trade  during the se lected  period showed that- the
increase in  imports from Belgium since the mid 1870fs .
was mainly due to the considerab le  r i s e  in  Imports of
iron  and s te e l  from that country# For the years 1889-
‘  ( 4 0 )  .
95, the report on the Indian trade explained the
194*
(40) F#P#1S93«. Vo l.LX VI# The report on Indian  trade  
stated  th at, apart from a short terra d ec lin ing ,  
there was a noticeab le  decline in In d ia ’s imports 
of coa l, hardware arid cu t le ry ,  l iq u o rs ,  copper, 
t in ,  iron  and s t e e l  m ateria l, paper, s i l k ,  and 
woollen goods from H#K# flAn examination of. the 
returns tends to support the conclusion that,  
in  re sp ec t  o f continental goods which U#K* was 
the depot fo r  shipment, the trade w ith  India is  
being conducted d ire c t  in  an in creas ing  degree, 
and in  respect o f  B r i t i s h  manufactures continental 
(European) competition is  g radu a lly  making way**#
India by the rap Id increase in exports of iron and
stee l from the continent of Europe to her# This
Increase came m ainly from Germany and Belgium which
depended previously on B ritain  to re-export their
goods but now they had their own ships which came
directly  to India, via the Canal, am charged rates
lower than those charged by B ritish  ships# In a
discussion held in.the Royal S ta tist lea l Society In
'1898, over a paper de livered  on °the Recent Course
of Trade within the Empire11, the opinion was expressed
that B ritish  iron and s tee l exports to India was partly
hindered by a high r a i l  cost in s id e  B r ita in  and p a r t ly
because o f  a r e la t iv e ly  h igh  f r e ig h t ,  consequent upon
( 4 1 )
the combination o f the shipowners of this country#,
In Austra lia , European competition In Iron'.and stee l 
trade was e ffec tive ly  f e l t  since the early  1890*3#
Iron and stee l o f European origin  were sold in the 
Australian market at lower prices# By the 1890 fs 
the Germans got a strong hold of most of the Australian  
market in certain parts of iron and steel trade such as 
those o f na il and wire#" However, l i t t l e  in that 
development should be attributed to the difference in
decline in exports of British iron and steel to
(41) See J,R.S*S» 1898, Vol#LXIt p,43 and 44#
f r e ig h t s  charged toy German arid toy B r i t i s h  ships coming
through the Canal, as that was atoout 3/- per ton in
favour o f  the former# In  Hong Kong, toar iron Imports
in  1893, were almost t o t a l ly  Belgian# Again, that was
p a rt ly  due to the fac t  that Belgium o f fe re d  lower p rices
than the B r i t is h  d id , f o r  ce rta in  kinds o f . iron  and s te e l
manufactures# More important, however, was the question
(42 )
of f re igh t#  Bar iron  goods were shipped from Belgium 
to  Hong Kong at 12/6d# f r e ig h t ,  per ton, while at the 
same time the lowest fre igh t  which shippers obtained  
from any B r it ish  port fo r  toar iron  to th is  colony was 
18/- per ton# A lso , most of imports o f  bamboo s t e e l ,  
in  Hong Kong, in  1893, came from the continent o f  
Europe ra ther than from B rita in#  I t  was Germany which 
won th is  p a r t ic u la r  market from Brita in#  "The Scottla  h 
manufacturers, a few years ago ", wrote the o f f i c i a l s  in  
Hong Kong to I# Chamberlain,"introduced the ir  make, tout 
have been hampered in  a great measure toy the h igher  
f r e ig h ts  charged, otherwise there is  no reason what­
ever, why Scottish  manufacturers should hot success­
f u l l y  compete#1
Throughout the period  1870-1913 A u stra lia  remained 
the la rg e s t  customer, in HUS#, fo r  B r i t i s h  woollens,
1 9 6  •
(42) See P .P . 1397# V o l.iau  Hong Kong's re p ly  to  
Chamberlain's despatch, p*32S#
a nil In d ia  fo llow ed  her in  importance* See Diagram (27 } • 
U n t i l  the ea r ly  1890 !a Hong Kong occupied the th ird  
p lace , hut a f t e r  that date Hew Zealand replaced her 
in  th is  pos it ion * Exports o f  B r i t is h  woollens, by 
value, to  B*E* grew a t  a very slow ra te  during the 
1870 rs aid the; 1880*a, dec lined  between 1890* and 1894, 
and then increased at a f a s t e r  ra te ,  than that o f  the 
ea r ly  period , u n t i l  1915* Although such development 
was. In  genera l, s lower than the development of exports  
of other B r i t i s h  manufactures to  E*B*, i t  was consider­
ab ly  f a s t e r  than that o f  to ta l exports  of woollen  
manufactures during the same period* Thus woollen  
manufactures exported to  E*E* made up fo r  7*1$ and 
14*8$ of t o t a l  B r i t is h  exports o f  woollens in  1870-74 
and 1910-15, r e s p e c t iv e ly *  I t  was exports of woollens  
to  A u stra la s ia  which increased from £*8 m il l io n  in  
1870 to £5*4 m illions  in  1910-15, or from 2*5$ to 
’ nearly  10$ o f t o t a l  exports o f  these p a r t ic u la r  
manufactures in  1870-74 and 1910-1915, re sp ec t ive ly *
Thus, although A u s t ra l ia  and Mew Zealand•were develop ­
ing th e ir  woollen  industry  and had in c reas in g ly  protected  
i t  by imposing h igh import duties (the  same f  actors  
which depressed B r ita in *a  woollen trade  in  .Europe 
and America during the  la s t  quarter o f  the 19th 
century) we can see that other economic fo rces  had 
in te r fe re d  into the s itu a t io n ,  during the se lected
1 , DIAGRAM ( 27) .
BRITISH EXPORTS OP WOOLLEN MAHUFACTURES AND 
WOOLLEtt TARH.1855-1913.
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period , and a llow ed  fo r  m  increase In imports o f  
B r i t i s h  woollens* These p a r t ic u la r  fo rces might bo 
found in the rap id  growth o f  population In A u s tra la s ia  
during the se le c ted  period , the pre jud ice  which had 
probably ex is ted  in  favour o f  B r i t i s h  manufactures, 
p a r t ic u la r ly  among the now s e t t le r s  from B r ita in ,  and 
the dec line  in  fre igh t  in  the A ustra lian  route*
According to data public  bad by the Board o f Trade, 
f r e ig h ts  charged on f in e  t e x t i l e s  from B r i t i s h  ports  
to A u s tra la s ia  declined  by about 68$ between 1881 and 
1895, and In sp ite  o f a r i s e  in  them a f t e r  that l a t t e r  
;year, they were s t i l l  lower by 50$ in  1900 than th e ir  
le v e l  o f 1881* Mo doubt th is  dec lin e  in  fre igh t  rates  
had played an important ro le  in  the development of the 
trade *
In  Hong Kong, European wobllens were rep lac in g  
those o f  the mother country* By the e a r ly  1890*8, 
a l l  woollen cloths came from Germany, h a l f  o f the tweeds 
and quarter of the f la n n e ls  came from the continent of  
Europe, although these were trades which the B r i t i s h  
monopolised be fo re  1870* The rap id  growth o f German 
woollen trade In..Hong Kong, and a ls o  in Ceylon was1 a 
re su lt  o f th e ir  attempts to s a t i s fy  the Eastern
consumer *s taste  at lower p rices  than those which the
1 %
B r i t i s h  asked f o r  th e ir  manufactures* F in a l ly ,  lower
fre igh t rates charged by German ships had, again, been 
o f certain importance to the development o f their  
Eastern trade a fte r 1870#
B r ita in *& exports o f machinery to B*B* during the 
selected period increased from an average o f £*7 m illion  
in 1886-70 to m  average of £7,2 m illions in 1910-13 
(See Diagram 28)* India*;a store Increased from £*4 
m illion in 1886-70 to a l i t t l e  over £3 m illion inr-l- -
1900-15* A u stra las ia fs shares were £*2 m illion and
£2#7 millions in 1888-70 and 1910-15 respectively#
The weight of machinery in B r ita in fs edtports to 1#E*,
accordingly increased from 1*8# in 1870 to 7% in 1915#
Of to ta l British  exports o f machinery, E«E* took 25,2$
in 1915 compared with 13*3$ in 1870*
It  is to be expected that the f a l l  in freight in
the Eastern route a fter 1889 was particu larly  important
to such heavy goods as machinery# In 1895 Bowley, A*L##
wrote In his ,“England fs Foreign Trade in the 19th
(43) .
Century** that machinery was s t i l l  28% dearer in
India than in England, yet, such expansion In their
exports would have been almost impossible before the
improvement of means of transport# However, we must
not underestimate the importance of other factors
which influenced the growth of machinery exports to
     ..... i. iii.wrcdfrwaaiENw#— nun»i*#i imrntrnty i*t#i#irin» mn* nnjh/mwi n»H ? u 'nwm»mi»>.iiw^ i'ww.nm>.»iii>
{45) Published in London 1895, see p* 89- 94*
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E#E# during the s e lected  p r ie d #  The a b i l i t y  o f
B r ita in  to  produce machinery cheaper than any other
in d u s t r ia l  country in the world, by that time, had been,
indeed, an important fa c to r  and i t  had c e r ta in ly
protected her machinery trade in  S#E» from European
(44 )
and American competition#, In fa c t ,  w ith  one exception, 
namely the trade o f  sewing machines which had been 
taken over by the German and the Dutch, the growth o f  
European and American competition in  the m chinery trade  
In B#B# was in s ig n i f ic a n t  throughout the period#
(44) From Hong Kong, o f f i c i a l s  wrote to J# Chamberlain 
11 At presort the ra te s  charged  by the conference  
from L iverpoo l to  Shanghai are -  l i g h t ,  35/­
per ton o f 40 cubic f e e t ,measurement; heavy, 
under f iv e  ton s , 40/- per ton; heavy over 
f iv e  tons, 42/6 per ton# Spec ia l arrangement 
i s  made f o r  any thing above ten tons • B o ile rs  
pay about £6 per ton# There is a l o t  of 
machinery out just now for the cotton m ills  
l a t e ly  s ta rted  in  Shanghai and the other 
in du str ie s  be ing  s ta r ted  throughout China.
D irect steamers from Hew York are quoting  
to Shanghai 27/6d. to 2S/6d« f o r  l i g h t  
machinery, and 32/6d. for heavy; and 
probably they w i l l  tale lower ra te s  fo r  
any la rg e r  cpantity# The Americans 
manufacture cotton m il l  machinery, but 
they cannot manufacture i t  so cheaply  
aa the B r i t i s h  manufacturer can. These lower 
fr e ig h ts  g iv e  the Americans the p u ll.  Machinery 
takes up a lo t  o f space, and fr e ig h t  is a very 
important Item in  the la y in g  down p r ic e ."  
p. 331, Parliam entary Accounts and Papers,
1897, V o l. LX.
From 1889 to 1913, not oven one ton o f B r i t is h  
coal was exported, to  Maw Zealand* The earn s itu a t io n  
app lied  a ls o  to A u s t r a l ia  from 1876 to  1913, with the 
exception of the period 1892 to 1901 when very  small 
amounts of coal were exported thereto* The reason fo r  
that was, c le a r ly ,  the cheap coal £roduotion - 
.Australasia* Coal exports to Ceylon increased from 
59,379 tons in 1870 to 333,436 tons in  1901 aid then 
they began to dec lin e  and by 1913 stood at 239,667 tons* 
Ceylon, w ith in  B#B*, became the la rg e s t  consumer o f  
B r i t i s h  coa l a f t e r  1900 and. i t  was fo llow ed  by Ind ia  
and then Aden* Colombo was used a f t e r  1889 as a coa lin g  
port fo r  almost a l l  B r it ish  ships on th e i r  way homewards, 
not only from Ind ia  but a lso  from China, Japan, the 
Eastern A rch ipelago and A u stra la s ia , and that was why 
Ceylon took in c rea s in g ly  la rg e r  amounts o f B r i t i s h  
coal throughout most of the period# Aden and few other 
ports in the Eastern coast of -Africa, w ith in  B*E#, were 
also  used as coaling stations fo r  steamers going to and 
from the Far l a s t *  Diagram (29 ) shows the development 
o f  co a l exports to B#B* from B r ita in *  rfhe increasing  
dependence on ra ilw ays  f o r  inland transport in  E*B*, 
and on steam ships fo r  fo re ign  trade promoted f a r  
more use of coa l*  However this increase  in  coal  
exports to  B*B*, t i l l  the ear ly  1890rs would have 
been impossible without the f a l l  in  fre igh t  ra tes  -
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See Diagram (30) -  as c o a l  production of India was 
developing at a rap id  r a t e  by that time* Yet, from 
the 1890*3 onwards when the cheap coal of South A f r ic a ,  
A u s tra l ia *  Japan and Ind ia  began to f lood  the Eastern  
market, B r i t is h  coal exports to E*E* had to dec line*
The lo ss  which B r it a in  had because o f  the dec lin e  in  
her coal trade." with E*E*,. was not because the s iz e  of 
such trade , in  fa c t  at i t s  peak in 1885 i t  represented  
8*7$ of t o t a l  B r i t i s h  coal exports, but because coa l  
exports f i l l e d  the tramp steamers bound to  the East 
and so kept low the return fr e ig h ts  on B r i t i s h  imports.
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The, Change In B r i t i s h  Share In B*E'a--Import.. Trade*
In. 1870 B r ita in  's exports o f merchandise to E*EU 
t o t a l le d  £38*2  m i l l io n s * o f vhieh only £1*9 m illions  
were of fo re ign  and c o lo n ia l  o r ig in *  Out o f  th is  t o t a l*  
exports to  Ind ia  accounted f o r  £20*1 m illion s  and those 
to Austra las ia : accounted f o r  £10*7 m illion s*  In  the 
th ird  place came Hong Kong* £5*6 m illion s*  fo llow ed  by 
the S t ra its  Settlements* £2*4 m illions*
In d ia  d id  not represent B r i t a in 's  la rg e s t  market 
in  BYE* only* bp.fc a lso  in  a l l  the world  w ith  the one 
exception of the U.S.A.* Of to ta l vaLue of B r i t is h  
exports in  1870 the share o f  the 0.S*A* was equal to  
12.8$ while that o f  Ind ia  was equal to 8.2^* • throughout 
the period  India maintained tier s itu a t io n  as the la rg e s t  
market fo r  B r i t i s h  export  t rad e  in IYE. Exports to  
Ind ia  increased to £71*7 m illions  in  1913. This .
notable r i s e  was only in terrupted  once durirg  the 
se lec ted  period  when exports f e l l  by £9*7 m illions  
between 1890 and 1896* However the r e la t iv e  importance 
of the mother country in  In d ia 's  t o t a l  import trade had 
only grown considerably  during the e a r iy  1870*3 and 
then i t  began to dec line  from that time onwards* Thus 
between 1870 and 1875, the share o f B r ita in  in In d ia 's  
imports from a l l  fo re ign  and c o lo n ia l  sources rose from 
64.9$ to 19%, then i t  f e l l  to 70.3$ in  1895 ard to only
57*8$ la  1912# Meanwhile* the share of* Europe* 
excluding Britain* in In d ia 's  imports grew considerably 
from 1*5$ in 1870 to about 11$ in the la s t  few years 
of the selected period* Hence, there is  a good reason 
to believe that the decline in B rita in 's  share in  
Ind ia 's  import trade was d irectly  connected with the 
growth in  the colony's imports from .Europe# ; In fact, 
the slow growth of B ritish  exports to India in the 
1890 *s was s ign ifican tly  correlated to a growth in 
Ind ia 's  imports from Europe* B rita in 's  share in  
In d ia 's  total imports declined from 78*2$ in 1890 to 
63*9$ in 1900*,while Europe's share in this particu lar  
trade Increased from 4 »8$ to 11*2$ between the two 
respective years* , ,
The importance of the markets o f  Australia and 
hew Zealand had also increased during the selected  
period* Their share in  the B ritish  exports was even 
developed at a greater rate than that of India*
B ritish  exports to  Australia and Hew Zealand Increased 
from £10*7 m illions In 1870 to £49*8 millions in 1913#
A major setback In such, growth came between 1891 and 
1898, when, exports thereto f e l l  by £11*3 m illions* 
Moreover* the growth o f  this particular trade was 
re la tiv e ly  very slow in  the period 1898-*1908*
The re la tiv e  importance of Britain  among &L 1 other 
sources which Australia  depended upon in her import 
trade* Increased from 64*0$ in 1870 to 74*4$. in 1885.
That m s  the period during which European countries 
had not yet managed in establishing regular steam 
communications with Australia* via the Suez. Canal*
Yet * between 1885: and 1910 the re la tive  importance of 
the mother country in Australia Ts import trade decreased 
by 15*8$.
A u stra lian  imports from Europe decreased from 
1 , 6$ to 1 . 8$ of her to ta l imports in 1870 and 1880 
respectively. Between 1880 and 1910 European countries* 
in particu lar Germany* Belgium and Franco increased their  
share in A u stra lia?s to ta l imparts by 10*7$, i .e . *  their  
share increased to 11.9$ in 1910* . A u stra lia ’s imports 
from TJ.B.A. (which also benefited to-some extant from 
the opening o f the Sue» Canal in her trade with Austra lia  
until Panama Canal was open in 1914) increased from 4.0$ 
in 1880 to about 11$ in the last few years of the 
selected period* Again it  w i l l  be noticed that when 
B rita in !s exports to Australia slackened '.off during 
the 1890 fs those o f Europe and America- grew rather' 
rapidly* In 1890 and 1900* Australian Imports from 
Britain represented 69*2$ and 61.5$ and those from 
Europe a rd O’*8.A • represented 14*8$ and 85*5$ of to ta l
20<&
The situation  of lew Zealand was, however, 
somewhat different from that of Australia# The store  
of the mother country in Haw Zealand's imports rose 
from 57’#9$ in 1870 to 69*9$ in 1885* and although it  
declined to 61,8$ by 1910, th is share was c learly  s t i l l  
above that one at the beginnirg of the period# Meanwhile, 
u n til the early 1890 *s the amounts which Hew Zealand 
imported from Europe were almost neglig ib le* By 1900 
these had Increased, yet only to represent 5*0$ of 
to ta l imports in the respective year# Until the end 
of the selected period the share o f Europe in Mew 
Zealand’s Imports was s t i l l  under 5$# It  is  possible, 
however, that some of the increasing amounts which 
Hew Zealand imported from Australia  were of European 
origin# The re la tiv e  importance of U*8#A* in Hew 
Zealand’s imports grew considerably from 1*5$ in 1870 
to 11*8$ In 1905 and then i t  f e l l  again to 8*2$ by 1910# 
The notable change in the store of TJ*S*A# came mainly 
in the 1890’s, i.e .,, from 5*7$ in 1890 to 10. 0$ in 
1900, whan the share of B ritain  shrank by 6*5$#
Apart, from die 1890’a, B rit ish  exports to the 
Straits Settlements had been rising stead ily  throughout 
the selected period# .Ttoy rose from £8#5 m illions in 
1870 to £8*0 millions in 1913# The share of Britain  
in the imports of the Straits had, nevertheless,
imports in those two years ream ctlvely#
declined from 26*6$ in 1870 to about 11*0$ by the cud
of the selected period* On the other hand the growth
of European or,American exports- to the Straits was not,
on the whole, impressive*. In fact the share of Europe
in the Straits * imports f e l l  • from 3*4$ - in 1870
to 8*3$ in 1880 and although it  had risen  la te r, it
did not exceed 5*0$ in  the last few j/ear& of the selected
period* Meanwhile the ,share of U*8 *A* in th is pa rt icu la r
trade was only a l i t t le  over 1 *0$ in  1910*
Thus it c&i be seen that the situation of B ritain
and other Western countries in the Straits ! import trade
was a Imos t oppos it a to that s ituation• whl oh t hey had
, . • '  (45 )
gained in her ^xport trade during the same- period#
Bearing in mind that the foreign trade of the Straits
was mainly carried fo r re-export purposes, we would
rea lize  therefore that the forces which influenced the
development of. the Straits * entrepot trade during the
selected jp riod , mainly the improvements o f -means of
*
transport, were more favourable to the growth of 
Eastern produce re-exports to the West, rather than 
they were to the re-exports o f  Western manuf-acturea 
to the East*
(45) See Table (15 ).
During the twenty .five years ending with 1895, 
B rita in fa exports to Ceylon had either remained stagnant 
at their leve l of the ea rly  1870!s or they declined. 
However, from 1895 onwards exports to  Ceylon were r is in g  
stead ily , u n til in 1913 they tota lled  £4.3 millions or 
4.8 times their level in 1870* .The share of Britain  
in the import trade of Ceylon declined stead ily , yet 
at a slow rate , throughotat the period and i t  stood at 
85*8$ in  1910, lower by 7*3$ than the corresponding 
percentage o f  1870* The share o f  Europe in. this  
particu lar trade remained almost neglig ib le  un til the 
early 18901a and than it  jumped to 7*6$ in 1900. Yet 
this share had declined to about 6. 0$ by the end o f  
the selected period* The reason why the share of 
Britain  and that o f  other European countries in the 
import trade o f  Ceylon had declined throughout was the 
growth of this colonyrs imports from India*
From 1870 to 1885, B ritish  exports to Hong Kong 
had not achieved any material progress and they on ly . 
fluctuated between £5 millions and £4 m illions* After 
1885, this export trade declined, and i t  was not before  
the la st  ten years of the selected period when it  reached 
by value, its  leve l o f the early 1870*s. Foreign 
competition, mainly European and American,, had in  
fact done much to undermine the B ritish  market in  
this colony throughout the selected period* '
Further dot a lia  about the development of Brit ish  
expor ta to various parts of B*E», are shown in Diagram 
(31)* fab le  18 shows the; changes in B rita in  fs aim re 
in the import trade of the principal parts o f E#B#
’ in the case of Mauritius, i t  oan be seen that the 
share of the mother country in imports had decreased 
between 1878 and 1898, then it  began to  r ise  again and 
by the and of the period i t  was greater than i t  had been 
at the beginning , of it *  Meanwhile the share of France 
In M auritius's imports grew during the seventies and the 
early eighties# but then it  declined and by 1910 it  was 
only 8*7% or lower by 5,1% than the corresponding per­
centage at 1870* The share o f  other countries West of 
Suez in Mauritius !s imports did not come up to un til 
the end, o f  the selected period* In fac t Mauritius fs 
imports from B rita in  and other festexm countries had 
been influenced during the selected period by two main 
factor si f i r s t ly ,  the f a l l  in the income coming from 
her sugar trade , and secondly, the change in her 
importance as a port a fte r the opening o f the Canal, 
as i t  became no longer necessary to c a ll  at her in  
the way to add from India and China#
It  w i l l  also be noticed from Diagram (31) that 
B r ita in ’s exports to the new parts of E*S*, namely 
Eastern African Protectorates aid the Federated Malay 
States, were growing at a re la t iv e ly  very rapid rate  
a fter 1900,
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Dividing the solooted p@3rf.od into quinquennia, • J-j
we MM. fin d  that during 1870-74, 1873-79, 1880-84 -"4
.  - = 
and 1885-89 Britain  was able to develop the exports . -g
of her manufactures to E*E* faster than she'/did i n
* * * . » * * *
a l l  other foreign and oolonial marie t a , an da ls  o .
fa ste r  than she managed to do in this particular market j
i t s e l f  between 1890 and 1915* Exports of hate. produce
and manufactures to E*E* increased from an average of
' r£-i:
£41*8 millions in 1870-74 to an average of £60* 5 m illions A
in 1885-89, and this growth corresponded to 17*7$ and
86*7$ of to ta l B rit ish  manufactures exported in these
two quinquennial periods, respectively* During the
periods 1890-94 and 1895-99 exports of B ritish  manufactures!
* ■ 
to E*S* declined to m  average of £58 millions and i
represented 23*9$ aid 23*4$ of to ta l B ritish  manufactures
exported in these two periods respectively* Shis f a l l  -*-f:
by value in  exports in  these quinquennia was partly  a -
result o f the great depression in  British  export prices •■!§
and partly  a resu lt o f the rise  in the cost of shipping "i
B ritish  manufactures to the Eastern marks t at a time gj
when European goods were carried to the same market at !
•v fa llin g  .freight rates* During the 1890 *s B r ita in ’s - 1
share in the imports of Australasia, In d ia , ,the Straits ’§
r y
Settlements and Hong Kong f e l l  substantially  as a resu u lt : M\ 
of the rap id  growth of European exports in-these markets* . | 
During the rest of ohe period, exports of B rit ish  M
manufactures to BUS* wore once more ris in g  rapidly  
t i l l  they averaged £X12*4m* in 19X0-15, yet the ir  
percentage in to ta l exp ox1 bs of B ritish  manufactures 
did not change from the re la tive ly  lower leve l to which 
they sank during the 1890’s. nevertheless we can s e e  
that the re la tive  importance of B*E* to the export 
trade of B rit ish  manufactures had increased by 6$ 
between 1870-74 and 1910-13 (and by 7*2$ i f  we take 
the figu res o f 1870 and 1913). ihat happened in a
... ' »V. v
period in which B r ita in ’s exports :pf home-manufactures* ' ’ * • «
increased from £234*8 m illions in 1870 to £474*3 millions 
In 1910-13 (or from £199*6 millions in 1870 to £525.3 
millions in 1913), and which was*■ characterised by , a 
dramatic increase in foreign, competition in B*i$# market* 
However, as our analysis demonstrates, th is  r is e  
in the share of E*E. in total B ritish  export trade was 
completely achieved during the tweit y years following  
the opening of the Suez Canal* During that period the 
old established B ritish  export trade with K.B* gained 
cons id erably from the f a l l  in freight rates in the 
Suez route as w ell as in the Gape route. Meanwhile 
exports of European goods to the /East were s t i l l  
hindered by the small d emand which existed for them 
and also by the small s ize  of the European owned 
shipping flee t*
Wot- further information on the growth of .exports 
of B r it ish  p? oduce aid manufactures to B*BU see fable  
(18) ani Diagrams (21) and (83)* fhe la t te r  diagram 
shows the change in the structure o f th is particu lar  
trade in some selected years during the period 1870­
1913* It  can bo seen that although tex t ile  exports 
had re la t iv e ly  declined during the period, they s t i l l  
represented the largest para cent age in  the trade with 
E*B* On the other hand, the most notable change was 
that of iron and stee l, and machinery, whose exports 
to 32* B* were d irectly  correlated to the Internal 
development of India and Australasia and to the f a l l
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Up to 1904 s ta t is t ic a l information on B ritish  
re-export trade was not ava ilab le  fo r  the values or the 
quantities of the commodities which were re-exp exited out 
of the imports from each foreign  country or B ritish  colony. 
Figures were ava ilab le , however, for B ritish  re-exports of 
foreign  aid colonial produce to each foreign  country and 
B ritish  colony, fhe la tte r  source of information is  used 
in th is research project to indicate the ro le  played by 
Britain in providing her colonies in the Bast with their  
.needs of foreign pro&txce and manufactures * Yet, as she 
supplied her colonies with moat of the ir requirements of 
mamfaotared items, B r ita in 1® re-exports of foreign  
manufactures, most probably European, represented only 
a small fraction of her to ta l export trade to E#B.,
8a© 'fable 18.
However, the role played by Britain in selling the 
produce of her B* 1. was always said to have boon of 
considerable importance to British entrepot trad© before 
the opening of the Sues Canal. Several articles were 
written, particularly in the 19th century, to describe 
how the building of the Q&ial was disastrous to British
re-exports of produce* Yet, one can not go
fa r  in describing th is depressing offoot of the Canal 
without more exact knowledge about the value o f B ritain *s  
re-exports of B*B*s produce before m  d a fte r  the opening 
of the Oan&X* With the availab le  data it  must be scarcely  
feas ib le  to reach, any precise estimation over this matter* 
However* the estimation which I  have been able to make 
would certainly help in reducing the area of conjecture 
and speculation* 1904*1913 are taken to be test years 
for which my estimation is compared with o f f ic ia l  figures*
Son Table 0-1, In ’which the errors between the estimated 
and the declared values o f re-export trade of liUB*s 
produce between 1904 and 19X3 appear to be very insign ificant  
except fo r 1905*
The follow ing procedure nss boon used: 
g irst.lyg:
Assumptions
m  Let (AT ) denote to ta l imports of a rtic le  A from a l l  
overseas sources* by value *
Let (A t) denote Imports of a rt ic le  A from HUB* by value*
Lot (AH) denote re-exports from AT* by value*
Let {A r ), Hot Inown to us, denote re-exporta from At, 
by value*
The assumption which my estimation depends upon is  that,
AB,   could bo deduced from the data supplied by
AT "
Paa&iatasnt&ry Papars o oncoming Imports and re-exporta  
of the main a rtic le s*  in and from U#K* AH and AT are 
given separately by value as w ell as by volume*
The r e l ia b i l i t y  o f this assumption depends* f i r s t ly  
upon the difference between AT and At* I f  AT r» At i t  
w ill  be 100$ re lia b le *  Secondly* i f  commodity (A) 
contained more than one grade* and the sta tist ic s  did  
not make any distinction  between them long stapled
cotton x short stapled cotton) and At whs la rge ly  d ifferent  
in quantity from AT ** At*
(2 ) Let denote value of general imports from B*E*
Mow (by multiplying) »■ Av would specify tihs
a t ” " S j r
amount which B rita in  re-exported of A^ at a percent of 
Mt *
( 5 ) Xf this procedure could be done fo r  100$ o f the 
commodities imported from 1 #B*
then Br r~ Or y-  «*.« » would indicate
%
re-exports $ in general imports from B«B*
However th is can not be done for re-exports of soma 
commodities (o f foreign or colonial o rig in ) were not 
given sometimes even in* to ta l i  # a * * a p o ss ib ility  
that AH is  not known*
■ fir
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Second ly . the proo&dure
A ll the main art Id e a  which B ritain  imported from E.JS. 
-.were -included, and care has always been taken as regards 
the important changes in the structure throughout the 
period 1855-19X5* Between 1855-1880 most important 
a rt ic le s  which wore imported therefrom wore* raw cotton* 
raw wool* raw jute* riea* coffee, raw sugar* popper* 
indigo* hides and tin* What started to emerge as one 
Qf the main exports of E*h* to Britain  after* 1875 while 
there was a decline in the re lative  Importance of pepper* 
indigo* sugar and to a certain extent cotton*
With regard to the f i r s t  criticism  the assumption 
has been made that there was not much fea r  of any bias 
as Britain*s imports of indigo* popper* r io s  and jute 
came almost en tire ly  from the Eastern colonies* Also 
imports of wool* coffee* t in  were mainly coming from 
these colonies* However*imports of raw cotton came 
mainly froraU*S#A*, except during the I860 fs mainly from 
India* but yet they represented a considerable portion 
in general value of B ritish  imports from B*£U Moreover* 
while the U*8*iita cotton was large stapled and needed 
by Britain  la rge ly  fo r home consumption, a largo proportion 
of In d ia1b short stapled cot ton was for re-export trade* 
This fact could be shown c learly  during the cotton famine 
when Brita in  re-exported a la rger proportion o f cotton
817.
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I t  was Indian cotton and was not much no©dad fo r  the
B ritish  cotton industry* Yet as no bettor alternative
was availab le  general percentage of cotton re-exports
was taken however and applied, to imports of Indian
cotton before and a fte r 1880 *a* Hence we mast take the
estimation for to ta l B rit ish  re-exports o f E#E*s produce
before I860 and a fte r  1889 up to 1880 as lower than they
ooulcl have been*
After 1880 the most important changes in the structure
happened as wheat* meat* butter (and other d ifferen t kinds
of fresh foods) started to occupy a large percentage in
value of B ritish  imports>from B*B# Again those colonies
became In the period 1880-1913 one of the chief suppliers
of wheat to Britain* He-exports of wheat * meat* butter,
wore* however, very low or almost n il  in some years in
that period and that was the general case whether imports
came from the East or from the West* A fter 1900, rubber
and tin  grew sign ifican tly  in importance in the value of
general imports from E*E* Again E*B* were the ch ie f source
of supplying these commodities and it  is quite re lia b le
to use AH b to replace Ar as it  has been explained#
AT At
Secondly> the value o f the main a rtic le s  which 1 consid­
ered above constituted not less than 70$ of to ta l value 
of general imports from E*B* and varied in soma years 
between this percent and 90$ or over* For the rest
of the commodities sampling method has been used to 
Indicate the general trend of B ritish  re-exports of 
them* One would not exclude the p o ss ib ility  that some 
rough judgements might have been made in the choice of 
the sample* However, the slight errors which are 
obtained in the teat years could wall support ray 
procedure* Moreover i t  must b© borne in mind that 
values of imports, exports and re-exports were a l l  
given in o f f ic ia l  s ta t is t ic s  as declared by the traders* 
Thus o f f ic ia l  s ta t is t ic s  of themselves were open to 
criticism *
2X9*
Teat Years in  Constructing Values of B rit ish  Re-exporta 
of the Produce of .Eastern Empire*
He-exports of Produce as a percent in
’ ’ General Imports therefrom .....
Years* Declared Values Estimated Values
0/ of
p  p
1904 30,7 30.6
1905 25.3 32.0
1906 33.6 34.3
1907 31.9 31,7
1908 35.5 32.2
1909 35,3 32,4
1910 ' 31,6 30,7
1911 32.0 32.4
1912 33,1 33.8
1913 33.6 33.4
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The Trade P o licy  o f  B*B» during the Period 1869-1913 
Throughout the period  f r e e  trade continued to  be 
the p o licy  of the B r i t i s h  Grown Colonies in  the Bast#
In 1875 In d ia  lowered the average ra te  o f import duties  
from 74* to dfo* N evertheless, demand was s t i l l  in s is ten t  
in  the B r it is h  Parliament that India should adopt com pletely  
f r e e  trade# The preference on the s id e  o f  the Indian  
manufacturer was viewed by the B r it is h  as a burden on 
the Indian  consumer and a lso  Im plied u n fa ir  d iscrim in ­
a tion  aga inst the manufactures o f the mother country#
In 1882 the demand o f B r ita in  was answered, the Import 
duties were abo lished  and India kdopfecdfree trade#
However, by 1894 the f in a n c ia l c r i s i s  In  In d ia  because 
o f the dep rec iatin g  rupee, necessitated  a re tu rn  to  a 
5$ import duty a l l  round fo r  revenue purposes* With 
the gradual removal o f  the fin an c ia l trou b les  of In d ia ,  
the import duty on a considerab le  portion  o f cotton  
manufactures was r e f lx e d  at 3i$* Imports o f  cotton yarra 
remained almost fr e e  o f duty a l l  the time, but other 
Import du ties  in  the Indian t a r i f f  ranged from 1% to 
5% ad valorem*
In Ceylon there were moderate duties about 5$ 
i in t l l  1881, but th e re a fte r  they were ra ised  and averaged
A P P B N .D I X  *! P H
about Q|$ fo r  the re  at of the period# Y et/  imports of 
cotton yarn and cotton manufactures were trea ted  d iffe ren t ly :  
arid paid only 4$ duty# As regards M auritius* moderate 
duties about a f■$ on imports were kept from 1869 t i l l  
1881* However, fo r  the re s t  o f  Hie period , i# e * , 1881­
1913, most of the imported a r t ic le s  in  M auritius were 
sub ject to  10#4$ duties#
The re s t  o f  the B r it is h  Crown Colonies in  the East 
p rac t ised  almost completely fre e  trade during  the se lec ted  
period* Y e t , the s itu a t io n  o f the A u stra la s ian  dominions 
was considerab ly  d iffe re n t#
In  Hew South Wales the t a r i f f  remained very low t i l l  
1892 when some moderate p ro tective  measures took p lace* 
However, these measures were removed in  1895 aa d an u lt r a  
f r e e  t a r i f f  was introduced# V ic to r ia  ra is e d  her duties  
considerably  in  1879 and increased  them s t i l l  more in  
the fo llo w in g  years* By 1895 protection ism  In  V ic to r ia  
reached g rea te r heights than In  any other country in  the 
world, except U*S*A*, as import duties averaged more than 
40$* To th is  s itu a t io n , there were a few m odifications  
in  1896, but V ic to r ia  remained u lt r a  p ro tec t io n is t  t i l l  
the establishm ent o f the A ustra lian  commonwealth*
Soxith A u s tra lia , Western A u s tra lia  and Tasmania Imposed 
considerable duties on various a r t ic le s  o f B r it is h  and 
fo re ig n  manufacture in  1879* With the exception of
Tasmania, the import duties in  these dominions were
*
not as h igh  as those o f V ic to ria *  In  the years  
fo llo w in g  1879, Queensland and Western A u s tra lia  ■*
e stab lish ed  h igh  protection ism  oT th e ir  ter±f'l%  yet was 5
not so severe as that o f V icto ria#  ’ ,
A fte r  form ing the commonwealth of A u s tra lia , a l l  *
i
the state  t a r i f f s  were un ilied#  The new t a r i f f  was 
higher than those which form erly  p rev a ile d  in  most o f t
the protected s ta te s , yet was s t i l l  low er than that which ,
V ic to r ia  had before# La te r, the fr e e  trade party  gained  
strength  in  A u s tra lia  and import duties were lowered and 
averaged only 6Jh P ig  iro n , t in  p la te s , s t e e l  b a rs ,  
chemicals and cotton yarn, which in  t o t a l  formed a >'
la rg e  proportion  of A u stra lian  imports were given, a j
f r e e  entry# Cotton p iece goods, worsted yarn and linen s  
paid  5$# Machinery a id  woolleh and worsted manufactures s
were du tiab le  at leifo and 15jS respective ly#  As regards  
Hew Sealand, duties amounting to  3L0$ wore imposed in  
1879 on se v e ra l imported items# In the years fo llo w in g
1
1879 fu rth e r  increases in  Hew Eeal&nd ?s t a r i f f  took 1
place# In  1881 a duty o f 15jJ on cottons was taken o f f ,  
but in  1885 and in  1886 there were additions to the 
t a r i f f ,  mainly to increase revenue# L ater, in  the i
period  when Hew Zealand moved towards free  trad e , average  
import du ties  on the p r in c ip a l items stood a t about 9jS, 
and furtherm ore every a r t ic le  used in  a g r ic u ltu re , and j
in  primary productions was .tree o f duty#
283.
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CHAPTER V
BRITISH TRADE EAST OP SHE'S AND DISTINCTIVE 
FACTORS WHICH AFFECTED ITS DEVELOPMENT 
(1913-1955)
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In  Part I  i t  has been exp lained  that the opening 
o f  the Sue a Canal was e s s e n t ia l to  the development of
A
steamships but that th is  r o le  was g radu a lly  d ec lin in g  
in  importance as steamship companies trad in g  w ith  the 
East succeeded in  e stab lish in g  a strong  com petitive  
p os ition  fo r  themselves* The course o f f r e ig h t  ra tes  
during the period  1869-1913 was c lo s e ly  linked  with the 
degree o f com petition which ru led  the business o f  carry in g  
the Eastern trad e , and which was in fluenced  by bbs process  
o f su b stitu tio n  o f  steamers fo r  s a i ls  and a ls o  by the 
r iv a l r y  between the new steamship companies and the 
o ld e r ones« Thus, the most notable decrease in  fr e ig h t  
ra te s  was achieved during the 1880 fa when that competition  
was moat vigorous# Around the e a r ly  1890*a the tu rn ing  
point In  that process was reached and fre ig h t  ra tes  
sta rted  to  f a l l  at a much slower ra te  u n t i l  they began 
to r i s e  in  the e a r ly  years o f  the 20th ceit u ry . That 
was a s ign  which c le a r ly  marked the end o f the circuit!" 
stances which the opening o f the Canal had c re a te d  in  
1869# From that time onwards the Suets Canal*s in fluence  
on fre ig h t  ra te s  was lim ited  to  the possib le  in fluence  
o f the change in  Canal dues, provided that the Canal 
would always remain open and in  su ita b le  conditions  
fo r  nav igation .
Til© opening o f  the Canal had also exerted a 
revo lu tion a ry  in flu ence  on trad© re la t io n s  between the 
Eastern world and Ehrope because Apart from it s  in flu ence  
upon fr e ig h t  i t  had ra is e d  new prospects fo r  the fu tu re  
of Eastern  trad e *  This fa c to r  to ge th e r w ith  fr e e  trade  
p o licy  played a very s ig n if ic a n t  ro le  in  the development 
of the European trade w ith  the countries East of Suez, 
almost u n t i l  the outbreak of fee f i r s t  World War* A fte r  
the War i t  was c le a r  that otV*ar fa c to rs  began to  p lay a 
more in f lu e n t ia l  part in  the course of that trade* 
G enerally  speaking we can say that the dominating p os ition  
o f the Sues; Canal was bound to  dec lin e  in  Importance in  
a period  of ra p id  change* In  h is ,f Seaways o f  the Empire1 
S arjan t, A* J* wrote in  1918 say ing ”To the present 
generation , the Canal (th e  Suez Canal) i s  so Bauch part 
o f the natural o rder o f  th in g s , that we are prone to  
fo rg e t  i t s  comparative youth m d  to ignore the profound  
changes which i t  produced in  a short period  o f time in  
the o rgan isation  of ocean shipping end the trade o f the 
w orld11* S im ilar to other g reat innovations in  the 
h isto ry  o f tran sport the Suez Canal dim inished in  
importance a f t e r  i t  had achieved i t s  revo lu tion *
nevertheless th is  research  p ro ject is  not lim ited  
to an examination o f  the revo lu tion ary  change which 
began in  1889 and continued to  in fluence sh ipping  
business and trade  fo r  almost fo rty  years* I t  is  a ls o  
our concern to rev iew  the decades that fo llow ed  the
end o f  that revo lu tion ary  change in  order to see whether 
or not the Suez Canal re ta in ed  the importance which it  
had gained during the period  1869*19X3* Therefor© , in  
th is  Fart o f the research  which deals w ith  the period  
1913-1956 a tten tion  w i l l  be given to the fac to rs  which 
a ffe c te d  the dependence o f B r i t is h  eastern  trad© on the 
Sues Canal and in  the l ig h t  o f  th is  an a ly s is  wo can 
estim ate the importance o f  that seaway to  B r ita in *
Before looking into the nature and the in fluence  
o f the fa c to rs  which determined the dependence o f th© 
B r it is h  trade on the Suez Canal we may, without en tering  
in to  many d e ta i ls  ou tlin e  th is  p a r t ic u la r  trade i t s e l f  
and b r i e f ly  review  the fa c to rs  which a ffe c te d  i t s  
development during the period  1913-1956* For obviously  
the importance to  B r ita in  o f th© Suez Ganal, or any 
other a lte rn a t iv e  route,w ould  p rim arily  depend upon the 
s iz e  o f the trade  conducted w ith  the .East#
B r it is h  Trade East o f Suez and D is t in c t iv e  Factors 
which a ffe c te d  i t s Development 1915-1955*
'Hie great depresalon  o f p rices  in  the la s t  quarter  
o f  the 19th century marked the r e v iv a l  o f a very a c t iv e  
protection ism  in  European countries# At the beginning  
the measures taken were gen era lly  lim ited  to  t a r i f f s  
designed to  p rotect native ag ricu ltu re#  In Germany, 
however, the new protectionism  launched in  1B79 ap p lied  
to in d u s t r ia l  as w e ll  as a g r ic u ltu r a l  goods* The ex tra ­
ord inary growth o f  the Germm economy under protection ism  
had c le a r ly  shaken the fa i t h  o f many coun tries in  the 
B r it is h  fr e e  trade policy#
With seve ra l countries In the world  adopting  
protection ism  B r ita in  fa a g r ic u ltu ra l  secto r was p laced  
under extreme pressure while the 0x 1m m  ion o f her  
in d u strie s  was slowed down by lim ita tion s  imposed upon 
them by fo re ig n  t a r i f f s #  In  s p ite  of the re v iv a l o f  
im p eria l p re fe rence  under J# Chamberlain, C o lon ia l 
Secretary in  the f i r s t  years of the 20th century, B r ita in  
held  firm ly  to her chosen p o lic y  u n t i l  the outbreak o f the 
f i r s t  War* B r ita in »s  example was fo llo w ed  by a few 
sm all European countries end by Ind ia  and the re s t  o f  
B r i t is h  dependent countries everywhere in  the world*
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The rev iva l of strong nationalism and militarism in the 
few years which preceded the f i r s t  War had, however, 
weakened the case fo r  free  trade in Europe aid had Its  
strong echoes In B rita in  and in her Empire* After the 
War had closed it  was increasingly rea lized  that there 
were grave d if f ic u lt ie s  in the way of restoring competitiara 
world markets* There was a very marked increase in 
protectionism by methods of quantitative restrictions  
as well a a by imposing heavy t a r i f f s ,  in Europe end 
elsewhere* These measures wore somewhat relaxed during 
the late 1920*3 but then came the international crises  
of the early  1950*3 and although this c r is is  was partly  
a natural result of protectionism, it  took away the 
.residue of fa ith  in free trade as a system which could 
control world trade*
In 1952 the B rit ish  government decided toeiabark 
upon a policy of protectionism# Imperial pr ©feroneo 
was also resumed and greatly  strengthened by the Ottawa 
agreements which had as one of their objects the develop­
ment o f closer t ie s  between Britain  aid the Empire#
There were separate pacts with ©ach of the Dominions, 
but the same degree of p? eference was extended to a l l  
of them# The main undertaking given by Britain  in these 
pacts was the maintenance, fo r  five years, of the 
preferentia l position created by Import Duties Act 1932# 
That .mt gave a free  entry to over 80% of a l l  imports 
from the Empire and subjected the rest to revenue'duties
£ 2 8 *
os? to pro-1931 protection ta r iff#  Besides Britain
made a number of other concessions in order.to increase
the share o f the Dominions in her market* Those were aa
follows j f i r s t ,  duties on butter, eggs, mid various kinds
of fru it  coming from foreign countries were ra ised  from
10$ to 16-20$, or more# Also wheat, linseed and Imwr ought
copper were l i f t e d  from the free  l i s t  aid became subject’ «
to duties# These were the products in which the .Dominions
had a particu lar interest* Second, it  was agreed to
maintain, fo r  fiv e  years, the general 3,0$ duties -
established by Import Duties Act, 1932 -  on a wiite rang©
of foreign goods* Third, the existing preference on
Empire tobacco was guaranteed fcr ten years and the
preference on coffee was considerably raised# Fourth,
i t  was agreed to re s tr ic t  imports of foreign meat for
the benefit of the Dominions* However, fo r  the protection
of her farmers, B ritain  kept for herself rights to re s tr ic t
imports of meat from the Dominions i f  these entered In
(1 )
too largo quantities.
Within the B ritish  Eastern Empire, India which 
fu l ly  adhered to  free  trade policy up to the outbreak 
of the f ir s t  War, began a policy of protectionism in  
1917* The War p r i e d  with naturally much leas competition
(1 ) F* Benham* Great Brita in  under Protection. p*91-94*
Bee also pages 96-98*
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from Europe had stimulated Industry In India and made 
a case fo r  protectionism# When Ottawa agreements were 
signed Australia* Hew Zealand and Canada, included general 
clauses promising ffto protect by t a r i f fs  only those 
Industries which were reasonably assured of sound 
opportunities of success and to keep protection duties 
at a leve l that would allow TJ*K* producers f u l l  opportunity 
and reasonable competition on the basis of the re la tive  
cost of economical end e ffic ien t production#n India* 
however* could not o ffe r  a sim ilar promlso*pr e&umifcXy 
because it started industria lisation  much la te r  than the 
white B ritish  Dominiona• India held to a policy o f  
giving special protectionism to infant industries and 
reducing It  once they were established#
In spite of the promisee given by the B ritish  
Dominions the ir t a r i f f s  sometimes rose even fa ste r  than 
foreign ta r iffs #  Meanwhile it  was not a mere t a r i f f  
protection in India which disposed lim itations upon the 
produce of Britain* but i t  wm  also the new nationalistic  
attitude which ca lled  for the preference of Indian produce# 
During the 1950 ?s the shadow of another great war 
was Increasingly growing and t a r i f f s  were raised every­
where in m  attempt to s t if fe n  national control over 
international trade aid to deny any benefit to r iv a ls  
who were potential enemies* Under these circumstances 
the course of international trade was certain ly throttled#
Nevertheless B r ita in fa trad© with top Empire was
re la t iv e ly  increasing at a faster rate*. Some economists
have tended to  attribute that favourable growth of the
B ritish  trade with Empire countries to the signing of
(2 )
Ottawa Agreements. yet there were certain ly other
; ( 3 )
important factors which affected the situation . Tims* 
Britain  *s tex t ile  exports to India had severely diminished 
in the inter*-war period but her exports of machinery and 
iron and stee l products to that country had increased fo r  
the same reason, i . e . ,  industrialisation# Haw jute 
Imports from India had decreased, but imports of jute 
tex tile s  therefrom had Increased, etc# Another important 
factor was the fact that B rita in  did not & ways demand 
immediate payments when goods were bought by the Empire 
during the 19th century or during the early  decade of 
the Both century. Generous credit terms were arranged.
Mow during the inter-war years repayments of debts, often  
in terms of goods, had enabled the volume of trade to 
grow continuously larger#
During the year a 1914-1918 the U.S. emerged in the 
world as the greatest industria l power* From 1913 to 
the la te  19BOfa, 1986-£9, the U.S. was able to increase 
i t s  store of world industria l production from 36.8$ to 
48*2$. Meanwhile Europe 9 a store f a l l  from 46*3$ to
(2 ) Sohlote. W* “B ritish
the 1930»sw see page 89*
(3 ) Ihe. Economist. May 1937
' £51.
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40*7$ of world Industrial production during the same 
period. . The r is e  of the IJ.S# was re flected  in  a fa s te r  
development of its  international trade, but the development 
was most notable in the market East of Sue#. Active 
attempts of European countries to invade, or red istribu te , 
the Eastern market during the la te  19th century and up 
to 1913 had suddenly come to an end with the outbreak 
o f the War* German goods disappeared completely in  
the Eastern markets almost u n til the 'mid 1920 *a#
That, obviously, le f t  a vacuum which Britain  was not 
able to f i l l  completely since her industria l production 
was also hard h it  by the War- circumstances# The opportunity 
was therefore a va ilab le  fo r  the m d also Japan to
take larger shares in the Eastern market# But even after  
Britain  and the rest of Europe had begun to restore their  
dominant position in that market, l . S .  exports to Asian 
countries m d to Australasia continued to increase.
U.S. imports from the East were also r is in g  rap id ly .
Between 1913 and 1924, IT# S. imports from Asian countries 
increased from 16$ to 31$ o f its  total imports. The 
opening of the Panama Canal had playad m important ro le  
in this respect since i t  had quickened end cheapened 
transportation between Asian and American ports. The 
growth of America* imports from the last had certain ly  
had Its influence upon the growth of B r it ish  imports 
from that hemisphere* Yet it  had also another indirect
833*
of feat* Baring that decade Britain had a favourable 
balance of payments in foea? trade with Eastern countries 
and t it s  obtained a good deal of their d o lla r  earnings 
which she spent in increasing hop imports’ from the 
do lla r  areas in the Western Hemisphere*
However, the leve l of American imports from Asia, 
particu larly  from India, Ceylon, Malaya arc! the Dutch 
East Indies reached its  highest le v e l in 1988 and then 
started to decline* The follow ing pab&ago is  quoted 
from J* Oonclliff e fs w3?h© Commerce of Nationsws ,fXn 1938, 
the XT* S* had imported from India, Burma, Gey Ion aid the 
Dutch East Indies raw materials to the value of .$361 
million* Ton years e a r l ie r ,  imports from those countries 
had boon $586 m illion, equal a fte r the 1934 devaluation  
to 0992 m illion of the present currency* In 194,6 aid  
1947, imports from these countries ware n eg lig ib le1 *
That was doubtless due to the great American expansion 
in the production of raw materials aid foodstuffs*
Tm f i r s t  War had not greatly affected the position  
of the B ritish  Empire# B rita in  *s p o lit ic a l dominance 
over countries in Asia, A frica  and other parts of the 
world remained almost tin chan gad* Only in India some 
experiments towards a sort of Indirect ru le  wore 
practised*
That situation  was different from what happened,, 
to the Empire a fter the second World War* The War
which lasted from 1939 to 1945 had greatly Impoverished 
B ritain  end at the same time gave m  extraordinary 
p o lit ic a l prestige in world a ffa ire  to .the 0\3*/u and 
U*S*S*R* Theso factors helped to explain why Britain  
oould not retain  her colonial strength in the poet-war 
period# On the other hand the period of the War for  
several reasons had fostered the growth of a strong wave 
of nationalism in B r it ish  dependencies as w ell as in 
European dependencies, everywhere in the world* The 
years which followed the Second War had therefore 
witnessed the d isso lution  of the British  Empire* In 
1948 India achieved Independence and in accordance with 
the wishes of the Hindu and the Moslem populations i t  
was divided Into India and Pakistan# Ooylon, Burma and 
Borneo also became independent in the same ysar, ih ile  
steps wore taken towards giving Malaya an independent 
federa l government* However, for the period under 
review in this Fart, 1913^1955, no great change had - 
taken place In the position of British colonies in the 
Eastern coast o f A fr ica , Hong Kong, Mauritius, Seychelles 
and Aden protectorates * Other te rr ito r ie s  in South 
Arabia and around the Persian Gulf were also retained  
under B ritish  protection#
P o lit ic a l Independence was bound to change the 
trade relations between Britain  and hex* former Empire#
The newly Independent countries war© not necessarily
83#*
going to p im tha.it? economies or their foreign trade 
in a manner which would keep fc&oao to the former 
colonial power* Yet, two factora wore now preventing 
such change from taking a serious form immediately a fte r  
the Empire was reorganised* F irst , the fact that B ritish  
Colonial policy in the pact decades had dona ao much to 
establish  a united Empire on the basis of mutual trade 
interests* Second, that independence to B ritish  colonies 
was in fact given gradually over several decades in  
increasing doses so that whan it  was fu l ly  granted i t  
was not followed by a revolutionary change in the attitude  
of the independent peoples towards the former occupying 
power. flhus# wo find  that only Burma withdrew from the 
B ritish  Commonwealth, while India, Pakistan and Ceylon 
w illin g ly  accepted to continue with Britain  their trade 
and p o lit ic a l relations almost without any notable change* 
One should emphasise, however, that those factors prevented 
only a sudden change, fox'* in the longer period other 
economic aad p o lit ic a l factors would most lik e ly  
increasingly loosen the t ie s  which connected B ritain  
in the past with some countries in the Eastern world* 
In te rc a s t  arn trade already started growing at a factor 
rate in the post** war period* Also U.S.A* and U*S*3*R#,
I
each In its  own way and each fox* its  owhreaaon, were 
also actively pushing the ir economic aid p o lit ic a l  
influence in the newly independent world* On the side
• £ 3 5 *
o f Britain  there were also new factors which started  
drawing her closer1 to the Western world. Xu 1947 
Britain was already buying 42$ of her imports from the 
Western Hemisphere. On the other hand she was se llin g  
there only 14$ of her total, exporta. In the fra-w ar  
period Britain  was able to get some d o lla r  payments in  
her trade with the Bast, hut now this situation was 
changed since tf*S* imports from that hemisphere had 
greatly diminished. B ritain  therefore had to concentrate 
In pushing her exports In the U.S. a ad in other do lla r  
areas In the West in order to earn su ffic ien t do llars . 
fo r  financing her imports from them# The and of the 
European colonial Empires, the appearance'of the B.S.S.H  
dominating the soc ia lis t  group of Eastern Europe, and 
the extraordinary growth of the U.S. as a world economic 
and p o lit ic a l power were a l l  outstanding post-war 
featn.roa which urged Western European, countries to look 
fo r  closer co-operation between them. Already in the 
immediate post-war period some new organisations, such 
as O.E.B.C and E.E.C. had begun their work to achieve 
more Inter-European economic co-operation#
The steady spectacular development o f Middle East 
o i l  production, particu larly  during the post-war years, 
has, however, created new B ritish  interests in the* East 
of Suejs. The discovery of o i l  in Iran at la s je d - i -  
3ulalman In 1908 and then at Haft Kel in 1928 wore 
only the beginnings of a aeries of great discoveries
236.
In  the Middle East area, Ih© 1930* s ware undoubtedly 
the most basica lly  creative years In the history of the 
Middle East o i l  industry* In Persia no %mn than four  
p ro lif ic  now fie ld s  were discovered, In Northern Iraq  
o i l  was found in considerable amounts at Kirkuk*
Bahrain came into produotion in 3,933 and Just before the 
outbreak of the War the existence of rich o i l  f ie ld s  in 
Saudi -Arab! a,* Qatar and Kuwait was established, The 
richness of the main, f ie ld s  in the Arabian area around 
the Gulf was Indeed extraordinary and unexpected I f  
measured by any standard*
Between 1946 and 3,955 to ta l production from the 
fiv e  main o i l  producing areas, Kuwait* Saudi Arabia,
Iraq , Iran and. Qatar increased from 35 m illion tons to 
an annual rate of 158 m illion tons, a r ise  of about 360/1, 
Middle East o i l  production as a percentage of to ta l world 
o i l  production had therefore increased from about 8,5$ In 
1946 to about 20% in 1955, See also Diagram No* 32*
With some minor exceptions to be made in the oases of 
Iran and Iraq a l l  o i l  production of the Middle East was 
not required fop loca l consumption, and therefor© was 
almost to ta lly  exported* Thua while Middle East o i l  
exports rose more than thro ©fold from 1949 to 3,954 
those from the rest o f the world went up by only one 
fourth, Diagram (33) shows the importance of Middle 
Bast o i l  exports in to ta l world trade of o i l .
837,
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DIAGRAM (32)
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For several w a ll known, reasons Wastern European 
countries were be coming Increasingly dependent upon o i l  
supply from the Mid&fe Bast* In  1956 about?. 90$ of theia? 
total, o i l  Imports cam© from that aouroe* B rita in 1 a 
situation  In this reapeet la ahown in  fab3*© (19) whoa?© 
imports of o i l  from the Middle Bast are compared with 
her to ta l o i l  Imports*
That, however, did not constitute a l l  the B ritish  
Interests in the Middle Bast oil# The richest o i l  f ie ld s  
of a l l  turned out to l ie  in these t r ib a l te r r ito r ie s  
beside the Persian Gulf, control of which the B ritish  
had taken on behalf of the Indian Empire during the 19th 
century# Besides, from the very beginning the ro le  of 
B ritish  capital in the exploitation of Middle East o i l  
was a dominating one# Without entering into many d e ta ils , 
British  p o lit ic a l dominance in the area whether It  was 
u n o ffic ia lly  practised aa the case with Persia* Iraq , 
or Saudi Arabia, or o f f ic ia l ly  declared as the case with 
Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar,deoialmly helped B ritish  
cap ita l to acquire a major share in the. o i l  investments# 
Hot only that* the B r it ish  government also ahax’cd in the 
o i l  enterprise of the Middle East a fte r  1914 by acquiring  
51$ of the Anglo^feraian O il Company# The action was 
principally  advocated by Winston Churchill, First Lord 
of Admiralty at that time* when navies wore fa st  changing 
to liqu id  fuel# Later, that purchase of o i l  shares had
far-reach ing p o lit ica l and economic consequences, 
particu larly  m  the Middle Bast turned out to be one of 
the richest o i l  areas in the world, and a lso  because the 
Anglo-Persian Company expanded its  investment in several 
countries#
{4 )
B rita in Ja imports from East of Sues increased from
£149*7 m illion in  1913 to an annual average of £269*0 
m illion in the years 1926-87-28 but decreased a fte r that 
to an annual average of £841*5 m illion in the years 
1930-57-38# Xho average of the post-war years 1946-47-4 8 
was however much above that of the late  1930*a, l * e * , 
£415*3 m illions, then import a continued to r is e  u n til 
they reached £1066*5 m illions in 1956* B ritish  exports 
to Bast of Suess developed in a sim ilar manner, 1*e *, 
showing a continuous increase throughout the period in 
terms of pounds ste rlin g , except during the 3,9301 o*
Xhey increased from £180* 1 millions in 1913 to an annual 
average of £246*0 millions In 3.928-87-88, and then went 
down to an annual average o f £138*6 m illion in 1938-37-38* 
In the post-war period they developed, from £558*8 m illion  
an annual average of 1948-47-48 to £985*1 millions in 
1965*
{4 } Figures of imports and exports in©Xuded re-exports; 
Sources, flAnnual .Statement o f the Trade of  the tr*E* 
with Foreign Countries and B r i t is h  C ountries”
Compiled In t h e St at x a tlea l Of f  1 oe o f the Qua t oms.
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The low figures of the la ta  1930 Us were partly duo 
to the general depression of trade In those years arid 
partly due to the new value which the pound sterlin g  took 
a fte r the gold standard was abandoned la  the early  1830*a 
Also the r ise  In prices must he taten into account when 
considering the notable increase in the value of the trade 
during tie post-war period*
The position of Britain*s t r&de with East of tkioz 
may ha seen more clearly  when compared with her to ta l 
trade* Imports from the Bast which represented 19% o f  
to ta l imports in 1913# formed 21* 2% and 26*0% o f the 
to ta l in the M to 1980?s (1926-87-88 av*) and in the 
late  1930 Ui (1936-37-38 av*)* Exports to the East which 
amounted to 88*4$ of total exports in 1913, constituted 
30*1$ o f the total la  the late  1920 *a (1926-87-88 av* ) 
and only 85*9$ in the late  1930 * a (1936-37-38 a v * ).
We can see therefore that while the leve l of imports 
from East of Sues in the la te  1920*a was higher than 
that of the late 1930 *s, the la tte r  represented a higher 
proportion in B ritish  to ta l imports* As we have seen 
above British imports from East of Sue# increased in  
importance by almost 5$ between the la te  1920 *s and 
the late  1930 *a* The sasie situation was not true in 
the case of exports. The lower value of B ritish  exports 
to .East of Sue* during; the la te  1930 *s was actually  
accompanied by a decrease in the importance of this trade
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The percent ago nhioh imports from the East o f 
Suea formed in to ta l British, imports in the years 
1940*47-48 was lower than the eorrespon&ing percentage 
of the la te  1950*8, by about 2*8$* But apart from this  
situation there was a de fin ite  change in the importance 
of the Eastern trade in the post war period# By 1956 
imports from East o f Suez amounted to 87• 8$ o f tota l 
B rit ish  import trade,and that was higher than 1915 by 
8.5$. Exports to East of dues formed 30*6$ o f  to ta l 
exports, which was higher by 2*2ji than the corresponding 
proportion of 1913, but only higher by #5$ than the le v e l  
of the la ta  I9601 a however*
fable (80) shows the development of British Eastern 
trad© by value and Table (81) demonstrates this develop* 
moats in comparison w ith the development of B ritish  trade  
in general* I t  is  evident from the information of ‘these 
two Tables that trade with Empire countries, and la te r  
with Commonwealth countries, had played throughout the 
selected period the most important part in the Eastern 
trade* By 1955 B rit ish  import trade with foreign  
countries in the Bast was s t i l l  as small as i f  had been 
during the X9fh century* The development of B ritish  
exports to foreign  countries East o f  Sues was rela fcively 
more important but nevertheless in re lation  to to ta l 
B ritish  exports they were declining almost throughout 
the selected period* Thus, in 1965 out of 27*5$
841 •
by about 4$>#
British  Imports came from East of Suez 85*4$ ware 
from Empire or Commonwealbh count r io s  and out of 5Q*6$ 
of B rit ish  exports sold la s t  of Suez only 3*6$ want to 
fo re ig n  countries*
We w i l l  re a lis e  however, from Table (81) that the 
notable expansion in tho share of .Empire and Commonwealth 
countries was mdLnly duo to the considarable -development 
of B rit ish  trade with A ustra lia , and How Zealand, through­
out tho selected period and with Kuwait in  the post-war 
period* B r ita in fs imports from Australasia increased 
from 7*6$ in 1913 to 11*5$ In 1955 ant, of to ta l Imports 
in those two years* Imports from Kuwait increased from 
a neglig ib le  position in the pre-war period to 3.8$ of 
to ta l B ritish  imports in 1956* Thus, imports from 
Australasia and Kuwait together were responsible fo r  
an increase of 7*7$ out o f 8*5$, the percentage increase 
in the share of Eastern Empire and Commonwealth countries 
in to ta l British  imparts during the period 19X3-1966*
On the other hand Australasia Increased Its  share of 
British  export trad© from 7*8$ In 1913 to 14*8$ In 
1956. Meanwhile the re s t  of tho B rit ish  dependencies 
and Commonwealth countries East of Sues decreased it s  
share of B rit ish  exports by 4*5$* A second glance at 
Table (81) w i l l  show that B r ita in ’s trade with Malaya,
0©yIon and other minor dependencies in Asia or in the 
Eastern coast of A frica had hem  s lowly developing up - 
to the lata 1930*0* but since then they increased in
848*
proportion to to ta l B rit ish  trade* The trad© which
had sign ifican t I j  changed In Importance was that which 
was conducted with India* Generally specking this  
trad© was declining -  as a pa roods ago in total B ritish  
trade almost throughout the selected period#
Had the B rit ish  trade with the East a l l  been carried  
through the Sues Canal, we would have simply and reason­
ably concluded that the importance o f this waterway had 
fluctuated with the deve lopm en t of this trade and with 
the Importance that It  bad assumed as a percentage in  
to ta l trade* Yet that was not the situation* We sh a ll 
see In the follow ing sections of this fa rt  that the trades 
which in particu lar showed a considerable growth, !#©«* 
British  trade with Australasia and B ritish  imports o f 
o i l  from the Middle Bast, had often needed to make a 
choice between the services provided by the Suoa Canal 
and those provided by other alternative routes*
(Annual) ^Review of tho Trade of India”, 1913-14 .and . 
1920-81 to 1946-46# Published by Department o f 
Commercial In te lligence and S ta t is t la s , India#
B ritish  Overseas Trade from 1700 to the 1950*3 hy Werner 
Schlote, Oxford 1952#
The Commerce of Mat Ions, by y#B# Ooadliffe* London 1961#
The End of Empire by Strachey, A# J*
The League cf Nations* Studies and Collections of 
International Statist, sod World Trade, .in particu lar!
World Economic Survey, Review of World Trade 1955-1938 
and The Network of World Trade, 1942*
Petroleum Proas -Service, ¥ol* XXX, p#366,587 and 2 7  B to 27 8
A Finm  e ia l Analysis of Middle Eastern O il Concessions* 
1901-65, by Euhayr MIkdaaM, published In 0#S*A* 1966*
See Part I for B ritish  O il Interests in the Middle East#
Great B rita in  under Protection, by P* Bonham, New York 1941
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Table 19
British Imports of Petroleum and Bstroleum Ecoducts 1951-55
1951
£
Mil.
1952
£
Mil* n
1955
&
Mil.
1954
£
m i.
1955
£
M l.
From East of 
Suez*
(a ) Middle East
waalth
Aden .512 .041 .055 .259 2.948
Bahrain ) 
Qatar )
87.841
( 10.980 17.600 16.062 20.647
Truoial States) 
Kuwait ( 155*892 129.438 134.371 125.140
a&fcftl .British
88*353 146.913 147.073 150.692 148.727
Foreim Countries 
Saudi Arabia 37*093 35.269 2.109 1.662 3.081
Iraq 5.432 41.015 56.433 42.344 30.824
Iran 26*983 «* m .121 11.197
Total Foreign 
Countries 69.508 76.284 58.542 44.127 45*102
(a) Total 
Middle East 157.861 223.197 205.615 194.819 193.829
fb) Rest of 
East of Suez
British Common
-  wealth 2.970 .794 .642 5.040 5.H5
Foreign
Countries .953 .561 .305 1.240 #986
fb) Total Rest
of Sas* of SuezL 3.923 1.555 .947 6.280 6.101
Co) From a ll  
other parts of 
world 145.095 110.987 103.423 110.893 134.413
Total Imports 
a + b + c JG6*879 335.539 309.935 311.992 334.343
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FACTORS WHICH INFLUSH CSD TklB 
DEPENDENCE OF BRITISH EASTERN 
TRADE ON THE SUES CANAL (19I3-
248.
Factors which Influenced the Dependenoe of B ritish  
Baaterp Trade . on t jbg . Bxxez Canal. 1915-1955
(a )  The Opening of the Panama. Canalt
In  1914 the Panama G&n&l was open fop navigation.
Bo fa r  m  is to© American trade In the Bast m.& concerned
the new Canal was bound to give some considerable
advantages over the Suess .Canal op other a lt e r a t iv e
routes, yet fo r  Buropean-Eaatex*n t rad© the situation was 
( X )
d iffe ren t. Table { 2 2 )  shows the re la tive  advantages -*
I n point of mileage- -  o f the Suess Canal and Panama Canal 
fo r  various journeys between London and several Eastern 
ports. London was s t i l l  consider ably nearer by 8ue& to 
Fremantle* Calcutta* Singapore* Manila and Hong Kong*
On tho other hand* Wellington (lew  Zealand) was nearer 
by Panama than by Such* We can PI so ace that the saving 
in distance via  Suqz over Panama In the journey London** 
Sydney was only 28 sea miles. Approximately* therefore* 
a hypothetical line In the Tasman sea* say 28 miles east 
of Sydney* and then across the Pac ific  would make a 
boundary between the #on©a o f the Suez and the Panama 
Canals. Deciding only upon the basis of tho geographical
(1 ) See I .E .3*3 * Vol. 76, 1912*1918 1 The Panama Canal 
and International Trad© Competition**, by Prof. 
Hutchinson* Lf Also Wilson, A. nTh© Bm z Canal11* 
Chapter X -  The Panama Canal; A Rival Route.
Also Christian Fun cloBr © ntana * Canal du Suea*
Chapter XV.
249*
'Bio R e la tive  A&vantam a  { in  point off m llea&e) o f the  
Suez Canal an d the Panama Canal.
Saving v ia  Saving v ia
Suez over . Panama 
Panama over Suez
TABES 10y 22. .
in Marine • ■
London to &   * " ~~~
Calcutta 9,310 «.*
Singapore 7,339
Fremantle 3,210 «***
Shan ghal 4 * '98® -  -
Hong Kong 4,729 *,«
Manila ' 4,700
Melbourne 1,803 -~
Yokohama 1,748
S;ydney 28 —* .
Wellington - -  1,077
aao*
d istance a id  concerning ourse lves with B r it is h  p o rts ,  
we should fin d  that trade  with any port that la y  to  
the West o f such a boundary and to  the East o f Suez 
would be c a r r ie d  v ia  the Suez Canal, w h ile  trade w ith  
any port that la y  to  the Bast of th is  boundary and to 
the West of the American continent would be channeled 
by the Panaraa Canal* *
Mere saving o f d istan ce  w i l l  always be but one 
determinant in  making the f in a l  choice of a trad© rou te*  
N everthe less , m  may q u a li fy  th is  statement by adding  
that the g re a te rs  aving in  d istance by the us© o f  a 
p a rt ic u la r  ro u te , the le s s  s ig n if ic a n t  would be the 
in flu ence  of other fa c to rs  in  making the f in a l  choice*
On the bas is  of th is  gen era l r u le ,  com petition between 
the Sues and the Panama Canals was u n lik e ly  in  the cases  
o f the B r i t is h  trade  conducted w ith In d ia , Malaya, Ceylon 
or Hong Kong, since the saving o f  d istance  by the use 
of the Suez rou te  was obviously  going t o  p lay  a d ec is ive  
ro le *  British/Hew Sealand t ra d e  was more l ik e ly  to be 
tmmn  by the Panama Canal than by the Suez Canal*
S 'tr
B r it is h  trade, w ith  south west A u s t ra lia  was l ik e ly  to  
continue by the Suez Canal or by the Cams o f  Good Hope 
as was the case b e fo re  1914* On the other hand, so 
much com petition was to be expected in  the areas which 
lay  very near to the hypothetica l border l in e  by which 
we d iv ided  the re sp ec t iv e  zones of the Suez Canal and
o f the Panama Canal. These areas wore eastern  A u s tra lia ,  
north east A s ia  and a l l  the P a c if ic  Is lan d s  which were 
adjacent to our hypothetica l l in e *  Competition between 
the two Canals was going to be determined according to  
various fa c to rs  c£ which the most important would be 
conditions o f nav igation , Canal dikes, insurance r  a te s ,  
costs cf bunkering f u e l ,  the amount of irisermedlate 
f r e ig h t s  and casual passengers picked up an route* I f  
the re3a t iv e  advantages o f the Sues* and the Panama Canale 
were equal In terms o f these fa c to rs  the p o s it io n  o f the 
“border l in e ”, vlaioh we drew on the b a s is  of saving In  
distance a lo n e , would remain unchanged* However, in  any 
other case the hypothetica l “border l i n e ” would tend to  
s h i f t ,  e ith e r  eastward or westward, and would thus 
red iv id e  the t r a d e  between the two routes*
Yet, in  p ra c t ic e , i t  should hot be expected th at  
whenever a s h i f t  in  the “border l in e 11 took place t r a f f i c  
would be re -rou ted#  I t  is  poss ib le  that th is s itu a t io n  
might occur during periods o f depression  o r  when soma 
new trade was s t i l l  in d iffe ren t  towards two, or th ree , 
a lte rn a t iv e  ro u te s *  But under normal circumstances any 
change In the r e la t iv e  advantages o f a lte rn a t iv e  rou tes , 
un less fundamental, in stead  of be ing  only temporary or 
a short-run  change, would not cause any re -ro u t in g  o f  
the dependent trade* Trade rou tes  were obviously  not 
mere mathematical' l in o s *  They were u su a lly  estab lish ed
851 •
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over a long period  of time and th ere fo re  the re -ro u t in g  
o f  the dependext trade would be very d i f f i c u l t  to  
accomplish un less a strong reason e x is ted  fo r  doing so.
Before the outbreak o f the f i r s t  w orld  War, approx­
im ately 25$ o f  the B r it is h  outward t r a f f i c  to  A u s tra lia  
want by the Suez Canal w h ile  a much la r g e r  peroart age, 
l * e * ,  75$ went by the Cape rou te* In  the homeward t r a f f i c  
from A u s tra la s ia  about 40$ came by the Suez Canal w hile
the remaining percentage was d iv id ed  between the Gape o f
,  (& )
Good Hope, 32$, and the Gape Horn, 28$, Roughly speaking,
th e re fo re , the la rg e s t  percent age o f B ritiah/A ustraLaaian  
trade was s t i l l  dependent on routes other than the Suez 
route* We neg lected  th is  s itu a t io n  in  the above d iscu ss ion  
in  order to concentrate and throw some lig h t  on the new 
com petition between the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal. 
However, In  a number o f other pages in  th is  Chapter
(2 ) These f ig u r e s  are ta len  from an in qu iry  addressed
In  1912 to the p r in c ip a l steamshipping firms in  B r ita in  
owning v e sse ls  engaged in  the A u s tra lian  trade .
They may be used to  in d ica te  the proportion  o f  
B rit lah / A u stra lian  trade which depended on the  
Oanal, but as a so rt o f  approximation only,
Had the in qu iry  been addressed to owners o f tramp 
steamers and s a i l in g  vesse ls  besides steamshipping 
firm s more re lia n c e  could have been p laced  on the 
f ig u re s *  See The Dominions Royal Commission:
Second Interim  Report o f  the lo y a l Commission on 
the N atu ra l Resources, Trade and L e g is la t io n  o f  
Certain  Portions o f  His Ma jesty fs Dominion,
Appendix I I ,  Command Paper No. 7810, 1914,
attention tea boon given to finding out tho influence 
which tho new competition of the Panama Oanal and the 
old r iv a lry  of the Gape route had on th© flow of British,/ 
Australasian t r a f f ic  In the Suez Oanal* This represents 
one of the important questions dea lt with in this Part, 
not only because of tho existence of many other altern ­
ative routes bes id es  the Suez Oanal but a lso  because 
B rit ish  trade with Australasia had In particu lar shown 
a consider able growth throughout tho selected period#
(b )  Wars and P o l i t ic a l  T ro u b le s :
Due to  i t s  high s t r a t e g ic a l  value the Suez Oanal 
was sub ject to  a ttack  by armed troops o r  by naval and
m
a i r  fo rce s  during the two World Wars# Besides, the 
p a rt ic u la r  nature o f  the two Wara, 1#©*, as mainly 
created and fought by European nations, le d  to the us© 
o f the M editerranean sea as a b a t t le  f i e l d  and thus 
d ra s t ic a l ly  reduced it s  us© f o r  purposes o f commerce#
Under these circumstances the commercial value o f  the 
Suez Canal as a trade  route was in e v ita b ly  reduced to  
a minimum or even to n i l  during the ac t iv e  w ar years#  
Consequently, . however small the trade conducted w ith  /  
the East , had become during the war periods , the use o f 
a lte rn a t iv e  sea  routes other than th© Suez Canal} was - 
favoured*
(3 ) H a llb e rg , 0*1*, The Suez Canal, London 1931, p*310-315 
and 315-318, Sohon fie ld , H# J# ^The Suez Canal In
World A f f a i r s ,  London 1952* „ Gh# VII., IX and XIII#
8 5 3 *
Total t r a f f ic  in the Suez Oanal decreased from
(4 )
20*054 mil* S* tons to 9*868 mil* S* tons between 1913 
and 1918# In 1980 t r a f f ic  went u p  again to 3.7*676 mil#
3* tons but the proportion which warships occupied was 
s t i l l  re la t iv e ly  very high* Out of Canal t r a f f i c  in 1915 
warships formed only' 501# S* tons while in  1920 they 
amounted to 3*401 mil. 8* tons* I t  was not u n til 1922 
when total t r a f f ic  had risen above tho leve l of 1913 and 
warship t r a f f ic  had much decreased in proportion*
During the period of the second 'World War the decrease 
in Canal t r a f f ic  was more dramatic# From 54*418 mil* S# 
tons in 1938 it' decreased to 7*028 mil* S* tons in 1942* 
Although Canal t r a f f ic  increased steadily a fte r  that date  
and reached 25*065 mil# S* tons in 1945, I t  was obvious 
that a vary high percentage s t i l l  consisted of warships 
or ships carrying provisions to the figh ting  troops in  
Egypt and in other Middle East countries* I t  is  known 
that the Panama Oanal zone was not subject to any 
m ilitary operations during the f ir s t  World War, nor 
was i t  disturbed by the Second War as much as the Suez 
Oanal* Yet, there is no such evidence as to suggest 
that some British/Australasian t r a f f ic  was re-routed  
to Panama instead of Suez during the war periods*
In fact It  is  w ell known that the Capo route gained 
most o f the t r a f f ic  which sb andorxcd the Suez Canal 
during these periods# ij
( 4 ) “s -to n 1* stands fo r  Sue* net ton , i * e * , Suez Canal 
Company * s measurement which is rough ly  equal 1*185
, - - ; R * it4ah itHfc io n . ^ •; *, : .._____ . - ■
254*
During the chosen period Canal t r a f f i c  was a lso
very sen s it iv e  to  p o l i t i c a l  troub les  in  the area* The
f i r s t  s itu a t io n  arose during tho I t a l ia n  campaign aga inst
A byssin ia  when M ussolin i made se v e ra l attacks on the
B r it is h  p o lic y  in  the Hear E ast, e sp e c ia lly  in  the
(6 )
context o f the Suez Canal* He claimed that the Oanal 
dues were exorbitant and questioned the e ff ic ie n c y  of the 
management* I t a l i a n  warships in the Oanal were in c reas ­
in g  r&p&dly In number so that t o t a l  warship t r a f f i c  
Increased  from 1*166 m il* S* tons in  1954 to 2*510 rail*
S* tom  In  1936* The s itu a t io n  became very alarm ing  
to the B r i t is h  and the question o f  b lock in g  the Oanal 
to  I t a l i a n  war vesse ls  was se rio u s ly  considered* Never­
th e le ss  the proposed action  was never taken as the
' j
atmosphere grew q u ie te r a f t e r  v ic to ry  was achieved by 
the I t a lia n s  in th e ir  war against A byssin ia*
The c r i t i c a l  s itu a t io n  that surrounded the Abyss­
in ian  campaign had c onei&ernbly ra is e d  maritime Insurance  
ra te s *  For example In  October 1935, 5/- per 100 lb s  o f  
merchandise was the insurance ra te  pa id  by vesse ls  using  
the Suez rou te , while only 1/0d. was the ra ta  in  the Caps 
route# In  1936 Suez Canal t r a f f i c  was fu rth e r  h it by 
the Spanish C iv i l  War which ra is e d  ra tes  o f  insurance  
between G ib ra lta r  and Malta, d ram atica lly  so as to  roach
8 5 5 *
(5 ) Schon fie ld , H# J*“I t a ly  aid th© Suez? London, July 1940
. ( 6 )
something between 7/6d* and 80/-# Canal t r a f f ic
belonging to B rita in  and to countries on th© Western
coast of Europe w'AsJ bound to be affected by such high
rates of Insurance* The share of B rita in , France, the
Motherlands, Norway and Sweden in to ta l Canal t r a f f ic
(7)
decreased from 65*9$ In 1935 to 63*4$ in 1956* B ritish  
share alone decreased, by 1.5$*
In general in the period 1934-1956 Suez Oanal 
sta tis t ic s  showed that ^merchandise t r a f f ic  want down 
from 28*448 mil* tons to 85*556 mil* tons* B rit ish -  
Australasian t r a f f ic  was especially  aenaitivo to the 
changes in the a ll-o ve r  cost of using the Suez route 
and therefore a considerable percentage o f this t r a f f ic  
was re-routed during the Abyssinian War and the Spanish 
C iv il war to the Gape rout© and to the Panama Oanal* 
Australasian trade in the Canal, which was principally  
conducted with B rita in , decreased from 3*356 mil* Q* tons 
in 1933 to 1*954 mil* S* tone in 1936# After that la tte r  
date It increased steadily  u n til the Second War interrupted  
the course o f trade in  th© Suez Canal*
Lastly, tho p o lit ic a l c r is is  caused by the national­
ization of Anglo-lranian O il Company in 1951 and tho
(6 ) Oompagnle Universa l io  du Oanal du Suez, C o llec tion  
Economic du Monde, Christian Funck-Bientane,
P aris  1947, p*223*
(7 )Annual Report of tho Suez Canal Company, for figu res -  
See 1934, 1935 and 1936*
966*
consequent intervention of the B rit ish  government in
the a ffa ire  of Iran, resu lted  in higher prices of
hunkering o i l  fu e l in the Suez route particu larly  in 
( » )
1951 and 1953% Again the most notable decrease was
that in t r a f f ic  belonging to Australia* Between 1951
and 1953 Australasian t r a f f ic  (mainly Australian)
decreased from 7*104 mil* S* tons to 6*195 mil* 8* tons*
At the same time under Europe/Australasia trade Panama
Oanal s ta t is t ic s  recorded a considerable increase
particu larly  during 1951-1953* Between these two years
Europe/Australasia trade in Panama Oanal Increased from
1*842 mil* long tons to 2*904 mil* long tons* an increase 
(9 )
of 57#?$* which was never repeated in the follow ing years 
un til 1956*
(8 ) See quotations o f  Fuel P rice s  given in  Petroleum  
Press Service* •
(9 ) Tho Report o f Panama Oanal Company fo r  the respective  
years# wThe cessation  o f m ineral o i l  shipments from  
Iran  re su lted  in  a gain  o f  an estim ated 1*5 m illio n  
net v e s se l tons o f tankers t r a f f i c  in  1953 and th is  
was r e f le c te d  jr in c ip a l ly  in  the east coast United
States/C anada-A ustra lasia  t r a d e * *• *•#MUnsettled  
conditions in the Sues Canal area are assumed 
to  have p layed m important part in  re -ro u t in g  
of some t r a f f ic  from Suez to Panama and to have 
accounted at le a s t  for the heavy in crease  in  
t r a f f ic  in  the Europe-Australasia trade0#
Report of the Panataa Canal 1953#
(o )  Technical .Development in  the Sh ipbu ild ing  Industry * 
and )?rice3 of Bunker!u/a F u e l# '
In  Part I  v/e r e a liz e d  that apart from the shorten ing  
of tho d istan ce , the .Suez Canal route o f fe re d  over the 
Cape route s e v e ra l other advantages to steamships# To 
sum up, these ■were b e t te r  weather conditions , su itab le  
navigable w ater, co a lin g  s ta t io n s  at shorter in te rv a le  
and cheaper bunkering coal*
However* from the e a r ly  years of hie 20th century 
onwards te ch n ica l development in  the sh ip bu ild in g  Indu a try  
and the change in  p r ic e s  of bunkering fu e l a v a ila b le  on 
route had s ig n i f ic a n t ly  changed the r e la t iv e  advantages 
o f  the Suez rou te  more than once*
To begin  w ith , te ch n ica l development in  the sh ip ­
b u ild in g  industry  was continuously reducing the Importance 
of the f a c i l i t i e s  which the Suez route had given to the 
e a r ly  steamers* Steamships evolved during the ea r ly  
20th century needed a m ailer and sm alle r p roportion  of 
i t s  to ta l carry ing capacity  fo r  bunkering fu e l*  They 
a lso  were in c rea s in g ly  becoming su ita b le  fo r  navigation  
In  a l l  kinds o f water and capable  of encountering heavy 
seas aril winds* In ad d ition  to th is  development, p r ic e s  
of the South A fr ic a n  co a l a t  Capetown were becoming 
lower than p r ic e s  at B r it is h  coa l at Aden or at any 
other coa lin g  s ta t io n  in  the Suez route#
258*
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Thus w h ile  du rin g  the 19th century steamers could  
share in  the Eastern trade only when operated on the 
Suez Oanal rou te , they ware now capable o f  making a 
choice between the Cape rou te  and tho Suez route a o cor ding  
to  other economic consider at io m  * Payments o f Canal dues 
plus the fo rego in g  o f  the cheaper bunkering f a c i l i t i e s  
at Capetown had to bo balanced aga in st the gain  r e s u lt in g  
from using the sh o rte r  route#
A fte r  the f i r s t  World War tho number of c o a l-  
burning steamers s ta r te d  to dec line  with the growth o f  
tfte tonnage o f o i l  burning steamers and motorships#
Table  (33 ) i l lu s t r a t e s  that s ig n if ic a n t  fe a tu re  o f tho 
development of the world merchant f le e t *  I n  1914,
43,859,381 tons gross or 90*6$ o f world merchant marine 
consisted  of coal-burning, steamers while in  1939 th is  
kind of v e sse l waa reduced to  31,015,069 tons gross or 
45*3$ o f  w orld  to ta l*  By 1954 coal-bu rn ing steamships 
had represented  le a s  than 11*5$,
A simultaneous development waa that o i l  aa sh ip  
fu e l  gained con sid erab ly  in  importance at the expense 
of c o a l, a movement which reached I t s  peak ju st a f t e r  
the second world War# This was one o f the  main fa c to r s  
which enabled the Panama Canal to capture some o f tho 
Suez Canal t r a f f i c  during the in te r -w a r period* O il  
f u e l  waa a v a i la b le  at Los Angeles and at other American 
porta at considerab ly  low er p ric e s  than in  any other 
p lace in  the world* The Gulf coast o f the U#S# was
fcoarashipa
C oa l »bu  m i  n p; O il-bu rn in g  gob oralxlpa 1’ofc a l  
bona bona tons bona
1914 43,089,381 1,310,209 234,287 45,403,877
1920 40,353,398 19,420,895 6,628,102 66,407,393
1939 31,015,069 80,575,676 16,918,687 08,509,432
1949 17,413,643 45,805,583 19,381,719 82,570,915
11,131,288 54,358,076 31,951,662 97,421,520
Sources Encyclopaedia B rltan n ioa , 
V o l.20, 1964 E d ition
(p f 556*587 Shipping S t a t is t )
the main source o f o i l  supply in  the world and there**
fo ra  independently formed i t s  own p r ice  and Imposed i t ,
w ith  a few  exceptions, in  every market* % *A buyer
anywhere in  the w o rld r?# **wroto P ro fesso r W*A* Leoman 
(1 0 ) , 
in  h is  book w,Xho P r ice  o f Mlddb JSaat Q l l?l * **pai&
the IT# 8# Gulf p rice  plus fr e ig h t  from tsfam Gulf even
though the o i l  a c tu a lly  was d e liv e red  to  him from a
nearer f i e ld *  From tho 0*8* Gulf Coast the p ric e  x»os©
with d istance over tho en tire  in te rn ation a l marketu* *
‘Bins although the Pers ian  Gulf o i l  industry  was ra p id ly
developing during the in te r -w ar p eriod  bunkering fu e l
was so ld  in  the Baez route  as i f  i t  had come o r ig in a l ly
toom th e  0*8* G u lf Coast* For the same reason  fu e l  o i l
was a v a ila b le  at many o f the porta of the Capa route
cheap ox* than in  tho Bum  rou te, which a lso  was d e t r i*
mental to  the Suez Canal t r a f f i c  -  the Austra lasian
section * ■
During and a f t e r  the Second World War the M iddle
East o i l  industry  expanded d ram atica lly , assumed a
serious p o s it io n  in  w orld  o i l  trade and began to
develop i t s  own p r ic e  s tru ctu re* Bia immediate b e n e fit
o f  the independence o f the Middle East fu e l  p r ic e s  was
roughly equal to  #L*90 per b a rre l which represented
(10 ) The P rice  of Middle Bast O i l ,  C ornell U n iversity  
Press 196&, Quotation, p*89*
the costs o f  tran sp o rta tio n  from tho TJ*B* Gulf Coast
(XI)
to tho Persian  Gulf* Such gain  was Indeed s lg a l f *  
lean t to the Suez route* P rices o f bunkering fu e l  at 
Aden continued throughout the post-w ar period  to be 
very favou rab le  and the Sues Canal was consequently  
a ttra c t in g  back t r a f f i c  loo t in  the pre-w ar period  to  
the Oaxa route and Panama rou te* In  Table (24 ) p rices  
o f bunkering fu e l  at Aden were quoted at various dates 
and compared w ith those a v a i la b le  a t other ports In the 
Panama and the Cap rou tes .
(d ) The P o licy  o f the Suez; Canal Company* ,
A ttention  may be given here to  two p r in c ip a l  
aspects of the Canal Companyfs p o licy  and to  the  
reapsctive  In fluence  o f each on the t r a f f i c  during the 
period  1913-1955* These a re , f i r s t ,  the p o licy  which 
the company c a rr ie d  towards m in ta in in g  and improving 
the capacity of the Suez Canal, and secondly t ra n s it  
dues p o licy *
F i r s t ; Improvement P ro jec ts  and In fluence  TTpon T ra f f ic  
The n ecess ity  o f m aintaining and improving the  
dimensions of the Suez Oanal was explained in  some 
d e ta i l  in  Chapter I I I ,  Part 1* In  b r i e f ,  i t  was
-^ - jn r.u r rutfi i/ruurt TUf .ilW M Iiiiir i.i'yr  mutP'ifflrriTfrw irmmurnjim u « i t  I iinr**) nr mr ii*r~rrt|ti . y i j i i i i < n i * * » * * * * * i * « r K y t r *.•**>*■*—
(11 ) P r ic e  of Middle East O i l ,  W*A* I*eamsm, p*92*
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the need to maintain con tinua lly  tho capa c ity  o f tho 
e x is t in g  Canal and fu rth e r  to  improve i t s  dimensions 
to accommodate the increase  In the s iz e  o f the commercial 
v esse l and the growing needs of commerce in  such a way 
that the waterway would always he i n  a cond ition  to  g ive  
s a t is fa c t io n  to  i t s  c l ie n ts *  Tho amount o f excavation  
and dredging th is  needed during the period  19X4-1984 
amounted to about 205 mil* cubic metres* That was 
roughly 8*8 times the volume excavated during tho 
o r ig in a l construction  work and more than the amount 
dredged during tho fo r t y  f iv e  years 1870-1914 by about 
20 mil* cubic metres* See a lso  Diagram (1 )*  Consequently 
i t  was p o ss ib le  to increase  the authorised  maximum draught 
o f  ships u sing  the Oanal from 8*65 metres in  1915 to 10.16 
metres in  1950 and then to about 10*60 metres in  1954#
Graph (54 ) demonstrates maximum draught of sh ips which
passed through the Cana! in  some se lec ted  years in  the 
p eriod  1870-1984* The average gross tonnage o f th© ■ 
vessels  u sing  the 8uo» Canal increased  from 5,456 in  
1915, to 7,376 in  1929,to 7,812 in  1939 and then to 
10*842 in 1955* B esides, the average d a ily  number o f  
ships using the Canal increased  from 11 ships in  1910-19 
to 14 sh ips in  1920-89, to  16 ships in  1980-59 and la s t ly
to  40 sh ips in  1955*
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8 6 5 *
I t  remains fo r  us now to sea whether or not these  
improvements had s u f f ic ie n t ly  s a t i s f i e d  tho requirements 
o f the Canal users* Concerning ourse lves w ith B r i t is h  
users we may make a comparison between the average s i z e  
o f  the commercial ship in  tho B r it ish  f l e e t  a M  tho 
average s i m  o f  the sh ip  which the Sues Canal was a b le  
to channel* On the b a s is  o f tho number and the gross  
tons of a l l  merchant vesse ls  o f 500 gross tons and over, 
the average s i z e  o f the commercial v e sse l in  B r ita in *a  
merchant f le e t  was 4,581 gross tons in  1989 and 5,438 
gross tons In  1955* Meanwhile the average g ro ss  tonnage 
o f  the vesse ls  using  the Suez Canal was, as p rev iously  
mentioned, 7 ,818  gross tons in 1939 and 10,548 gross  
tons in  1955* Considering only the category  of v e sse ls  
o f 10,000 gross tons and over, the average sisse of the 
la rg e s t  v e sse l in  tho B r i t is h  merchant f l e e t  was 11,560 
gross tons in  1989 and 11,938 gross tons in  1955*
Again the capac ity  o f the Oanal, I f  measured in  such  
a way,was c le a r ly  qu ite  s u ff ic ie n t *  The average gross  
tonnage of the la rg e s t  sh ip  which used the Oanal in  1989 
was 42,556 gross tons and In  1955 i t  was 52,181 gross  
tons* B esides, sh ips o f 10,000 gross, tons and over 
represented  14*2$ and 51*9$ o f  t o t a l  number of vesse ls  
using  the Oanal In  1939 and 1955 re sp ec t iv e ly  w h ile  
th is  category represen ted  only 2*9f a - and 11*0$ in
t o t a l  B r it is h  merchant f l e e t  o f 500 gross tons and 
(13 )
OVBP *
However, tak ing t he baa Is  of the time requ ired  
f o r  passing  t hr cm $3. tho Suess Oanal we would f in d  that  
tho se rv ices  performed by th is  waterway during the post­
war period  ware not so s a t is fa c to ry  as they had boon in  
tho pre-war p r i e d *  Th© number o f hours spent in  
trave rs in g  the Canal da ore as ad from 16 hours 19 minutes 
h i  1913 to 14 hours 57 minutes in  1929 and then fu rth e r  
down to 12 hours 58 minutes In 1939* In  the post-w ar  
period such an average was r i s in g  continuously and In  
1955 i t  became 15 hours 17 minutes#
fhe considerab le  r i s e  in  o i l  trad e  and A u stra lian  
trade in  the Oanal in  the post-w ar period  re su lte d  in  a 
n otab le  in crease  In the average d a lly  number o f  v e sse ls  
using the Oanal# Obviously that was not qu ite  expected  
by the Canal Company and was not th ere fo re  w a ll  prepared  
fo r  in  terms o f  a la rg e r  w idth of the channel throughout 
i t s  course# liuis when i t  happened i t  was n ecessa rily  
going to  alow down the movement of tho Canal t r a f f i c *
At th is  point we might go back again  to  the pre-w ar
{12 } F igu res  concerning tj«K fs merchant f l e e t  are  obtained  
from 11 Annual A bstract of S t a t is t ic s ’* published  by 
the. C en tra l S t a t is t ic a l  O ff ic e , London* A l l  other 
f ig u re s  are compiled from S t a t is t ic a l  ta b le s
pub lished  by the Suess Canal Company*
period  and wonder whether the Sues Oanal would have 
functioned s a t i s f a c t o r i ly  i f  the period  of the 1930fa 
had been a prosperous period  ra th er than one in  which  
the course of trade  was so much In terrup ted  and depressed#  
n eve rth e le ss , th© de lay  in  t r a f f i c  in  tho post-w ar p eriod  
was not considerab le  and on the b a s is  o f the a v a i la b le  
in form ation I t  d id  not im pair the business o f the Suess 
Oanal#
In  Part 1, Chapter 3, we suggested that the Sues 
Oanal dues would always have to be reduced because o f  
two fa c to r s j  tech n ica l development in  sh ip b u ild in g  and 
the existence of other a lte rn a t iv e  sea rou tes, tech n ica l 
development, i f  we may r e c a l l ,  by in creasin g  th© speed  
of the chip and by reducing i t s  operating  costs , c u r t a i ls ,  
although very  s lo w ly , the r e la t iv e  advantages of the 
sh orter sea route and increases the burden o f the dues 
which should be paid  fo r  i t s  usage. T h is  an a ly s is ,  
however, ap p lie s  to th© Oanal dues as measured in  r e a l  
terms in  r e la t io n  to  other v a r ia b le s  such as p rices  and 
f r e ig h t  rates# In  other words, an increase  in  Oanal 
duos would not be burdensome i f  f r e ig h t  ra te s  or 
merchandise p ric e s  were r is in g  fa s te r*  S im ila r ly  
a rodiaotion In  Canal dues need not always Ind icate  a 
reduction  In th e ir  burden. Besides, I t  w i l l  be
nooeesary sometimes to  measure the changea In  the Suez
(13)
Canal dues aga in st tho dues o f  the Panama Oanal#
The Suez Oanal duo a were assessed  in. terms, o f go ld  
fran cs  during the period  1913-1935 and then in  Egyptian  
currency from 1935 onwards# Apart from the War periods*
I t  appears c2e a r ly  from Diagram (35 ) that these dues 
were su ccess iv e ly  reduced throughout the period  .1915#193S* 
ihe conversion of the Suez dues in  terms of B r it ish  
currency i s  however necessary* I t  would enable us to  
form a c le a re r  id ea  about the s ig n if ic a n c e  o f these dues 
from the side of the B r it is h  users* I t  i s  a lso  Important 
to e s ta b lish  a concrete s e r ie s  o f the changes In the dues 
In  terns of one currency* in stead  of two currencies*  
throughout the se lec ted  period* '
(13 ) A proper comparison between the Panama Canal dues 
and the Suez dues is  hindered by several factors  
which are  exp la ined  a t the end of th is  section  
and a lso  by the lack  o f d e ta ile d  s t a t i s t i c a l  
statements (s im ila r  to those which were prepared  
and pub lished  by the Suez Oanal) about sh ips  
which used the Panama Oanal* 'Phe f i r s t  annual 
repo rt of the Panama Canal was published  in  
195.8# H is to r ic a l  data  fo r  the period  1915*»195£ 
have been supp lied  to me -  on -  request -  by 
the Adm inistration  o f the Panama Canal*

t n  t oxnnu o f  s h i l l in g s  -  Sea Table (26 ) ** its 
appeara that the  Sues Canal dues were not f a l l i n g  
continuously throughout the period* as i t  seemed a t  
f i r s t *  when we observed them in  terms o f go ld  fran cs  
and ‘Egyptian P ia s tre s *  The ra te  o f dues increased  in  
1927 and a lso  between 1961 and 1937 -  See a lso  Diagram 
36 «* bes ides* the increase during the two periods of 
World Ward# To obtain  a c le a re r  view about the s itu a t io n  
the percentage changes in  the dues have been ca lcu la ted  
on the b as is  o f 1088 *  100* Computations ?^ero made 
f i r s t l y  on the b a s is  of the currencies used by the 
Sues Oanal Company* i* a * *  French gold franco and 
Egyptian p ia s tre s *  and secondly* on the b a s is  o f  
s te r lin g *  The two se ts  o f f ig u re s  arc shown together  
in  Diagram (57 )#  I t  is  quite evident that th ere  m a  
a much g rea te r r i s e  in  duos between 1915 and 1980 whan 
payments ware made in  s t a r l in g  ra th er than go ld  francs#  
The ra te  of exchange used fo r 1913 was the o ld  par 
value o f  j£L »  85*226  fran cs  go ld ; but in  1920 £L was 
only equal to  18*11 fran cs gold* In tho years 1920-29  
tho rat©  o f exchange between the s te r lin g  and the gold  
fran cs  m s  g en e ra lly  speaking* changing in  favour o f  
the pound s ta r lin g *  Consequently* G&nal dues ware 
d ec lin in g  fa s t e r  when paid  in  s t e r l in g ;  th is  was to  
the b e n e fit  o f the B r it is h  u se rs . From 1989 to  1935
£ 6 9  •
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DIAGRAM (37) •
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN SUEZ CANAL DUES.
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SKUgJii ( 2 5 )
Year Dues in 7o
#•
Dues fo °/° Dues*
Gold Change In £ Change Change in
Franc 1928*100 Sterling 1928*100 1940*100 Shilling
1913 6.25 88 *2470 88 4.956
1920 8.44 119 •4595 164 9.190
1921 8.19 116 .4082 146 8.164
1922 8.00 113 • 3452 123 6.904
1923 7.79 111 • 3303 121 6.766
1924 7.50 106 .3244 116 6.488
1925 7.31 104 .2885 103 5.770
1926 7.25 103 .2821 101 5.646
1927 7.25 103 *93881- 105 5.762
1928 7.06 100 .2805 100 5.610
1929 6.90 97 .2740 98 5.480
1930 6.82 96 .2717 97 5.434
1931 6.57 93 .2801 100 5.602
1932 6.00 85 .3322 118 6.644
1933 6.00 85 • 3493 125 6.986
1934 5*61 82
a/o Change)
.3730 133 7.460
1935* 5.75 
Dues in •3782 135 7.564
0 Egypt..... 1948* 100)
1935*
1936
1937
• 5751
•35343
•30469
■¥r
91 
' 70
.3626
.3126
129
112
91
78
7.252
6.252/ aaa
1938 .29250 75 .3001 107 75 O 9 0025.752
8.002
8.002
8.002
8.002
8.002 
7.854
7.490
7.490 
7.254 
6.976
1939 .20050 72 .2876 103 • 72"1 AA
1946 .39000 100 .4001 143 100
1947 .39000 100 .4001 143 100 •1 aa
1948
1949
1950
.39000
.39000
.39000
100
100
100
.4001
.4001
.4001
143
143
143
100
100
100
1951 .30271 98 •3927 141 98A i
1952 .36500 94 •3745 134 94
1953 .36900 94 • 3745 134 94
1954 •35354 91 .3627 129 91Ar7
1955 .54000 87 .3488 125 87
TABLE (2rj ) (contd.)
SUEZ CAML DUES PER HEJ M  (CAKAL I^SUEElflSNT) IN B5.LLAST
270(a )
Dues in T ---- Dues *
—— —
7° /o Dues
Year Geld Change in £ Change Change in
Francs 128*100 Sterling 1928*100 1943-100 Shilling
1915 3.75 82 .1487 82 2.974
1920 6.35 139 .5457 191 6.914
1921 5.69 125 .2836 157 5.672
1922 5.50 120 112573 131 4*746
1923 5.29 116 .2297 127 4*594
1924 5.00 109 .2163 120 4.326
1925 4.81 105 .1898 105 3.796
1926 4.75 104 .1850 102 3.700
1927 4.75 104 .188? 104 3.774
1928 4.56 100 .1812 ..100 3.624
1929 4*40 96 .1747 96 3.494
1930 4.O4 89 .1609 89 3*218
1931 3.28 72 .1398 77 2.796
1932 3.00 66 .1661 92 3.322
1933 3.00 66 .1747 96 3.494
1934 2.91 64 *1868 103 3.736
1939. 2.88
Dues in % Change )
.1891 104 3.782£ Egypt* 1948-100 )
1935 .1828 •X-
1936 .1767 91 .1813 100 91 3*626
1937 .1523 78 .1363 86 78 3.126
1936 .1463 73 .1301 83 75 3.002
1939 .1402 72 ♦1433 80 72 2.876
1946 .1950 100 .2001 111 100 4.002
1947 .1950 100 .2001 111 100 4.002
1948 .1950 100 .2001 111 100 4.002
1949 .1950 100 .2001 111 100 4.002
1950 .1950 100 .2001 111 100 4.002
1951 .1977 96 .1926 107 96 3.852
1932 .1700 87 .1744 9 6 8? 3.488
1953 .1700 87 .1744 96 87 3.488
1954 .1651 84 ♦1674 93 84 3.348
1933 .1550 80 .1390 88 80 3.180
but; p a r t ic u la r ly  from 1931, m  got a com pletely d if fe re n t  
s itu a t io n *  B r ita in  abandoned the go ld  standard  in  1931, 
and throughout th© e a r ly  19301 a the go ld  va lue  of the 
pound s t e r l in g  was f a l l i n g  at a considerab le  rate*
9?hua* u n t i l  tho Sims Oanal Company l e f t  the go ld  standard  
in  duly 1935, the dues as estim ated in  terms o f  B r i t is h  
currency were sharp ly  r i s in g  to  the detriment of the  
B r it ish  users# 'faking 19SB as equal to  100 to f in d  
that Canal dues f o r  sh ips In  cargo between 1928 and 
1934 decreased by 18$ when assessed  by the company in  
terms o f go ld  fran cs , but these increased  by 55$ when 
converted Into s te r lin g *
We now come to tho next question , that o f  estim ating  
the e ffe c tiv en ess  o f  the dues on the development o f  
merchandise t r a f f i c  in  the Oanal* Wo can not, however, 
r e ly  d ir e c t ly  and sim ply upon these f ig u re s  which we 
obtained above and which d istin gu ish ed  between cargo  
and b a l la s t  dues# Th© c r i t i c a l  question is  how much 
was tho “b a l la s t  su rcharge11 paid fo r  e ach tan o f  
merchandise* As they appeared, b a l la s t  dues per S, ton 
{ i * o *  net ton, Sues Canal measurement) d id  not seem o f  
ranch s ig n ific a n c e  but in 'a c tu a l  fa c t  they played an
071.
2 7 2 *  ,
(14 )
important ro le  in  determ ining the Jlactu&I ra te  o f dues” 
B a lla s t  p roportion  in  t o t a l  merchandise tra ffic s  grow 
, from 5*8$ in  19X5 to  2 2 *3 $  and 34.3^ in  1933 and 1948 
re sp ec t iv e ly , la d le  (28 ) demonstrates tho growth -o f  
b a l la a t  tonnage in  t o t a l  Oanal t r a f f i c  o f merchandise.,
Hie Table d is tin gu ish es  between tankers and dry  cargo  
vesse ls  { I ,© # ,  v e sse ls  not carry ing  o i l )  Which traversed  
the Oanal in  b a l la s t ,  i t  is  evident that the growth in  
b a l la s t  p roportion  was p r in c ip a lly  du© to  the ex tra ­
ord inary  growth of t r a f f i c  o f tankers, To exp la in  th is  
s itu a t io n  we would r e f e r  to  the unbalanced development 
o f South-Uorth and Horth-South o i l  t r a f f i c  in  the Oanal,
I n  1913 510,000 tons o f m ineral o i l  t r a v e l le d  In  the 
Oanal from Horth to  South mainly from U *S ,A , and Russia  
to In d ia , Manchuria and some other p laces in  the Far 
.Fast, Meanwhile in  the same year about 800,000 tons
(14 ) I  c a l l  i t  the ” actual ra te  o f  duos” in  d is t in c t io n  
from the o f f i c i a l  ra te  o f  dues which the Sue a 
Canal imposed on sh ipp ing in  cargo oft sh ipp ing  
in  b a lla s t#  The nac tu a l rat©  o f dues” combines 
together o f f i c i a l  cargo and b a l la s t  dues, and 
i s “not only a ffe c te d  by changes in  the o f f i c i a l  
dues but i t  a lso  r e f le c t s  ac tu a l changes in  
coats of using  the Suoa Oanal according to  
conditions of trad e , Fkplanation in  d e t a i l  
1a g iven in  the fo llo w in g  pages.
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TABLE (26)
BALIAST PROPORTION IN TRAFFIC
A. - Merchandise T ra ffic  in the Suez Canal (excluding o i l  and
and Mail Traffic") . "
Year*
h i
Merchant 
Ships in 
Cargo 
Net Tons
(2 )
Merchant 
Ships in 
Ballast 
Net Tons
( 5 ) 1+2
Total 
Merchant 
Ships 
Net Tons
z J T
Percentage
o f
Ballast
fo
1913*
1920 9.566 1 .02? 10.593 9.7
1921 10.822 .415 11.235 3.7
1922 12.899 .072 12.971 0*6
1923 13*652 .739 14.391 5.1
1924 13.635 .062 14.517 6 .1
1925 13*747 .702 14.529 5.4
1926 12.723 .021 12.744 0.2
1927 14.397 .406 14.803 2.7
1928 15.726 .680 16.408 4.1
1929 16.991 .223 17.214 1.3
1930 14.105 .055 14.160 0.4
1931 12.117 •496 12.613 5.9
1932 10.902 .839 11.741 7*1
1933 11*197 1.363 12.560 10.9
1934 12.089 1.366 13.455 10.2
1933 11.880 2.637 14.517 18.2
1936 11.073 2.078 13.951 20.6
1937 13.355 2.576 15.931 16.2
1938 12.322 2.369 14.691 16.1
1939 10.087 1.541 11.628 13.3
1946 12.668 1.401 14.149 10.5
1947 13.861 .877 14.738 6.0
1948 16.365 1.070 17.435 6.1
1949 20.426 1.876 22.304 8.4
1950 19.982 .928 20.910 4*4
1951 21.259 1.250 22.309 5.6
1932 20.295 1.433 21.728 6*6
1933 20.972 .820 21.792 3.6
1954 23.264 .900 24.164 3.7
1935 26.359 1.028 27.387 3.8
*  1913 A l l  Merchandise o i l  included
Ballast proportion *860 «  6.2°/o
13*980
'J ilB LE  ( 2 6 ) ( c o n t d . )
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B. -  Oil traffic  in the Suez Canal*
Year
I
in k ers  
transited 
in Cargo
Tankers 
Transited 
in Ballast
Total
Tankers
1+2
“ 273
Proportion
of
Ballast
1913x
1920 •670 .379 1.049 36.1
1921 .922 .754 1.676 45..0
1922 1*349 1.021 1.370 74.5
1925 1*393 1.174 2.567 45*7
1924 1*505 1.527 2.832 46.9
1923 1*774 1.648 3.422 48.2
1926 1.962 1.748 3.710 47.1
1927 2.102 1.817 3.919 46.4
1928 2.265 2.086 4*351 47.9
1929 2.574 2.364 4*938 47.9
1930 2.711 2.507 5*218 48.0
1931 2.153 2.409 4*562 52.8
1932 2.481 2 .426 4*907 49.4
1933 3.120 2.735 5*855 46.7
1934 3*167 2.758 5*945 46.4
1935 2.792 2.068 4*860 42.6
1936 2.665 2,305 4*970 46.4
1937 3.357 3.034 6.391 47.5
1938 3*095 2.879 5.974 48.2
1939 2.984 2.869 5*853 49.0
1946 4.769 5.150 9.919 51.9
1947 7.690 8.179 16.069 50.9
1948 16.071 16.208 32.279 50.2
1949 20.105 20.090 40.195 50.0
1950 25.660 26.432 52.092 50.7
1951 24.405 22.327 46.732 47.8
1952 49.129 22.988 72.117 31.9
1953 52.221 25.125 77.346 32.5
1954 58.062 30.214 88.276 34*2
1955 64.324 37.891 102.215 37*1
. B74.
o f  o i l  t r a v e lle d  in  the Couth-North d ire c t io n , During  
th e ’ years a f t e r  1913, but p a r t ic u la r ly  during the p ost-  
Second War pe riod , fo llo w in g  the d isco v e rie s  o f r ic h  
o i l - f i e ld a  in  the Middle East?South-North o i l  t r a f f i c  
was becoming in c re a s in g ly  la r g e r  and la r g e r  than that 
from North to  South* See Diagram (3 8 )*  .da o i l  had to  
be c a rr ie d  in  a s p e c ia l  c la s s  o f v e s se l, v ia * ,  tankers, 
such an In c rea s in g  gap between o i l  t r a f f i c  c a rr ied  in  
both d ire c tion s  meant an increase in  tonnage c a r r ie d  in  
b a l la s t  in  the Southward journey* In fa c t ,  tankers  
t r a v e l l in g  the Canal in  that d ire c t io n  freq u en tly  had 
to make th e ir  passage f u l l y  in  b a l la s t .  Thus in  the 
case o f o i l  " b a l la s t  surcharge" formed an important 
element in  determ ining the "ac tu a l ra te  o f duos". 
Leaving o i l  aside  we f in d  that the " b a l la s t  surcharge" 
which was normally paid  f o r  other so rts  o f merchandise 
over the b a s ic  cargo dues was qu ite  sm all* Yet we need 
to  draw a tten tion  here to  the flu c tu ation s  o f b a l la s t  
tonnage w ith the conditions o f  trade* To g ive  m  
exam ple t during the 1930*0 when trade and fre igh t  
businesses were g e n e ra lly  d opr a s sod / h a H a s t  proportion  
in  t o t a l  merchandise t r a f f i c  in  the Canal considerab ly  
increased* This trend, is  beat observed by -fo llow ing  
the esca lation s in  tho b a l la s t  p roportion  i n  d ry  cargo

t r a f f i c  in  tlx© Canal Bee Table (86 ) -  The b a l la s t  
proportion  was normally vary low and was considerab ly  
decreased when t r a d e  p?osperod, and r ic e  versa*
Hence b a l la s t  dues ware s ig n if ic a n t  in  s p i t e  o f  
th e ir  sm allness, s in ce  in  the f i r s t  p lace they played  
an important part in determining the a c tu a l coat o f  
tran sp o rtin g  o i l  through the Canal, and secondly because 
th e ir  burden g re a t ly  increased  at periods when f r e ig h t  
earnings and t r a d e  p ro f it s  wore depressed* To fin d  
out the amount of "b a l la s t  surcharge" per 8* ton in  cargo , . 
to t a l  duos paid by merchant ships which used the Canal in  
b a l la s t  have been computed fo r  each year during the se lec ted  
period  and then charged against t o t a l  tonnage of merchant 
sh ips vhich used the Canal In cargo* A d is t in c t io n  is  
made in  these c a lc u la t io n s  between bankers and dry cargo  
vessels and the r e s u lt s  are given in  Table (27 )*
^B a llast surcharge” per S* ton in  cargo had in  the case  
of o i l  c le a r ly  d i f fe r e d  su b s ta n t ia lly  from other so rts  
o f merchandise and had also  varied  from year to year  
according to oondl tion s o f trade*
The ”actual ra te  of dues11 p  r  3* ton in  cargo can 
now be obtained by adding the nb a l la s t  su rcharge” as 
computed above to  the m  cmnt o f  dues which the Canal 
Company charged per S* ton in  cargo* In Diagram (39) 
we can compare th is  11 actua l r a t e  o f  d u es11 with the 
Sues Canal dues# Apparently o i l  paid on the average
£ 7 5 *
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M lBUE ( 2 7 )
Year
-V J, .UMV
(a)
Suez Canal 
Dues per 
S. l'on 
in Cargo
M • d. KJU JU'i Uii.il
(to)
Ballast 
Surcharge 
per 8* !Ton 
in Cargo
(afb)
Actual 
Bues per 
8* i’on 
in Cargo
fo Change 
1928*100
1913
Shillings
4.956
Shillings
*184
Shillings
5.140 57.5
W.W.I 1920 9.190 3*914 13.104 146.5
1921 8 . I 64 4*638 12*802 143.1
1922 6.904 3*592 10*496 U 7.3
1923 6.766 3*872 10*638 118.9
1924 6.488 3*814 10*302 115.2
1925 5.770 3*526 9*296 103.9
1926 5.646 3.296 8.942 100.0
1927 5.762 3.262 9*024 100.9
1928 5.610 3.336 8*946 100.0
1929 5.480 3.210 8.690 97.1
1930 5.434 2,976 8*410 94.0
1931^ 5.602 3.130 8*732 97.6
1932 6.644 3 .24a 9*892 110.6
1933 6.986 3.062 10.048 112.3
1934 7.460 3.234 10*694 119.5
1935 7*564 2.802 10*366 115.9
1936 7.252 3.136 10*388 116.1
1937 6.252 2,e26 9.07B 101.5
1938 6.002 2.792 8.794 98.3
1939 k m % m ig jjg l x|f :f
XT 1947 
194S
8.002 4.148 12*150 135.8
8.002 4.036 12.038 134.6
1949 8.002 3*998 12.000 134.1
1950 8.002 4*122 12.124 135.5
1951 7.854 3-534 11.378 127.2
1952 7.490 1*632 9.122 102.0
1953 7.490 1*678 9.168 102.5
1954 7.254 1.742 0.996 100.6
1955 6.976 1.874 8.850 98.9
O il Talkers
'J&BUi! ( 2 7 )  ( o o n t d . )
2 7 6 (a )
ACffUtVL jTJKS HS b« M l P I CARGO.. 1913-1955 IX . - Dry Cargo
Year
(a)
Buea Canal 
Dues per 
8. Son 
in Cargo
ft)
Ballast
Surcharge 
per S* Ton 
in Cargo
(a+b)
Actual 
Dues per 
S. Ton 
in Cargo
°/o Chai
1928*:
Shillings Shillings Shillings
1913 4.956 .184 5.140 69.1
1920 9.190 .742 9.932 172.3
1921 6.164 .216 8.380 145.3
1922 6.904 .026 6.930 120.2
1923 6.766 .248 7.014 121.6
1924 6.488 .280 6.768 117.4
1925 5.770 .216 5.986 103.81926 5.646 .006 5.652 98.01927 5.762 .106 5.068 101.8
1928 5.610 .156 5.766 100.0
1929 5.480 •O46 5.526 95.8
1930 5.434 .012 5.446 94.5
1931 5.602 .114 5.716 99.1
1932 6.644 •256 6.900 119.7
1933 6.986 *426 7.412 128.6
1934 7.460 .422 7.882 136.7
1935 7.564 .840 8.404 145.8
1936 7.252 .942 8.194 142.1
1937 6.252 •604 6.856 118.9
1938 6.002 ♦578 6.580 114.1
1939 5.752 ♦440 6.192 107.4
1946 0.002 .468 8.470 146.9
1947 8.002 ♦254 8.256 143.2
1948 0.002 .262 8.264 143.5
1949 8,002 .566 8.368 145*1
1950 8.002 .186 8.188 142*0
1951 7.854 .226 8.080 140.1
1952 7.490 .246 7.736 134.2
1953 7.490 .136 7.626 132.3
1954 7.254 .130 7.384 128.1
1955 6.976 ♦124 7.100 123.1
V essels
877* *
something I lk a  5 to 4 s h i l l in g s  per S* ton more than 
other so rts  o f  merchandise. The p r ie d  o f the a ever© 
depression  in  the ea r ly  1950 *s nsay he taia n f o r  
comparison, to show how the b a l la s t  due a* although  
sm all and d e c lin in g , had s ig n if ic a n t ly  en larged  the 
“ac tu a l ra te  of dues11 ♦ On the other head  we can bob 
th a t, although both cargo and b a l la s t  dues ware kept 
constant in  1948-1950, the “ac tua l ra ta  o f  dueafr was 
s te a d ily  d ec lin in g  because of the f a l l  in  the b a l la s t  
surcharge, due to the post-w ar boom. The “actu a l ra te  
of duos11 fo r  o i l  d ec lin ed  considerab ly  in  1951-58 
fo llo w in g  the o i l  c r is is  in  Iran m  d the consequent 
Increase of o i l  shipments to East o f guess, which 
sim ultaneously reduced the amount o f  tanker tonnage 
ca rr ied  in b a l la s t ,  •
The “actua l ra te  of dues11 has been ca lcu la ted  per  
S, ton which is  rough ly  equal to  1*185 Briu iah  net ton, 
“ac tu a l r a t e  of due a11 per ton weight w i l l  vary consider­
ab ly  from a r t ic le  to a r t ic le  as the requ ired  stowage 
apace d i f f e r s  from one case to another. A ton weight 
of A u stra lian  wheat needs between 50 to 55 cubic fe e t ,  
w hile  a ton o f A ustra lian  wool requ ired  a stowage space 
o f 840 cubic f e e t .  Hence “actual ra te  of dues13 per ton  
weight o f wool is  bound to be more than 4 times that 
paid  fo r  a ton weight o f wheat. Table (88 ) shows the 
average stowage apace requ ired  fo r  some se lec ted
8 7 8 .
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N everth e less , the use o f  the a c tu a l ra te  of dues per 3# ton 
In  estim ating the actual rat©  o f dues per ton weight is  
not advisab le* Ihe fa c t  is  that there can not be any 
f ix e d  r e la t io n  between the v esse l*s  occupied oargo spa ee 
as de fin ed  by the Canal*a regu la tion s  and measured in  
terms of 3* tons and -what that vesse l might a c tu a lly  be 
carrying# A r t ic le  (5 ) in  the Sues Canal Company1s Rules 
o f N avigations s ta te d  the d is t in c t iv e  character o f ships 
in  b a lla s t  as fo l lo w s t ^Merchant ships which a re  not 
earning f r e ig h t  on th e ir  voyage, and A lo h a  r e  carrying 
only such fu e l as is  necessary fo r  th e ir  own consumption, 
and only th e ir  crews w ith  the p rovis ions f o r  sane, are 
considered in  ba lla s t#  A ship landing her passengers
or cargo be fo re  passing through the Canal a id  tak ing  
them on hoard a fte rw ard s, w i l l  in  no ease he consider ad 
as being in  b a l la s t *  Further, in  order to he e n t it le d  
to claim  the b e n e fit  o f the b a l la s t  r a t e ,  th e  volume of 
bunko# coal or fu e l  must not exceed 166 per cent of the 
engine-room”« Thus, i t  is  quite p o ss ib le  that “b a l la s t  
surcharge” as estim ated above d id  not r e f le c t  the r e a l  
s itu a t io n , p a r t ic u la r ly  in  the case o f dry cargo ve sse ls  
which c a rr ie d  passengers* Vessels which were trea ted  as 
using the Canal in  cargo could have been p a rt ly  o r f u l ly  
loaded*
However, i t  is  p o ss ib le  to  reach  some so rt  o f u se fu l 
f ig u re  by approaching the matter d if fe re n t ly #  In th is  
attempt we may r e ly  on the dec larations o f  sh ips *
Captains regard in g  the amounts of merchandise, in  tons  
weight, which they c a r r ie d  through the Canal# Such 
d ec la ra tion s  should not be expected, however, ‘to bo 
very accurate# In  Table (29 ) the “ac tua l r a t e  o f dues” 
per ton weight has been estimated in  each year of the 
period  3.913-1955 (exc lu d in g  war p e r io d s ) sim ply by 
d iv id in g  the to ta l amount of dues which merchant ships  
paid  (whether fo r  sh ipp ing tonnage in  cargo or in  
b a l la s t )  by to ta l  volume o f  merchandise which these  
had carried#  Again i t  has boon e ssen t ia l to  d is t in gu ish  
between o i l  and other so rts  o f merchandise f o r  the am ®  
reasons exp la in ed  previously# See also Diagram (40 )*
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ACTUAL COST OF USING THE SUEZ CANAL.
DIAGRAM ( 4 0 ) .
shillings/
TON WEIGHT
MERCHANDISE
otrer than :
OIL. * !* 1 \' i '
* POST PARCELS ARE EXCLUDED FROM MERCHANDISE 
THROUGHOUT THIS RESEARCH PROJECT.
ACTUAL COST (SHILLINGS HSR TON WEIGHT) OF USIBG THE SUEZ CANAL 
19X5, 1920-1939 and 1946-1955
2 8 0 .
TA B LE  ( 2 9 )
Oil A ll Merchandise (excld. Oil)
Year k illin g s  
per ton 
weight
fo Change 
1928*100 1948*100
Shillings
per ton 
•^weight , /
% Change 
1928*100 1948*100
1913 2.790 50.8 2.790 89.0
1920 8.360 152.2 5.940 189.5
1921 7#744 141.0 5.674 181.0
1922 6.202 112.9 4.604 149.5
1923 6.062 110.0 4.710 150.3
1924 5.904 107.5 4 .OI4 128.1
1923 5*528 101.0 3.486 111.2
1926 5*292 96.3 3.256 103.9
1927 5.412 98.1 3.248 103.6
1928 5.494 100 3.134 100.0
1929 5.504 100.2 3.084 98.4
1930 5.112 93.1 3.196 102.0
1931 5.112 93.1 3.198 102.0
1932 5.654 102.9 3.900 124.4
1933 5.640 102.7 3.886 124.0
1934 5.904 107.5 4.202 134.1
1935 5.738 104.4 4.690 149.6
1936 5.624 102.4 84 4.398 140.3 66
1937 5.024 91.5 75 3.428 109.4 52
1936 4.946 90.0 74 3.482 111.1 52
1939 4.870 88.6 73 3.210 102.4 48
1946 6.960 126.7 104 7.960 254.0 120
1947 6.878 125.2 102 6.974 219*3 103
1948 6.670 121.4 100 6.642 211.9 100
1949 6*496 118.2 97 7.150 228.1 108
1950 6.532 118.9 98 6.552 209.1 99
1931 6.198 112.8 93 5.376 171.5 81
1952 5.658 IO3 .O 64 5.048 161.1 76
1953 5.678 105.3 85 4.740 151.2 71
1954 5.606 102.0 84 5.080 162.1 77
1935 5.602 102.0 84 4.836 154.3 73
^actual r a t e  03? dues11 pea? ton weight which we have 
now obtained can only be used as a rough* approximation  
ainc®, again , goods which needed a la r g e r  cargo spa oe 
would obv iously  be paying in  excess of th is  rat©  and  
v ice  ve rsa . O il  was excluded from th is  g en e ra lisa t io n  
since it  was c a rr ied  in  i t s  p a r t ic u la r  c la s s  of vesse l*  
Y et, the so rt  of ^average” which we obtained  fo r  if ac tu a l 
ra te  o f dues” par ton weight may be employed u se fu lly  to 
help us in  form ing some ideas on the s ig n if ic a n c e  o f 
Canal clues*
The p r in c ip a l question now to  be considered  concerns 
the p roportion  which ^actual ra te  of du©aw p r  ton weight 
had constitu ted  ib  the p ric e  o f goods which B r ita in  
traded  with East o f  Suesa* The answer to  th is  question  
would enable us to  fin d  out whether ac tua l Canal dues 
were burdensome m d whether they s e r io u s ly  a ffe c te d  
merchandise- shipments In the Canal*
hot \XB consider f i r s t  d if fe re n t  sorts of dry  
merchandise, apart from o i l *  For p r in c ip a l a r t ic le s  
which B r ita in  imported from Bast of Sues "ac tu a l Canal 
cluesn in  1915 comprised a percentage vary ing  between 
*05/  ^ and 1*84$ o f the p r ic e s *  The ac tu a l ra te  o f dues 
per ton weight fo r  that year has been estim ated to l i e  
in .th e  reg ion  o f  2»79 s h i l l in g s | meanwhile some import 
p rices  w ore a s  h igh  as £96*32 per ton o f  A u stra lian  
w ool| £290 par ton of Malayan rubberf and £85 per
ton  o f  Ind ia i tea* lh© payments of dues wore of 
lim ite d  s ig n ific a n c e  only in  the oases o f  the cheaper 
goods such as eo rea ls9 o ilseed s  and undefined augaa?| 
fo r  they comprised ’between IjS and B$ o f t  h e ir  p r ic e s .
As regards B r i t is h  exports to the E ast, t e x t i le s  and 
m achineries were h igh ly  p riced  and ac tu a l dues per ton  
weight represented  something between *09$ and #3^ o f  
th e ir  f «o*b# prices#  Iron  and s te e l manufacturers were 
exported a t an average p ric e  of £11 per ton and pa id  
another 1.3J& (o f  the export p r ic e ) when ill© Canal was 
used. On the other hand, actua l Canal dues formed 
rough ly  about 20$ o f  oo&l fs £*o*b* p ric e s  and th is  
was almost p ro h ib it iv e .
Tkmn at the outset o f the s e le c te d  period  we do 
f in d  that the burden o f actual Canal dues was o f  
lim ited  s ig n ific a n c e  only In  the oases o f those  
commodities whose p ric e s  stood at £80 per ton or  
under* As regards other commodities outside th is  group, 
which in  fa c t  con stitu ted  the la rg e s t  percentage In the 
value o f B r i t is h  Eastern t rad©, the impact o f Canal 
dues was in s ig n if ic a n t  * fh is  s itu a t io n  was bound to  
remain unchanged un less a su b stan tia l r i s e  in  actual 
Canal d&ea took p lace  or a su b stan tia l decrease in  
p rices*
8 8 2 *
For the purpose of ta s t in g  th is  l a t t e r  conclusion  
the impact of actual Canal dues has been ca lcu la ted  
f o r  ce rta in  other years during the se le c ted  p  r lo d *
The r e s u lt s  o f the te s t  la  given In  Table (5 0 ).  In  
1988 actua l Canal dues were h igher than those of 1913 
by about 11$ (1928- 100) $ yet in  1928 th e ir  burden 
was sm aller because of the continuous r i s e  in  p rices  in  
the la t e  1980 fs* In  1929 p rices  ceased to  r i s e  and then  
they dec lined  a t a con siderab le  ra te  in  the p  rioel 
1930-1938* Meanwhile, fo r  seve ra l reasons a lready  
exp la ined , the a c tu a l ra te  o f dues was r i s in g  sharp ly*  
Under 'these circumstances the burden of th e  dues 
in areases s1gn ifican tX y*
Yet, at i t s  h ighest po in t, the p roportion  which
i
actual dues occupied dri the p rices o f the c o s t l ie r  
(16 )
goods could not however be regarded as s ig n if ic a n t  
in  i t s e l f *  During the e a r ly  1930Is the percentage o f  
the ac tu a l r a te  o f duos in  the p rices  of A u stra lian  
wool, fr e s h  moat and b u tte r  f lu c tu a ted  under X$* The 
impact of Canal dues was a lso  of a vary  lim ited  magni­
tude in  the cases  o f  ten , raw cotton, oof fe e  and rubber, 
In sp ite  of the considerab le  f a l l  in  the p rices o f these
(15) k& d e fin e d , a b o v e , i  * a *, good a of v a lu e  over £20 
per ton*
883 *
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commodities in  the y ea r ly  193G*s# S im ila r ly  most o f  
the p r in c ip a l items in  th e  B r it is h  expo rts  to the Bast* 
with the exception o f  iro n  and s te e l manufactures* wore 
only s l ig h t ly  burdened by the cost o f  u s in g  the 'Canal 
even when th is  considerab ly  increased# .
Cereals* o i l  seeds* unrefined sugar* raw jute  and 
iron  and s te e l wore in  a d if fe re n t  category because o f  
th e ir  r e la t iv e ly  lower p rices#  As regards wheat we f in d  
that actual r a te  o f dues had normally constitu ted  about 
1 *1% o f  i t s  o «l»£ V  p rice  in  the 0‘#it* This percentage 
f a l l  in  s o b i ©  porio&a to 1*2$ or 1*4$ in  certa in  years  
and increased  to  about 3/1* when wheat p r ic e s  f e l l  and 
actua l ra te  o f dues was r is in g#  ‘Bio s itu a t io n  of o i l  
seeds was very s im ila r  to that of wheat* although to  
a le s s e r  ex ten t« In  the case o f r ic e  ac tu a l dues
VC
normally ooraplriUsad something in  the region  o f 1*2$ and 
that flu c tu a ted  downward to lj£ ana upward to a l i t t l e  
over 3$# The decrease in  the p rice  o f un re fined  sugar  
was remarkable during the int ©r~war period# Thus w h ile  
in 1924 actua l Canal dues had comprised only *83$ o f  
sugar p r ic e  in  (J#K#$ they constitu ted  1*14$ in  1928, 
and 3*28$ in  1938* During the e a r ly  1930 *s the per­
cent ago which ac tu a l clues formed in  the p rices o f raw 
ju  to* lead  and iro n  and. s t e e l  f lu c tu a te d  between lf >
f v ChYYY f  ft rV*:
Y ^ h  Y ;- '/; J u r i - : ; I f. -;>\: '! --h'-h 1111
' '- , , 286,
n./v',-/
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merchandise was :less; a igriificant~ as ,;prices had cons iderably »■
i -\ u,Am" ' su*- •.
Msen during and after the War*
In Diagram (41) the actual rate of dues per ton• '■■- • *- ■■'■■••■*'-•'■ -•    ‘ • '• - *w •— - ■*•• - •••' . v.....• • • • " • • • -: .-.» - ../ r* •-.. , ,.. - ... . . l. if. . •. . * * ! %  _ , -(t,.,.., v. -c> , ... .. .... . ^  
weight is  shown against the development of merchandise
tra ffic  • It  can he seen that the^grbwth of tierbhahdise
t r a f f i c , generally speaking, accomp-
A* Kt \ ., .**p4 'A ' ■ ~ - " '* C” 'y ^ , - rv I ' „ • •£'.
i/L'f *• J * :■ •• •*• U ♦-> . 1 v. A _ 'L' '• . '.. •'/ • * ...»* ■ .••’ Y*V.' A ri*- * Y • • •I •• ' 1“ y
anied by a decraas a; in  the actua l ra te  o f  dues and v ice
f
versa# This result need rx>t, however, be inconsistent 
with the isibove analysisy nainely that the actual dues had
V: • •=."■•: ,v .v  "‘W -:,J> V* ■.. -; . -;:: fH; •.
bn ayeragQ? formed a ri {iihsigni fleant element^  ih the
•fr .}« * Y - (»*. y • f». >• / 4 y \ t  ^ ,, f 'i „ v''i ,.V;’trh.Y, *X * * ^*»y ' ">■ 'k" * * , *• '* ’ 1"* i* ' i %5 . • «.  ^ >/ f‘ ' a . “l-vf.'.l •’'f  ■•. , k- ... y /* •* ' '“A ‘ ■ • •xVJ»J* cV ' 'Z’i "• * * . *v\ j/ ,*■ . - i *•'» V' £ ■" * • ■'«'* ~ \* . v - 'Yl> 1 # f'v^ .
merchahdla®' X>ilces>h) The following reasons explain ^
_ _  ^ r 
the co rre la t io n  which ex isted  between;the t w o v v a r i a b l e s ^
. . A  F i r s t ly ,  the. trades of the-cheaper commocfLties which
Company always adopted-h
A r h h A:‘;ji:.oautibus attitude when ohanglhg the dues so asYto
if*;C .■ -V-' Y" V ' ■ ' * •’ • ;' ; • > - - • 1 .v.': • • •' '•■, ' . ^  ^  Y'. '■ ‘"'--v' >■. \ ¥'S r -^v > V-'C^
At'YYhY •: l in k  -them ;f';“ ’ "  ' '*.;►>.v5 • . . . . • - .»  o f t „  « «  f l u o t w t l o t o  t r » d ,  . a d  . r o f l t s .
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However* I f  we look more c a re fu lly  at Diagram (41 )
wo can aoo that merchandise t r a f f i c  had dec lin ed  in
certa in  years when the actua l ra te  of dues was a lso
fu l l in g *  i #a* *  1926, .1935-36 and 1939# Merchandise
t r a f f i c  a lso  increased  in  ce rta in  other years when
the actua l ra te  of dues was r is in g  such as in  1933-34#
The flu c tu a tio n s  of merchandise t r a f f i c  in  these years
can in  fa c t  he exp la ined  by changes in  maritime in cu r-
(16 )
ance ra te s  such as in  1935-36 and 1939, and by the 
changes in  the impact of Canal dixes upon fr e ig h t  r  afcoo 
as in  1926# In  1926 actua l ra te  of Canal' dues was 
f a l l i n g  a id  p rices  of merchandise were r i s in g  but as 
f r e ig h t  ra te s  were f a l l i n g  h eav ily  a c tu a l dues co n st i­
tu ted  a burden on fr e ig h t  earnings which induced a 
portion  of the Sues Canal t r a f f i c  to use a lte rn a t iv e  
routes#
There are a lso  other examples which cou ld  be 
found during the a e lec ted  period  to show that the 
Impact o f dues on f r e ig h t  ra te s  sometimes played an 
important r o le  in  determ ining the shipments of 
merchandise in  the Suess Canal# In 1928-1950 when 
actua l dues were f a l l i n g ,  p rices  of many commodities 
had not yet begun to d ec lin e  as they d id  in  the
(16 ) See pages 255-857 of th is Chapter# The Munich 
c r is is  and the nearness o f the Second War had 
also  d ram atica lly  ra is e d  insurance ra te s ,  
p a r t ic u la r ly  In the M editerranean and that 
depressed Canal t r a f f ic #
2 8 7 #
'>•* tv.
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;f o l l o w in g  yoarsm v*Yet I n ,these th ree  ;years fr e ig h t  ^. ’ 
ra te s  In  general were f a l l i n g s  at a fa s t e r  ra te  than
•••■’’'fy- they e;ver d idduring!:-the 7 c r ls is fo £  the 1930 fs> Thus
the lmpact o f  ac tu a l dues on fre ig h t  earn ings g re a t ly  ■ ;
) - }• ^Increased^thereby Inducing sh ipp in g  eompahies t o se le c t
the Canal. Another example j In   ^
y' ■ * var i ous a ^ t id le s  )w hiphw ere '
-L ca i^ ied  from the East to  U .K.; and Europe were n o tic e ab ly  
I' ii  in creased , yet as factua l; dues rose at a fa s t e r  ra te  
. • th e ir  burden was probably  heav ier than i t  had been; in  ;
3'-; 19 28-1930# Ihe , ^L iverpool St eams hip Own era A ssoc ia ti 6nv
* ; estim ated that Canal dues amounted to  more than 14$ o f
v-; Vgross-:frP ighta „In  1931V The repo rt o f ;;th is  A ssoc ia tion  : 
):AK)Iri 1930*,; 1931 and 1932 dec lared  that ;shipowners trad in g  
with the;East v ia )th e  Suez Canal were becoming in c re a s -
• y r; I ngty burdened< by) the Canal dues • The report > a lso  :: ..
C ^ o f   ^*•->,*>‘<-1;
.. . sought a lte rn a t iv e  sea ro u te s . They a lso  expressed j.
v th e ir  trade ^ In terests East of Suez.
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(17 ) See Diagram (4 2 )^ F re ig h t  Kates o f a l l  a r t ic le s  
< in  the various sections of the diagram dec lin ed  
in  1928-1930. : - V
’ff.
,vV I*'5
(18 ) See D iagram !(42 ) with few  exceptIons a i l  f r e ig h t  
i !vv ra te s  in creased !!*!>  i931-38.^ - ; ' ; ■ * •r
■ K  < } £
»J-oaZlrZi
; (1 8 ) ' See A#T# W ilson MThe Suez Canal*-, p .129,130 and 145*
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DIAGRAM (4 2 ):
SOURCE OF DATA;i 
ARTICLE ON % 
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VOL 101,1938.
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in crease  in the impact -of dues' on ; h e ig h t  ra te s  had. - ,
always decreased the dependence of trade on the Suez 
Canal, i:a £  the la ck of the necessary t ,
information as regards freight rates. Besides,! as we 
stated above* ’when we investigated the burden o f:dues
‘i j H O f c - S j p i f c e f f e c t  on trade using the.
Canal, we cannot reach any definite conclusions because
of the various factors other than dues which affected '•'is**?■- Ha
Canal tra ffic , Let us now bonsidef the ;actual\;i,||
Canal- dues- on o il shipments In the Canal,  ^ In Table:: (30) 
we can see that the percentage of the actual rate of r 
dues in o il prices was continuously risin g  throughout 
the lint er-wafr period*. It  increased from 9,07$ in 1928 .-■•
1 1,VAJ
to 12.02); in 1932 and fc6ri3,.3> in 1936. It  ia quite
conceivable that this had imposed a burden on o il !  \v ; . ' * < &
*' *'f ' 9 '     ’ ‘ '
shipments through the Canal, Yet, giving some consider-
v.5F“S|A
’. i *' '•* g/M
. . < . . , . .     .    t i   .
at ion to ’Sputh^o^th '
a :eei-Si'iagram
dramatically throughout with the, except ion of ; 1931, 
a year In whlch Pars 1 an o il! Reduction was interrupted,
f-., V* -V Vj/Wj}i V vs. 53
(20) Due to a;dispute) between(the Anglo-Persian 
'! V ■ Company and-: the;! Shah.1, of' Persia ■))-h) );v)
| ) l .•!* 
- ? ■*
vJ’SVl•i*. i j
./'A-,-
'3%
«&
• < V  ..• -.v.-t: ' .f.c^v
. , .... . , . c v    - r .  ^ v<?
and freight rates were depressed; 1936-37 and 1939,
■years :ih which'maritime insurance ratesyin the .Suez :v-‘ v ; ,^ |1
* % ‘ n '; route and in the Medlterranean had risen, considerably. f :„|
As regains Uorth-South o il tra ffic  during the same
,~0,
~c,%
•!
1 7?* .‘TO#
• y  • > jd
%
: .::period a declihejseems more’.evident in 1931 but /
1 p a r t ic u la r ly  in  1936-39.; ; horth~Sou th ! 611 t r a f f ie  was ./••
1 naturally: declining because of the increasing competition 
I of! thePersian o il and therefore was probably more 
’sensitive to the ris e  in the burden of
.• ddes'V^ a im ila r  to  the;! o a $ e f o f - 1 t is  h jjjJ
coal exports through the Canal from the e a r ly  years o f 
i:• the ,20th centixiy * 1 Canal dues con stitu ted  a very  -high; :/ ';C§§ 
y A p ie^ bh tage^ f coa l export)-]^ ihesyat'' th e ’ laarae-1ime/^vi^h 
:C the p?oduction o f  South A fr ic an ,: A u stra lian  and IM 1  
1 } ) £ l ower i ng coa l p rices
• E a s t !o f  Suez. Ih  the, post-w ar period  there was a
AC?
- * ^ i*. ndian ! Aftg
SM
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clear change in the Impact of actual dues upon prices :•>*& 
A.v:- ;.-k'. of oil* i  Oil .prices' had ap par e nt ly r i  3 e n muc h fas ter r;- .*
than; the actual) rate;} of dues during the War .period# 
;i^s^l;ih;i948; actual i^te pf fOTmed on3y 4.9$ '
and further declined in the; following years . In 1952 
the burden of the actual rate of due® had reached its  
lowest level during the selected period, i.e ., 2.7$
1^ 1
:
of the price. A This was obviously due to the cris is
of o il in Iran which; raised crude .oil, prices and ?' v||;
’;S
?!V.';v li
a. ■ ' 5; A;
reduced actual rate Of duee (See page, 2 5 7  above). 
Considering section (b) of Diagram (38) we find that 
the growth in o il shipments through'the Canal was . 
extraordinary and uninterrupted during 1946-1955, 
except 1951 the year which marked the Iranian io il
-..A'-riJp
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yy Finally since theyPanama Canal wasi a riv a l route 
'.’to Suez. - in  so far as British/Australian; trade was f 
*• e i^io r^hed:!;^ ; r;it |;is  t; ;o A- ary* *- * -v * •­
dues together.. A direct and olos e: comparison (between; 
the Panama and the-. Suez dues is not however ^ possible % 
for ia number of reasons. ; F irstly .;the^Suez dueaf as A 
we have seen, were fixed in gold francs, then in sterling* 
and lastly  In Egyptian piastres, whilst the Panama duee 
were assessed in U.S. dollars, which were on the gold 
/base untUMarch 1933. Cony ersi on of one currency in  
terms of the other is simply a matter of computation 
when the correct rates of exchange were available.
&
'■ '0• . ' •* 1‘ *• ** 'r*A T 1 "i *t-l . * f*- p* ' •*• ’ - ■ • < < - M - _j
Hence we would find that comparisons between the two
rates o f dues - in t ermsvpf AU* sy dollars Aor in terms > i-
iift?of Sterling were held by some researchers in the past
KS:.A e V e h . ; d u r i n g ; |  
A'm'ost unstable* However, there are several objections 
which should prevent us from holding such direct .
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” { '--’V.iv  S'-' ■ - ■■•  ^ - • •• 4 V - ' * i fV ^comparisons in  th is  respect even a f t e r  the ra te s  o f ‘:,yyy§
dues o f the two canals have been converted, in  terms . .
yv#fi?­..iv.-'s;
of a s in g ie ! puwdhcy* 
below* Considering now the gross revenue from Canal 
dues which would be e s se n t ia l fo r  any ca lcu la t io n s  o f  
actua l ra te s  o f dues ( i # e #, revenues d iv ided  by tons
o f cargo of .by t o t a l ,  neb -.shipping-: ton rage u s in g  bhe-A.*A - A.', xA%i 
y;. y \.y / “/ • !  : 7-y. , v : ’T ' : y" A A'AAAyy y - v.« vx.vyy
.AA’ •-.-v. ~ AGanall we'yfindv'that -• '•. 1 'A
that above* it; is  almost! im possible that the Sue®
%' ' ><2fifc<S8 M
]: Panama \gfoseAfOTenuej5 'from ; due is could t t ; : , :  >' o > A :
s l . 7  ( i o f f lQ f l p a d  om/lno;' t o .  t h e  d i  f  f © * » e h t  h e r  i o d a  ■ •: ■> • ’: accu rate ly c mpare wi g  f fe re n t ; p s
: fo r. which accounts were kept * The Panama ;Canal always 
kept’ accounts fo r  years .ending they30th June w h ile fth e A y\A
u.
, „ ^ .     ... im\
Sue® Canal accounts were kept on the b a s is  of the
A)calendar year.'' We-xmay be ab le  to  assume s ometime that ;A;y^|
■ •>
, - ' *ni*
’ V-Vi • . 1 7.-!- :
the two can a ls  t r a f f i c  and dues revenues could be 
: compared on tM'e^yhas'isi'. yet suchyari a s sumption A can A yyA 
- never be maintained in >a l l  the period s 'w h ich  witnessed.; .-, TA■' y.*-:*►.* -f i.-.-i ■' •••. V*£•■ • - ! \.v Y '--v V - . ■-V-’- - V. -,V '4 v- ,o ' ’ -H' ^  y '■" * *>*■' ’ ■' :
A  notable*; 9P exotonge; o r s'x.ik t
■in ;intefaational.-Atrade. .^ Secondlyv--.(t.he' Panama. 'a;nd> .the '• :-7A{S 
•’’Vyy* A 'x.v'-"'i ’S ; x  y * Ay A- -^ :.! '.V:y;y-v.y ..y--.' "-."y- " x s :: ; xx:
Sue® dues were f ix e d  pe r  net tonnage • o f ;. sh ipp ing#A yet
-rules r o f  ,;mea^uremeht*. ’ Theof e t ic a l ly  /a ie .a idn^ ' i t  was ' ;
•' mM
.,.vVX‘5«
' i'SS'J
*
p o a js ib !^  yythe; PaniimaA^Jpf^bn as  <a peroen tage.
.A:'r A ' A -v A. AA.xAAyAk:xyyA.yAA:-A' A '* y  - '■' Ik '* * '
of; the^ Sue® net t  on Abut the case xihv^hot^eVwj^s- A y ;
;'s - -ir;, ;.': . ,. , * . * ’ * ■< • • ..... Y'< ,v '■ '
• ; j-'r -• X ;; - • :
' __ _
- v 7 ?  7 / 7 7 - f £ # * r H !.‘>V*
*v:."-■ ? ■; ’7'{ ?'-v!. . v * * * , h * -, v, > > . \ * * 'i * * * . ■*• • c.  ^ ■ *:*■ -£ *jtv» ■ •■ • • v ■*.*>*., .. » t^4 . -i ■• • 7  H'-, ■ «--•« .*•■* .„• . - ■ *,• '5/$ ■ • • '-;v ': % . - .
different• Tpy; give jad' 'exattip^ eA w4 Amy;:.qUobe ;the,: v^y ■j , * [
■- Vv,_fdllowing information from the Panama Canal publld- .
. . - ■ y (0 0  Y. v t* .■' . - y r / ; . • • - hhc , / "xy x , y ' y v / x / y x y y k V c ?  yyyy 1 . !■!; • »T^'| -'V * - ■;'••'/ •'-* X ''•'•■ ':'V ;" ■ ' 1': : y .■ . yxv - • -v- : • /• ! ,
■ **4 +* 4 v* it* , 1 .. • - '• •'. >'.•, .. •. ’ : .• ’■ • > ..Z£jti'S
Net Tonnage
'\ k t
atlons*
■;; vXX?X$
—-
;P «aaer^ er
Ora/611- Hunker H ill-  Los Angola a-X
• ••'. : ’X y M a t s ib n t *y x y ;^
W   i X P.S. ■ Frltzen- 1 •■ . -•- . -■ - . ___ fciS
G«r. V ' A - i i. ? ^i ' y^ y A:
Suez-7. ■■:»'• ■ >
Panama
18,352 
12,890,
8.134 , ' 6,804
c 7 ,7 4 5  xyx  jy / e  ,43oxX:y;i i
vtti::*. t.cJ. ■%
(1958 S tatistics).
7v-
‘, ‘ ‘ r ---------------
iltai
(22) Xn three eases in this numerical example the 
Panama rules of measurement produced\a net , 
tonnage averaging about 94$ of the Sue® net 
tonnage. Yet in the case of the passenger 
ship %atsoniaHthe Panama net tonnage was x 
‘ A xCA- ;vA.
, Professor Emeiy Johnson in ff Report to 
. • Cohgress on Panarna Canal ^ a f f ic ”r
j^ VeA irif ormation- the A y
A * . Panama; CanalA ms asuremen t pr oduced a hot y : &  
\  ' : tonnage av0raging 66$ of the gros s while A 
' Atfee/A-^ e'®'xC«ml made the average net . ,
tonnage of a ll vessels using that Canal 
■ 72$ of ;tho • gross*y■ i .e.:f:- Panama:netA;tonnage ;• 
was about 91*7$ of the Suez mt i tonnage7 ; Ay .
V.-i" *-■' His: ' , X;
’i / W k
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. y,v
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 ^y ;•
i-.- . ••,.•'■;«•$*&
. J ;  " K r Z f i
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- . Thirdly, as regards ballast dues Waich were
always lower than oar go dues each canal again had . \
" A . A  '■ *A* y A r -A '*-y ;:A' AXx-A" v/AAAAA-" A-;AX'A A ,..yAAAA'AAAxx!" ' 7 A/A'A A 
its-Abwh; reflationsconoerhing wbat should, be regarded Ai^
-7 •. « ; * X A’/'|
asraA V e 's s e lx ih ;yb a lla a t#-x;/A 'in 'h^a; . * v ^
■■f' ?’ '■■"-- ..-
-k \ jBuei treatment of ballast tonnage differedAfarom the x
x?A A y ;y :2 A- - V A’A li. .'A; . x. A ; A ■: \ x -A iA-:'-"-■' -'' ' 1■>;
Panama,;--Canal. '
_ _ . . .  . . ■ - . . „  ,  , .  , - , , . . }}■*& .
v It  is  ,d esiffitole '-however' tox-obtaihv'someAUp^oximathA^x-y^fS
•:A;x" -AA/A ' - ' ' A x A A ; X*: W<- AA  AA;xx. AX' *. • • •* JA , A * . x
idea €b out xthe r e la t io n  which e x iste d  b at we e h  t be ( ra t  g a ,' ,77.
,* v  v H/A.AAAAaaa:y-AAA A A x -Ax.-.Xx 
iwA - *I*M «  ASM Ah jfrM A«h AftnVduesx of theAtwb waterways*  This can beaee  in
.• " / y  v;/  ;4‘ - A - A A A '-A, v. A r- vA>Jp‘Cat
y,:
Table'; ( 31) where annua 1 to lla ; wefc; divided-.^AhetA A, aa-: • A 'AA^
tphnage; of t ra n s it  ing 3hips#A; x Xtv-l's c le a f  Atiaat the
Ay A A'A;A’y, A A” :A*- ’''AvAA'XAA'xAAA^ AxAA; a'A-^ AiaA-A-^ A^ AAxA'AAxAA^ vA AAAv^ xA-"AaAAS 
; in calcula;ting the
figui*ea of this Table has reduced the amouhfe) ofxbrrbrb
• .* ; 7  -.- -■•. xAZ ■’ " ■ - - ‘ -.Vx 'XX -X-■'■'•••" - -x..y y-. x . y . - ; y v - A V * - / •
., x- ,-.x; XxAx'.AAxe'xx A-X^x.:; V.A'.  ^ • -# .LX-AA/ yy/x .-x xsvx ■/■■■■p/yyyiy. :x...,-x X'^y'x xxx--. x
- which:would result :l f  a--direct -/comparison 1 was7 d^eAA'AA^ ®yv, £* A .* . x , - - > ft ** -».^X, /'
between the o ffic ia l rates of dues of the, two canals*
:' f>;r-AA.A:i^ lfed''^  -s ^ ^ 7 s tated in - the
x s t i l l  prevent any close comparison
?. ’ A'A ' ; " , ; (23)k W»<fc-AiiX v x i  /niX:..... ............. .- - between the aotual rates of dues of Suez and Panama. i  :
‘    *   "" ' ‘    * ' "' '    ” ''
7 ; XXxAfXPk®’ be noticed from Table (31) that the Suez dues
■-' " always been higher thari fchba e of / the /Panama Canal.;
\ '} ;>xv^xxAAA'Xxx'!'•; x xA ,-i • v x v A - A ' A A ; x - x v x y t ’-c;■XxxAvxxxxxx.•X::.X‘?vV 'XX? 'X-'-X/X-'''",;’ J-;V-X X' .! VHt • X -r XX* • : • , ; • rf'S.J*?. :fs*»x
A.. In 1920 and 1925 the difference was as large as 52 and
54 Acent a per tonxmeasureraent: respe ctively. A Ain a ll iAA/AAAif-I ■■r. - -%v
other years (exoluding 1945) except 1950 the difference 
varied between .13 and 26 cents per ton. in 1955 the A A
' ■ ■  -■■ ' A X  X x - ; ' i :s - A ‘ - A ' ' : L ' X X X A  - X X X ; X X  y - X - y * ! ' \ X  X x  > ,  . - x  : x :  X . : . ' X ; X X  - - /  - X - V - ' V X X '- •, • * "• X y>-'X*i-- ;Xv*- - ’ v> -J 4iX '■ ;, ' •;•.'• . 'x^  ;' t' ;< •; ' V' W;:' yy - i^'X? ’■•
A , Sues dues were only 3 cents per ton above those of Panama#
A  A.  *- XX- - A ,
■*‘t *«.*. v '-X 'i. ,r '. 7 - x Jyy’kAJfcXX:,XX=i. : - . - 7 . . . - , v7: ' ‘. X - ; : - \  - ' X X X  - • ; y  ; . X. , , 7- 7 - 7 7 ' X > : - . r T  ' X X  ' -
. , - * 7"' * >X *£'-■ *$a-1 ’ ; 5 - .' V -. ' . . ," X . X,v* j 1 -A -X A ' 7- - X'v ■ - . - ' - - fe - . : A ., : 1 , ■: ■ ,,4A* - v ' - .’ - - :;-
;v va,\ XX77 :X !"X '- j: W 7 X ;y  -- - ; '■ ■ V V X :.:!,;.!!:
V i- TABLE 
AVERAGE TOLLS; PER
A i  " A
•’ (Panama Canal : P u b lic a t io n s  )
(Annual To lls D iv ided  by Tonnage o f - T ra n s it in g ‘S h ip s ) 
A { Cost Aper NetAion: to  Shipping: ))aA - aAa A' :r AA a: AAa A '! !
i p
(Rounded Average)
a\$ 2.30AA ■ ,/
v a  2.73 ' 'A ,
A' A 2 .52 ,a .• '
1.87 . '
1.83 ' ' ‘
1.73 
' ' 1.73 A - v
1.63 
r 1.48 
 ^ 1.14 A A  A
. 1. 59 A" A; * ’/
. 1.43 .
A 1.28 A-, ; A' ' ;
Av-v; 1.05 *"'A . . '
Year
1870
1880 A 
1885
1895
1900
1905
1935
1.54
%98 -
.88  A
>«2
1950
1955
*•;:-AxAAPanama,;"lAA: V A 
!/(‘R<f ndedxAverage)
.88 
♦ 87 
iU  9 
.90 
.92
.38/
.85
.87
; ax .High proportion - of eWorld War I I  to ll- fr e e  transits
In t he l ig h t  o f  the d is  cussi on about A dues which we 
hayeA-giveh in  th is  Chapter we can a lso  see thatA'AAy;A 
t h e r b . - h r s A o t h e r  " a= . > • :
f r o m d iv id in g  g ^ s S  r  evenues from dues by net 
tonnage of sh ipp ing using the Canal when c a lc u i -  
a t lh g  the a c tu a l r  ate o f  dues .  For exaapla net/A- a . 
tonnage of sh ipping cons is ted of commercial t r a f f i c  
whichvyrev ne ed fo r  our purpos a 1 n th is  res earch w
Besides* A.gros s' t o ils  -r^ e-ndesA.dfAA the ;P am me AA • -; ,
Gah&l were normal ly &efhatad bytheApart ibular' >,, 
exemption from duesAgiyehAt,o Panamahlah and A
• Colombian warships as w e ll as ships Apa'soIng:, A- 
solely for purpose of repair at Panama Canal 
y a ‘{.SiseAshbyoibpaedia .BfitarmlcW,: Vol. 17, A; ■ ■ ■ A l  
P.172-B),. :  A A x x A - . ;  ; : a  ; :a a - A / - ; ; ; A '  A;'A%A‘A a V % A ? ;" A x^A-- '
A h-j
' J' - AxAs! 
. i
i yAif* r<»x,x
'.'<"'4 AAV-' '• ;
? •  | . ' ■ ■ ' ' 297 *  ■'  *-r i * -
‘ ‘ “ ’ *& '.$6$ ** * ’*’"’* v* ‘" “ '* -r'" •*•■’•*" -*'*>*There are other sources of information which actually 
. confirmed that the Suez dues were l i i f  er - considerably 
‘ higher sometime - than those of the Panama Canal during
^ ..‘1920 fs and tbs 1030 fa* But at .the same time there
... ',vX: .;-yv. ;V'vw.->v.v r ’
route* During the 1930 *3 the difference between the
X, dues of the Suez Canal!ai:id those of the Panama' Canal ,{ Tr
•!;V was one among several other factors which Increased >■ v- #1
'•>, x V A  '• " A - ' r  V  '•• X A  /  V  :  A ' / X  X  • f : - A  * VA  A A A  A  X  X  -  X X X  /  o  a  \ X  A A 1
ahara of tha latter route.in Australasian tra ffic.. ,7 X
>S ! /Spsfe';eyan.; during these years Uben many factors discouraged 
the use of the Suez Canal the main flow of Australian 
*,. • , > ' i3r i^ a n^ continued to flow throughAit becausetra ffic
rnmmnm m - m t *  <*»■ «■». »■»■■«»■<«»■ i»i««>iiii»‘ v r  i » »>-  u w ^ n w ^ . - ' i r i ,•
'•AAA'
(24) The "Report of Liverpool Steam Ship Owners f 
A s s o c ia t io n ” for 1930, p .14, stated that 
, : ;  ^ ^The Suez Canal ;.duesA. compare very unf avourably 
with those of the Panama Canal; the net tonnage 
as calculated by the Suez Canal Company is  
considerably greater than the British registered 
net tonnage, whereas1on the Panama Canal basis
of calculation it  is less the effect of this
difference In tolls has been to divert,a 
considerable snount of tonnage to the X^ aaama 
Canal"* Bowewer, there were many other factors 
which we have already dLscussed and which 
discouraged the use of the Suez route in 
that period. See also "Compagnie Universelle 
Canal de : Suez11 by C* Funck~3rentorao* p*222
t£:
A-:
L • ’/R A < * A*-; j V-*A.v,
A. ACA--”/  A- 'y y. .. /• A--,- V A yA  A  . A- A rxA A  A /A A A /A y ,  ' A.
-tV A AJ'A - A'-
„•.- C“'- .*>: •<-V. *•'">• y “AV--'. • iM'k -* ' '. ,•> , -’7 • :.f; yy - * X • • • -; .«•*“■*•*j-.m- •% «;, .y.,v -v,' •"SHV. - •,"> *r/ :>• '-!': «•<-''•>. A ‘X AiV?i£; * - - ', - ' <-y:' • -'I' *, - - • ■;•■ /v ■ . • » * > ' / * 11 ?.. . •„ • >■- ■ » - »«. . •■■-;. ■, -- '-a ,* • >..■ -t -.. ' - ■, -f , v - ' ,,, '. f\ni o  >; r, .:*.<■ ■• * .♦.•»*-i;';AXv,rv %AvAAn;cAv. A^.ai:*K,V.A y ; '/tv*'-y.v ■ AvAn A* v •<*«*
.!• 'A . : Panama Canal and the Gap© route. A
X  ■ ■'  <■ ■"•>!*: i ' " j V -  • . • , V . i M 1.: i »■"■"7 /  * / A  ' *■ 7  , .',v ’ 5 ■: *’
-  '  ’ • • - '  - i  ‘ •”. ' y - f - , ’ A V - ;  A '  •■ ■ * ' / '  '  \ ' . . A *  -  /
•A;’ . >• *. • * •• ' :  '  V V . - V X  A > . ’ v  *’>■' A * . A A ' . -•:*?* 'X A A A  • « - V  %  ’ v  . X  A * . ’- X  \ . V *  ■ - X  *♦', / • >' . ' r/  * « • .  V  "  ■• '  • ’ • •* : '  -  %A A
/• :/S . Af.S’ /'•->&
.   . , , .....  . . ,   . „ -y-$i
During the post-w ar .^period’- :the actua l r a t e  of dues A -a |' VA“
A ; 'A aax, of the Panama Canal ..was ris ing  Aihilst that - of - the Suez;:; 
A;!AA-;Can«i:Wft8 f  al ling*:AAln the Aforegoing pages of this J
AS ■* .,*»'>,.-1
;.-S v;
Chapter we showed t hat two large; cuts; in the-r.o f f ic ia l■; 
AtiranisitAduea of the Suez Canalv were made in the)post-
■'.syfy
A$
a" war period. The situation was d ifferen t with the Panama-  ^ . A ,4 * •_ ' *>;• / *, * . • -A. * v f .■</_«>--. x, * .*„• •, * • . -'v. » *• i »“.* * * .. <■ 1 ^  . V * - 4 A x ; - * A ' *?.-
Canal* "The t o l l  rates, 90 cents a ton fo r  laden vessels 
and 72 cents a ton fo r  ships in b a lla s t , are v irtu a lly
the same as when the.;;Canal was opened. A Thus!by 195 5 v . Ail
x - f  X A  ‘ X X A / A x v A ^ x . - A a ^  A  f ■ - X  . ;  . ’ . ■ ' ■ ' A r ' ;  ; . x *  A ! ' -  -  r' v  *•' ' " A
f . h .  *• P tan A m o  H b n o !  Hu am tuAnA a 1 -t cv*Yvh 1 ir HrkH «*n  f: ihrta a  n f  hVi o  XX;
it"/:
> A l
: ■ -?.
•: XSxx;
A!;a ' ■ ' ;: A was even oppoa ite ; t o ; th a t . !
VAX''- •- " ■ - ;'/ - ! A A ’*A ;.f XA''v‘XH;!'a 7 "'A- ' Ar>,.;A '
I A  X. " ; X ’ A ; ,C«)Xrii8 ..fflva^a  ,q ,^, a
a! ; A.A -:a ■ a ! ;With ': the d iscovery o f  r  i c h V o i l - f i e ld s ’ in A lraqx in  ■ "  a |
A A-v A  ■ • ' a  A : ;x  x.r-'-X.A: •. : X } : A - '• A ' ..h  - x /T'V; % •'*: ■ A. / A -A A / '’' ;x A  >t: • v~ v . "  f*&£
j-;A A 'A ^ A th e -e  a r ly  19301s' it- was/-fully understood/that Athe > A l- •*!
;.'A; A.AAIAx;AXA/A-; A-•'?Av X A ;' X X X X ;;! / , " -- • ■ ••' • X" >. A . " A *  A "• • ; AA  A:* (A'
aaA;!:x"'x ' Ai‘ A!.; construction o f-.p ip e lin es ;'to  ..convey the p roduct;to !th e  : -J>|' a .j* s ’ * ■ ' * v ) A ’• “A. > ■» -\ * ‘ -f’  ^^ ?■• - , r »V"* .v' ' A "■ * ' > 1 ■' -•1 >a; ■ - A-'. ■ • ' i • * v
" A A -x; ' . /xAA x- Mediterranean was a necessary jiieaiB of commercialx .
AA:!: / : a ;  a ' ! ' , x  / x  A V 1 ; A ' , ;  a A ; - A A A x A  ■ y  M ’ / ' - a !  '
A xaAa- ;• :x-/,;; ';;A;.-x development • ’A’ Kirkuk o i l - f i  e ld  and theAreatAof the
aAa;:a ; -'i x "a! - s ' al l i i i e; f , .
(25 ) Quotation; from ; ttEticyclopaedia Ameri can V, Vol. 21,'- p* 23%
■xfesvX-.A
1 .a . , 1915-1955, they; fluctuatod a l i t t le  around ; . 
thaaa o rig in a l leve ls , 7; 7 -:77';//' yX./-.. : '
H,/-; 
• ft.Ji-w'1
: - A’ ’ 7 Xs"*1 a
i5
;k , _ _
:> - s. 7AX
■ v ; . • - . ... / 299m
I ra q  fo r  from the Persian  Gulf which, is  the coun try 's
- . \ < - . • . . > ; -  * • , v . *
only ou tle t to the Sea* B u ild in g  up a p ip e lin e  from :- . -i 1 •• ' -v ■ - •
the o i1 - f i e ld  to the Gulf seemed u t te r ly  uneconomical since -*
the costs of such a scheme would have probably been 
as much as those which were necessary fo r  constructing f :j
the d ire c t  connection to  the M editerranean* •’ An *v !
ad d it io n a l journey of about 3,500 sea m iles, from the,
Persian  Gulf to  the Mediterrajneah, and the payments o f  
Canal dues apparen tly  weighed the sca le  in  favour o f
inches diameter were l a i d  from Kiricuk to  H a ifa  a id  
T rip o li and they came into serv ice  in  1934* They 
were capable o f tran sporting  aboAt fo u r  and a h a lf
m illio n  tons of o i l  annually  between them* There la
' . ■. (2 6 ) . ■ ' ' ; . . ■ ‘ • v  ;■ ■ .
some evidence which suggests that the flow  o f Persian
o i l  through the Suez Canal In the years 1934-1939, and 
a lso  In the immediate post-w ar years, was a ffe c te d  by  
the b u i ld in g  of the Kirkuk p ip e lin es  since these >• 
placed the I ra q i o i l  in  a much b e tte r  com petitive  
p o s it io n ; f o r  they considerab ly  lowered costs of 
transport to the main market in  Western Europe. 
Although there is  not much s t a t is t ic a l  support f o r  , 
th is  po in t, i t  i s  qu ite  conceivable , because costs
,-rj
using the M editerranean ou tlet rather than the Gulf ' P 'P  ^
. • -< ■" V . • • ' - • :x' ■ , ’ ■ /4
ports f o r  I ra q i northern o i l .  Two p ip e lin e s  of 12
(26 ) Compagnie U n iv e rse lle  du Canal de Suez* 
C, Finck Brentano, p.224 and 225*
o f transport were among the p r in c ip a l fa c to rs  which 
hindered the growth of the Pers ian  o i l  In d is t ry  befo re  
the War* The success o f  the p ip e lin e  system In Ira q  
in  the pre-war p eriod , besides the an tic ip a ted  expansion  
in  sev e ra l new f i e ld s  around the Persian  G u lf, s tron g ly  
encouraged the In troduction  o f some new p ro je c ts  o f  
p ip e lin e s  to ca rry  o i l  d ire c t ly  to the eastern  coast 
of the Mediterranean Instead  of go ing through the Red 
Sea and the Suez Canal. In  I ra q , a new 16 inch l in e  
was la id  from Kirkuk to  T r ip o l i  Instead o f the one 
which served be fo re  the War* A s im ila r  scheme was 
undertaken to  expand the capacity  of Kirkuki?Halfa 11 ne 
but a ft e r  1948 the l in e  was e n t ire ly  abandoned fo r  
p o l i t i c a l  reasons* A second 16 Inch lin e  was then 
constructed to  T r ip o l i  to  rep lace  the H a ifa  lin e  and 
the combined capac ity  o f the two northern l in e s  reached  
about 10 m illio n  tons a year a f t e r  1951. Between 1950 
and 1952 a 30/32 Inch lin e  was constructed from Kirkuk 
to Ban!as and that was designed  to  carry  14 m illio n  
tons a year* , • ’ • . . •
In the Persian  G u lf area there were two major 
schemes. The f i r s t  was the Trans-Arabian P ipe lin e  
(TAPLIHS) 30/51 Inch In  diam eter o f I , 070;m iles from 
Aramaco o i l - f l e l d s  in  Saudi A rabia to the M editerranean  
coast*The TAPLIIB was designed to carry 15-15*5 m illio n  
tons a year by the construction  of add ition a l pumping
s ta t io n s . The second en te rp rise  was a l in e  w ith  pipe • 
of? 36' and 34 Inch diam eter that would dea l with o i l  
both from Abadan and Kuwait. The lin o  was to  have a 
capacity  of 26 m illio n  tons a year and w ith  500 m iles 
o f  I t s  length  In Ira q  and 280 in  Syria  would a llow  fo r  
s eve n pumping $ t at Iona • \ Only the f i r s t  o f tlx ©a e
p ro je c ts , Tapllrxe, was c a rr ied  out in  p rac t ice * The 
second f a i l e d  to  obtain  the necessary sanctions from 
the I r a q i  government and so was abandoned. Unlike  
the e a r l i e r  cases o f the northern lin e s  from Kirkuk, 
the -TAPLINB, or s im ila r ly  any other p ro jec t to carry  
o i l  from the Persian  Gulf to the M editerranean, o ffe re d  
a serious challenge to the Suez Canal. We need th ere ­
fo re  to  In vest iga te  the new s itu a t io n  and to fin d  out 
the in fluence  which it  might have had on-the flow o f.  
o i l  in  the Suez Canal. The fac to rs  which v/ould 
determine vh ether Persian  G u lf o i l  should be ca rried  
through the Suez Canal In tankers o r by p ip e lin es  
across the- desert to  the Mediterranean coast a re  
numerous and undoubtedly com plicated. In  the f i r s t  
place i t  could be merely a matter o f simple comparison 
between the costs of each way, yet b e fo re  the f i n a l  
choice Is  made sev e ra l other economic and p o l i t ic a l  - 
fa c to rs  must be taken in to  account. .B eg Ides , inva - 
very com petitive industry,, such as o i l  Industry  the 
choice between two ways o f t rang par ta t I on, which.
*C^ .V;£Vv:V. i'~'
f  0 2 . ;
would n ecessa rily  e n ta i l  a huge amount of Investment 'y ''
;; b\;i ;§£;V*v1 ; - > -  ;'.V ' ./■ -V.
d ire c t io n  ra th e r  than the o th e r f  w l l l  liave to f ; l l: > i n one l l  ' ther.,' i - h y#-;fo..:-:
\ i> ; v'he.' rnade in  th e/ ligh t o f  th e lo n g -ru n  world o l i  snijply  
';:'.bf..-hnd' demand* ' The dec is ion  can not a lso  be separated : - •:•: ;
. '-from, the • oom petitive s itu a t io n  of -tire M iddleb Hast 01I f - ' ]
; • ^industry-' in'- the - world:'-'markets *■■; ■ : f  f  ■- v;: T^.
^  ih.;our/ana3^ald-w.e'i:a h a ll
th is • ■■ f i r s t  re so rt  to  Diagram (4 3 )*  In sec t io n  (a )  o f i
v V ; ;'% ?V' rieasures -the..; export p r fb b ' bf/'^a' toh '.of ' 0'rudevo I l ' ;
•; b'jartf the IJiS* Gulf . *-
•-■ ^dx irce ' -'to:';iibnd6n^ ;
.-;>■;■;export p?Ice o f a  ^tbn;;o fvbrddeio il-'a t,: the ';Peralan ;% lf^V .'
. ;  : ahd;':tto :freight, rat©  per ton fo r  the journey from th la  ' ■
• V-v . f 1 'v ■ •/ - '•  V*.‘ ' ';/• ts^ rr- *''f\ ?\
source to London v ia  the  Suez Canal. tfLn measures the
/  -*'v \ •'v/ 1 *
v  c # I * f  ♦/ p rice; :p;er';;tori-of/;crude;-oil;offtheVeamef g r a y i t y ; -
• '-■• a s ith a t  .^ Df- the^;U* S . - 'G u lf ; ‘a h i/ th e fp e ^ ^  ; -•
. ^ ';V . T h r e e ;  aasumptions w i l l  be made; "
.. fu rth e rs  -
. . I .
■' ! - ^  ; b : : v’';: i ^;. ■; ; f  -'Y;: -■; ' -
' Y. 1.0*> .the. U. S. G u lf ;mcf ith e ? e rs ia n  .XAalf,.■;arp-:■ complet e l y •■
•. in&ep endent; o f e 'ach ,:0ther^ .'so; 1 hat'-, o'a phVof-Yhem ’ w i l l  - -;•
• - .;; V i t i ^ K : < P i i S 3 i * r :. %t
doe;fa,*/./ . ? ■ ■ -‘/y| -■•
'v:' •';; • ‘..I' >- -..v? ;*-' - :.'i> •:.,v'.- .., . <•'.: ‘' . . . -^J.: V:^  fv •' -:‘‘'"i/'jiV.’' ':v-• k ' # '; v-'k- k.kkw-'" C-; •?&>;,% k ,.^ C, *v - : ''s K.; ' I '.H v.
2* Let us assume fh a t the cos ts  o f  t  rarh port are  f  -
-■: rY  . » ■ ; . : ; • «  -■ ■ ' 4 Y Y '  . "*V f  v’> '* . ^ Y Y Y f Y ; :  „' *i .•; \ *. _Y Y f .  Y  '••'V f p f - J - f f  '' ; - u f  Y";  ‘ -,:• /  I .  V ,- Y %  * Y s f  Y
p ri nci p a l ly  ’■ determined .byf t h h - '^
YY • f V!Y* TY ■•' .’' ** V * ** ^ ' a.*V.; .-■ kfv,; *i . */. .f f Y/ YYf • ’-<>/ ?Y. ',f X.".v I fV/v* • ''// 7. :'*'*.
rhncYthat/' they;:r e m a i n h o h a t a ^ Y ; - , Y f  f 7 ' f ..,.; .;
:}. 3# Let us assurae that the c • i  .'fW;-:;grl ch':'pf-.‘;orude ■ o i l  i  
' 'in;- Londoh .w il^ h lw ay s  - 
com petition between the tt^ ; ceiitres o f produetion, so  
' that;-the ;IowerkP^iob, . . U  . ; f \ ; Y V ’*
f  •. „-'' ;\ lhe\diegram -a.^
?i sim p lify ,' the • case in  p r  ac tice  C o h s ld o rab iy y e t ; they do : 
-not introdu ce > Ahy': m is le a d in g c o n c e p ts ,,T h e c o r ro c tn e  s s 
' ‘of, the -I mad©/-'!*©>> -th a t f export
p ri ce© fa re  det ermined; ihdepe ndent ly  ih :t:h©. ; G u lf> • 
and the Persian  G u lf, is  d isputed only f o r  the pro­
. war-p’sriod* ;. I t  . IsY&oneraLly b e lie y e & th a t  by that ’.£ 
time o i l  p ric b s  any h e r e  in  t he world werh detefm ined  
• k v a c c o r d i h g - ' t o - ^ U * \ l * e y , Y U v $ Y :;
v..;k
(2 7 )
Gulf exports p rice  -plus fr e ig h t  ra te  from the if.S . Gul f .. k i;
• Y *■ ***•»
?rv • 7 *•'V -'$£4
l i& ,5'k
in fa c t  meant that the Persian Gulf export pri ce 
was burdened by the cost o f transport mt  the journey  
•; from t h e .: Gulf -'to\the' • Pers-ihn■;.Gulf-*i: |Tp;: exporti ' :.
pay the transport co sts . A fte r  that, according to  
fth e-^U tB * -G u lf’; i^ l f .7 p il :7
i^fWras
v ;,W"|k..
• -Vk'ki
:k-; k%tj m
5#e^;^e--;Pri-c©kpf; Middle.; :l^ st ;'011,V;::Leeman^W* '^ 'Y  ^ • ,
-p^'89-93. -;Y  ■ f  --f| - • - Y 'y ':;:.: \ 7 f  f  f :; , f  ;fk;'V f;;; f ,
Y :%
f f "
Y Y  Y:tv'Y: Y1Y Y Y  ;Y4Yf
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producers had to accept a loss equal to the difference 
f betweehtheir  ^ of transport and the lower •:’:y-
price as determined by the IJ.S* Gulf producers#
Available evidence points out that Persian Gulf o i l  xlJ *
- companies accepted that situation* Yet as these . 
companies produced the o i l  and provided transportation  
and marketing fa c i l i t ie s  they moat probably covered 
;their; huge losses In the transport s t a g e b y p ro f lt s  
:'7Ih-the: ^  odAletIbn a t ■ )i
Y ^ off'Mc S*;Y^lf'' • P lus’1 '-f.crn^^a;• for* ''<ietermlnihg:-. .'the-- Y*+»' 5 ■!■ r■. - .* x YYv*\ '* ';*> ' s ' >-/ **;,  ^v ° Y ‘-r f fi'. ■ v^  ^ •£'«■*Y ' T- ' V-Y r
export price at the Persian Gulf could, have been 
'. o ffic ia l only and good only for book-keeping and / ; ' '' *. '3%S,s
■. »<* y$ \
financial analysis* In fact, the actual export prices 
of the Persian Gulf were revealed In the few "spot ;v ‘
sales” or short term contracts which were made 
major Persian; Gulf b il  companies wIth uon4ai,filiated  
‘N.epBipanies.*. Inthese salesywherebuyers had to cover
costs of t ransport Persian Gulf .o il was sold-atfabout
/ f / ' Y v  Y '; y y ' S K s i < ( 2WV
16 cents per barrel lower than O'.3* export price*
.%; As regards the second assumption there is  noYdoubt 
that freight rates are greatly affected by the length
of the journey# However freight rates are subject to
’ " - ' ‘Y  • ■. YY-  - 'f"
■rJ'
(28) A Financial Analysis of Middle Eastern Oil 
V r ‘ Concessions /  1901*65* > Suhayr M lkdashi, Y - 7 
XJ*S* 1966, p,96-97.
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o f crude at the Persian  Gulf is  a lso  equal to "o c ” ,
A ' i . e *  •„ m n  — n  ;i : l n e k  P a » < 3  -t o n  f i n  1 fV; A,-r> M i i f ' A H f l A  4Vn i«ti o  r t r t A n t  V '.£&q s oc, the- Persian  G u lf ipr? oducers must accept}h :1VG' 3
✓*
*. , a lo ss  equa l to t!f a {l p e r 'to n  i f  they, intend bo 3e l l  in
p London*■ Rr a ” is  the d iffe ren ce  between lfqau, the cost  
. o f the1 Journey from the Persian  Gulf to London v ia  the 
Svlqz Canal, and ^oa" the cost o f  the journey from the 
” b * i v ; G u l f \ .}• t  j ' ' ' ' - - t : ’v ::: < ->V (..-.•
- * i  - t ■& ;-s>‘ i ' - t
. 2 -  At a p eriod  ^ g , Q.S* Gulf export p ric e  is
.G:<V' to  110011 and th e  Persian  Gulf export p rice  is  y
*• ‘ equal to  “me1** ftme,l, is  leisrav than ”oow by the d i f f e r -
' V:;: : ,„bnbe between the:-cos t t o f  th e  journey itotivthe IT,S. G u lf/> S• -■, v* :•», ; /.fa *s • •■>. ■ s-v $&'■/** x.^ 'aS": v ;v : ‘ Ol’ ■*’ • % '^ A - ' V'-1 'vr . ‘^ -.c : '“A*.. .. ,, ~ '
' vvt’f'to'^libndpih; .and^3b^t :^rom the Persian  Gulf / to London,; ive* ,
.^00/ - '-me _  . .
pro die era w il l -  s e l l  .c ru d e -o il  in  London - at a p rice  •.e.qualVt^ 
nA-Fii „tt ^iv^urring/any tioeaes^ ;•//• Leaving' a s id e  .
. /rf f.’fvZ, -V Vi /’ ,.“‘C ?'^ ,V
m qa ; * Gcsd/-/Thusvhoth.-Porsian G u l f * d  :by8.; /Gulf 
?ers  de * ~
' to  : d f r? w ithout/ nc i g  a ;
: the a ccounts; records \o£^vtheK^Por s i ant Gulf/roil’^ coftpaftlea 
^  vihlfh o f f i c i a l l y  recogn ised  the G*S* Gulf Plus form ula,
, this;-;was- most, •probd') ly  'tlie s itu a t io n  which ex isted  
- before-, the Second World War# /
3 -  At' a, period  t * ,  dJ*S# Gulf export p rice  is  \
r..- ' i  ■■<- ' • ? % &  ' '■■-.rP  ■ • ■ * - • ; ■ ■ ,  -  r - ' - t
t ”;.'equal to: ”o'c-ff 'and .Persian-.Gulf, export/.prlceVlauequal. 
to The o#i#l% p rice  in  London w i l l  be equal to
\ --/ fv ;*dh  
::■. ,/w ill • •. ipcur i
s t i l l  in te rested  in  s e l l in g  in  London* This was
fvS,'7^/ ’ 'S  ' ' . - .'A,; _ /, ' ;aAv A;:V'..'; ,. ;
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A ■ ‘ A - '■/ A ‘ • .** \ ' ■■ ' ■’ v' . '. A ; . - / -  A. ■ ’ v. , - : , : : A ’ '
J '/ ;^ iadu a lly : becoming \
,./f/'pqa?iodV: - O i l  ;j ^ o r  
\J -J.J;: a t : a/muoh/greater ra te  thdh It\ d id  :in-t-he-'tf* S* /and • i■ k 
, . JJV.4 a- other . /post-  6 f/ b i l ;-.■ £. ■. ,
; A J -f S / prdduct id n - in  the/ Bersian  Gulf was ■. al;ad d ee l i  ni ng a t:|| I 
* / //,/ ; one id e rab le / ra te  lit •'
■.-/:•// dhe/ooht ;■ /b it^to ;-
. ., ;.; to other markets in  Western Europe:; vma . - s t i l l  noticeab ly  
a .:<• therA journey .fro n i/ d *B t/ ^ lf^ tp ''
. * - London, Persian  Gulf o i l  companies success ive ly  ’ • / 7
, /';/•;//■-.managed to  cut dow n .o il /^ icesfand . td -paptiiye ;an : ; ;;A // .
/-/''/Increasing jio rt io h  of th e  market p rev iou sly  supp lied  :■£$ 
'.'/a/- ' by/^vS#;.Gulf -proddeers* ;/• Although'?.thqir.• 'cornet i t  iy e  :- 
^/'A;/;;/'hituatIonv;was g r e a t ly  s trehgthehed/AbyA'the/extradrdihr t : 
-.{•A.;'/'ary‘expansion : ih t h e i r / d id  :/p»^ - 1/ •'/-
', •;//.. .d . p o s t - w a r  /period'
.. Jr.*: ■; tO Areduce th e ir/co sts  * o f transport t o t h e .  main .:)mrket: J. a 
J.;.v'-/:ih:: W e s t e r n - o f  pi^dines-t'o//-. ./ 
,;J a J - /carry; the - o i l  to the /Medit e r r -  / . f .
r /./-■ • ■ jdnean was thoroughly ■ in v e s fi g a te d a n d  planned| to mdet; v /•• 
/ :f';/'/A /the- anticipated:, in cred3© :'ih :s a le s ; to/t^j/'West*//A'For;
£f\ t h e  d iscussion  we/move to sac tion  (2 )
' ■ • :./;'/of - .Diagram (43 ) in  o rder to  domonst ra to . thq/.solution .J'; -',; 
 ^J J ; A;'offerpd;hy t.he ••pipdLlnes * ,: '
o f  the journey from bhe Persian  Gulf to  London v ia
i
/,//
A';.-A-'--A ■ 9
V- A - > ^  *V.. • :.V , -,A • A**c ’.- '•, -V' • •?•
308.
the Suezjl6Z Canal .  QA ^  ;AS 3T •+“• QT,* .where /AS1* .,■.. -
rep re sen ts  the c o s ts  o f  tran spo rt  fo r  about; 3,500
miles  
of the
the Canal per. ton* and f i n a l l y
r*
yM
•>•♦;• : of; transport for the remaining part/of \bhe journey,
1 i*e*. from the eastern entrance of the Mediterranean■ . ... \ . A  T'--. s\~ A'-;-.. .*» *’ - , - •• -v. •• ;■ •.; _ - -.y • - ■ <.*„«' / r - . *4, $?■ vV* a ,«s •' ' AA':
/'} : : - ■■■'.' ’ . . 5 ; A  . . ,.-v '<K *» ? ■ . y  . .... is ■ ■ : "  , ; 1 <, *♦. •«.• t. , / ., - ..
- ;J ; /to;: London* -‘/a/pipe line from/the Persian "Gulf, to the /• /.
A / " - -  - A-./' " • / '  ‘A  / ’ - A ’A A A  A c A A 7 : : • > * / * > * *  & & '& }7 :  A -A  k . v A  • ' ' ■ \ V . / / / - ' / / A : / l ;. A ’ ' / / : / V / ;/ v 1 A s■' •' " . • • • .j/r'.’vV ‘ '•j i. —'—-,'7'"'.' V **• ','A * v A Ar ^ ' \ > ' V A'A v" '*%.>•• ; * ■'. }{‘lZ ' i A;/ V a,/;. • Mediterranean w ill firstly/save AH ,/■ AS which /represents
* ■ : .- the cos ta of tran a port: from t he Pars la n-Gulf to - the
a /  , ; .  . . ; . -  - a \ ' / ' A / /  / / / A - ' a - ' ? A : '7 . / :/ /  / / ; - . / / V / / / /  / ■ /  / ' . / / A  / / / / ■ - / ; ' / ;; ’ f ;' / / / : - -  J v / . " " /  ■a ; / a  'A  / ' ■ /
/ , J entrance of the Mediterranean* Secondly,' ST .the Suez
; Canal dues w i l l  a ls o  be saved. But aga inst  these
' * • * ■
../;a ;/7::a- , : a;s a v in g s ;th e re  a r e  the. c o s t s :o f :b u i ld in g / a n d  opQ'ratlng]JJg|  
v the p ip e l in e  and the overland  t r a n s i t  dues which are 
to be  p a id  to the host governments which would a l lo w  .
3 companies to extend the/ p ip e l in e  oyer t h e i r  land  
or to  t h e ir  p o r t s .  O i l  companies estim ated these
il rtVi . 1  n iiiaw  ' 4"Viri M r. 4-1-i a r\ ' rs-f' >4* V»nn ci V\Art4“ "expenses 
from the
to
in c lu d in g  the  Suez Canal dues. In  terms\Of the diagram  
••we*shaii/^Assu^v th a t  the t o t a l  cost o f moving o i l  from  
‘  ^i/ P e rs ia n  Gulf to  London by using a p ip e l in e  i s ’ equal  
— QT -f* TU, where QT -  QT -  the costs  o f  t ran sp o rt  
. /  -o f  the journey from th e -h as te rn  M editerranean to London 
* , . : and where TH rep re se n ts  the cost o f  using the pipe l in o
per ton in c lu d in g  o v e r lan d  t ran s it ' and port dues to host 
governments. • A-A'
- 7 How i f  the c . i . f .  p ric e  p e r s o n  of crude o i l  .
in  London is  equa l to Hdhn befo re  the completion of
the p ip e lin e / i t  w i l l  be poss ib le : once the new system /> ; ;
r»« H b ‘, ■!« V~&r\ f^ nia'h t? rtrv' Gss • mtf, 4 h ArivuinifrvAri 4 /o f tran sp o rt  is  in  operation  to  cut i t  down bo nd j  
or tq make extra  p ro f it s  equal to  jh  «  i lK per ton. | I
In  e ith e r  case the Persian  Gulf p? o due era/w ill* strengthen
•f f.r.v
th e ir  com petitive p o s it io n  in  the, Lon don/m r^tfahd r ; :; . r J 0' . - ■ : - ' » * i* » . -1 y*T>' u : !•. ,. ,: .■• v«. J'i * '»* ’•' !**,*»•' • .• 1 ... . <
y fo rc e  out the U .S . Gulf producers i f  those can not
-1 • \*;.y
.:hut th e ir  p r ic e s  to the same exten t. * - J /
• Ih© fo rego in g  re su lt  can be held to be/va lid ,' / •: i] 1 /v
• : - /under ’- t w o . 1*\ ■/7VvL7/77/7
. .* / These conditions a re 0 ;v0 0 0  • • 0  ;•
. v : J- ' X  ' / l «• ' 4'- / \ J Vv ’ y /. •'•. h . . , '**' «..V* • 'V - * /• /  J
/ l . l h a t  p ip e lin e s  a re  constructed w ith -s u ff ic ie n t
V ;. capacity  and designed to  ca rry  ,ft o t a lm. or' the '"la rgest
1 of s a l e s t  h  i  he /market West ■ o fvS u ez i: •* v /- : ♦* /SI
■ ■ ' * - .'
■' : #  ^ ,3 o;»■- ' » ■/
viip
4f1^;-.
• pf oportion” f ; le s  ^ o it ^marke o- -  ^;;, et*.j - -
; • Ih© ;g re a te r  the extent, to which th is  conditl on is
I l i e d t  the greate r is  tiae proportion  o f  o i l  l e f t  
/ to  be c a r r ie d  at the ,fh lg h e r ,r cost o f transport ( i . e . ,
, through the Suez Ganal) and the le s s e r  the a b i l i t y  to  
: .us© the economic advantages o f  p ip e lin es  in  low ering | 
v .... / q i i ;  p-ricea:. : : $0r e ^ la t h / t h is ;•furfher7iittV.'ifs/;|s 7 7> ’ "7/
• / going through the Suez Ganal. In  th is  case lower
: 0/ ''Iqwer/o.osts-hf/transport*:/
• : . can not be o ffe red  to  buyers at bite Eastern M edl-: •- . *
an since th is  would on ta il/d isc rira in ation  agalnatV-/'7|| 
he iaa jo rity  o f buyers ab the Persian  G u lf.
0  /7 ...' /a •< : 7 0 0 *
I f  o i l  companies
t w i l l  bb , Incurred/ in  the transport stake a3 o i l  .;' ■ :' aa
l i e s  w i l l  M  th e n  in  afVfertti•■•nh#irtT»h'i:ri'c' fralr/h-h A' Mcorapa ni  111 be  i  e f f e ct aba prbin^yf eijglit
blxe G u lf to  the entrance o f ?/>; 
the;^M editew aneM */a • 0/ / ’ * / / / ' ■ • 7 r/0 ;07/ .y// O f  • " •■ '•
; 1 ;  a  I f  the capacity o f p ip e lin es  is  s u f f ic ie n t ly  
/ / . / la rg e  t o ’.ca rry -a  ma jo r  p roportion  o f o i l  e x p o rts fro m  | 
the G u lf, economic gains r e s u lt in g  from the operation rsi&.
, o f the system may then a llow  Middle East companies
/ /  ' /  ' ' V  J 0  - f " * ’ . ’ '
to  o f f e r  lower export p rices  to  a l l  buyers (a t  the
Eastern  M ed i t  e rran ean ,as w e ll  as at the Persian  G u lf) ’ -
* t ot al .  ■ a ’ ■ / 7 / i
/ ’/  •'y''/''';2 0 fh a t  overland t r a n s it  dues to host/gbyernments;//' ^  
////|^|fi. lands or ports are used fo r p ipe lin e  operations  
' are negotiated  on a long term bas is  at a ra te  which
net gains achieved ' 
by avoid ing the sea journey from the Gulf to  the
i / 0  :0 / / / 0 y > / / ; 77///’7:///// &’ 7/^111
‘ . : Mediterranean and the payments of the Ganal dues. 
a . 5 fhe f i r s t  o f t h a  fo rego in g  con d ition sycbu ldh o t 0
a a be f u l f i l l e d  in  p ractice ', fo r/variou s p o l i t i c a l ,  aid. --fj<7/| 
/ / ' SpmbtimeS ^ 0 :^ . ,.
M ine. 'Was: projQ_cted:_tb:'.carry ,o ilrfrom /iibaton :^ a h d ' : ; V '\ ■ / ’’I/
07, - ' : to t h r o u g h :i r a q i ' 7 g b v e r h me h t - v00|
,//  imposed p ro h ib it iv e  conditions on the b u ild in g  o f  bhe 
00-7 p i ]^ l i r » c in  ,’i t s  lan d . I t  . was s tro n g ly  be lieved  in
vAAjM'f*
/ Irsiq that the  p ro jec t would jeopard ise  the trade 0' =; • <? - t^ ;c
'k&*
\ / 3 1 1 .
owners
77: ’ in te re s ts  o f I r a q i  o i l  i f  f i t w a s  to serve the in te re s ts  ; 0:
- o f the r ic h  o i l f i e ld s  in  the Persian  Gulf* The p ro jec t
0 ^ j . - ' j .  0 / 0 0 0  //../0/,--0/::/: : '*//? 
0 : 7 ’a To discuss, the fulfilment? o f the second condition  . //
* 7 /0''0 y?  have to t ra c e  the development o f events between the
o f the p ip e lin es  $ IPO and ABAMCQ, on the one |
x, Lebanon and Jordan on the othex*. J .
y ./These are the three countries which gave perm ission * V
fo r  tho lay in g  o f p ip e lin e s  through th e ir  t e r r i t o r i e s  i ~
'*• - /..hni 'in;;t;3aebase o f  Syria  and Lebanon, a ls o  fo r  the 0, /f 
• ’ 0;use  o f a th e ir: .pbrts*. 7 * /  0 " . v* •%. 0 * /, t ... -7 J
• //• , y in  1931, a convention between the: -IPCJ:hud;; the ‘ = /yt 
a Syrian government provided fo r tho la t t e r  to  re c e iv e  
an annual payment o f  £400,000 fo r  a llo w in g  the t r a n s it  
o f I r a q i  o i l  through it s  t e r r i t o r y .  Other sums o f  
, money were a lso  paid by the IPC to the governments £
0/ i o f Lebanon, Jordan and Pales tin e  (K lrlcuk-Haifa l i n e )
04:// ■ ' ■ ' y - . •
0 In  1947 IPC volunteered to pay to ^ rr ia  ex g ra t ia
.0  t r a n s it  fe e s  o f £75,000 s t e r l in g  a year, r a is e d  (to 0, i
../’/•^f/M'O&iboo^ in  1950 and £45,000 to Lebanon. From 1950 • :- •*a*' -0 0 •* < ■ 7*<\/0H< . <V/ - - 0 '/'’:yiL7-0; r ' ■ 1 / 7 / • "0 v/000 1 • 0 0>f0 - * ; 4 „ /-0 '|
yy j f  />=Onwards in c rea s in g ly  h i$ ie r  shares; in  -the^ prp fits.7'of 
.y :/ ;yy0IPC/pipelides':'Wq/eAdemahded:, by/the/goyo^hme'nts/of -//•- ; //fi
7// (2 9 ) : K irkuk-H aifa  p ip e lin e ;was abandoned a ft e r  th e ; ' . - 
establishm ent of I s r a e l  f in  1948 and .the re fu sa l:
•' ^  00 7/ - 0--v' v'of { ;t he;/Arabs ytb/ le t  /the i r ' o i l/ ;gb : /  hrbiigh -what /' > 
:/; 0  / / / / : was regarded as' an enemy land . ’
000
Syria , ; s.-*;'
0buto»le;&:7bha:^ . ■ j0/ 0 -
return  by ;trans p o 'rt in gvo ii: througti th e ir  /tbOTit o r ie s  ;
in stead  of r e ly in g  on/’ tarrker shipments from the Persian
. •;" y ••,•'••' ;V .; . £//"• '-/0;’> :'00 / j ‘ : / S / ’££:&;£$/ //■- 0 
Gulf through' t h e .'Suez>Canal• Another reaubn^p$gs /that /'-
Lebanon - had p ro v c d a  ■ f  a i lu r e a n d  th ere fo r©  th e ir  o i l  0 • 
in te re s ts  were bound to  ba oohcentratod oh/the business  
o f .;trana it.,- shipping/or r  e f i n i n g o l l  :produced in  the ,/v ■ 
nearer t e r r i t o r ie s *  In  the/absence o f any c le a r  means
7  / - //’' : %  '/>■//////0-- V;/  "v//-;0 . 0y"y  t y y f/ '
of, measuring the ■ p ? o fI t a b i l it y  o f . 
circumstances;
‘a r iy , i h ' ^ r i a /  ;hOgbtiations% b n -tran s it  and port /dues0: 
bbtween.sucoeasiyo;AgbVermnb'ntsland;/IPO were - In ev ita b ly  
.prolonged/.and the v a l id it y  of';:Any
doubted* In  1952 /after 'long * *  >
-0//-' // -  /■■/:';■■ , / 0 0 , ;:0-v -,-/':/:/■•.;/7/'07i?/^^5v7^0A,/7f' * ’
agreed to  .";rai s © brans I t  and port dues to the .Lebanese 
government to '£450,000 a year* Yet be fo re  the a g re e -/ .  
ment ''was ' r a t i f i e d : by - '''Parliament'£ d ls a a t is f  action;';was ‘ P  ac ■ 
■shown • in s ld e :/Lebahpn, apdy b att e r ; farm s y wi th ' iPG?-/y#r •/'' - •;:
Amitfht* Annther ex a mole was the Agreement F a a oh air)sought I*; / ot t o  pl  -  ; a r t'; re c ed ;;. 
between- fPG'-'and;tixe/Syriaix';.g6yernment\befbre/the':; 
cbnstruction '..of y t h e - i n . - ’ ' / 7
T / / / : / 0 y f  ' 7 / / - / ; - v V ♦ / '
I95& and -a fterA 'the ,p ip e lin e  j,Ms- com pietoly/,flnlsto(i/.
f ? i j a n  /  0/ -
. ' ' /  0  . " 313.
payments, on le v e ls  qu ite  remote from those p rev iou sly  ::
o one luded * The Syr ian government a skad fo r  ha I f  o f / ; . 0 •
the jr of i t s  re su lt  ing - from t he- ;s aving o f  the ,s oa v.. • :;r,
, journey from the. Persian  G u lf to the easterni M editerr­
anean* I t  a lso  asked fb r the h u ll  d ing o f  a re f in e ry  
In s ide  i t s  t e r r i t o r y  and fo r  the d e liv e ry  o f somef r e e  •
amounts o f oru.d© o i l *  "Negotiations then s ta rted , and / .
only in  1955 an agreement was reached and the p r in c ip le  
o f 50:50 xr o f i t  sharing  on p ip e lin e  operations was /
accepted by the IPC. . P r o f i t a b i l i t y  was to be assessed  
on the b a s is  o f a hypothetica l journey --by sea from 0 " V / j
Fao, ( I r a q i  port at the Pars ian /G u lf} to. the .Eastern ■
M ed it e r r  ane an * The no w a gre erne nt was to r a is e  .Syr la  fs 
t ra n s it  and p ort  dues to  £6j m illio n  s t e r l in g  in  1956* /
IPO a ls o  agreed to  pay the government o f Syria  the ’ • 
sum o f £8'|* m illio n  s te r lin g  in. settlem ent o f  a ll.-o u t*  •'//  
standing cla im s. On every  occasion when Syria  succeeded,y  
in  obta in in g  h igher t r a n s i t  dues the IPO expected to  
be asked fo r a s im ila r  treatment or even b e tte r  terms ' / '
by the Lebanese government* -0 • 0 . 0 v
Tho s itu a t io n  bo two on TAPLIHB (o f  AHAMCO) and the . /•• 
governments o f  Syria and Lebanon durirg  tlie .ea r ly  1950 *s 
ran in  more or lo s s  tho same- v/ay* Agreements which /
T A PL ip  made in  1946 and r a t i f i e d  in  1947 were changed 0 
in  1952 with th e  r e s u lt  that more t ra n s it  payments . •
were made to S y r ia , Lebanon and a ls o  Uo Jordan* In ' 0
■/ y  \ ■ \% .0:  7 ;J
: y  ■;•• asau rih g th ©  p r in c ip le  Q f5 0 :5 0  pro iftg sh a r in g  . l a / .  0  . ■
• i&  ‘was; announcod tJaaf thQ^ TAPLIHlY /; ,
:’0?' A t; 03?m^ 0;.,;V ; 0g//0g/ . I V , - /
;" 00. g-0- / / ft;'-la ' -not p u r :p^Pobh:: herb-.; t  o |di sous a/tha/- f a i r  no a s f ■ 41 
■;/^-;/;0# : tto  u n fa irn ess  o f th© d emands which Syria  or ~ 7
, ''^//hbbanon-had' raiaedv in  tho;.'-P©ribdvl947hl955;0/; /Out/gg,- * .- / 
74 0  bo ld  ■conc©rh-;ls;- tb  emphasise that u c i r c u m -  
it ' was almoat irapoasiblo f or o i l  companies ;g
'■■■■. i-.v ; -  * 1 * # , ■ ... - ' - ■ . ■'.- - ' K , ’ ,- - • ‘ ?•$• • ’• ' • ' ■ , iJL - ; -,* ■ '■' • ■ ■ ; ■ ■ . :' - '■ * - • ( ■ ■v 0 '.'A ^  d . . * 0- •; > V>. . , \ t * ., % / - ., . -# ; .* "" %v;g, • 1 g /' ", .. * ; * /.9. ■ . » . i * '«&
■4 -70; to'/rdachraby /long;' t©rm/agr©©mo.nt/ :qh/.oy©rlaxid;tranBit.-/ '• gg/  
•/d u e s * ... Had f 4 . 005
.*• v - '* * ■ . \ t '.,' \ 0; ■ .* *-> *• ■» h\ '■ *. • - 'H, * /-fg - / 4 *■.* ' ’• ■ ■ ' d \•. ... . , • *, ' -■:- -■ - , -if - .. •„ .:■ •■•-•_■. ■ . • '*■■ ; probably have been b u i lt :  and an Independent lower
*00; -prio©.; of.-.oil. at/gtto' • d0v ;7|
vhich must bot y :■*’ r .;•* “vi,' •' :’ ■ ’ , • fag
emphaaisod concerns th© continuous ria©  in; pyerland : /:/
• / '-/ ' ■'■/ ■- * ■'"*■■,/
■ ; ;• T / . r  / . g ; ’/ /
•"• * . .' '• ' *-V A " ’ :'.' • A1' *■'• ! ' *- . *■ ‘ • \ ■- y :- ';■ ,■• '• ;' I , ■?•*' ' .. .. • .itA
;J .- y ".is t r* ••: :
; :'/ ‘.'g .- accept ed, h  ’ /
■ ■//,':/;Canal*,:. Ihcreasa in  transItgpaym etta t©ndod a I ^ a7s '(/• 1 /|
; •>* J-A;tp/r©tipv©/s;uch;.a;'.diff erenco, and ixg 1055 agr©|m©nt ofg// dg m 
- :/*L.!v:L-h05SO;■ p rp f it  sharing; in  p ip e lin o  operations was a-
c le a r  acceptance of the p rin c ip le ,-o f d lv id in g h h e  ,: /•-' /I
g  • - .r g g -  ; - ' . J - ;.■ . 0' : ’/ '/ ', ' ' ' '0 / / g ' r g  S : * W ^ 'h  ■ 0 0 / 0 0 0 ' 0 ' .  ?0  ■ . ' * 0/ 0 : 10
'(:-g’;'©cpnomic/adv ant age©’•■which :thes© gp ipeiinea  ^produced/; •;;.- '/'::
■I.m' '/Ar -.}'; ■ ■'.
' >*..•' T-Js&'r
' 4*077.5.4
i.y
<>.= *; i >-"^  •/'*/ ..^ .. w
I t# , V«■>&;« 4The.tendency towards c lo s in g  tho gap between the costs
| ^ the Suez G&nal was U  c fe a r  s ig n  that the e ssen t ia l  
- purpose of b u ild in g  p ip e lin es  was f a r  from bo lng *. \ *
;i//'V'■•'■'achieved* The f in a l  point in  th is  d iscussion  concerns
>.* .;0>v0'■"
5/ which r e l ie d  on I r a q i  o r Saudi o i l  ra th er than Kuwaiti
or Persian  o i l  depended f a r  le s s  on the Suez Ganal ' ; |
' p a r t ic u la r ly  a f t e r  the TAPLINJS was constructed* 'Tho
; i case w ith  B r ita in  was d if fe r e n t ,  however* *
, ( - During 1946*1951;. B r i b lah  -o il imports;' froin/ E ast^p f'/
: : ; x j I l. ;$ue z.; cam e g matnlyg from I r m * .?.Kuwait;;arid • Saudi, j\rabia  
"l-g/ .-'w h iid  irA q  ranked fo u rth  In importance#' In  1951
, /- f \  ; ' . • ’ ’’ -g .. V:, -.' " ;,v ' A > " i  »• 'A g 'g / .-g  g\. •’•g/c  I I 7||
, ■ • . imports o f Iran ian  o i l  wore cons Id e rab ly  a ffe c te d  by
■ ; ' ■' ; V V/U W . ■'
' 4 *. the h a t io n a llz a t io n  of ItAXQQp and subsequent in t efyqntion  
, v f - v  o f the .B r it ish  government* In  1952*1953 imports of. , , 1 . . • *■
<0,4V:\lrah lan o i l  were n il 'a n d  they were rep laced  by an
44 4.•(30). The •;gaP;::,was'hlsqv blos/ing.-be cauaev/of■ the cobsiderab le  
04 • • from the; Gulf*
4 (31 ) A IO O ,,A nglo *Iran ian  O il  Co.,Ltd* 1%
U:f<■*)
g.gv
v ; / .  , 1 v  • '-.tnv v f  : A/I
r < { ‘V vS . ggg*^?
*--?f. • v 4 ;;  ^*- 4* :V-- / f‘ ' « Z
v/1*/- ./r*.v .0. /^ •/,,,/4/ v4 / 7-. . . {•
*g£*/f.v. / -I
v i * ■ */{r;*»*.; .■/ > y ' >-r ,'?/• * /A*4 - ^  ? *f 4 • /- * V^> L 4f •> v / •;? • -- ' J V; v« y
i: Y  ' 1 7 :;7- - * 7 :Y "% • Y L;Y :-y Y ' ;: 7/. ‘ - 316* . 7
’;. ■; . in crease  in  B r it ish - o i l  imports from Kuwait , Iraq. • : 
:. •• and Baud! A rab ia* ; In 1954-55 im ports: o f ‘ o i l  from 4. 
;0-v ,„/ Iran  ware resumed but they ware vary; much boiow/ th e ir
•: /•, 1950 le v e l .  Imports o f o i l  from Saudi; A rab ia  liad 7
; \4, ,,Bb#.;alao;4Table (3 2 )*  4 7 4.. :/"g.0^  44vTZ/Z,-’ •
* ;■ . ..... To estimate; how much o i l  B r ita in  imported from
■ . . ‘ •
, v the. Middle East through the Suez/Canal during ;t he a , 0
period  1947*1955 w e/shall assume/that throughout the , .'/’0
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CHAPTER VII
THE SUEZ CRISIS (1956-57)
FROM THE DAY OF THE NATIONALISATION UNTIL 
THE CLOSURE OF THE CA.AL*
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1. BACKGROUND TO T m  1955-57 SJEZ CRISIS
It  has been estimated in Chapter ( 6) that some­
thing between a fifth  and fourth of the value of 
tsritish trade depended on the Suez Canal in 1955.
These figures may al30 be adopted for the p re -c ris is  
period in 1956 without risking any sign ifican t change 
in their accuracy, however.
Furthermore, the outlook for the future in 1956 
supported the view that more depends nee on the Suez 
Canal was well within expectation. The British  
government was not prepared to join the European Common 
Market at the cost of lim iting the Commonwealth trade.
Eden, British Prime Minister, believed that "both for
economic and political reasons the necessary solution
la a wide area of trade agreements which comprises the
( 1 )
British Commonwealth and Europe. ‘ It  is  needless to 
emphasise the importance of this policy on the depend­
ence. of British trade on the Canal; we may only recall 
that the major part of tnis particular trade had been, 
and was s t i l l,  conducted with Conmonwealth countries 
East of Suez.
(1) "Full C ircle”, Anthony Edenfs Memoirs, p .337
Most important, however, was the expected large
Increase in o il shipments in the Canal in the years
after 1956. The British government had shown its
intention to work for an annual rate of g rowth of
3$, an increase which implied a doubling of 1956
standard of living by 1985. On the assumption that
an increase in the consumption of power at a rate of
0.5 - 0.7$ would be required per each 1$ rate of growth,
( 2 )
about 429 mil. tons of coal-equivalent was estimated,
as the rate of fuel consumption to be expected in the
U.K. in 1985. See also Table (34) which presents three
other estimates made by the same authority in December
1955. Out of the figure of 4 29 mil. tons about 91 mil.
(3)
long tons of o il might be needed. Table (35) shows 
estimates of o il requirements in the U.K. between 1955 
and 1985. The most striking fact that emerges from 
Table (35) is the high rate at which estimated U.K.
(2) Estimation made by Dr. G.H. Daniel, Ministry of 
Fuel and Power in Paper presented to the 
Institution of production ! Engineers - 
London, December 1955.
(3) Roughly 1 ton o il products » 1.5 ton coal, and
1 ton o il crude = 1.4 ton coal
3 2 6 .
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S 4 & &- U  1).
U.K. ESTIMATED TOTAL FJEL CONSUMPTION (intimation 
(mil* tons of Coal equivalent a year) made in 1955)
"High" Estimates "Low" Estimates
u> l i t ( o )
(Actual) 1954 245 245 245
Estimated I960 278 273 251
1970 342 326 291
1980 415 385 320
1985 458 418 332
(a) Assuming that rational Income Increases by 3$ 
per annum and that fuel consumption Increases 
by 0*7$ for every 1$ increase in rational 
Income •
(b) As for (a) but assuming that fuel consumption 
increases by 0*6  ^ for every 1 Jo increase in 
national income*
(c) Assuming that national income Increases at 
a lower rate arising from an increase in 
productivity of only 1*6$ per a mum - 
instead of 2*8$ per an um in other estimates - 
and a small Increase in population* Also 
assuming that fuel consumption increases by 
0*6$ for every 1$ increase in income.
TAdLE 35*
U.K. ESTIMATED OIL CON SUM. TION 
Mil. Long Tons
Actual 1954 22*2
" 1955 25.0
Estimated 1960 40.0
1970 61*0
1980 32.0
1985 91.0
x Petroleum products rot used as Fuels are 
excluded.
x
(Estimation made 
in 1955)
o il needs were to grow between 1955 and 1970, i.e .,
6 0 %  increase between 1955 and 1960, and 53/i between 
I960 and 1970. Conventional fuels would s t i l l  count 
for a large portion of the growing needs but their 
importance, a ccording to the estimation, would be 
declining relatively. Atomic energy was expected to 
provide an increasing portion in future fuel consump­
tion in the U.K., particularly from 1975 onwards.
Forty mil. tons of coal equivalent might be met by 
atomic energy.in 1975 and perhaps 94 mil. tons in 1985. 
Thus although consumpt ion of atomic energy might be 
growing faster than the consumption of o il between
1975 and 1985 more reliance would s t i l l  be placed
(4) 
on oil.
Britain and the rest of Western Europe relied  
greatly and increasingly on the Middle East for their 
o il supply throughout the post-War period. The 
prospect of replacing this source in future with any
(4) In 1956 O.E.E.C. estimated that about 1,200 mil. 
tons of coal equivalent would be required by the 
whole of Western Europe in 1975. Again it was 
anticipated that o il would be consumed at a 
faster rate than any other sort of fuel; 315 
mil. tons would have to me met by the use of 
o il in 1975. Q.E.E.C.. Europe Ts Crowi rg Needs
of EnerCT - "How Can They Be Met?1*, 1956
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other o i l  source was quite unfeasib le . The Middle 
East o i l  reserves were vast and they were capable of 
very great expansion, much greater than in any other 
producing area in  the world. Therefore the biggest 
contribution to future expanded needs, not only those 
of Western Europe but also of a l l  the rest of non­
Communist world, was of course expected from the 
Middle East where an immense expansion was foreseen. 
See also Table (36)
TABLE .(,361 *
POSSIBLE PATTERNS OP FREE WORLD OIL PRODUCTION 
TO MEET DEilAND.
________F la g g s , An lliljX&a_____________________________________ *
actual Possible Possible
_______________ 135,5..-.....1965__________ 1925____
329 •
U.S.A. 328 450 450
Canada 17 50 65
Mexico 13 25 30
Caribbean 119 190 225
Other W. Hem. 8 35 50
Middle East 159 400 900
Europe 9 20 30
A frica - 10 20
S.E. Asia 18 50 80
Synthetic & 
Natural Gasoline 31 70 185
702 1,300 2,035
Estimation ;ade by D.C. Ion, "O il Resources 
in the Next Half Century", Paper published 
by Institute of Petroleum 1956.
That forecast which la id  so much reliance on
possible o i l  supply from the Middle East, at least
during the twenty years 1955-57, placed a tremendous
dependence on a l l  sea channels through which supply
might be carried to West o f Suez. The importance of
the Suez Canal in  particu lar was expected to  grow
considerably at least during the rest of the 1950 fs
(5 )
and the 1960*8 because of the following reasons!
F irst, the prospect of placing more reliance upon 
Middle East pipelines by building new lines was regarded 
with pessimism. rIhe post-war experience of Middle East 
o i l  companies in that particu lar f ie ld  could not be 
regarded as successful as it  has previously been thought,
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(5 ) Apparently the future efficiency o f the Suez Canal 
after the 1930vs was viewed with s cepticlsm in 
in B rita in . The Sue* Canal Companyfs concession 
was to end in 1968 a fte r which date the govern­
ment o f Egypt was to take over the waterway. 
Whether or not the Egyptians would be able to  
manage the a f fa ir s  of the Canal was s t i l l  to 
be proved. Yet, on several occasions hints 
were dropped by the company fs o f f ic ia ls  (most 
probably instigated by se lf  interests -  see 
A. Wilson, the Suez Canal, p .95 about the 
company’s attempts to extend the concession 
in the past) that a non-marltlme nation like  
Egypt would be incapable of administering to 
the business of the greatest man-made waterway.
and no doubt was discouraging to any further schemes.
Second, in 1956 work started in the Suez Canal 
to provide fo r  vessels drawing 36 f t .  to use the 
water way. Yet, on the other hand there were tankers 
on order with draught of over 40 f t .  Thus it was 
expected that a l l  projected large tankers would be 
unable to navigate the Canal, unless they were in  
b a lla s t  or ligh t ly  loaded, and would be making their  
homeward journey -  i . e . ,  from the Persian Gulf ports -  
in future via the Cape o f Good Hope. Nevertheless, 
despite the economic advantages gained by employing 
la rger size tankers there were like3.y to be some 
lim itations upon the growth of their number in the 
near future. Depth of water and other shipping 
fa c i l i t ie s  at most of the world’s receiving terminals, 
besides the existence of small number o f suitable  
repair docks would confine the use of the largest
(6 ) See discussion about pipelines of the Middle 
East in Cahpter 6.
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( 7 )
tankers to a restric ted  number of routes. Hence 
i t  was very lik e ly  that the growth of the size of 
the tanker would not by i t s e l f  a ffec t the allotments 
of Middle East o i l  t ra f f ic  between the Canal and the 
Cape route. In other words, Improvements in the 
dimensions of the Canal might not always be para lle l 
to the la test development in the size o f the tanker 
but so night also be the case with most o f the world 's  
ports and repa ir docks. Thus a considerable portion  
of new tankers would s t i l l  be ordered to suit most of 
the world 's ex istin g  commercial routes and consequently 
the largest number of tankers would most probably be 
able to navigate the Canal. That estimation was 
fa ir ly  predicted by o i l  aid tanker exports for the 
decade or so fo llow ing 1956.
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I I .  THE NATIONALISATION OF THE SUEZ CAivAL COMPANY
A^D THE REACTION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.
On 26th July 1956 the Egyptian government
announced its  decision to  nationalise the Suez Canal
Company. The 1883 Constantinople Convention was
accepted as a basic constitution for the future
management of the a f fa ir s  o f the Suez Canal.
Hence the freedom o f navigation in the Canal was 
(7 )
promised. In hie nationalisation speech the 
Preaidert o f  Egypt, President Carnal Abdel-Nasser, 
explained that his government's decision to rationalize  
the Canal Company was ju d ic ia lly  Justifiable  on the 
basis of Egyptian sovereignty. Yet, he said, the 
decision was provoked by the attitude of the Western 
powers towards a loan which Egypt desperately needed 
for the finance of its  development. The Egyptian 
government had appealed to the World Bank far a loan 
in order to bu ild  the "High Dam" which was regarded 
as indlspenslble to  Egypt's economic development.
But the World Bank "influenced by the U.S. and B rita in ”
(7) A rtic le  I in the Nationalisation Act provided 
compensations to the shareholders on the basis 
of the closing quotations at Paris Stock Exchange 
on the day preceding the nationalisation  (25th 
July 1956). This compensation however was only 
to be paid when a l l  assets and properties o f the 
company were fu l ly  surrendered to the State.
was reluctant to give Egypt any assistance.
A fter a long course of negotiation the U.S. and
Britain agreed to grant the foreign  exchange necessary
fd r the finance of the f i r s t  stage of the High Dam
and on this basis the World Bank offered some other
( 8)
part o f the to ta l cost of the project. But the World 
Bank and the Americans, as i t  appeared to the Egyptian 
Givernment, "were trying to impose conditions on the ir  
loan the acceptance of which would have subjeoted
3 3 4 .
(8) Estimates of the to ta l cost of the scheme varied  
but it  was somewhere in the region of >£1,350 m il,, 
of which >£450 m il. were required in foreign  
exchange. The f i r s t  stage was to have been 
financed by an outright grant o f /S70 given by 
the U.S. (£56 m il.) and Britain  (>£14 m il.).
Egypt was to provide labour and materials 
to an equivalent value. On this basis the 
World Bank offered  jjfeOQ mil. neoessary to 
continue the work a fte r  the f i r s t  stage 
had been fin ished. Ihe rest of the 
cap ita l needed was to be given to the 
Egyptian government i f  the Bank was 
su ffic ien tly  s a t is fie d  with the state of 
the Egyptian economy and the development 
that was achieved.
Egypt once again to Western domination. -Egypt
refused to bow to these powers and therefore they
( 10)
withdrew their offers of aid11. Egypt was determined, 
however, to build the High Dam. Tn.us Nasser nin 
the name of the Egyptian nation11 decided to "restore back 
the Canal for Egypt" and to use its revenues for the 
finance of development. Nasser's decision was widely 
acflalmed in Egypt.
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(9)
(9) Western powers demanded that the Egyptians would 
give the High Dam priority over other projects. 
Here it  seems that some hints were made about 
the rising proportion of the budget that Egypt 
devoted to military preparations - See Eden's 
Full Circle, p.420. It  was also demanded
from Egypt to refuse aid from communist sources. 
These demands were regarded in Egypt as a 
direct intervention in Egyptian affairs.
(10) The reason which the U.S. gave far its action 
was that the Egyptian economy was not function­
ing satisfactorily and that it was doubtful if  
Egypt woujd be able to carry out the project. 
There were in fact many other reasons than 
this. See "Dulles Over Sues" - Chapters 2
and 8 - by H. Piner. S e e  also the Economist 
July 28th, 19567 p.295-297 for the effects 
of the withdrawal (the nationalization of 
the Canal was not known yet).
The nationalization o f the Suez Canal Company
was not accepted toy the B ritish  Government, Anthony
( 1 1 )
Eden, Prime Minister, fo r the following reasons:
1. President Nasser's declaration that the 
revenues of the Suez Canal would toe directed to serve 
Egyptian economic development aroused strong doubts 
that essential improvement projects in the Canal, 
which can only be met at considerable cap ita l costs, 
migjat not be Implemented properly, i f  at a l l .
Egypt might also try  to exploit her new monopolistic 
position by introducing a steep Increase in Canal 
to lls  to serve her Internal needs. I f  these policies  
were carried  out the trade and shipping Interests of 
Brita in , and other maritime nations would greatly  
su ffe r .
(11) Based on information obtained from:
A. Eden,"Pull C irc le ."
The Times -  Dally Newspaper -  London, during 
the period o f the c ris is  -  See in particu lar  
the issue of August 1st.
The Economist -  issues appeared during the c r is is  
"Dulles Over Suez". By H. Finer,
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2. During the period 19 5 2** 19 56 the new Egyptian 
government had consistently disregarded the Security 
Council's resolution that Is ra e li  ships should have 
freedom o f passage through the Suez Canal. Such a 
precedent, in the opinion of the B ritish  government 
had shown that the Canal would hot be Isolated from
the national policy of Egypt in future years. B r ita in 's
trade and shipping interests in the Caned were already
vast and were lik e ly  to grow much more. The B ritish
government was not prepared to leave such Interests
under the control of the Egyptian government, or at
the mercy of a man like Nasser who frankly deolared
his intentions to remove a l l  sorts of fo re ign  influence
( 1 2 )
from a l l  the Arab world.
3. The Egyptian government's seizure of the Suez 
Canal company before the end of its  concession repres­
ented a breach of an international agreement. By the 
act of nationalization the Egyptian government had
(18) see Th. Philosophy o f the
Revolution, p .58-63., printed in Cairo, Egypt.
Eden wrote in one of his telegrams a fte r the 
Suez nationalisation "A man with Colonel Nasser's 
record could not be allowed to have his thumb 
on our windpipe". See A. i^den. Full C irc le , 
p. 337.
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shown a complete disregard fo r an agreement which
had been reached with the Canal company in June 1956. 
This matter was quite serious to the B rit ish  govern­
ment. In the post-war period B rit ish  troops were 
withdrawn from many countries in the Middle East 
(including Egypt) and in Asia. The B ritish  govern­
ment was also preparing to give independence to the 
remaining parts of the Empire. However, where British  
Interests s t i l l  remained the B ritish  government re lied  
upon b i la te ra l agreements with the te rrito ry  concerned. 
For example, B rita in  had defence agreements with Egypt, 
Iraq and Jordan in the Middle East area. The Anglo- 
Egyptlan agreement concerned the defence of the Suez 
Canal. Besides B ritish  o i l  intersts in the Persian 
Gulf area  were dependent on "agreements". The B ritish  
government, therefore, saw that i f  Egypt were ^allowed 
to succeed in taking the Canal through a u n ila tera l 
act and in defiance of an international agreement, 
other countries would sooner or la te r fo llow  its  
example. Nasser's Influence was spreading not only 
among Arabs but also among the Moslem nations of 
Asia and A frica , which formed a considerable part of 
the old B ritish  Colonial Empire. Therefore, and 
irrespective of the le g a lity , or i l le g a l i t y ,  o f the 
Egyptian act, the B rit ish  government was not ready
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to allow Egypt to gain the fruits which might be 
gained by the nationalization of the Canal.
These were the main points vthich really concerned 
the British government. Besides, the government 
expressed doubts about the Egyptian technical and 
administrative ability to manage the affairs of the 
Suez Canal. houbts were also expressed that the 
Egyptian government migjat not be capable financially  
of paying compensations to the shareholders even i f  
that was promised and the British government was 
not prepared to accept unless a satisfactory solution 
to the principal cris is  was found. However it Is 
Important at this polrt to emphasise that the 
government preferred to handle the issue of the Suez 
nationalization through broader questions such as 
the "sanctity of International agreements" and the 
future of British influence and interests In the East. 
This attitude had certainly placed on the British  
government such pressure that an "easy" solution to 
the Suez problem of itse lf, fa r  instance a new 
agreement with the Egyptian government, was not 
feasible. Consequently, it  is quite important to 
emphasise that the pr ice which Britain paid during 
the nine months of the Suez c ris is , and also after, 
was not merely for the safeguarding of the British
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interests in the Canal hut a lso , aid probably mainly, 
fo r keeping the B rit ish  authority and the B ritish  
Interests in the Middle East as w ell as in  some 
other parts of Asia and A frica .
In dealing with the situation  the B rit ish  govern­
ment preferred that action should be taken in co-oper 
ation with the U.S.,France and the rest o f the 
N.A.T.O. countries as well as other maritime nations 
concerned. In 1955, about three quarters of the 
Canal t r a f f ic  (by f la g )  belonged to the N.A.T.O 
countries -  B rita in  alone had 28.3$. The B ritish  
government was conscious that a close co-operation 
with the U.S. was particu larly  needed, however.
There had been several p o lit ic a l reasons behind such 
a policy but we may concern ourselves here only with 
the direct economic reason. U.S. o i l  supply, tankers 
and financial assistance (most probably) would be 
needed i f  the Canal were closed under emergency.
To explain this point we may have to re fe r  in some 
deta ils  to the nature o f the problem which would 
have to be faced in case of a closure of the Suez 
Canal. In 1956, o i l  shipments from the Persian Gulf 
to Western Europe via the Canal were conducted 
approximately at the rate o f 60 mil. tons a year -  
an increase of about 17*5$ above the corresponding
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figu re  of 1955. The B rit ish  share was nearly as much 
as one th ird  of these amounts. Now, supposing that 
the Cape route was used Instead of the Canal and 
that the same volume of tanker oonnage would be 
availab le  in either way. Given a certain period of 
time, only about ha lf the amount of o i l  carried  from 
the Persian Gulf to Western Europe via Suez would be 
reoeived via the Cape route sinoe this is roughly 
twice aa long. Thus, to ship Western Europe's o i l  
needs from the Persian Gull via the Capa, instead of 
Suez, at the rate of 60 mil. tons per year (1956) 
would take up roughly as much tanker tonnage as that 
required fo r carrying 120 mil. tons a year via Suez.
To recru it such m extra amount of tanker tonnage was 
v irtu a lly  impossible in 1950. The world 's tanker 
tonnage, roughly adjusted to carry o i l  to various 
destinations v ia  "normal" sea routes, was almost 
fu l ly  employed. It  was therefore out o f the question 
to re-route a l l  of Western Europe fs Canal o i l  round 
the Cape. Only about h a lf  of these amounts, i . e . ,
30 m il. tone per year, would possibly be received  
via the longer route. It  must be emphasised, however, 
that the significance of this argument was dependent 
on the length o f the period In shich passage through 
the Canal might be obstructed. The shorter this period 
would be than one year the less Important would be
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the consequences of using the longer route. I f  the 
Canal were to be closed for a month or two fo r Instance, 
the delay in shipments and the resu lting decrease in  
o i l  supply might be easily  met from home or European 
reserves. A temporary solution might even be found 
fo r the problem of the shortage in tanker tonnage.
Ihe U.S.A. was about the only oountry which could 
help B ritain  and the rest of Western Europe i f  the 
Suez Canal was closed fo r  some time. In 1953 the U.S. 
was buying o i l  from the Middle East at approximately 
a rate of 13 m il. tons ps r  year; 5 mil. tons from 
pipeline terminals at Eastern Mediterranean, and the 
rest was shipped from Persian Qulf ports. The surplus 
oapaoity of the U .S ., which was normally controlled  
under government regu lations, had been variously  
estimated in 1953 at between 35 mil. tons and 60 mil. 
tons psr annum. Thus, i f  decided, the U.S. was in 
a position to counter the Suez threat by increasing 
its  o i l  production and by placing under the services 
o f Western European countries the tanker fle e t  engaged 
in carrying its  share of Middle East o i l .  Such a 
solution would have produced a considerable saving 
in tanker tonnage which could have been of a s ign ificant  
help in case of a stoppage of navigation in the Canal.
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For example, London is only 3,300 n. miles from the 
Eastern Mediterranean pipeline terminals, whereas 
New York is  5,200 n. miles. Thus American tankers 
which carried 5 mil. tons to New York from Eastern 
Mediterranean terminals could have carried roughly 
about 8.5 mil. tons to London from the same source. 
Sim ilarly tankers which carried o i l  to the East coast 
o f the U.S. from the Persian Gulf v ia  the Cape and 
via Suez, would carry larger volumes of o i l  to Western 
Europe from the same source and via the same routes. 
Thus in case of a Suez closure they would be more 
advantageous to  Western Europe. Yet, most of the 
U.S. Imports from the Persian Gulf came via the 
Canal. Besides, the voyage from U .S . ' east coast 
to the Persian Gulf, via Suoz, was about three quarters 
of the voyage from the same source to Western Europe 
via  the Cape. Thus given a oertaln period o f time, 
roughly about three quarters o f what the U.S. would 
have normally received from the Persian Gulf, could 
have been made availab le  to  Western Europe i f  the 
Suez route was closed. In fact a maximum use of the 
capacity o f these American tankers could have been 
obtained by employing them for carrying o i l  from 
U .S ' east coast to Western Europe. This voyage 
across the Atlantic was shorter by 8,300 n. miles 
(London is  taken as an example) from the alternative
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voyage ( i . e .  Persian Gulf-London via Cape), and 
only about 60$ o f the actual voyage from the Persian  
Gulf to U.S» east coast via Suez. Thus, rou^aly, the 
tanker tonnage used in 1956 in the aotual voyage to 
the U.S. for sending about 9 mil. tons via Suez 
could have been used fo r carrying something around 
14 mil. tons of American o i l  to Western Europe 
(given a certain period o f tim e). This solution was 
obviously dependent upon the assumed a b ility  of the 
U.S. to increase its  local production of o i l  by 
30-60 mil. tons a year.
In addition to these possible solutions the 
U.S. government was in  a position to give further 
help to Western European countries, in case o f a 
Canal closure, by taking out tankers from its  own 
reserve f le e t  and, possibly a lso , from tankers 
engaged in American coastal trade. A fter the nation­
a lization  of the Canal and with the expectation of 
troubles, experts in B rita in  estimated that the U.S. 
was in a position to f i l l  in the gap which mi$it be 
created in Western Europe's o i l  supply i f  the Suez 
route was closed. On the basis o f the above analysis  
and the assumptions that underlay i t ,  that estimation 
was su ffic ien tly  reasonable. However, sceptiolsm was 
expressed that the o i l  problem which Western Europe 
might faoe would be quite c r it ic a l  i f  the pipelines
3 4 4 .
at the Eastern Mediterranean were to be c losed  as w e ll
(13)
as the Suez Canal.
(14)
With the exception of France, B ritish  attempts to 
co-operate with the U.S. and other maritime nations 
over Suez did not lead, however, to any fru it fu l  
resu lts because of d ifferences in economic and p o lit ic a l  
in terests. The U.S. excluded the use o f force, which 
the B rit ish  and the French strongly recommended as a 
f in a l step, u n til economic and p o lit ic a l pressure over 
Egypt had completely fa i le d . Later the B ritish  govern­
ment was disappointed as ths U.S. government declined  
to carry out e ffe c tiv e ly  its  suggested polioy of 
economic pressure over Egypt. One example may be 
cited here concerned the U.S. government Ts unwilling­
ness, or In ab ility , to hold American owned ships from 
paying Canal dues to the new Egyptian management, a
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(13) See the Economist, Sept. 22, 1956, p.933-984. 
See also Petroleum Press Service, Sept.,1956, 
p .313—320.
(14) France was the only other Western country which 
had interests in the Suez Canal and in the 
Middle East area s im ila r to those of B rita in ; 
about h a lf the shares of the Canal company,
a considerable stake in the Middle &ast o i l  
industry and French colonies in A frica  
neighbouring Egypt. See A. ru l l  c ir c le ,
about co-operation with the French government 
in 1956.
policy which was adopted by Brita in , France, and some
(15)
other a l l i e s .  Besides, the U.S. government showed
i t s e l f  to be to ta lly  unprepared to carry out too fa r
the suggestion of the B ritish  and the French which
called  for the internationalisation o f the Suez Canal.
This was mainly due to the U .S f absolute control of
the a ffa ir s  o f another international waterways Panama
(16)
Canal. Ifce divergence between the B rit ish  ani French 
in terests, on the one hand, and the Interests of the 
U.S. and other maritime nations, on the other hand was 
most evident a fter the fa ilu re  of the f i r s t  Suez Users f 
Conference which was held in London during the third
week of August 1956. Ihe resolution  which was adopted
in that Conference consisted of two points; f i r s t .
"the operation of the Canal should be Isolated from 
the Influence of po litics  of any nation; and 3 econd. 
that to enable this to be done, there should be 
established, under an international convention to which 
Egypt would be a party, a body charged with the operation, 
maintenance and the development of the Canal.* Egypt
(15) A. Eden. Fu ll C irc le , p .438-39.
(16) See H. F iner. Dulles Over Suez, about this
particu lar point an d it  a fnrluence upon the 
American policy during the Suez c r is is .
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the existence of any international body as suggested
by the Conference to control the a ffa irs  of the Canal
(17)
would be a derogation from Egyptian sovereignty.
To prevent a possible war at that end the U.S. Secretary 
of State, John Foster D u lles, introduced the scheme of 
the "Suez Canal Users' Association" (S .C .U .A ). Dulles 
suggested that the Canal users should join together, 
provide the p ilo ts , co llect dues and undertake them­
selves a l l  other administrative, organizational and 
technical services needed for the Suez Canal. A 
second Conference was held in  London therefore to 
establish  the S.C.U.A.
Iron ica lly  the S.C.U.A. was based on the f ir s t  
Conference proposals which were already rejected by 
Egypt. Meanwhile Dulles made it  c lear that he had 
ruled out the use of force i f  the Egyptians refused 
to co-operate with the S.C .U .A 's s t a f f  or prevent them 
entiro ly from doing their job in the Canal. I f  that 
happened (and in fact It  was de fin ite ly  going to 
happen) Dulles suggested that for the punishment 
of Egypt members of the Association should divert
(17) See Exchange of correspondence between the Suez 
Committee and tho President of Egypt regarding  
the Suez Canal., England-Foreign O ffice .
London, 1956.
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re je c ted  that re so lu t io n  because she considered that
their tra ffic  to the Cape route. The S.C*H»A.scheme 
was supported with a promise that the U.3. would f i l l  
in any gap in o il supply to Western Europe I f  tankers 
were to be diverted around the Cape. As the problem 
of finding dollars to buy American o il would not be 
less d ifficu lt  than finding o il, Dulles supplemented 
his promise by adding that the Export-Import Bank 
would "stand ready to consider favourably applications 
by European countries for loans to finance imports of 
o il from the U.S," The offer although not yet a firm 
one meant that the U.S. would commit Itse lf to lending 
Britain, France and the rest of Western Europe about 
j i Q Q Q  mil. per annum. From the very beginning of the 
c ris is  co-operation with the U.S. over the question 
of o il was certainly Important. Yet It is beyond 
doubt that the British government was thinking of 
substituting American for Middle East o il i f  a 
military clash with Egypt led to the diversion of 
tra ffic  around the Cape. In this case the British  
government had most probably estimated that the Canal 
would be closed only for a short period of time, 
probably three months. The price of substituting 
American o il for the cheaper o il of the Middle East 
and df giving payments in dollars Insteed of sterling  
for a short period of time was probeb ly accepted as
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a necessary price for restorlrg control over the Canal
and keeping Western authority in the area. But to
divert tra ffic  around the Cape and to accept American
o il and dollar loans for m  indefinite period of time
would have mounted to become a burdensome pressure
on the British economy. American o il could have come
only at higher prices and that would naturally have
raised prices and led to the introduction of some
undesirable monetary and fisc a l measures to correct the
situation which had only started to show definite signs
of improvement since the War. Also a large American
loan would have weakened the sterling position and
enlarged the deficit in the balance of payments with
(IB)
the dollar area.
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(18) A. Eden wrote about Dulles 1 scheme and offer of 
help, saying, *It was an ambitious plan and meant 
sending round the Cape of Good Hope about half 
the one and a half million barrels of o il a day 
which usually passed through the Canal. The 
other half of the normal Western consumption of 
Canal borne o il was to be obtained from expanded 
production in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean.
The plan had two unwelcome implications for 
us. First, friendly countries in the Middle East 
would have to be asked, while the emergency lasted, 
to cut back their o il production, though their 
stability largely depended on its revenues. 
Secondly, Britain would have to spend many dollars 
to replace the supplies by Gulf and Caribbean o il.  
Even i f  we were granted a loan from the Export- 
Import Bank to finance this o il transaction, as 
had been promised, that loan would eventually 
have to be repaid in dollars and with interest. 
Since we and the French were not paying dues to 
Nasser and did not intend to do so, to send our 
o il round the Cape would injure us more than 
Basser. The Cabinet decided against this 
project as an immediate means of pressure 
against Egypt.", A. Eden. Full Circle.
The rest of the eighteen powers which shared
In the Second London Conference ware certainly
divided not only on the S.C.U.A. scheme but also on
the way to end the c ris is . Sweden, isorway, Denmark,
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Iran and Pakistan and
Japan declared In one way car another their opposition
to the S.C.U.A !s scheme. They were ready to submit
the dispute to the U.N. or sign a new agreement with
Egypt to end the c r is is .  These court rles had become
worried about their own interests in the Canal and/or
about their trade and political relations with Egypt
and other Arab countries.
Ihua out of the twenty two nations which attended
(19)
the firs t  Conference in London, only six countries 
were s t i l l  o ffic ia lly  on the sl&e of Britain and 
France. Ihese were Australia, West Germany, New 
Zealand, Ethiopia, Portugal, Turkey. Only the 
f irs t  two of these nations had some significant
(19) Altogether the nations which attended the firs t  
London Conference numbered twenty two (Egypt 
and Greece refused the British government's 
Invitation) and their traffic, by flag in the 
Canal represented approximately 95$ of total 
tra ffic. India, U.S.S.R., Indonesia and Ceylon 
refused to vote In favour of the resolution 
which ended the work of fche f irs t  Conference.
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interests in the Suez Canal.
The continuation of the Sue* dispute without any
defin ite  hope to reach a satisfactory  end was having
a serious effect upon the B ritish  economy* . The m ilitary
measures which the government took a fter the f ir s t  week
of the dispute consisted of reca lling  s one of the reserves,
delaying the release of conscripts, moving some B ritish
forces from B rita in , Germany, and from the Far East to
the Middle East, and requisition ing a number of ships
from the commercial f le e t .  By late  August the number
of reservists who had been recalled  amounted to about
20,000, quarter of the size of farce whioh was stationed
in the Canal zone before evacuation started in 1954.
The withdrawal of these workers from their job was
certain ly causing some disorganization in their firm s.
The number of ships requisitioned reached about 60
medium sized tramp ships, comprising in  a l l  perhaps
( 20 )
on e -fifth  of t o ta l  tramp tonnage. The e ffect of this 
requ isition  was to squeeze the needs o f the shippers 
but it did not lead Immediately to any general r ise  in 
fre ight rates. Movement of troops a lso  necessitated  
some extra expenses and created pressure on private a ir
3 5 1 .
(20) fhe Banker. September 1956, p .54
charter companies. Apart from the coat to the economy
these measures were costing the British government
( 21 )
about £1 mil. a week.
The implications of the British government policy 
for market prices were sufficiently clear. In the 
firs t  week of the cris is  when war speculations were 
stimulated by the tough 11 r &  which the government took 
prices rose sharply as they usually do when war clouds 
gather. The rise was particularly steep in the prices 
of the Canal borne commodities such as tin, copper, 
rubber and wool. Between July 26 and the end of the
second week of Sept ember tin was higher by £64 a ton
, ^  ^ (22> (8.4$), rubber by 2 d. a lb. (0.7$), copper by £22
a ton (o.7$) and luture wool contracts (Dec.) by
15^d. per lb. (13$). Prices of common Indian tea were
also rising in London market despite ths Increased
supply on North India during August.
During the third week of September Dulles f
S.C.U.Bi. project was broached and preparations were
made for the Second London Conference. It seems that
(21) The Banker. November 1956, p.659
(22) Ihe price of copper was partly affected by African 
miners ' strike in Northern Rhodesia.
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this nova aroused expectations that the Suez crisis
was going to be dragged on for some time before
any serious course of action might be considered.
As a result ourredb commodity prlcos f e ll  a lightly.
Future prices were jet s t i l l  rising .indicating that
pessimism s t i l l  Influenced the general course of
events. For example, in October/November raw jute
sales from Pakistan to Europe which were conducted
at £88 per ton c . l . f .  before the c r is is ,  fetched
(23)
£10 premium per ton during September.
Meanwhile the same uncertainties and pessimistic 
expectations were naturally having a general depressing 
effect on stock market prices. The index of o il share 
prices in London Stock Exchange (1936 - 38 r 100) 
stood at 380.4$ on July 23 recorded a decrease of 
19 to 19.4 points during the weeks between July 26 
and October 29. Western Hemisphere o il shares were, 
however, rising In prices in expectation of better
business and so also were shipping companies shares
(24)
for the same reason.
During the firs t  six or seven weeks of the Suez 
dispute two Incidents wor6 to throw doubts on the
3 5 3 .
(23) See The Economist. Vol.180, 1956, p.987.
(24) ihe Economist, Vol. 180, 1956, p.988.
possibility of making the passage through the Canal 
without risking a considerable delay. Ihe first was 
when shipping companies were advised by the govern­
ment to continue to pay their Canal dues Into the 
account of the Suez Canal compary in London, and not 
to the new Egyptian authority. I f  the latter attempted 
to exact payments British shipowners were to re-route 
their ships round the Cape. However this Incident 
passed almost without any effect as the Egyptian 
authority decided to overlook the matter until the 
dispute was over.
The second incident happened when the national­
ized company attempted to paralyse the passage through 
the Canal by inviting the non-Egyptian pilots who 
accounted for about 4/5ths of the total staff to 
choose between remaining under i>ts authority or 
joining the new management. This requirement was 
directed at 107 pilots who were s t i l l  performing 
their Job In the waterway. Meanwhile 58 pilots 
(the rest of the non-Egyptian pilots) who were on 
holidays during the dispute were instructed by the 
company notxto return to Egypt.
Nevertheless the purpose of the company was 
foiled when the Egyptian authority made It clear 
that nobody was to resig i his Job in the Canal 
without a month's notice. Meanwhile, new pilots
3 5 4 .
were being recruited from all over the world to 
replace even those who wished to remain with the 
Canal company. During this pilot cris is  some 
leading shipping firms, such as the F & 0 and the 
Orient Lines, thought it  wiser to re-route some of 
their cargo and passenger liners round the Cape.
Other shipping firms took out insurance against 
possible delay in making the Journey via the Canal. 
The pilot cris is  was gradually overcome during 
September and October when the new recruits with 
Egyptian and friendly EuropB an pilots managed to keep 
the Canal tra ffic  running smoothly. Such a success 
had certainly restored oonfidenoe In the Canal and 
prevented the volume of tra ffic  diverted to the Cape 
route from reaching any serious level.
The diversion of some traffic around the Cape 
route was partly stimulated by the rise In the war 
risk insurance rates on shipments for the Suez area. 
During Sepb ember these had been raised in two stages 
by 5s.par £100. Yet against this factor there was an 
extra cost involved when obtaining bunkering fuel 
from Capetown instead of Aden. During the period 
July 26 to October 22 fuel o il was 34/6d. per long 
ton dearer In Capetown than at Aden (I.e . 183/6d 
against 152/-) and diesel o il was also dearer by 
23/Sd. per ton (i.e . 266/- against 232/6d. ).
3 5 5 .
In the last weak of October fuel o il had become
36/- per ton dearer in Capetown than at Aden and
(25)
diesel o il was 35/- per ton dearer. .
The main factor which imposed a limit over 
diversion of tra ffic  around the Cape was the cost of 
spending more days at sea. To quote an example on 
this point from The Economist (September 2 2 ,  1956),
"a tramp ship belonging to "Silver Line" has been 
chartered to take about 8,000 tons of sugar from 
Britain to Port Sudan with the option to the ship­
owner to go round (the Cape) i f  necessary. I f  that 
option is exercised and an extra 30 days taken for 
the voyage, the freight charge w ill be nearly £15,000 
higher". However, that was an extreme case when the 
saving of distance via Sues was almost at a maximum. 
To Australia where the journey around the Cape took 
only one or two days longer, the diversion of some 
liners from the Canal was not followed by any change 
in freight rates or passenger rates. Yet the re­
routing of some Australian liners was one of the 
reasons behind the Increase in freight rates on the 
Journey to India and the rest of the Far East by 15/j.
3 5 3 .
(25) Spot prices quoted by Shell Petroleum Company 
and published monthly in "Petroleum Press 
Service".
Such a surcharge could not have any seriou s e ffe c t  
on B r it is h  trade because it  was maintained only fo r  
two weeks.
On September 26 the B r i t is h  and the French
governments re fe r re d  the d ispute w ith  Egypt over the
Suez Canal to  the U.K. On October 13 the U.N.
Security  Counoil debated an Anglo-French re so lu t io n
which consisted  o f two p arts . The f i r s t  part la id
down s ix  p r in c ip le s  \h ich would form a bas is  for any
(26)
settlem ent o f the Suez question .
The second part dec lared  that the proposals o f 
the e ighteen  powers o f London Conference ( i . e .  in t e r ­
nationa l con tro l over the Canal) corresponded to the 
requirements of the s ix  p r in c ip le s , and in v ited  Egypt
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(26) These principles were to guarantee that: (1 ) 
there s hould be free and open transit through 
the Canal without discrimination; (2) the 
sovereignty of Egypt should be respected;
(3) the operation of the Canal should be 
insulated from the politics of any country;
(4) the manner of fixing tolls and charges 
should be decided by agreement between Egypt 
and the users; (5)  a fa ir  proportion of dues 
should be alloted to development. The sixth 
principle stated that in case of disputes, 
unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal 
company and the Egyptian government should 
be settled by arbitration.
to put forward tier proposals to give effect to them.
Ihe firs t  part of the resolution was adopted unanim­
ously by the Security Council and the second part, 
which the British and the French considered most 
Important and v ita l to any satisfactory settlement 
of the dispute, was vetoed by the U.S.S.R.
The agreement reached on the six principles was 
unduly greeted with optimism in Britain as well as in 
other parts of the world. Thus while business In the 
Suez Canal began to come back to normal tie British  
and the French governments prepared to regain control 
over the waterway by force. On October 31 the British  
and the French joined In an attempt to invade the Suez 
Canal zone. It  was 3aid then that the Invasion was 
undertaken to protect the vital route from the fighting 
which broke out between Israel ard Egypt In Sinai on 
October 29.
The military plan failed to achieve Its purpose 
mainly because the U.S. took action both directly and 
at the U.N. to stop it .  The U.S.S.R. threatened to 
intervene In the dispute and throw out strong hints 
that atomic weapons might be used. Oil pipelines 
from Iraq t o  Syrian and Lebanese ports ceased to 
function a3 a result of a deliberate action by the
3 5 8 .
Arab n a t io n a lis ts  who stood on the side  o f Egypt. 
Meanwhile, the m ilita ry  operation  I t s e l f  was not 
going as smoothly as It  was planned, p a rt ly  as a 
re su lt  o f b lock ing  the Suez Canal. On November 6 
the f ig h t in g  was stopped.
CHAPTER VIII
THE SUEZ CANAL CLOSJRE AND ITS EFFECT 
ON bHITISH TRADE AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. 
1956 -  1957.
Maintenance of Commodity Supplies during the Suez
Q.aaal_Clp?^re L ..ovaqfrer 1,956-,^ r l j .  .,3,9^.
(a ) O il.
I t  ha a been explained that the closure of the
Suez Canal while the world tanker f le e t  was almost
) fu lly  employed meant that o i l  supplies could not be
maintained from the same sources at the same rates.
The stoppage o f the I.P .C . pipelines made the d i f f ic u lt
position s t i l l  worse. Only 25$ of the Iraq i o i l  which
was carried to Europe v ia  Syria and Lebanon could now
be obtained, using the same amount of tanker tonnage,
(1 )
via the Cape route. The O.E.E.C, estimated that 
maintaialng f u l l  supplies fo r  Europe by re -routing  
round the Cape o i l  which was normally carried via 
Suez and I.P .C . pipelines would have required an 80$ 
Increase in the tanker capacity serving Europe.
A reference has already been made to the necessary 
re-arrangements estimated by o i l  companies to maintain
3 6 0 .
(1 ) What is meant nere is  that a tanker transferred  
to the Cape route could only transport from the 
Persian Gulf to Europe about 25$ of the volume 
which It  r.ormally carried from Syrian and 
Lebanese ports. P ractica lly  no o i l  from 
northern Iraq  could be moved to "Fao" at the 
Persian Gulf. Estimation of the figure "25;*>" 
by O.E.S.C. See "Europe's Heed fo r  O il" , p.23.
o i l  supplies to Europe In the event of actual disruption  
of the Suez Canal and the I.P .C . It  remains fo r  us 
now to see how these plans were carried out during 
the axtual emergency.
Theoretical re-arrangements required to maintain 
f u l l  supplies of o i l  to Europe assumed that the U.S. 
o i l  companies would increase their production and 
co-ordinate their tanker fleet with that of Europe 
In order to minimize the loss of the Suez Canal and 
other transit f a c i l i t ie s  In the Middle East. Yet, 
d issa t is fied  with the Anglo-French intervention in 
Suez, the U.S. government decided to suspend the work 
of the M.E.E.C. and a l l  other precautionary measures 
previously drawn up to help Europe. Such a policy  
was intended as a sort of economic, as well as p o lit ­
ic a l,  pressure on B rita in  and France until they had 
decided to withdraw their forces from the Suez zone. 
November 1956 was therefore the worst month In the 
Suez c r is is .  B r ita in 's  crude o i l  Imports from the 
Middle East and from other supply sources in the 
world f e l l  by eb out 40$ from the leve l o f October 
1956.
Once the B ritish  and French governments decided 
to withdraw their troops from the Suez area t Le task
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of c learing the Canal began. Three to nine months
were estimated for the completion of this work but
it  took only about f iv e  months. A sim ilar period
was spent In restoring the f u l l  capacity of the I.P .C .
pipeline system.
Following thd decision of the B rit ish  and the
French governments the U.S. government allowed the
( 2 )
work of the M.E.E.C. to be re-activated  on the 3rd 
o f December. By the end o f the f ir s t  week of December 
programmes were drawn up ard U.S. o i l  companies began 
to co-operate with one another and with foreign  
companies to Implement the complex process of exchanges 
of o i l  in  order to ensure the best o ve r -a ll use of 
availab le  tanker tonnage.
During the months December 1956 to May 1957 Middle 
East o i l  shipments to  the U.S. and Canada had been 
gradually reduced to very small amounts and were 
substituted by shipments from the U.S. Gulf. Europe 
therefore managed to obtain the share of the U.S. In 
the Tapllne, about .5 mil. tons a month, above its
3 6 2 .
(2 ) The Middle East Emergency Committee "M.E.E.C", 
a Committee that worked under the supervision of 
the government o f the U.S. -  from 10th of August 
1953 -  and on which were represented American 
o i l  companies having foreign  o i l  in terests.
It was authorised to co llect information about 
the o i l  situation , to prepare plans and advise 
in the event of a substantial Middle ^ast 
transport c r is is .
usual share of *8 mil. tons per month. Tanker tonnage 
which was employed before the c ris is  in carrying o i l  
from the Persian Gulf to the U.S. and other Western 
Hemisphere countries was also made available to 
Europe. Besides some o i l  which was normally shipped 
from the Caribbean to the U.S. east coast was replaced 
by American o i l  and was exported to Europe. F inally  
the U.S. government reactivated some 18 tankers from 
the "mothball f le e t " ,  and l i f t e d  load line lim itations 
of coastal tankers so that an Increase of about 3yo in 
their to ta l capacity was achieved and was added to the 
f le e t  employed In the inter rational trade.
The American o i l  companies welcomed the Increase 
In exports to Europe since it  reduced their o i l  stocks 
which stood at about 283 mil. barre ls (51.525 mil. long 
tons) by the end of October 1956. Yet, there was some 
d issatis faction  because Europe's requirements consisted 
mainly of crude petroleum rather tnan gasoline.
Although, by that time, consumption of gasoline was 
rationed in Europe its  Imports from the U.S. ware checked 
by two factors. F irs t , there was the desire to minimize 
the do llar costs of buying American o i l  during the c r is is .  
Second, there was the need to use ava ilab le  tanker 
tonnage In carrying crude o i l  to European re fin eries  
in order to maintain the level o f their a c t iv it ie s .
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The Independent Refiners Association of the U.S. 
protested against supplying Europe with it s  needs of 
crude and fo rge ttin g  about the ex istin g  high supply 
of gasoline. I t  can not be determined however how 
fa r  this attitude had affected exports o f crude o i l  
to Europe during the c r is is .
During the three months December 1956-February 
1957 U.S. crude o i l  production increased at a rate 
which was much slower than that estimated by d ifferent  
authorities as necessary fo r  meeting the requirements 
of the Amerioan and the European marlmts. Diagram (44) 
Illu stra te s  the gap between U.S. actual crude production 
and the forecast of demand estimated by U.S. Bureau o f  
Mines. Two main factors affected the production policy  
in the U.S. iroducing areas: f i r s t ,  the fear that
production might be Increased before ex isting o i l  
stocks had been substantia lly  reduced, and second, 
lim itations imposed by the internal transport system.
In b r ie f  that was designed, approximately, to meet 
the normal requirements of the Internal and the 
external markets, and thus it  was d i f f ic u lt  to expand 
its  oaja city fle x ib ly  with the emergency of some 
exceptional circumstances.
3 6 4 .
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Imports of crude petroleum from the U.S. during 
the closure of the Suez Canal are shown in Table (37) 
and in Diagram (45 ). They grew from n il in October 
1956 to 17.580 mil. gallons in November and then to 
112.187 mil. gallons in the follow ing month when the 
U.S. government resumed co-operation with Brita in  and 
other Europeans to solve their o i l  problem. Yet, the 
high leve l o f imports of U.S. crude in December, 
compared with January and February 1957, was due to 
the a v a ila b ility  of a substantial le ve l o f crude o i l  
stocks as well as su ffic ien t tanker tonnage at the 
U.S. Gulf ports. For January and February, some 
significant re la tio n  can be observed by comparing the 
leve l of U.S. crude production (Diagram 44) and the 
leve l of B rit ish  crude imports therefrom.
In addition to the crude imported from the U.S. 
during the emergency increasing quantities were 
obtained from the Caribbean area, and some other 
Western Hemisphere countries. Thus during the six  
months November 1956-April 1957 B r ita in ’s crude 
imports from Western Hemisphere countries (including  
U.S) increased from 117.597 mil. gallons to 317.132 
mil. gallons -  about 2.7 times.
3 6 5 .
DIAGRAM ( 45) .
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However, to see whether or not this Increased
contribution had r i l le d  the gap In o i l  supplies 
created by the closure of the Suez Canal, and partly  
by the sabotage of I.P .C . pipelines, some obaei'vations 
have to be made about the development o f crude o i l  
Imports from the Middle East during the same period. 
This can be seen in Diagram (46), where crude o i l  
imports into B rita in  during the twelve months July
1956 -  June 1957 are d ifferen tia ted  according to the 
source of supply and are compared month by month with 
the period July 1955-June 1956. It  is c lea r that 
imports from the Western Hemisphere during the four 
months November 1956-Februar;y 1957 had le f t  a consider 
able gap in crude supplies. During March and i*pril
1957 to ta l crude o i l  imports in B rita in  were only a 
l i t t le  lower than those obtained in the corresponding 
months in 1956. That was partly due to a higher leve l
of crude exports from the Western Hemisphere and 
partly to the successful co-ordination of tanker 
operations a l l  over the world which increased the 
rate of Persian Gulf crude exports via the Cape route.
In the diagram B rit ish  imports of crude from Iraq  
and Saudi Arabia are shown separately because tO-85/o 
of these came normally via pipelines to the eastern  
Mediterranean ports. It  can be seen that these 
imports had been cut sevemly by the sabotage of I.P.O*
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pipeline system in Syria ard by the o i l  embargo 
imposed by Saudi Arabia. Thus the supplies of crude 
which B rita in  imported from these two countries were 
reduced during iiovember 195 6 to April 1957 to amounts 
obtained from o i l  fie ld s  in southern Iraq only, which 
nonnally earne via Suez.
The above estimation of the gap in o i l  supplies 
during the closure o f the Canal was simply made by 
comparing crude o i l  imports during the emergency with 
those obtained dicing the corresponding periods in 
1955 and 1956.
However, by examining the development of B ritish  
crude imports during the live  years period 1954-58, 
excluding the second h a lf  of 1956 and the f ir s t  half 
of 1957, we would c learly  see that the trend was set 
for an increase of 7/o to 7.5/b per an urn. During the 
f i r s t  h a lf  of 1956 Imports of crude increased by 7.3)4 
above those of the corresponding period of 1955.
Between the nationalization of the Suez Canal 
and its  closure crude imports into B rita in  increased 
by more than 13/4*- most probably fo r purposes of 
stockpiling. Yet, had the situation been normal 
(no Suez c r is is ) imports of crude presumably would 
have been increased by 7.3> above the corresponding 
period in 1955, and reached 3897.792 mil. gallons 
(the actual figu re  was 3567*6 mil. ga llons). On
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tills basis the monthly average o f crude o i l  Imports 
In the second h a lf of 1956 oould have been 649.632 
mil. gallons* Comparing this figu re  with the actual 
monthly average of crude imports in  November and 
December 1956, l * e . ,  433*439 mil* gallons, we may 
estimate that there had been a gap in supplies by 
as much as 186.199 m il. gallons per month, l . e ,
28*7%. Actual imports of crude in November and 
December 1956 were about 22$ below those of the 
corresponding period of 1955. Table (38) afcd Table 
(39) furnish some detailed explanation for the methods 
adopted in obtaining the above estimation and also 
estimated figures fo r  1957. In 1957 an amount equal 
to 695.608 mil. gallons per month most probably would 
have been imported in B rita in  i f  the situation  was 
"normal". The actual monthly average o f crude 
Imports in  the four months January-April 1957 was 
below th is figu re  by 162.698 mil. gallons, a gap of 
23*4$.
369*
(3 ) On the basis of 1956 rate of crude imports, it  
was generally estimated that the leve l of imports 
in November and December 1956 was down by about 
29$. See Petroleum Press Service, Vol. 24 -  
1957, p .181.
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TABLE l,g§)
BRITAIN1S CRUDE OIL IMPORTS DURING THE PERIOD 1955-1956
Estimations for the gap in oil supply in the years 1956 and 1957, 
due to the Suez crisis* (All Figures in Millions of Gallons)
Tear Eatli
(a)
sates
(b)
Actual Selected
Estimate
Difference 
From Actual $
% - 7212.2 m - -
1956 7737.8 7717.1 7407.6 7727.5 -319.9 4.14*
195? - 8347.3 7241.8 8347.3 -1105.5 1 3.24$
195 8* - - 0740.4 - - m
Estimate (a) 1
First half of 1956 (Jan. - June)........... 3840.003 mil. Gallons
First half of 1955 (Jan. - June)..........  3579.568 * "
Thus, Rate of Growth - 260.435/3579.560 • 7*3$
Estimated crude oil imports in the second half of 1956 on the 
hasis of a 7i'3$ rate of growth above the amount actually imported 
in the second half of 1955 (3632.611) - 3897.792 mil. Gallons.
Estimations 1956
First half of the Year.•••••••• 3840.005 (Actual)
Second half of the Year  3897*792 (Estimated)
Total 7737.795 Mil. Gallons
Estimate (h)s
Total crude oil in imports in 1958.........8740*4 Mil. Gallons
Total crude oil imports in 1955...........  7212.2 " M
1955 and 1958 have been selected in order that an estimate can be 
made for the rate of growth at which imports would have been 
developed if the Middle East transit facilities were not disrupted 
during the six months November 1956 - April 1957*
Rate of growth per year calculated on the basis of the amounts 
imported in 1955 and 1958 - 7.07$
Thus, on the basis of 7*07$ rate of growth above 1955* 
crude imports, imports of crude oil in 1956 » 7717.1 mil. Gallons.
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Estimate (b)
Secondly, estimated crude oil imports in 1 9 5 7 » on the basis o f  
7*07/6 rate of growth above the estimated figure of 1956 
(i.e. 7717.1), - 0347*3 mil* gallons.
(See also Diagram (47))*
TABLE (39)
Monthly Averages of Crude Oil Imports during November 1956 - April 1957* 
Actual Imports compared with Estimates 1 (Figures in millions of 
gallons).
1956. 1957
Nov.-Dec. Jan.-April
From Persian Gulf Berts 
(via the Cape of Good Hope)
300.389 309.287
From the U.S. 64.884 87*320
From the Caribbean area 90.160 136*303
and other supply sources
*2West of Sues
Total Imports (Actual)
Monthly Average. 463*433 532.910
Total Imports (Estimate) 649*632 695.608
Monthly Average.
Estimated
Gap in Imports
(Monthly Average) 186.199 162.698
1 * Estimates derived from Table (38) above.
2 * U.S. is shown separately.
(See also Diagram (47))*

Nevertheless In  sp ite  o f the heavy drain  in
crude imports during November and December 1953, the
year*s  t o t a l  imports were only 4.14$ below that le v e l
which has been estim ated above for Intended im ports.-
thanks to the precautionary steps which were taken
be fo re  the c lo su re  o f  the Canal and which led  to  an
exceptiona lly  h igh  le v e l  o f  imports during  the th ree
months August-October. The e f fe c t  o f  such a small
gap in  crude imports on the l e v e l  o f home consumption
of products was easy to  overcome by the ration ing  o f
consumption and probably by some drawing on stocks.
So f a r  ra t io n in g  was concerned an a l l  round reduction
in o i l  d e l iv e r ie s  o f  10$ was imposed in  B r i ta in  from
the beginning o f December. In 1957 the l e v e l  o f
to ta l  crude imports was about 13.24$ below the le v e l
estimated f o r  normal imports in that y ea r .  Table (40)
shows the reductions in  o i l  products consumption in
the f i r s t  quarte r  o f 1957 which was made poss ib le  through
re s t r ic t io n s  on consumption.. .
F igures are not a v a i la b le  fo r  the contribution
made by o i l  stocks during the c r i s i s .  Yet, according
(4 )
to the Press, stocks stood at about 5 m il. tons -
(4 )  See fo r  instance The F inanc ia l Times -  Nov. 2, 1956, 
p. 6. O i l  s toeks were estimat ed at 5 rail, tons or 
about 6-3 weeks supply at 1955 ra te  o f  consumption.
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TABLE (40)
THE EFFECTS OF RATIONING DURING THE CLOS HE OF THE SUEZ CANAL 
AND THE I.P.C. PIPELINES ON CONSUMPTION OF THE MAIN OIL PRODUCTS 
IN THE U.K. - 1st Qrt. 1957*
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Product.
1st Quarter
1956 
Metric Tons.
1st Quarter
1957
Metric Tons.
Percentage
Change.
Motor Gasoline . 1,428,157 1,003,397 -29.7
Gas/Diesel Oil (inland) 1,149,784 926,977 -19.4
Fuel Oil (inland) 1,926,818 1,731,784 -10.1
Gas/Diesel Oil (Bunkers) 266,717 154,843 -41.9
Fuel Oil (Bunkers) 928,524 519,600 -44.0
Sourcei O.E.E.C. "Europe«s Need for Oil", p.78
(implications and Leason3 of the Suez Crisis)
Baris. Jan. 1938.
about 1307*6 mil. gallons -  by the time o f the c r is is .
I f  that figu re  was correct such stocks should have 
been suf fic lon t by themselves to cover over 90 % of 
the estimated gaps in o i l  supplies in  1956 and 1957 
(See Table 38). However, figures given by the O.E.E.C. 
fo r Europe showed that drawings from stocks had only 
been substantial, and essentia l to meet the c r is is ,  
during November 1956. Total European stocks were 
reduced by 3*921 mil. tons during that month, i . e . ,  
from 17.556 mil. tons In 1st November to 18.635 mil. 
tons by the 1st December* Stocks were Increased a fte r  
that, with a l i t t l e  exception in February 1957, ard 
reached 16.369 mil. tons by the beginning o f -iprll*
By the time when the Canal was re-opened they to ta lled  
19.653 mil. tons*
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(b ) Commodities Other Than O il.
Among a l l  Suez borne commodities o i l  was by f a r
the most important. I t  increased  the in ten s ity  of
the problem created by the Canal c losu re  that tanker
tonnage was f u l l y  employed before  the c r i s i s  and that
the r e la t iv e  advantage o f  Suez over the Cape route was
highest in  the case o f the journey between B r ita in  and
the Persian  Gulf,
In the case of commodities other than o i l  the
problem of su p p lie s  maintenance v ia  the Cape was le s s
c r i t i c a l ,  As i t  has been estimated in  the previous
chapter at le a s t  ZX/o o f  B r i t ish  imports came v ia
Suez and of them & out 6,8^ were o f A u s tra lian  o r ig in .
The maintenance of such a la rge  proportion  o f t ra d e
which consisted  of wool, wheat, f r e sh  food s t u f f 3  and
some in d u s t r ia l  raw m aterials d id  not present any
( 5 )
serious problem a f t e r  the c losure o f the Canal, 
Re-routing round the Cape Austra lian  shipments which 
normally came v ia  Suoz involved only 1% Increase in  
time spent at sea. Taking Into consideration  the 
time which the commercial vesse l had to spend in  
load ing and d ischarging at ports the d if fe ren c e  
between Suez and the Cape routo in  terms of round 
t r ip s  pei* year was n i l  in  case o f A u s t ra l ia ,  See 
Table ( 4 1 ).
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(5) See Diagram 48-<3,
THE SUEZ ROUTE RELATIVE ADVANTAGES
TABLE (41)
Hound Trip Hound Trips
.. Days * A Year ♦
Via Via Via Via
Si^ ejt . cape Suez Cape
From London tot
Persian G u l f ^ 37 65 9 5i
Mombasa 30 43 6 5
Bombay 31 54 6 4i
Calcutta 40 57 5 4
Colombo 34 52 5S 4i
Singapore 41 58 5 4
Penang, i-alaya 40 56 5 Ai
Sydney 58 62 4 4
Wellington 63 66 4 3i
Hong Kong 48 65 4§ 3i
Source: "The Economist", Aug. 4, 1956, p#419
* For all trips except Persian Gulf, Steaming time at 16£ knots
+ For all trips except Persian Gulf, every round trip included, 
extra 30 daysf for loading and discharging at ports.
(l) Assuming tanker speed 14^ knots and 4 days for loading 
and discharging.
However, i t  w i l l  be noticed from the same tab le  
that in  terms of e f fe c t iv e  round t r i p s  per year the 
closure o f  the Canal r a is e d  the need f o r  a la rg e r  
volume of dry cargo tonnage, i f  trade was to be 
maintained. In the cases o f  Ind ia  and Ceylon as 
w ell as Pakistan, dry tonnage serv ing  the trade  v ia  
the Cape rou te , instead o f  Suez, had to  be increased  
by proportions which roughly var ied  between 20$ and 
30$ Trade between B r it a in  and lialaya and other Par  
Eastern countries cou ld  be maintained v ia  the longer  
route by an ex tra  15$ to 20$ in  dry cargo tonnage 
which was employed v ia  Suez. As regards tonnage which 
served the B r i t i s h  trade with Tanganyika, Kenya, 
Zanzibar, Somaliland, Sudan, Aden, there was a 
necessity o f an increase  in  tonnage by about 40$ to  
60$. During the c r i s i s  L iner firms had to  provide  
sp e c ia l  feede r  s e rv ice s  to  these Suez route countries .  
Yet i t  must be emphasised that a 28^ increase in  the 
tonnage which served the trade between London and 
Bombay was much la r g e r  than a 60$ increase in the 
tonnage that served trade with a Somaliland port .
Ihe extra  dry cargo tonnage had to be found in  
the tramp market. At the time o f  the Suez closure  
there were about 80 vesse ls  at the d isp o sa l of the 
B r it is h  government and probably 20 or more w ith the 
French government, s t i l l  requ is it io n ed  fo r  m ilita ry
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shipments. Besides, seasonal requirements fo r  dry  
tonnage were normally h igh  at that time o f  the year,  
fo r  c e re a ls ,  sugar and coa l*  Thus by the time o f  the 
Canal c losu re  there was an apparent acute shortage in  
supply of dry cargo tonnage.
Again the U.S. was a b le  to a l l e v ia t e  the s itu a t io n  
by re -a c t iv a t in g  some units o f  I t s  reserve f l e e t .
During October and November 1956 the Federal Maritime 
Board authorised  the re le a se  of some 30 o f the "moth­
b a l l ” f l e e t  to  carry coal to Europe and a s im ila r
number to carry  government a g r ic u ltu ra l  surplus to  
(6 )
A sia . These con tr ibu tion s , and some others made 
during December, had e f f e c t iv e ly  increased world  dry 
cargo tonnage and thus in d i re c t ly  provided some o f the 
extra requirements f o r  the /oropear?-Eastern trade a f t e r  
the c losure  c f the ouez Canal.
The de requ is it ion  o f  sh ip s , taken fo r  m ilita ry  
purposes, was made at severa l stages during the two 
months which fo llow ed  the m ilita ry  events at ouez.
By the end of November about h a lf  the tonnage 
prev ious ly  re q u is it io n e d  was re -a c t iv a te d  and the  
re st  o f the ve$fcel3 was made ava ilab le  to the trad ing  
world during December 195 6.
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(6 )  The Economist, Vol. 181, 1956, p .509.
As fre ight rates were r is in g  dramatioally 
between August and December 1956, many private  
shipowners ware encouraged to re -activate  tnelr 
la id -up vessels. Yet the contribution which came 
through this channel after the closure o f the Canal 
was not very s ign ifican t. Most of the laid -up ton .age, 
fo r  lack o f  unemployment, had already been re-activated  
during the two months which followed tn e nationaliz­
ation of the Canal-to quote figures fo r  British la id  
up ships; 12,894 gross tons were re-activated  between 
1st October 1956 and 1st January 1957 compared with 
23,899 gross tons during the three months July -  
September 1956.
Obviously a l l  these additions to the supply of 
world dry cargo tonnage had together eased the 
situation  greatly . 3y January 1957 conditions in 
the fre ight market were much easier than they had 
been since the nationalisation of tbe Suez Canal.
The sharp f a l l  in tramp freight rates during 1957 
(See Liagram 50) showed that the supply of dry cargo 
tonnage had increased above world trade requirements.
In fact during the four months which preceded the 
re-opening o f the Canal shippers had no problem in  
obtaining any extra amount of tramp tonnage that 
they needed# Since that time until the re-opening 
of the Canal, the e ffect of the c ris is  was only
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lim ited to the influence which higher freight rates 
(Liner firm s) could exert on the trade.
Examination of the monthly figures of imports 
showed that supplies of commodities which came from 
Asia and East A fr ica , normally via  Suez, were s ig n if ­
icantly disturbed during November and December. In  
some cases, such as rubber and tea , November figures  
were notably very low whereas in other cases the d is ­
location happened mainly in December. Generally 
speaking the disturbance in  November imports was due 
to the sudden closure of the Canal add the Inevitable  
delay in the a rr iv a l o f shipments. On the other hand, 
one tends to think that the low leve l of imports from 
the Far East during December 1956 would have been 
avoided i f  there was enough dry tonnage availab le  in 
the market fo r chartering.
During the four months January to ^ p r il 1957, 
monthly imports from the Far East varied d iffe ren tly  
from the normal seasonal trend. Yet on the average, 
in the majority of the oases examined, they were 
maintained at the leve l of the corresponding period 
of 1956. In some cases such as that of tea. Imports 
during the f i r s t  quarter o f 1957 were above those of 
the corresponding period in 1956. In the case of 
rubber the situation  was d iffe ren t. See Diagram 
(48, a, b, d ). Yet the reduction In rubber imports
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was not only particu lar to the period of the Suez 
closure, it  continued a fte r  the re-opening of the 
Canal and in the fo llow ing years. (In  1958 raw 
rubber imports were 15 m. tons below the level of
1955).
Trade sta tis t ic s  showed that the closure of the
Canal had a depressing effect on the imports of some
kinds of o i l  seeds, cereals, fresh  food s tu ffs  which
came from Asia and East A frica . Shipments of these
goods to B rita in  during the c r is is  were mostly affected
by the extra cost o f  transport as w ell as by the need
to spend more time at sea rather than by the shortage
in shipping tonnage. However, the principal flow
of the fresh  foodstuffs from East of Suez normally
came from Austra lia  and New Zealand. Shipments of
wheat, butter, f ru it s ,  fresh  vegetables continued to
flow from these two countries through the Cape route
(7 )
and Panama Canal* without being s ligh tly  reduced by 
the closure o f Suez. In fact Imports o f some of the
Australasian products such as butter and wheat were
(7 ) See Diagram (1 ),  Appendix E at the end of this
Chapter) for the increase in Panama Canal t r a f f ic
during 1956 an d 1957. Most o f the Increase (See 
the Panama Report fo r  1957-58) was credited to 
Australasia/Europe t ra f f ic  and also to some 
extent to shipments between Asia and Europe.
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proportionally higher during the c ris is  when compared 
with the levels of 1955 or early  1956. See Table (42)
fo r wheat imports from Austra lia . Yet imports of
( 8 )
fresh  meat from Australia  during the three months 
which followed the Canal closure were apparently much 
lower than th e ir  leve l during the corresponding period  
in 1955-56. See Table (4 3 ). Meanwhile some small 
quantities of fresh  meat which normally came from 
Eastern A frica  were sometimes reduced to n il ,  u n til 
the Canal was re-opened.
As regards the annual figu res of the trade which 
came from East of Suez, evidence c learly  showed that 
the e ffect of the closure of the Canal fo r  a s ix  
month period in 1956-1957 had but only a s ligh t  
effect on the leve ls  o f these two particu lar years.
The situation  would have been completely d iffe ren t  
i f  the large proportion of Imports which came from 
Australasia had to come from India and the Far East 
as it  was the case u n til the f i r s t  War period. The 
problem o f tonnage shortage would have a lso  been quite 
d ifferen t i f  the U.S. had not possessed such a huge
(9 )
reserve f le e t  In the post-war period.
(8 ) Also, to some extent meat Imports from New Zealand.
(9 ) See Table (1) -  Appendix E for figures concerning 
U.S. Reserve f le e t  in re la tion  to world tonnage. 
Such a f le e t  could always increase the e la s t ic ity  
of the supply o f  world active tonnage.
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U.K. WHEAT IMPORTS, SHOWING PROPORTIONS WHICH CAME PROM 
AUSTRALIA.
TABLE (42)
Total
Wheat
Imports
Percentage
from
Australia
Grain 
Freight Bates
M il. Cwts. (1952 '1 0 0 )
i m
Jul. 6.651 12.6 130.9
Aug. 9.353 7.3 131.0
Sep. 6.491 9.E 143.0
Oct. 7.111 11.8 155.2
Nov. 6.589 10.2 143.6
Dec. 7.375 6.5 154.4
1956
Jan. 6.959 8.7 160.6
Feb. 8.450 7.7 157.0
Mar. 8.167 4.5 167.5
Apr. 9.288 16.2 185.0
May 7.529 17.8 181.8
June 10.930 8.0 161.6
Jul. 10.049 19.5 162.8
Aug. 6.969 16.4 169.0
Sep. 5.549 17.1 171.4
Oct. 8.845 12.2 170.9
Nov. 7.640 10.6 196.6
Dec. 6.385 17.2 206.4
1957
16.9Jan. 7.513 189.6
Feb. 8.081 15.0 182.3
Mar. 8.37e 18.9 153.0
Apr. 6.480 25.3 137.4
May 7.881 31.8 106 .7
June 5.900 9.1 102.7
Jul. 6.876 Nil 97.2
It can be observed that during periods of increasing rates of 
freight total wheat imports into the U.K. were affected 
proportionally hi^ier than wheat imports from Australia.
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The most direct increase in shipping costs 
consequent upon the use of the Cape route instead 
of Suez resulted simply from spending more days at 
sea. This naturally  d iffe red  according to the speed 
of the vessel employed in the voyage.
Yet, by using a fast fre igh ter steaming at 16^ 
knots (1956 figu re ) some comparison can be obtained 
and would be usefu l fo r our purpose, see Table (41 ). 
One round t r ip  from London to Bombay took 54 days by 
the Cape instead of 31 by Suez, to Singapore 58 days 
instead of 41 and to Hong Kong 65 days instead of 48 
by Suez. In the case o f Australia ard New Zealand 
the difference between the Suez and the Cape in one 
round trip  from London was only 3-4 days. Assuming 
a tanker speed o f 14 & knots (1956 figu re ) one round 
tr ip  from London to the Persian Gulf took 37 daja 
via Suez agalna) 65 days v ia  the Cape. That was the 
greatest saving in  time obtained by using the Suez 
route instead of the Cape route.
By using d ifferent speed vessels in d ifferent  
trips  to the Seat the above picture would c learly  be 
distorted. For instance less speedier vessels were 
generally used in the Indian run, in d istinction  from 
other Far Eastern runs. Thus the extra coat of 
shipping when using the Cape instead o f the Suez
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route was bound to  be re la t iv e ly  more burdensome In 
a tr ip  to Bombay compared with a t r ip  to Hong Kong.
However, generally speaking we may fa ir ly  re ly  
on the picture drawn out from Table (4 1 ), since the 
vessels which served the Eastern trade did not in 
fact vary considerably in their speed. According to 
the Suez Canal s ta t is t ic s  and the B ritish  sta tis t ic s  
the great majority of these vessels was roughly of 
speeds between 14^ * and 16^ knots.
Another important factor which decisively affects  
the costs of shipping is the size of the vessel. It  
was estimated in 1956 that the cost of shipping a ton 
of crude o i l  from the Persian Gulf to London by using 
a fu lly  laden tanker of 19,000 tons d.w. was via Suez 
39$ le ss  than via the Cape route. Meanwhile by using 
a fu lly  laden tanker of 45,000 tons d.w. the difference  
In shipping costs between the Caps and the Suez Canal 
was only 6$. See also Diagram (49) and the accompany­
ing Table which illu s t ra te  this point fo r  various sizes 
o f tankers. It  can be seen that the cheapest wa;y (in
1956) o f shipping o i l  from the Persian Gulf to B ritain  
and othar Western Europe countries was to come by 
using a fu l ly  laden 38,000 tons d.w. tanker via  Suez.
It  can also be observed from Hagram (49) that the 
use of a fu l ly  laden 65,000 tons d.w. tanker via the 
Cape was cheaper per ton of o i l  than using a fu l ly
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laden tanker o f the size  of 32,000 tons d.w. -  or 
under -  v ia  Suez. Nevertheless, in  1956 85$ of 
the tankers in the world were under the size of 
19,500 d.w. Far the remaining 15$ of the world tanker 
f le e t  the majority was of the size 35,000 tons d.w. 
and under. There were only about 21 tankers In the 
world in the s ize  of 45,000 tons d.w. and over.
Under these clroumstances the closure o f the Suez 
Canal was going to ra ise  costs of shipping o i l  
considerably.
Dry cargo vessels which used the Suez Carml were 
also of such sizes that the ir costs were bound to be 
increased substantia lly  by using the longer route*
For 1956 B ritish  sta tist ic s  showed that the 
average size of the foreign  going tramp vessel was 
about 5,000 gross tons. For liners the figu re  was 
about 7,700 g. tons. Yet, as the vessels employed 
in the Eastern run were known to be re la t iv e ly  la rger  
than those operating on other world routes it  would 
not be surprising to learn  that about 60$ of dry 
cargo vessels which traversed the Canal in 1955-1956 
were o f sizes between 6,000 and 14,000 g. tons.
During the Fuez c r is is  i t  was estimated that the 
extra running costs by using a vessel o f a tonnage 
between 10,000 and 13,000 g. tons In a round trip  
to India via the Cape (took about 24 days longer
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than the Canal) was around £11,700.
These were the factors which affected the cost 
of transport because of the need to spend more days 
on the Journey v ia  the longer route. There were 
also other important factors which added more to the 
disadvantages of the longer sea route. F irs t ly ,  
liners which were employed between Britain-Western  
Europe and the Far East lost easy access to a l l  ports 
in the southern parts of Arabia, the eastern coast of 
Africa (p articu la rly  the Red sea ports) and the 
Mediterranean sea area (p articu larly  the eastern po rts ). 
Under such circumstances shipping firms were le f t  to 
choose either between a temporary loss o f the trade 
with these ports or providing specia l feeder services 
to them. Obviously, e ither way, high financia l losses 
or huge extra expenses were Involved. By using the 
Cape route instead of the Canal, liners employed 
between Britain-Continent and Australia were also at 
a considerable disadvantage, being unable to make 
profitab le  diversions to Indian and Ceylonese ports 
besides other ports in the Suez route.
Secondly, the closure of the Suez route meant also  
the lo ss  of Aden fu e llin g  fa c i l i t ie s  as w e ll as other 
fu e llin g  stations in the Suez zone. Apart from 
Increases in fu e l o i l  prices during the emergency,
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the price per ton of fue l was much higher at South 
and West African ports than at Aden (see Chapter 7, p .263) 
Also when ships called  at fu e llin g  stations in  the 
Suez route they were also carrying or discharging 
cargo at these ports. Now costs Increased because of 
the need to c a ll  at some African ports just fo r  re ­
fu e llin g  purposes. Consequently many shipowners 
preferred to oarry extra bunkering fue l on the ir way 
to and from the Far East rather than making diversions 
and getting delayed at ports at which they normally 
did not dock. For a dry cargo vessel of a tonnage 
between 10,000 and 13,000 g. tons in a round t r ip  
between B rita in  and India (o r the rest of the Far 
East) the loss of deadweight due to extra fu e l carried  
was estimated at about £10,000.
The la tte r  figu re  as w ell as some others given . 
above, concerning the increase in the oost of the 
voyage to India and to the Far East a fter the closure
of the Canal, have been derived from an estimation
( 1 0 )
published in the Financial Times In November 1956.
After making allowances fo r  the Increase In interest 
and depreciation, because o f a lower turnover per a 
given period of time, mid fo r  the fact that the Canal 
dues were saved, to ta l extra cost in a round tr ip
(10) The "Financial Times", Nov. 7, 1956, p .3.
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between B rita in  and India, via the Cape route, was 
estimated at £27,450. To the Far East the extra 
cost of a round t r ip  was estimated at £28,040.
See fab le  (44 ). Several factors were not, however, 
taken into account in  that estimation such as the 
extra delay caused by congestion of re-routed ships 
at A frican  ports, the Increase in fu e l prices, the 
loss of Intermediate cargo (o r the cost of providing 
feeder services) and the rise  in the dues of some 
African ports consequent upon the need to accommodate 
the extra t r a f f ic .
It  has not been intended in the above argument 
to give any more than a broad picture for the Increase 
in different items in the cost o f  the Eastern journey 
a fte r the closure of the Canal. Any precise quantit­
ative measurement in th is  score would be subject to 
error due to the exceptionally poor Information 
available on shipping f irm s1 expenditures and revenues. 
Admittedly with the help o f  some recent valuable
studies in cost and revenue structures of ships we may
(11 )
be able to a rrive  at a reasonable estimation. Yet 
this would involve a great deal o f work which would
390.
(11) See fo r  Instance "Supply and Demand o f Uater
Transport” by Thomas Thorburn -  Stockholm 1960.
TABLE CAA V* 
EXTRA COST OP VOYAGES ROUHD THE CAPE.
, Nov. 7, 1956.Rough Estimation - Published in "The Financial Times"
Average Extra Days Extra 23 days Extra 13 days
bpent in the Trip via the Cape via Cape via Cape
.. to India Far East
£ £
1. Extra Running Costa 11,700 11,040
2* Loss of deadweight due to
extra Fuel carried 10,000 10,000
3* Interest & Depreciation 5,750 7,000
Total 27,450 28,040
The assumption of the table was that the vessel in question 
carried only cargo and was of a tonnage between 10,000 - 
13f0C0 tons*
It was also assumed that ships on the Far Fast run - other 
than the Indian run - were faster and that they therefore 
were in a better situation so far as the first item was 
concerned* Yet as more capital was invested in them 
their extra costs in the 3rd item were higher*
most probably Impede the main theme of this research; 
and yet it  is  our main interest here to see how the 
o ris is  had affected actual market fre ight rates which, 
although affected by shipowners* costs, were very 
much sensitive to charges in world active shipping 
tonnage and world demand fo r sea transport*
F irst : Liner freight rates.
Immediately a fte r the closure of the Canal rates of 
fre ight fo r  voyages between B ritish  and Asian ports 
in the Far East were raised by 15$ to 17&& of the 
rates which were previously availab le . To Port Sudan, 
Jeddah and Massowah (Red sea ports) the r is e  in rates  
was 25$, whereas a surcharge of 20$ was imposed on the 
journeys to Aden, Berbera, D jibouti and Assab (Eastern 
coast of A fr ic a ). The maintenance o ft ra d e  with Red 
sea, Eastern African ports as well as with Aden was 
kept at a much higher cost by the provision of 
particular feeder services between them and Cape 
Town. There were also sim ilar increases in  rates of 
fre ight from a l l  the above mentioned ports, in Asia 
and A frica , to B rit ish  ports.
During November and December bunker fue l prices 
rose by about 25$-40$ above the level of October 195Q.
To quote B ritish  figu res diesel o i l  price rose from 
253/6d in October to 318/- on the 10th o f  December.
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Fuel o i l  price Increased from 169/- in October to 
236/- in December. This besides other increases in  
the cost of transport (explained above) whioh were not 
reckoned immediately a fte r  the Canal closure forced  
further revisions in rates. For example by the f i r s t  
week of January 1957 the surcharges imposed on t r a f f ic  
to Aden, East A frican and Red sea ports were ra ised  to 
40$ and 50$ instead of 20$ and 25$. As regards India, 
Pakistan, Ceylon and other Far E astern runs rates  
were raised  on two occasions, f i r s t  in  February and 
then in March. Freight rates of lin ers  which ran 
their services between Britain-Continent and Australia  
were kept at the leve ls vhich prevailed before November 
1956. Yet, in February an increase of 14$ was decided 
by the Australian  conference for a l l  cargo shipped to 
Britain-Continent. A sim ilar r is e  was passed fbr the 
outward journey to Australia in the following month.
How fa r  the loss of lmtermediate cargo in the Suez 
route had contributed to such r is e  in the rates of the 
lin ers serving the Australian trade can not be 
determined. When Increasing their rates durlrg the 
c r is is  lin er conferences ju st ified  their action on 
the basis o f the r is e  in their costs both because of
393.
which would have made such revisions necessary even
( 12 )
i f  the situation had been normal. That was probably 
true in the case of the shipping firms nhich Insisted  
on the Increase even a fte r  the re-opening of the Canal. 
That was the case with liners serving the Australian  
trade, yet even then the timing of rates rev ision  was 
certain ly a ffected . As regards other Journeys between 
Britain  and East of Suez freight rates which prevailed  
during the emergency could not be maintained once the 
Canal was re-opened. lor example f r e lg it  rates on 
cargoes shipped to or from India, Pakistan aid Ceylon 
were reduced by about 6$ in May 1957 and by 9$ in the 
follow ing month. Yet at their leve l in June they were 
s t i l l  a l i t t l e  over 10$ of the rates of October 1956. 
Table (45) furnishes Information on changes in fre ight  
rates for journeys between B rita in  and some selected  
countries East of Suez during 1956-57. Figures fo r  
the years 1946- 56 are shown for purposes of comparison.
(12) It  is reasonable to assume that Liner firms
always endeavour to maintain a balance between 
their costs and their revenues (including a 
certain p ro fit margin). Yet it  is  d i f f ic u lt  
to see how they oould do that and maintain 
their profit margins at times o f trade 
depressions or increased supply of world 
tonnage.
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the closure of the Canal and because of other factors
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INDEX NUMBERS OF LINER FREIGHT RATES 
(l) Rata Relatives for soma salacted U.K. Export Routes 1945-100
TABLE (4 5 )
(l) Australia (2 ) New Zealand
September 1949 100.0 October 1948 105.0
September 1930 118.8 September 1949 U3.4
April 1951 136.62 July 1950 115.28
July 1951 155.25 May 1951 186.3
September 1952 ' 136.62 August 1951 124.2
July 1955 150.28 October 1951 180.09
March 1957 171.32 January 1952 173.88
February 1952 170.15
March 1952 161.46
April 1952 124.2
July 1955 130.31
September 1957 149.97
For Export and Import Rates.
It will be noticed that New Zealand Route - was more affected 
by the Korean crisis than the Australiar route - The latter was 
affected by the Suez crisis while rates at Ne# Zetland route did 
not show any change during that time.
(3) India
June 1949 
January 1950 
Marsh 1951 
September 1951 
February 1955 
March 1956 
November 1956 
February 1957 
March 1957 
May 1957 
June 1957
(5) Ceylon
March 1951 
April 1951 
September 1951 
January 1952 
February 1955 
March 1956 
November 1956 
February 1957 
March 1957 
May 1957 
June 1957
109.1
100.0
125.0
143.75
158.13
173.94
200.03 
304*38 
224.82 
210.5
191.4
125.0
156.25
172.5 
143.75 
158.13 
173.94
200.03 
204.38 
224*62
210.5
191.4
(4) Ihkistan
Ma$oh 1951 125.0
September 1951 143*75
February 1955 158.13
March 1956 173.94
November 1956 200.03
February 1957 204.38
March 1957 242.82
May 1957 210.5
June 1957 191.4
(6) East Africa (Kenya)
March 1951 115.0
March 1955 126.5
November 1956 145.48
April 1957 152.7
May 1957 146.08
June 1957 132.8
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TABLE (45) (oontd.)
(7) Japan
February 1948 105.0
January 1951 116.13
June 1951 129.94
May 1952 116.13
October 1953 106.52
February 1954 100.41
June 1956 122.26
November 1956 142.64
May 1957 155.34
June 1957 141.21
(2)  Hate
*
Relatives for U.K. Import Routes (1945 - 100)
( l )  Australia (2 ) New Zealand
September 1949 110 September 1948 105
October 1951 126.5 October 1949 113.4
October 1955 136.0 May 1951 170.1
October 1955 146.2 July 1951 113.4
February 1957 166.7 Ootober 1951 124.7
(3) East Africa (Kenya)
March 1951 115
May 1955 126.5
November 1956 145.5
May 1957 149.6
June 1957 136.0
November 1955 
September 1957
(4 ) India 
Pakistan 
k6; Ceylon •
March 1951 
September 1951 
February 1955 
March 1956 
November 1956 
February 1957 
March 1957 
May 1957 
June 1957
130.9
147.26
125.0
143.8 
158.1
173.9 
200.0
204.4 
224.8
210.5 
191.4
oouroe« Study on "Index Numbers of Liner Freight Hates", by 
Dr. D.L. Me Lachlan
Yorkshire Bulletin of Eoon. and Soc. Research,
Vol. 10, No. 1, June 1958.
Second* Dry Cargo Tramp Rate*
Freight rates of tramp cargo ships always re flected , 
rather accurately, the state of supply and demand for  
available  world shipping tonnage* With a given supply 
o f active tramp tonnage the r is e  in demand in any of 
the world routes would push a l l  freight rates upwards, 
ard vice versa*
Between July and October 1956 tramp shipping time 
charter rates rose by 14*8/t> as oompared with only less  
than 4$ In the correspording period of 1955* As i t  
has been explained that was due to the requisition ing  
of a number of vessels fo r  m ilitary shipments, higher 
rate o f chartering, above the normal seasonal demand, 
due to pcecautionary stockpiling of Sueze borne 
commodities and also fo r  fear of a sudden Canal 
closure. Yet, during the same period voyage charter 
rates fo r  various goods normally carried  by tramps 
(ootfL, grain , sugar, timber, ore f e r t i l i s e r  and 
esparto) s t i l l  varied according to seasonal require­
ments* A fter the closure of the Canal demand for 
tramp tonnage was sharply ra ised  by attempts to 
maintain supplies of commodities which were normally 
oarried to West of Suez via the Canal. Theoretically  
speaking "an increasing demand fo r  tonnage causes more 
and more ships to be taken out of lay-up u n til a
39$.
stage Is reached, where only ships undergoing rep a ir  
or inspection remain and then supply becomes very 
in e lastic ; even very large increases in fre ight rates 
prodioe but l i t t l e  Increase in the supply of tonnage.
Should demand continue to be in excess o f supply very
x
rapid increases in freight rates w i l l  occur”. That 
is  what happened in 1956. Laid-up tonnage was almost 
a l l  re -activated  by iovember and then, inevitably, 
freight rates were negotiated at rap id ly  r is in g  leve ls  
one day a fte r  another. During the m ilitary events 
which took place around the Suez Canal a vessel was 
chartered fo r carrying manganese ore from Portuguese 
India to Northern Prance at 160/- per ton ( f . l . o )  
via Suez or 193/- via the Cape o f Good Hope. 125/­
per ton was the last rate reported in that trade
f
before the outbreak of figh ting . The rate of fre ight  
fo r wheat cargo from Western Australia  to the U.K. was 
increased by 10/- per ton, to 185/- during the second 
week of November. By the third  week of December this 
rate had reached 210/- per ton. Transatlantic coal 
and gra in  fre igh t , regarded as a barometer for world 
rates, increased by 60# and 40# respectively during 
the three weeks which followed the closure of the 
Sues Canal. Cod. rates were further affected by the 
shortage in  o i l  supplies by that time. The most 
notable increase in transatlantic coal rates was in
x G. Alexandersson and G. Norstrdin, World Shipping 
p .37-38.
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the f i r s t  week of December 1956 when there was an
■ (13)
average inorease of about 3/6d per ton every day*
In a l l  trade routes the Korean rates were reached and
then new peaks were soon established*
To many in the shipowning industry it  s eerald that
such a boom was going to last u n til the re-opening o f
the Sues Canal* Yet, by January 1957 there was a
defin ite  sign indicating the end of the shortage in
world dry cargo»tonnage* The reasons for such an
early solution were c lea rly  the release of the cargo
ships jr eviously requisltooned by the B ritish  and the
French governments, the re -activation  of vessels from
the U*S, mothball f le e t ,  the mild winter in Europe
and the gradual Increase in o i l  supplies which
e ffec tive ly  reduced the demand fo r American coal*
(14)
In Diagram (50) ohanges in freight rates of tramp 
shipping are illu s tra ted  fo r  1956-57 and compared 
with other changes which took place during the period 
1952-1958* It  w i l l  lie noticed that by March 1957
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( I I )  By that time the Board o f Trade was about to 
charter a large number o f vessels fo r coal 
shipments from U*3* across the Atlantic*
(14) Also, see Table 46*
3 9 8 ( a )
o&BLh: (46 ) X  
Chamber of Shipping of the U#KV
INDEX NUMBER OF SHIEHNG FREIGHT
( l )  Voyage Charter 1 9 5 2  *  100.0
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
Jan. 146.4 79.3 71.9 115.1 144.3 173.7 64.9
Feb. 146*6 80.0 77.6 119.8 140.2 167.6 64.0
Mir. 122.4 85.2 77.4 113.7 147.2 145.5 63.3
Apr. 106.4 85.6 75.8 110.2 151.6 134.3 62.7
May IO5.6 82.2 77.4 122.6 162.2 116.6 64.6
June 91*2 73.8 77.6 128.0 155.5 109.9 66.5
Jul. 75*5 75.8 79.7 130.0 155.2 101.9 66.6
Aug. 71*2 73.9 80.1 129.9 157.9 86.9 65.O
Sept. 76.5 73.9 90.6 138.1 156.1 61.6 65.7
Oct. 84*9 77.3 99.5 146.9 153.6 80./ 70.4
Nev. 88.0 73.3 110.4 135.5 171.4 82.3 76.4
Deo. 83*7 71.3 115.5 140.1 189.4 71.6 74.6
Year 100.0 77.5 86.1 127.7 157.0 112.7 67.1
(2 ) Time Charter 1952 -  100.0
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
Jan. 184.5 59.8 58.3 114.6 138.0 216.3 61.1
Feb. 177.0 61.5 62.0 123.8 148.2 203.7 54.4
Mar. 124.8 64.8 63.4 113.8 150.0 165.6 51.8
Apr. 111.9 69.7 65.5 102.3 171.5 164.6 -
May. 116.5 65.5 59.0 124.2 190.0 117.9 -
June 104.I 61.6 64.2 135.4 169.4 111.8 50.6
Jul. 85.2 57.4 59.9 145.3 167.1 93.8 60.1
Aug. 56.5 59.0 61.9 137.0 176.6 74.2 55.1
Sep. 58.1 56.4 71.3 142.2 174.2 82.7 52.7
Oct. 65.6 56.3 84.O 151.2 191.8 78.9 54.2
Nov. 61.9 58.0 101.8 135.5 191.3 70.4 59.6
Deo. 54.0 57.8 109.0 132.2 207.2 63.O 55.8
Year 100.0 60. b 71.7 129.3 172.9 120.2 55.5
Source t Annual Report 1957-58 of the Chamber of Shipping
The Old Index Number 1948 * 100 the average for 1952 in that 
Index -  110.6
TTH W  1VNV*
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tramp freight rates had approached the leve ls which 
were availab le  in July-October 1956, then they began 
f a l l in g  steeply under such levels in the follow ing  
months o f the year. From December 1956 to December
1957 the rate fo r  the carriage of coal from the U.S. 
to North Vvestern Europe was down from 118/- or 120/­
per ton to 25/- per ton. In the same period the fre igh t  
rate fo r  grain from West Australia to the U.K. was
down from 220/- to 72/6d. As a resu lt of this 
depression in rates la id -up tonnage, fo r lack o f 
employment, was sharply r is in g  above any previous 
levels since 1935-36 -  See Diagram (5 1 ). That 
depressed state of tramp fre igh t continued during
1958 and fo r most of 1959 (when only showed l i t t le  
signs of recovery). The reasons Ibr such a prolonged 
depression were by no means so le ly  re lated  to the 
nationalisation of the Canal and the subsequent 
events. In 1954 after two years of freight degression  
the r is in g  level of vorld trade created a large demand 
on shipping tonnage and raised freight ra tes . This 
r^se in rates (see Diagram 51) was su ffic ien t ly  large . 
so that laid-up tonnage was substantially  reduced
and new tonnage was ordered at various shipyards in 
the world. The r ise  in demand fo r new tonnage continued 
in 1955 and was further accelerated in 1958 by the Suez 
c r is is .
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DIAGRAM ( 5 1 ) .
MILLIONS OP 
GROSS TONS.
INDEX
SouroesWith l i t t le  variations,the diagram is taken from 
WORLD SHIPPING ,by G. Alexanders son and G.Norstr8m,1963. 
Original source of data sTHE CHAMBER OP SHIPPING OP THE U.K, 
and NORWIGIAN SHIPPING NEWS.
As we have already explained the po lic ies of the 
British , the ranch and the American governments 
during the Suez c r is is  created extraordinary conditions
in the shipping market which a r t i f i c ia l ly  led to a sharp
(15)
r ise  and then f a l l  in  freight rates* Before ship­
owners were ab le  to recover from the Suez a f fa i r  new 
tonnage, which was ordered on a rather large scale  
during 1954-1906, began to come on the market and 
prevented any quick recovery from the depressed rates 
of 1957 fo r  several years*
Thirds Tanker shipping fre igh t rates.
The main features o f the development of the rates  
in "tramp tanker market" ( i . e .  tariSmsrs chartered fo r  
a short period of time and/or per single voyage*
These are usually owned by private companies other 
than o i l  companies) were the same as those in dry 
cargo tramp market* The fluctuations in the t r ip  
charter rates in the tanker market were however 
much wider than those experienced in the dry cargo 
tonnage during the Suez c ris is *
Trip charter rate fo r  the run between the Persian
(15) The m ilitary oampalgn in Suez led to the 
requ isition  o f a large number of vessels 
at one time and the ir derequisition at 
another time* Also the re -activation  of 
vessels from the U.S. reserve f le e t  played 
a s ign lficart part in fre igh t rates 
fluctuations during the c r is is .
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Gulf and Britain  increased from Scale plus 250$ 
at the end of October 1956 (Soale rate «  49/2d*plue 
Canal duea of 6/3 per ton) to Soale plus 325$ by the 
end of the f i r s t  week o f November* Yet i t  must be 
noted that during the m ilitary events in the Sues 
zone the "London Tanker Brokers Panel" had fixed  a 
new Scale ra te  for a lternative routes from the Persian 
Gulf* The new ra te , for vessels laden and in b a lla s t ,
(16)
to U.K. and Eire via  the Caps route was equal to 80/10d* 
Thus the tanker t r ip  charter rate ( f o r  the above 
quotation) had Increased by 67£ from 206/- to 344/­
per ton, within the f i r s t  week* By the end o f  November 
the Persian Gulf -  Britain  single t r ip  rate had reached 
Seale plus 340$* That was l i t t le  more than £18 compared 
with £6*15/- reached at the peak o f  1955*
During December 1956 the single t r ip  rate via  the 
Cape continued to  r is e  u n til it  reached Soale plus 
375$, £19 per ton. At the leve l ru ling before the 
nationalisation of the Canal, about £5 per ton via  
Sues, the longer distance via the Cape would have 
*dded roughly £2 per ton.
(16) For alternative routes between U .K .-^lre an d the 
Persian Gulf the new Soale rate was 65/2d via  
the Caps laden and through Sues in b a lla s t , 
including 2/- Canal dues) while via Sues 
laden and by the way o f the Cape in ba lla s t  
the new Scale rate was 65/- plus Janal dues 
4/3d* Rates published by L.T.B.P. in the 
f i r s t  week of November 1956.
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Meanwhile single t r ip  rates in other o i l  routes
had also reflected  the high leve l of demand which
(17)
existed for available tramp tankers. The ra te fo f  
transporting a ton of o i l  from the Nether land V*est 
Indies to U.K. (4,200 miles) rose from about £2.2/­
in February-March 1956 to a peak of nearly £7.10/­
in December. Diagram (53) demonstrates the develop­
ment of the single voyage rates for the Journey Aruba/ 
Curaco -  U.K. Fluctuations of rates in  this particu lar  
journey has been taken to indicate changes in freight 
rates in other main o i l  routes in the world. It  w i l l  
be noticed the steep decline in single tr ip  rates  
between the end of December 1956, a fte r i t  had reached 
a new post-war peak, and December 1957. The rate  
continued to f a l l  in January 1958, then it  recovered 
very l i t t le  during February and then reached its  
lowest point since the war in A p ril. It was by then 
less than one-tenth of the peak value reached In 
December 1956. The reasons fo r such drastic i a l l  in  
single t r ip  rates were again very sim ilar to those in 
dry cargo tramp market; the release and re-activation  
of tonnage from the American reserve f le e t ,  the success 
which International o i l  companies had achieved in
exchange of o i l  supplies aid tanker co-ordination and
(IB )
the mild winter in  Europe in 1956-57 Later in May
(17) See Diagram (52) which c learly  shows the close  
correlation  between tanker rates in d ifferent  
routes. P .P .S . V.24, p.342.
(18) Also the number of laid -up tankers was considerably
ncr fcha Ql»ia ia . _____
4 0 2 .
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Sources Sun Oil C o . '1957 Annual, "Analysis of the World 
Tank Ship F leet".
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* L T B P - “LONDON BROKERS PANEL AWARD RATES",AND THIS WAS LATER 
REPLACED BY A P R A -AVERAGE FREIGHT RATE ASSESMENT.
* L T B P AND A F R A s SHILLINGS PER TON FOR ARUBA -  CURACO- U.K.
* SCALES OF THE DIAGRAM s INDEX 100 -  35 s, 6 d. -MINISTRY OF
TRANSPORT (U.K) SCALE.
* *
*Source:World ShippingjBy G.Alexandersson and G.Norstrttm., 1963*
Later in Mqr the Canal was re-opened and thus increased 
the e ffec tive  supply of tonnage in re lation  to demand. 
As regards the defr ession of rates which lasted fo r  
years a fte r  1956-57 i t  was also explained by the 
continuous a r r iv a l o f newly bu ilt tonnage which had 
been ordered on a large s cale during the boom period 
of 1954-56.
(19)
The bulk of o i l  trade was howeverf carried  
in o i l  companies owned tankers or In tankers on long­
term charter. Rates fo r  these vessels were only to 
a lim ited degree influenced by the circumstances of 
Sues and by the rates paid fo r  voyage chartered v ess e ls . 
Hence they fluctuated during and a fte r  the c r is is  
much less v io len tly* The available measure of fre ight  
rates fo r  these vessels is  the Average Freight Rate
Assessment (AFRA) of the London Tanker Brokers' Panel.
• '
(The AFRA is  a weighted average of a l l  ra tes ) single  
and consecutive voyage rates as w ell as short-term  
charter and long-term charter ra te s ). The AFRA rate  
showed m  Increase from Scale plus 41.3^ in October 
1956 to 74.8$ in January 1957. The rate was reduced 
a fte r that in April and the n on 1st o f July. Ttie
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(19) About 90% in 1956-57
The la tte r  rate was equal to Scale plus 31.9$, by 
then the Canal had been re-opened ard normal navigation 
was restored. See a lso  Diagram (53 ).
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Chmga* In Commodity M o m  during tfaa Crlala
Import prices were affected  in varying degree 
by changes in freight rates and in some cases, e .g . ,  
o i l ,  by changes in sources of supply which led  to 
changes in f .o .b .  prices, wholesale prices were partly  
affected by the same facto rs , but were la rge ly  sensitive  
to the changes in  commodL ty supplies as determined by 
the flow of Imports and the sise  of ava ilab le  stocks. 
Besides, speculations about the length o f the c r ia ls  
and the a b i l it y  of the Importers to maintain the supply 
of the Sues borne commodities played a very sign ifican t  
ro le  In f ix in g  market prices.
( 20 )
Prices o f coal, gra in , sugar, ore and the rest 
of the bulky goods which were normally carried in tramp 
tonnage were c learly  most affeoted by the dramatic 
changes in fre igh t rates during the c r is is .  Let us 
tete wheat fo r  example. The fre ight element in Canadian 
wheat price, o . l . f . ,  Increased from 16$ In July 1956 
to 18$ in November and then to over 20$ in early  
December. The o . l . f .  price of wheat, Imported into
(20) Contracts fo r wo re -o a rrie rsM(spec ia l purpose 
carrie rs ) are normally negotiated many months 
in advance. Thus during the Suez c r is is  
changes in ore freight rates arid prices 
lagged behind those of other commodities 
that were carried in  tramp cargo.
Britain  from a l l  overseas sources, Increased by about 
4$ between July and December 1956, compared with a 
f a l l  of about 7$ during the same period In 1955.
During January and February 1957 o . l . f .  prices 
continued to r is e  and in  the la tte r  month were about 
7$ above the leve l o f JUly 1956. Tramp shipping 
fre igh t rates had started to decline by the end of 
December 1956 but most of January, February and March 
shipments were carried In tramps which were chartered 
when rates were r is in g . Therefore the f a l l  In rates 
was not Immediately re flec ted  In prices. During 
March 1957 wheat prices, o . l . f . ,  f e l l  s l i g i t ly  and 
then during the following months were fa ilin g  r  ather 
heavily. By July 1957 o . l . f .  wheat prices were 23.6$ 
below the leve l of July 1956 and about 21$ below that 
of July 1955. Prices of coal and sugar also showed 
sign ificant variations fo llow ing the trend in tramp 
fre igh t ra te s . The pro portion of fre ight in the 
o . l . f .  prices of U.S. coal increased from 47$ to 52$ 
between July and November 1956 and to la rger proportions 
in December and in January 1957. It  is  needless to 
emphasise the close re la tion  between fre igh t rates 
and prices in this particu lar case. Aa regards sugar, 
o . l . f .  .r lc e s  increased by 8.5$ between July and
4 0 6 .
November 1956 mainly because o f the r is e  In fre ight  
rates. Sugar prices continued to r ise  and were 45$ 
above the July 1958 leve l by February 1957. However, 
while grain and coal prices were shaken by the f a l l  
in freight rates during 1957 sugar prices were not 
very much affected  by this factor. In fact sugar 
prices were strongly affected during that period by 
the clearance of surplus stocks o f Cutefen sugar whioh 
had been considerable since 1952, and also by the low 
European beet crop fo r 1956-1957. Thus no close  
correlation could be drawn between changes in sugar 
import prices and freigfrt r  ates by that time.
Meanwhile, in none of the cases examined above 
had wholesale prloes fu l ly  re flected  the changes in  
c . i . f .  prices. Obviously the r is e  or f a l l  in import 
prices had only represented s r is e  or a f a l l  in the 
costs of additional stocks. Most o f the commodities 
whioh normally came v ia  Suez in ctaference ships 
enjoyed high prices, see for instance the prices o f  
rubber, t in , copper and wool in Table (4 7 ). Consider­
ing July 1956* prices and rates of freight we can find  
that the fre ight element in Malayan tin  was about 1.7$, 
in Malayan rubber 2.5$ and in Indian tea cfoout 6$.
As regards Australian lead and zinc the percent 
occupied by freight was about 7$. In the case of 
Pakistan raw Jute the fre igh t element was about 11$.
4 0 7 .
TABLE (47 VX
408
COMMODITY iBICES
Commodity Unit End End End Per Cent .
1955 1956 1957 Fall'iir Rise -'
End 1956 
Compared with
_____________________________________End 195?
Tin £/Ton 833* 782* 730* -  6.6
Copper £/Ton 400* 268* 180* -  32.8
Zinc £/Tan 1006 102§ 61* -40.4
Lead £/Ton 120* 116* 72* -37.8
Rubber d/lb 37f * 16 24* -23.3
Cotton
(U.S.futuro)
d/lb 27.40 26.85 26.55 -  1.1
Wool
(Futures)
d/lb 105* 136 108| -20.3
Sisal
(E. Africa)
£/Ten 85 75* 73 -  3.3
Whale Oil £/Ton 87* 95 82* -13.2
Sugar 
(Fas Cuba)
Conta/lb 3.25 4.90 3.85 -21.4
Cocoa Bh'owt. 244* 192 305* +59.1
Wheat
c .i .f .  U.K.
£/TOn 30/6/6 32/9/9 27/15/6 -14.5
Maize
c .i.f . U.K.
£/TOn 24/H/9 27/13/;? 21/3/9 -23.5
Barley 
c .i.f . U.K.
£/Ton 25/7/- 28/7/9 20/5/- -28.7
Shellac
(Futures)
tsVcwt. 358* 292* 176 -39.8
Source 1 The Economist (v.186) Jan. 4* 1958» p.58
Consequently the r is e  In conference rates of 15-20# 
could not lead by I t s e lf  to any sign ifican t changes 
in c . i . f .  prices of these commodities. For example 
in the case of raw Jute the 15# fre ight surcharge, 
worked out at 3 l/5d., was equal to 1.4# of the price 
which prevailed in July 1956.
Under these oircumstances it  was not expected 
that the changes whioh took place in freight rates  
would s ign ific an tly  Influence market prices. In fact 
changes in the prices of most of the Sues borne 
commodities were due to faotors other tkan the cost 
of fre igh t . Immediately a fter the Is ra e li  attack on 
Sinai, but particu larly  a fte r the Anglo-French 
intervention in Suez prices of a l l  the Suez borne 
commodities were soaring. For example the price of 
Indian plain  tea rose from 3/6d. per lb . on October 
28th to 4/5^d on 9th November. The fre ight surcharge 
could not have accounted fo r  more than a fractiona l 
increase in such a r is e  In price , i . e . ,  about id . 
per lb . Yet market speculations about the future  
supply positions were quite active and led  to sharp 
increases in commodity prices until the task o f 
clearing the Canal was begun and it  became possible  
to estimate an approximate date fo r  the re-opening 
of the waterway. Speculations were so e ffec tive  in 
fix in g  market prices especially  when the stocks of 
some commodity were known to be particu larly  low,
4C&.
e .g .,  t in . Another Important factor which affected  
market pricea waa the sudden interruption of the normal 
flow of imports in November and then the irregu lar  
a rr iv a l of shipments in the months that followed. 
Diagrams 54, 55, 56, and 57 demonstrate the changes 
which took place in the prices o f rubber, t in , tea 
and copper. It  is c lea r that the most Important changes 
in pidces in a l l  the oases had taken place either 
before or on the eve of the Suez Canal closure.
Market speculations had obviously played an important 
ro le in these changes. The r ise  In pricea during 
November and their maintenance at a re la t iv e ly  higher 
le v e l, in a l l  cases but copper, during December had 
also been a resu lt of the sudden interruption of 
imports and the f a l l  in market stooks. Besides these 
examples there is  a lso  some evidence whioh suggested 
that the higher prices of Australian meat during 
January and February 1957 were partly  due to the 
Irregu lar shipping services between Australia and 
the U.K. a fte r the closure of the Canal.
So fa r  we dealt with a l l  d ifferent cases except 
that of o i l .  That was the commodity which had been 
most affected by the Suez c ris is  and i t  would be 
reasonable therefore to explain the changes in Its  
prices in some d e ta il. F irs t , me may examine the 
influence which freight rates had exerted on prices
410.
RUBBER PRICES IN LONDON MARKET.
(Prices of spot rubber sales quoted daily  at 5 P*m) 
Source:Financial Times,March 14,1957sP.5»
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COPPER PRICES IN LONDON MARKET.
Source:Financial Times,February 12,1957>P*7
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TIN PRICES (CASH) IN LONDON MARKET. 
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DIAGRAM ( 56) .
I'iiv,
Jc/r*ON
Coo 4 .. «
Tam r *H A V*J O ‘n "0 J* n n"V
HfC Hf? ;kfroaT
DIAGRAM (57).
INDIAN PLAIN TEA PRICE3 IN LONDON MARKET. 
SourcetFinancial Times,March 0,1957>P*5«
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and then we sh a ll draw an outline fo r the changes 
which took place in f .o .b .  prices* We have observed 
in pages 4 0 0 -4 0 2  that the most dramatic changes in 
fre ight rates had taken place in the tramp tanker 
market* Changes in A.F.R.A* rates were re la t iv e ly  
much more moderate* Normally about 10$ o f the o i l  
trade was carried in vessels hired on the spot whereas 
the rest was carried by o i l companies owned tankers or 
by tankers hired on long-term cortracts. Yet during 
the two months which followed the closure of the Canal 
a much la rger proportion of o i l ,  about 50$ of Europe fs 
o i l ,  was carried in  tramp tankers hired on the spot* 
Between October and December 1956 c * l* f*  o i l  prices 
in Britain  recorded an increase o f 11*2$ large ly  
because of the violent r is e  in single voyage rates 
of fre igh t* A.F.R.A. rates reoorded no Increases 
between October 1956 and the 1st of January 1957 and
f .o .b .  o i l  prices showed only minor changes during 
that period. The drastic f a l l  in single voyage rates 
during 1957 was, however, much less  important in 
fix in g  c . i . f *  prices since the dependence on tramp 
tankers was successively reduced from January onwards.
Delivered o i l  price continued to r is e  un til April 
1957 when i t  beearns 40.5$ above the leve l of July 
1956 (B ritish  p r ice s ). The considerable r is e  in 
A*F.R.A. rates in  the 1st January was fu l ly  maintained
4 1 1 .
during the f i r s t  quarter of 1957* Also, the cost 
of fre igh t was s t i l l  s ign ifican tly  re lated  to the 
high rates which prevailed in the tramp market during 
the last two months of 1956 ( i . e .  shipping contracts 
drawn in advance).
Changes in posted prices, f .o .b . ,  must also be 
taken into consideration i f  a complete explanation 
to the changes in c . i . f .  prices is  d es ired . The f i r s t  
change in f .o .b .  prices was im plicit in the substitution  
of Middle East o i l  fb r  the more expensive American o i l .  
Such a change in the cost of o i l  was gradually and 
increasingly fe lt  with the r ise  in  the percentage of 
Imports from the U.S. Gulf. Ihe preosuro of the 
sudden and large Increase in  the demand of Western 
Europe fo r  U.S. crude was, however, bound to ra ise  
its  price. During November and December 1956 U.S. 
producers managed to maintain their posted prices at 
the old love l o f JUne 1953. Nevertheless, the demand 
for o i l  products in  the U.S. was particu larly  active  
during the period of the c ris is  so that an American
.
purchasing company which f e l t  unable to secure 
su ffic ien t supplies of crude at the old price, 
voluntarily raised  its  buying price in Texas by 12$.
That was on 3rd January 1957. Immediately the move 
was followed by other U.S. o i l  purchasing companies 
so that within the f i r s t  week of January posted prices
4 1 2 .
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( 21)
in a l l  American fie ld s  were raised to new le v e ls .
The increase in prices varied from 25 to 45 cents 
per b a rre l, 9 to 14.5$, according to the degree of 
 ^ gravity o f o i l  and the proximity to the Gulf ports. 
Subsequently the f .o .b .  prices of Venezuelan o i l  
followed the trend established by the U.S.
Persian Gulf f .o .b .  pricea wore maintained at 
their p re -c ris is  le v e l throughout the period of the 
Canal closure. Theoretically speaking Persian Gulf 
producers were at a competitive disadvantage because 
of the need to de liver their o i l  to the Western market 
via the longer sea route. Therefore the ir f .o .b .  prices 
should have been lowered to allow for the increased 
cost of transport to be absorbed and to maintain the ir  
market. However, Persian Gulf producers rea lised  
that the maintenance of the size  o f th e ir  market west
m
of Suez was impossible even i f  they had reduced the ir  
prices because of the shortage In tanker tonnage and 
Europefs need to re ly  on nearer sources of supply. 
Besides, the major supplying companies of the Middle 
East with long-term Interests at stake could not 
obviously risk  changing their basic prices in 
response to a short-term emergency.
With the re-opening of the Suez Canal market 
forces began to operate and soon the link  between 
the Western Hemisphere and Middle East o i l  prices
(21) Petroleum Press Service , February 1957, p .41-43,
was re-estab lished . Kuwait f .o .b .  price was 
advanced by 13 cents a barre l at the end of May 
1957 and soon other exporting ports at the Persian  
Gulf raised  their crude prices by 9 to 17 cents above 
old prices. It  w i l l  be noticed f r o *  Table (43) that 
these advances in Middle East o i l  prices were smaller 
than those made by Western Hemisphere producers during 
the c r is is .
By the removal of the transport surcharge imposed 
during the closure of the Canal and by the return to 
the consumption of the cheaper Middle East o i l  c . i . f .  
prices began to decrease. the beginning at June 
1957 crude delivered prices in Europe had become only 
6 to 3$ a b o v e  their July 1956 leve l. See Table (49) fo r  
monthly changes In o . l . f .  o i l  prices in B ritain .
During the c r is is  market o i l  prices In Europe 
were s ign ifican tly  influenced by the changes in  
c . i . f .  prices as well as by the changes in supplies.
In B rita in , on the 4th December, r e t a i l  prices of 
motor fu e l were ra ised  by l/5d per ga llon . The new 
r e ta il  prloea fo r  premier grade motor s p ir it  became 
6/-^d and for standard grades 5/6^d. The wholesale 
price o f d ie se l fue l fo r  road vehicles was raised by 
about 25$ to 5/-f d . ,whereas the r e t a i l  price o f that 
group was advanced from 4/lfd . to 5/6;d. The price  
of heavy fu e l o i l  was Increased from 11 d. to l/g|d ., 
a r is e  o f about 31$.
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TABLE ( 4 9 ) *
CRUDE OIL IMPORTS AMD PRICES c . i . f .
Year Month Crude
Imports
Million
Tens
Crude
Oil
Prices
c .i .f .
1955 July 2.280
£/Ten
8.183
Aug. 2.511 8.123
Sep. 2.255 8.110
Oct. 2.243 8.181
Nov* 2.174 8.175
^ c . 2.431 8.297
1956 Jan. 2.285 8.539
Feb. 2.448 8.444
Mar. 2.287 8.547
Apr. 2.533 8.357
May 2.595 8.271
June 2.531 8.335
July 2.537 8.228
Aug. 3.065 8.491
Sep. 2.257 8.468
Oct. 2.617 9.086
Nov. 1.603 9.171
^eo. 1.941 10.101
1957 Jan. 1.622 10.394
Feb. 1.778 10.959
Mar. 2.275 I I .277
Apr. 2.474 11.562
May 2.728 10.890
June 2.451 9.989
July 2.956 9.588
Sources Basic data compiled from Accounts Relating to 
Trade and Navigation of the U.K.
consisted o f aa increase in the motor Ihe l duty,
i . e . ,  from 2/6d. to 3/6d. per gallon, in order to
re-in force o i l  rationing and to provide extra tax
( 22)
revenue to the government during the emergency.
The increases in basic prices which o i l  companies
had been allowed to charge were su ffic ien t to cover
the r ise  in c . i . f .  prices and the increased cost of
d istribution  due to the supply shortage and the need
to operate the d istribution  system at a reduced sca le .
(23)
The Financial Times reported that the higher cost
o f ocean transportation had forced o i l  companies to
raise  the fre ight element from 3d. to 5jd. a gallon
on a l l  o i l  products. Proportionally, therefore,
the r ise  in the oost of transport was higher than
the r ise  in the petrol tax. The oost to industry
because of this r is e  in  prices of o i l  products was
(24)
estimated as fo llow st-
(22) See a lso  Table (50)
(23) "The Financial Times" -  See December 5, 1956, or
Maroh 13, 1957.
(24) "The Financial Times", December 5, 1956#
Most of the r ise  in r e ta i l  petrol prices
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1!ABI£ (50)
W* Europe I RETAIL HIICES OF ORDINARY CRUDE MOTOR GASOLINE 
Actual or Equivalent in Penoe per Imp* Gallon
1/11/56 1/1/57 Increase
London (a) 49* 66* 17
Dublin 47* 51* 4
Athena 52* 54* 1*
Paris 76 83 7
Brussels 50 51* 1*
The Hague (a) 30* 47* 8*
Zurich 43* 51* 8
Hamburg 57* 60* 3
Rome (a) 79* 88* e*
Vienna 46* 46* mm
Stockholm 47 50 3
Copenhagen 51* 55* 4
Oslo 53* 55 i*
Helsinki 70* 70* -
Reykjavik 51* 51* -
Madrid 86 86 -
Lisbon 61* 68 6*
(a) The lnoreaeo was chiefly due to higher taxes
Referencei Petroleum Areas Service, Vel* 24 -  19571 P*20 (January)
(approximately per annum) £ M illion
A ll goods v e h ic le s .* . . ............ 40
B ritish  Transport Commission,
(including B rit ish  Road Services 
£2 m. ard London Transport £2 m.) 1 0 - 1 2
Agriculture * 5 . 7
Steel making 5
Glass Industry .750
Non-ferrous metals 1
Ceramics .250
During February and March 1957 the inland supply 
position was so improving that it was possible to 
ease measures which were taken e a r lie r  fo r petroleum 
rationing# The Improvement in supplies was consequent 
upon the increased rate of imports irom the Westera 
hemisphere as well as upon savings made by the Central
e lectr ic ity  -Authority and by the steel industry, by
(25)
the substitution o f fue l o i l  by coa l-ta r lue ls. 
Moreover on March 19th wholesale prices of petroleum 
were raised once more. A ll grades of motor gasoline 
and a l l  fu e l o ils  were up by id .  a gallon; aviation  
gasoline by ^d. a ga llon , white sp ir it  turbine fue l 
and kerosene by Id . a gallon  and gas/diesel o ils  
were up by l£d. a g a llo n . Retail gasoline prices
(25) See E.E.C. Europe’s Need Ibr O il, p .77.
were advanced by Id . a g a l lo n  to 5/7^d a ga llon  fo r  
standard grade in the inner zone, 6/l^d fo r  premium 
grade and 6/5d. fo r  100 octane £p*ade, which, however, 
was tem porarily  o f f  the market. I t  Is  not c le a r  whether 
that r i s e  in p r ices  of petroleum was aimed at encouraging  
more su b s t itu t io n  of coal fo r  o i l  or as means o f  p rotection  
to a v a i la b le  stocks a f t e r  easing d ire c t  ra t ion ing  measures. 
Yet, th is  second r i s e  In market p rices  o f  petroleum might 
a lso  be ju s t i f i e d  on the basis  that c . i . f .  p rices  were 
s t i l l  r i s in g  by that time. A fte r  the re -opening o f  the 
Suez Canal lower transport costs made i t  p o ss ib le  to 
remove part o f the emergency surcharge on s e l l i n g  prices  
fo r petroleum products. Yet, the return to the pre­
c r i s i s  s e l l in g  p rices  could not be achieved due’ to
the h igher f . o . b .  p rices o f  crude which were s t i l l
(26)
maintained. See a lso  Table (51) fo r  the changes 
in bunker fu e l  p r ic e s .
4 2 0 .
(25) A reduction o f  ^d. per ga llon  in wholesale p rices  
o f gaso lin e  alone was announced on 2nd May 1957. 
On 18th May wholesale prices of a l l  the major 
petroleum products were reduced by l*-d a g a l lo n .  
These reductions were sm aller than the Increases  
made in  petroleum p r ic e s  during the Suez c lo su re  
( e . g .  on 13th May 1957 r e t a i l  p r ices  were 4/4d. 
per g a l lo n  fo r  standard grades gaso line  compared 
with 4/ l «  on 4th December 1956, a d if fe ren ce  o f
2-Jd per ga llon  ok* more than £ 2 . 1 0 / -  per t o n ) .  
Pricea were again reduced on November 13th 1957 
and on February 18th 1958, each time by about 
f d .  per g a l lo n .
---------
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The Effect of tba Crlala on Imports, s p o r t s  and 
th . Balance of Ifrada.
In the f i r s t  month of the Cana! closure,
November 1950, B rita in 's  net imports ( i . e .  exclusive 
of re-exports) were lower by £23.7 m. from the 
corresponding leve l of 1955 ard by £9.7 m. from the 
monthly average of January-Ootober 1958. This f a l l  
was largely  due to the delay in the a rr iv a l of Eastern 
t r a f f ic  due to the sudden closure of the Suez route. 
Imports o f crude o i l  alone were lower by more than £7m. 
from the monthly average of the ten months which enied 
October 1956. Imports from the B ritish  Commonwealth 
countries in  Asia, exclusive of the Persian Gulf 
countries, were lower by about £10 m. from the average 
of January-October. B rita in 's  imports from Austra lia  
showed a considerable growth during November. 
A u stra lia n 't ra ff ic  was normally serviced through the 
Suez Canal but was re-routed without more d if f ic u lty  
via the Caps and Panama.
B ritish  exports continued to increase in the 
f i r s t  month of the 3uez disruptions. November's 
net exports (exclusive of re-exports) were £29 m. 
higher then the average of the f i r s t  ten months of 
the year. The r is e  had oeen particu larly  marked 
in shipments to North America. Yet exports to Jiast 
o f Suez were also buoyant. Net exports to the
422.
Commonwealth countries East of Suez -  exclusive of 
Australasia -  were £42.4 ia* compared with £57.5 m. . 
the average o f the ten months January-October. The 
closure of the Suez Canal could not a ffect eotports 
immediately because the required tonnage fo r November 
shipments was available at B ritish  parts. The situation  
in December was c learly  d iffe ren t. By that time the 
shortage in  shipping tonnage which developed during 
November as w ell as the d islocation  in shipping 
schedules had cut down tonnage ava ilab le  for exports. 
Consequently net exports were £53.2 m. lower than the 
le v e l o f the f ir s t  month o f the c r is is .  Unlike imports 
the f a l l  in B ritish  exports was not only lim ited to the 
region East of Suez. It  may be added that the f a l l  in  
December's exports was partly due to the shorter number 
of working days in  that month. Yet whilst in the f i r s t  
eleven months of 1956 the value of British exports was 
about 10% higher tban that of 1955, exports during 
December 195 6 were almost unchanged from that of 
December 1955.
The trade returns of the second month of the 
Canal closure snowed a further f a l l  in imports, from 
£504.8 m. in x^ovember to £296.5 m. in December. Ihe 
la tte r  figu re  was £28.2 m. below that of December 1955. 
However, total Imports from East of Suez were higher 
than those of November due to the a rr iv a l of the
425
shipments which were re-routed round the Cape.
Total imports from the B ritish  Commonwealth countries 
in East A frica  and Asia (inclusive o f the Persian 
Gulf protectorates) were higher by £13.0 m. over 
the level of November.
As a resu lt o f the unusual f a l l  in Imports 
during November 1956 whilst exports continued to 
increase, the trade gap in that month was greatly  
narrowed. The figu re  of November (net imports c . i . f .
- net exports f . o . b . ) was only about £13 m. compared 
with abodt £52 m. the average of the f i r s t  ten months 
in 1956. In December the gap was raised to £43.0 m. 
mainly as a resu lt o f  the f a l l  in exports.
For 1956 as a wnole the trade gap stood at £568 m 
compared with £356.5 m. in 1955. As i t  has already 
been shown a small part of th is f a l l  was due to the 
Suez disturbances which forced a f a l l  in imports 
higher than that of exports. On the other hand, the 
trade gap in 1956 was in fla ted  by the r is e  in import 
pricea, a l i t t l e  more than 2% over 1955, and by the 
considerable r is e  in fre igh t rates in the last five  
months of the year. Normally shipping costs, freight  
and insurance, accounted for about 10% of the total 
costs of landed imports. I f  such a proportion Is  to 
be applied to the Imports ( c . i . f . )  of 1955 and 1956 
the net trade gap ( I . e .  Imports f .o .b .  -  exports f . o . b . )
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in these years would be £430.3 m. and £194.0 a.
respectively. Yet in 1956 liners fre ight rates
were about 6.3$ above those which prevailed in 1955
while voyage charter rates were about 50% higher and
time charter rates about 33$ higher. Therefore, we
should expect to find that the fre ight element had
occupied a much higher percentage in the imparts
value c . i . f .  in 1956.
Unfortunately we have no information as regards
the actual proportion whioh freight and insurance
occupied in the value of landed imports. In the
o f f ic ia l  statement of the U.K. Balance of Payments
imports are normally given In f .o .b .  values. Yet
fo r several reasons i t  Is not possible to deduct the
fre ight and Insurance elements by comparing d irectly
Imports f .o .b .  as given in that statement and imports
(27)
c . i . f .  as given in the Trade and Navigation Accounts.
4 2 5 .
(27) For a detailed  statement on the differences  
between the figures of imports and exports 
In the "balance of payments'1 and those in the 
"Trade and Navigation Accounts". See the 
o f f ic ia l  statement of the "U.K. Balance of 
Payments" by H.M. Treasury -  published annually.
me trade gap as given in the U.K. .balance of 
Payments (to ta l imports f .o .b . -  total exports f .o .b )  
was £51 m. f jp  1956 compared with £356 m. in 1955.
Although these figures are not s t r ic t ly  comparable 
with those which we have calculated above (imports 
c . i . f  -  exports f .o .b )  a comparison between them 
may roughly indicate the significance of the cost o f  
transport in 1956 imports c . i . f .
In Januaiy 1957 landed imports reaohed £376.5 m.,
£52 m. above 1956 average and the highest monthly to ta l 
ever recorded un til that time. Exports, on the other 
hand, were £3 m. above the corresponding figure  of 
January 1956, i . e . ,  £261 m. compared with £258 m., 
but were £3 m. below 19561 average. Due to that 
strik ing rise  in  imports, generally explained by the 
dislocations in shipping schedules, whilst exports 
increased only s ile n t ly  the trade gap in January 
increased to £103.9 m. That was the highest monthly 
average since the dock s trike in the mid months of
1955. During the fo llow ing three months B ritish  
imports and exports continued to show some unusual 
fluctuations. For example exports rose in February 
by £17 m. Nevertheless considerirg the four months 
January -  ~ p r il 1957 in total we find that the Suez 
Canal closure had on the average exerted a very 
moderate effect on B r ita in fs external trade. See Table (52)
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Commonwealth in the Far East averaged £32*8 in. per
month during that period* This figure was £3*8 m.
higher than the corresponding average of January -
A p ril 1956* The case was somewhat different with the
colonies and protectorates In East Africa* Imports
in January -  A p ril 1957 showed progress over the
corresponding average o f 1956, but were s t i l l  below
the average o f 1956 (12 months average, see Table).
On the other hand imports from the B ritish  protectorates
in the Middle East area showed a clear sign of decline
because of the situation  of the o i l  trade* It  must be
emphasised, however, that the f a l l  in imports c * i . f *
was largely  concealed by the sharp r ise  in freight
rates# For eotaraple during February 1957 the volume
of o i l  imports from Kuwait was about 26$ below that
of the corresponding month in 1956, meantime the
value of such imports c . i . f *  was only 5$ lower.
During the period January -  A p ril 1957 exports
to East of Suez, with the exception of the East
(28)
African region, showed a remarkable growth* In
(28) Generally speaking it  seems that the trade with 
East A frica  was hindered to some degree by the 
closure of the Canal and the r is e  in f  reight 
rates, it  may be reca lled  that that r ise  was 
most dramatic in this particular case*
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For example Imports c . i . f .  from the B ritish
fact we find no evidence to indicate that exports, 
on the average, were hindered by the closure o f the 
Canal during that period. B ritish  exports to Asian 
Commonwealth countries East of Sues were about 15$ 
above the corresponding average of January -  A p ril
1956. This rate  of growth was about double that 
achieved fo r to ta l B ritish  exports, taking the same 
periods into account.
Generally speaking, therefore, the impact of the 
Sues closure on the trade was much less serious than 
i t  had generally been assumed when the disturbances 
began. Imports and exports had been badly disturbed  
during the f i r s t  two or three months of the closure 
but a fte r that the e ffec t of ship re-routing was less  
marked. The trade was becoming more settled  on the 
basis of voyages via  the Cape a fte r  shipping tonnage 
was e ffec tive ly  increased by withdrawal from the
American reserve f le e t  and the la id -up tonnage.%
I t  must be emphasised however that the situation  was 
d ifferent in so fa r  as o i l  trade was concerned. The 
Canal closure s ign ifican tly  affected that trade by 
volume and by value, changed the sources of supply 
and, therefore, burdened the U.K. balance of payments 
with the do lla r area. The la tte r  point is  explained  
in some d e ta il la te r . The Canal alosure also exerted 
an Important e ffect on the trade gap when that was
429*
calculated on monthly basis* Yet considering the 
annual value of the U*K* external trade we find  that 
the trade gap in 1956 was not seriously affected by 
the changes in the Imports and exports figures of 
the last two months* In 1957 the fluctuations in  
the figures of the f ir s t  four or fiv e  momths had by 
themselves exerted no influence on the annual trade 
because taken on the whole they presented no change 
d iffe re rt from the normal trend*
However the s ta t is t ic a l trade gap (imports c . i . f .  
-  exports f .o * b . )  was s ign ifican tly  influenced by the 
changes in fre ight rates* As we have seen the r is e  
In rates in 1956 added considerably to the cost of 
Imports c * l* f*  On the other hand the dramatic f a l l  
in fre ight rates throughout 1957 must have had Its  
effect on the trade gap* Yet we have not been aule 
to estimate quantitatively the gross amount of freight  
charged over B ritish  imports durirg 1956 and 1957 due 
to the lack of s ta t is t ic s *  Ihe effect of the changes 
in fre igh t and Insurance rates on the balance of 
payments Is a d ifferen t matter and is d e a lt  with 
separately under B ritish  shipping earnings*
One of the amazing facts which the above analysis  
of 1956-1957 trade figures bas shown was the consid­
erable growth of B r ita in fs exports to Asia during the 
Suez closure* There had been so much fears> when the 
cris is  started that the Japanese manufacturers would 
be given extra advantages over the European in the 
Aslan market because of the closure o f the Canal.
Yet the f a l l  in fre igh t rates in 1957 and the quick 
re-opening of the Canal could not hinder the normal 
growth of the trade.
431.
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F irsti -aarnlngs from dry cargo tonnage:
During the post-War period -  u n til 1956 -  j^ritain 
was always a net exporter and a net earner on dry cargo 
account by a substantial margin* Nevertheless i t  would 
not lie reasonable to jump to any conclusions about net 
earnings during the Suez c ris is  on the basis of these 
facts alone* The existence of two separate markets 
fo r  dry cargo tonnage, i * e . ,  tramp shipping and lin e rs , 
each with d ifferen t price mechanismSwould necessitate '  
an investigation into the composition of the B ritish  
f le e t*  Between the end of the War and 1956 B rita in  
was increasingly re ly in g  on the services of the lin e r  
fle e t  in  shipping earnings* Such a f le e t  had there­
fore kept pace with the growth of world tonnage. On 
the other hand tramp tonnage ha& declined from about 
5*5 m* tons before the War to 2*5 m* tons in  1956*
Thus although B ritain  remained on the average a net 
exporter of tonnage she became a net Importer of tramp 
tonnage. In turn shipping earnings were bound to be 
affected by changes in tramp rates whioh normally 
showed violent fluctuations i f  compared with lin e r  
rates*
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Diagram (58) shows that during the period 1952­
1957 shipping debits (i*e *  B ritish  shipping disburse­
ments abroad plus payments to foreign shipowners) 
were adversely correlated, to a very sign ificant  
degree, to the "sharp" changes in tramp freight rates, 
l * e * ,  in  the second ha lf of 1952 and between July 1954 
and Deoember 1956 (Since the diagram shows that lin e r  
rates were on the average changing d irectly  with tramp 
rates it  must be emphasised that shipping debits were 
not by any means adversely affected by changes in  lin e r  
rates, B ritain  was a net exporter of lin e r  tonnage -  
see above)* On the other hand changes in shipping 
credits ( l* e *  overseas earnings by B ritish  ships plus 
foreign ships disbursements in  the U.K) were c le a r ly  
as the diagram demonstrates d irectly  correlated to 
lin ers more than to tramp freight ra te s*  However, 
i t  must be made clear that since the B ritish  fle e t  
consisted o f lin ers  as well as tramp ships shipping 
credits were bound to be increased by any r is e  in 
freight rates whatever its  source, and vice versa* 
Normally there would be many factors other than fre ight  
rates which would a lso  determine shipping earnings*
But as we observe from the above picture freight rates  
had obviously played a sign ificant role* The diagram 
shows that shipping debits were only reduced when 
tramp rates were depressed. On the other hand violent
433*
increases In tramp rates -  particu larly  In periods when 
a higher degree of dependence was placed on tramp 
tonnage such as the second ha lf of 1956 -  resu lted  
in greater paymehbs to foreign  tramp owners. And 
(given a oertain period of time), when lin e r rates 
were not increased as greatly  as tramp rates, net 
earnings were e ffec tiv e ly  reduced. That was exactly 
the situation  in 1955 and In 1956* In the la t te r  
year, as it  has been explained e a r lie r , the r ise  in  
tramp rates was continued above the high leve l of 
1955 and then was dramatically in tensified  during 
the Suez c r is is .  Table (53) shows that net earnings 
declined by £26m* and £18m* in 1955 and 1956 respect­
ive ly . The smaller f a l l  In net earnings in  1956 «  
compared with 1955 -  was walnly due to the fact that 
lin e r  rates were stronger in the year o f the Suez 
c r is is .  In the f i r s t  h a lf of 1957 we can c learly  see 
that the s trength of lin e r  rates whilst tramp rates 
were fa llin g  led to a r is e  in  net earnings. Yet that 
r ise  was only a moderate one because shipping debits  
were s t i l l  correlated to the high tramp rates which 
prevailed a fte r the Canal closure, i . e . ,  many ships 
were chartored a few months in advance especially  
during the panio whioh prevailed among charterers 
immediately a fte r  the closure of the Canal* See also  
Table (54) which shows the U*K* net shipping earnings 
with principal trading areas* In the l i ^ i t  of the
434*
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above analysis it  would be easy to deduce that the 
foreign  owners o f tramp ships which served the 
B rit ish  trade were mainly within the O.E.E.C* group 
of countries*
Second? Tankera aarnlngat
In tankers a lso  B ritain  was a net earner* It  was 
estimated in 1956 that B rita in  was a net exporter of 
about 30$ of her tanker tonnage, which by then counted 
for about 19$ of the world tanker fle e t*
Most o f B r ita in ’s tanker f le e t  was owned by B rit ish  
o i l  companies and employed on long-term charters* Thus 
from this angle the r ise  voyage oharter rates (tramp 
tankers) during 1956 must have had an adverse e ffect  
on net earnings* Also, such an adverse effect must 
have been seriously unfavourable during November and 
December in  particu lar because* (a ) A.F.R*A. rates 
were kept donatant, ard (b ) a much la rge r  proportion 
o f o i l  trade was carried in tramp tankers* Again in  
1957 the situation  was very sim ilar to that one that 
has already been drawn for non-tankers*
The analysis here can not go further, however, 
since s ta t is t ic s  fo r  payments and receipts in respect 
o f o i l  tankers were never given separately in the U.K 
Balance of Payments or in any other documents.
Tankers earnings were always given together with 
many other items and these cannot be s eparated without 
the o f f ic i a l  help of the 'Treasury.
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Ha_a££ft0.t q£ tbs _Crlal8 on Sterling and the
S a & JU & J& M N L  ««,qervaa.
Immediately a fte r  the nationalisation of the 
Suez Canal Sterling was strongly affected by the 
uncertainties about the future o f the B ritish  Eastern 
trade and by the fears that B rita in  mi$it become 
Involved in a Middle East war* Diagram (59) shows 
that the transferable Sterling rate  of exchange 
against the d o lla r  was quite sensitive to the 
p o lit ic a l development; o f the Sues c r is is *  The rate  
f e l l  heavily during August and early September and 
then recovered when the Suez question was re ferred  
to the U*N* and i t  looked as i f  a Suez war had been
f
averted* Nevertheless with the re-appearance of war 
clouds in  la te  October transferable Sterling f e l l
*9
again* The f a l l  was however most dramatic during 
the actual fighting which took place in the Canal 
zone; the rate f e l l  under ^2*74* The diagram shows 
that the fluctuations in the spot rate of exchange 
were very moderate re la tive ly * Yet this situation  
was due to the o f f ic ia l  measures given to Sterling  
throughout the c r is is  to prevent i t  from fa l l in g  
below jfe*73i'* It  must be emphasised however that 
the changes in the Sterling rates of exchange were 
not only governed by market speculations about the
prospects of war and about the possible effect o f  
the c r is is  on the j^ritlsh balance of payments.
Other factors such as the freezing of the Egyptian 
Sterling account at the Bank of England had also  
unfavourably affected the situation  of the B ritish  
currency. To oircumvent the move taken by the B rit ish  
government and to show their sympathy with the Egyptians, 
the Chinese made substantial sales of th e ir  transferable  
Sterling in Zurich market and obtained Swiss francs 
which were forwarded to help Egypt in financing her 
external t rado. Besides, some other f*riendly countries 
with Egypt were anxious to withdraw their Sterling  
accounts which they held in  B ritain  le s t  these might 
be also blocked i f  the Suez dispute developed seriously . 
Taking into account the large holdings of the Middle 
East countries, the e ffect o f this attitude on the 
pound was sp ec ia lly  serious. Wlthdrawitl o f Sterling  
balances from London was particu larly  active during 
August and early  September. Yet there had also been 
heavy s e ll in g  of Sterling on the part o f these countries 
a fte r the November cease f ir e  in  the Suez zone. The 
Economist (November 17, 1956) wrotet "Seme of the 
pressure on Sterling within the la st  ten days has been 
due to heavy se llin g  from Middle Eastern quarters.
The shieks have been running down the ir Sterling  
balances and the conversion to do llars has been
439.
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effected through the transferable market, where the 
rate fo r Sterling In terms o f  do llars dipped towards 
the end o f la s t  week to ^2.73, then recovered to 
>f2.74i, but has again weakened to #2 .75 i.*
Another factor which affected the do lla r reserves 
throughout the closure of the Suez Canal was the 
additional d o lla r  payments for Wastern Hemisphere 
o i l .  In 1956 and 1957 crude imports from the U.S. 
were Increased by £5.2 m. and £22 m. above the leve l 
of 1955. Imports of o i l  products (as a result o f the 
shortage in  crude supplies) were increased by £2.3 m. 
and £26.0 m. above the leve l of 1955 in 1956 and 1957 
respe otively . Thus altogether o i l  imports from the 
U.S. were increased bt £7.5 m. and £43.0 during 1956 
and 1957 because of the closure o f the Canal and the 
I.P .C . p ipeline. , These Imports, in d istinction  from 
others vhloh came from the rest of the Western Hemis­
phere, were paid in d o lla rs . It  may seem strange to
add such a statement but in faot agreements among
international o i l  companies were very e ffective  In 
breaking down the currency b a rr ie rs . In 1956 and 
1957 imports of o i l  from Venezuela were Increased by 
£4.5 m. and £25.5 m, respectively , above the leve l of 
1955. These Increases were also due to the Suez
clrcunstaboos but it is  not known to us how large  was
the do lla r  component when payments were made to
Venezuela. In fa c t , in the absence o f any o f f ic ia l
estimate fo r the net do lla r  cost in  o i l  Imports it
is not possible to measure exactly the drain  in the
reserves consequent upon the purchase of o i l  from
the do lla r area -  Instead of the Middle East -  during
(29)
the Suez c r is is .
4 4 1 .
(29 ) O ffic ia l s ta t is t ic s  gave no spec ific  information 
either on this matter or on the contributions 
which B ritish  o i l  companies and British  tankers 
made to do lla r earnings. See fo r Instance the 
"Economist", A p ril, 13, 1957, "O il in the Dark". 
During the period of the Canal closure some 
estimates appeared in the Press about the 
additional d o lla r  payments fo r o i l  imports 
from the Western Hemisphere, yet these 
varied between £30 m. a month (the "Economist”, 
Feb, 9, ard May 18, 1957) and £40-50 m. a 
month, (Petroleum Press Service, Jan. 2,
1957). Although it  was admitted that these 
estimates were subject to e rro r, i t  should 
be added that they were made at the beginning 
o f the c r is is  shen it  was wrongly assumed 
that moat o f the gap In Middle East crude 
Imparts would be covered by crude imports 
from the U.S. and Venezuela. 5mailer 
amounts of crude o i l  than expected came 
from the U.S. and Instead came la rger  
Imports of the more expensive o i l  products, 
nlso estimates o f the do lla r oost at 
beginning o f the c r is is  could not, however, 
take into account the substantial r ise  in  
o. 1.1 . p rl c e s .
Additional do lla r payments to the Western 
Hemisphere and the withdrawal of some o f the s te rlin g  
balances in B rita in  by Middle Eastern countries 
exerted a direct e ffec t on the reserves. Yet, more 
important in  a ffecting  the position o f the reserves 
was the f a l l  in the Sterling rate of exchange. That 
was due to the considerable amounts of short-term funds 
whioh were normally attracted to London to take refuge 
in Sterling as a world reserve currency.
During the f i r s t  h a lf of 1955 gold aid do lla r  
reserves were bu ild ing up at a remarkably higher rate 
than that o f 1955. By the end o f July reserves stood 
at the ir best for 1956 when they amounted to £2,405 m.
Following the nationalisation of the Canal and the 
subsequent events the drain  in the gold ard do lla r  
reserves was quite notable) by £129 m. in August 
alone. The o f f ic ia l  figu re  fo r Sept ember showed an 
Improvement in the reserves by £52 m., but that was 
su p erfic ia l. What had concealed the true situation  
was the sale of Trinidad O il Co. to U.S. Interests  
whioh added to the reserves £177 m. during September.
I f  that sum was le f t  out of the reckoning September's 
figu re  would have recorded a d e fic it  of £125 m.
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The moat dramatic f a i l  In the gold and do lla r  
reserves camo during November, I . e . ,  by £279 m.
But even this high figure  was underestimating the 
actual f a l l  because of the receipt o f  £30 m. from 
the sale of over ha lf o f the Treasury's holding of 
U.S. government bonds and also because the settlement 
with the European Payments Union, £28 m. was one 
month in arrear.
During December the situation  was changing.
The withdrawal of the B ritish  troops from the Canal 
zone was a decision that the U.S. government had 
strongly recommended and thus once i t  was taken it  
paved the way for receiving American help. £500 m. 
credit from the Export -  Import Bank was made availab le  
to Britain  to finance purchases of specified  goods 
from the U.S. Traditionally the Bank confined its  
credits to the purchase of American cap ita l goods, 
but under the circumstances of Suez purchases of o i l ,  
coal, wheat, tobacco, stee l and o i l  from Venezuela 
were covered. The second re-inforoement to B rita in 's  
gold reserves and currency came on the 10th of December 
when the government announced that £561.5 m. had been 
drawn from the I.M .F. The sum comprised B rita in 's  
gold tranche o f £236.5 m. and 25$ of her quota in the 
Fund, i . e . ,  £325 m. Moreover the I.M .F. released the 
whole of the remainder of the B ritish  quota, i . e . ,
4 4 3 .
£738.5 m., as stand-by cred it. The reserves1 
third reinforcement came about by invoking the 
waiver on the Interest due on December 31 on the 
American post-war loans. B rita in  paid U.S.A.
£72 m. of principal on the loan of 1945/6, but asked 
for cancellation o f £104 m. of interest payments.
A new agreement was negotiated. By i t  U.K. could 
postpone u n til the early  years of next century and 
at 2$ per annum both principal and interest. But 
it  could not do so on more than seven occasions; and 
i t  promised not to do so in the immediate future.
In fact i t  used the esoape provision for 1956 and 1957.
A fter taking into account the £561.5 m. loan 
taken from the I.M .F. and the defence a id  December 
reserves showed a surplus of £168 m. Otherwise 
there would have been a d e fic it  of £218 m. in the 
reserves of that month. However the situation was 
greatly improved a fte r  the strong measures taken in  
December by the government to reinforce the reserves 
and restore  oonfldence in the pound. There was only 
a small f a l l  in the reserves during January 1957 and 
then during the rest  of the period of the Canal 
closure the situation  was showing a continuous surplus.
4 4 4 .
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Nevertheless a fte r the c ris is  had gone it  beoame 
a matter o f paying back the debts to the I#M.F# 
and to the U.S. See Table (55) fo r changes in  
B rita in 's  gold aid d o lla r  reserves during the c ris is  
compared with other periods# See also Diagram (59) 
for improvement in the Sterling rate of exchange 
after December's measures were taken#
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BRITAIN1^  GOLD AND DOLLA.R RESERVES.
Changes in 
Reserves
(Millions of U.S. $ )
1950 +1612
1951 -  965
1952 -  489
1953 + 672
1954 + 244
1955 -  642
1956
First Quarter +157
II Quarter + 108
III Quarter -  57
Ootober - 84
November -  279
December + 168
1 2 5 1
January -  49
February + 65
March + 62
First Quarter + 76
becend Quarter + 172
Reserves at and of Beriod
(Millions of U.S. $ ) -  (Millions of £
Starling)
3300 
2335 
1846 
2 518 
2762 
212#
2277
2385
2328
2244
1965
2133
2084
2147
2209
2209
2381
1,178
834
659
899
956
757
852
762
850
Souro.t U.K. Balance of Bayments 1946-1957 (H.M. Treasury) 
Tho Banker, Vol. 107 II, 1957
DIAGRAM ( 59) .
STERLING DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS 1956/57.
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Source:With some variations,the diagram is  taken from 
the FINANCIAL TIMES,Jan.23,1957,p. 1.
P ag e N um ber o m it t e d  i n  e r r o r .
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!Pw Sues Settlement
Conditions fo r  re-opening of the Canal as given 
by the new Egyptian administration emphasised that 
the principles of free navigation as outlined in 
1888 Convention would be respected, and that dues 
would be levied in the same way as before nationali­
sation* The Canal users were also assured that at
least the same proportion of dues would be spent on
(30)
Improvement project as under the old company*
Total costs involved in c learing the Canal from 
blockahips and other hindrances to navigation were 
8*4 m* dollars* 3y resolution  of U.ltf* (which super­
vised salvage operations) merchant ships passing 
through the Suez Canal on and a fte r  September 15th,
1958 had to pay a surcharge o f 3> above rates of 
dues* The "hanque de la  Sooiete General de iielgique" 
was appointed agent of the U*N* fo r  colte otlon of 
the Suez surcharge* I t  was estimated that by this 
means about 3 years would be required to recover the 
cost of clearing the Canal* The decision to Impose 
that surcharge over shipowners mho contributed nothing 
in the blocking of the Canal were certain ly  adopted 
by the U*N* fo r p o lit ic a l expediency, i* e * , to avoid 
further extension in the Suez c r is is *  However, it
(30) Memo published by the Egyptian government,
March 19th, 1957.
must be mentioned here that most of the world 
maritime nations including Britain had re-imbursed 
their shipowners fo r  the amounts of the Suez surcharge. 
The Canal Company'3  Compenaation.
When the Egyptian government decreed the nation­
a lization  o f the Suez Canal company it  offered to 
compensate the shareholders on the basis of Paris 
Bourse1 closing prices on 25th July 1956. This meant 
a tota l payment o f  about £71 m., or about £15 m. more
than the value of the company’s assets held outside
(31)
Egypt. The company’s counter compensation claim
was a sum of £204 m., the largest item in  which was
£120  m. : estimated loss o f p ro fits  on the 12 y ea rs ’
period which remained in  the concession (i.e ..betw een
(32)
1956 ard 1968). Besides, the company f la t ly  denied
the Egyptian government’s right in assets held outside
Egypt. Eventually with the mediation of the World
Bank the disputing parties oame into agreement which
in fact was ndt fundamentally different from the
orig in a l Egyptian o ffo r . The company kept its  assets
oucside Egypt and received in addition £E.28.3 m.
(^ l )  Figures from The Economist, May 3, 1958.
(32) Figures from ffhe Economist, Nov., IS, 1957.
4 5 0 .
or about £29 m. s te r lin g . In addition the company
accept ad a l i a b i l i t y  far the pensions of a l l  ex-Canal
employees who le f t  Egypt, that was estimated by them
at £13 m. s te r lin g .
About the payments of the compensation it  was
agreed that 40$ at least should be made in s te r lin g .
The payments were also freed from risk  of changes in
exohange rates by stating a fixed  exchange rate  of
( 33)
£2*6715576 to £E. With the acceptance of these 
terms the Suez Canal company was f in a lly  liquidated  
and a new finance company (the Suez Finance Co.) was 
created to receive and d istribu te  the compensation as 
well as to Invest some of the remaining assets in new 
business. The Suez Canal Company stockholders were 
mainly French and B ritish  but there were others in 
Switzerland, Belgium, Holland and the U.S. The 
British  government which owned 44$ of the Canal 
shares up to the Second War had sold a portion in  
the market in the post-war period. The remaining 
holding of the government by the time of the nation­
a lization  was about a th ird  o f the to ta l canal shares. 
It  is worth mentioning that dividends and Interests  
which the B ritish  government obtained from the Suez
(33) The Economist, July 12, 1958.
4 5 1 .
Canal shares (purchased by D israe li in 1875 at the 
sum of £4 m.) to ta lled  about £38 ra. up to 1932# 
Further £14*5 were received before tne Second War
had reduced the Canal pro fits to n il ,  and ebout
(34)
£28 m. during the period 1946-1956.
4 5 2 .
(34) Annual dividends from the Suez Canal shares 
were given annually in Parliamentary Accounts 
and Papers -  See under "Financial Accounts of 
the U.K. & °uez Canal.
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APPENDIX E
STATISTICAL TABLES AND DIAGRAMS
* Panama Canal -  Suez Canal,Annual Net 
Tonnage. 1914 -  1955 end 1870 -1955.
* World Tonnage By Flag.1939 -  1958.
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ANNUAL TRANSITS (APPENDIX E)
SINCE OPENING DATES (diagram 2 )
SHIP S 
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W O R L D  T O N N A G E  B Y F L A G  1939, 1948-58. .
Steam  a n d  M o t o r  V esse ls  o f  500 g.t. and over e x c lu d in c  
L a k e  a n d  r iv e r  T o n n a g e  a n d  M is c e l la n e o u s  c r a f t ,  e .g . T u c s ,
T r a w l e r s , e t c .
G ross T o n s  (ooo )
( APPENDIX * E )
TABLE { I
3 Sept. 
I9?9
31st December .
H948 1949 1950 5955 5952
United Kingdom ..  
Canada . .  . .  
Other British
Countries. .  . .
16,892
358
L 358
16,046
1,807
*,396
16,321
5,584
*,477
56,557
5,494
5,575
16,526
5,435
5,607
16,600
5,376
5,759
British
Commonwealth . . 18,608 19,249 59,382 19,626 59,568 19,695
Argentine . .  . . 246 677 744 826 955 973
Belgium . .  . . 386 4°7 435 459 462 460
Brazil . . . . 446 676 675 636 669 781
Coste Rica . .  . . — 3 4 55 86 106
Denmark . . . . 1,093 1,037 5,127
463
5,570 5,263 5,322
Finland . .  . . 553 446 497 547 566
France . .  . . 2,748 2,462 2,686 2,880 3,522 3,375
Germany . .  . . 4»i8 5 141 93 509 854 5,203
Greece . .  . . 1,763 1,298 5,334 5,306 1,259 5,223
Honduras . .  . . 84 388 476 585 435 453
I ta ly . .  . .  . . 3,322 2,085 2,373 2,615 2,937 3,229
Japan . .  . . 5,427 1,200 1,200
164
1,200 2,200 2,755
Liberia . .  . . — 1 353 709 1,060
Netherlands . . 2,792 2,640 2,789 2,908 3,005 3,053
Norway . . .  . . 4,686 4,213 4,809 5,223 5,582 5,765
Panama . . .  . . 722 2,843 3,037 3,350 3,658 3,816
Portugal . .  . . 213 422 440 406 426 451
Russia . . . . L I 54 1,250 5,059 5,545 5,592 5,232
Spain . .  . . 932 985 975 975 983 1,015
Sweden . .  . . 1,442 1,841 5,893 5,959 2,061 2,257
United States! . . 8,722 26,199 26,045 25,793 25,726 25,669
Other Countries . . 1,902 2,308 2,710 2,700 2,765 2,931
Tota l . .  . . 61,426 72,771. 74,909 77,084 80,460 83,382
United States 
Reserve Fleet
included^ . . -  - 53,070 14,811 14,213 9,530 53,274
t Vessels of s,ooo gross tons and over.
SOUHCEs CHAMBIiR OP SHIPPING <i>F THE U.K. 
ANNUAL REPORT 1958-1959.
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APPENDIX E 
TABLE I  ( c o n t . )  
WORLD TONNAGE BY FLAG—<«»(.).
31st December
>953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
United Kingdom 
Canada . .  . .  
Other British 
Countries . .
16,832
>,213
1,784
17,286
1,108
1,885
17,549
1,013
2,°57
17,828
1,005
2,208
18,363
835
• 2,467
18,758
797
2,55*
British
Commonwealth 19,829 2° , 279 20,619 21,041 21,665 22,107
Argentine . ; 974 968 965 966 967 970
Belgium . . 453 473 501 528 578 658
Brazil . . . . 807 813 820 838 832 844
Costa Rica . . 179 263 448 508 510 547
Denmark . . 1,406 1,469 1,561 1,656 1,844 1,970
Finland . .  . . 583 667 729 746 788 762
France . .  . . 3,5*2 3,559 3,782 3,838 3,935 4»253
Germany . . 1,670 2,°45 2,506 3,020 3»424 3,950
Greece . .  . . 1,182 >,257 1,299 i ,459 1,569 1,889
Honduras . . 4 13 43 i 395 364 358 208
Italy . .  . . 3,333 3,705 3,867 4,192 4,640 4,876
Japan . .  9. 2,969 3,350 3,586 3,95 2 4 »625 5,488
Liberia . . . . 1,619 3,206 4,504 6,405 9,187 11,102
Netherlands . . 3,091 3,103 3,44° 3,801 4,150 4,344
Norway . .  . . 5,962 6,308 7>I2 4 7,794 8,497 9,582
Panama . . . . 3,942 3,980 3,933 4,028 4 ,293 4,4 28
Portugal.. . . 450 463 465 456 454 479
Russia . .  . . >»392 1,704 1,934 2,140 2,412 2,654
Spain . .  . . 1,039 1,073 1,126 1,208 1,267 i ,337
Sweden . .  . . 2,384 2,500 2,638 2,836 3,033 3.301
United Statest . . 25,835 25,483 25»25° 24»O I3 23»725 23,840
Other Countries 3,080 3,33 i 3,443 3,613 3,920 4,383
T o ta l . .  . . 86,104 90,430 94,935 99,402 106,672 113,972
UnitedStates  
Reserve Fleet 
included^ . . 13,934 14,437 14,679 ! 3>523 13,864 14,500
t  Vessels o f 1,000 gross tons and over. 
Table ii (eont.) ,
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CHAPTER IX
ATTEMPTS TO SEDUCE DEPENDENCE ON OIL IMPORTS THROUGH
SUEZ DURING THE DECADE FOLLOWING THE 1956-57 CRISIS.
After the Suez c r is is  had passed i t  became 
widely accepted in Western European countries that 
serious considerations must be given to any measures 
which might minimize their vu lnerability  to interruption  
in the flow of o i l .  Ihe O.E.E.C. *s O il Committee 
recommended in particu lar the fo llow ing measures to 
the European governments:
a) the accumulation of la rg e r  reserves of o i l  in 
Europe than have been held hitherto;
b ) the further development of f le x ib i l i t y  in the 
means of transport by alternative routes arid 
in refinery  operations;
c) means of inducing further d ivers ification  of source 
of supply;
d ) mutual consultation and appropriate planning by 
government and industry, taking account o f  
consumer’s in terest, to place Europe in a better  
position to overcome a temporary drop in o i l
( 1 )
supplies or interruption o f transit f a c i l i t ie s .
4 5 8 .
(1 ) Europe’s Need f o r  O il -  Implications and Lessons 
of the Suez C ris is , O .E .E.C., p .44.
Of these measures the most important for our 
purposes here a re the second (b ) and the third (o ) .
It  is  clear that the Importance of the Suez Canal 
as an o i l  route could hr reduced either by placing 
less reliance on Middle East o i l  or by channeling 
this o i l  t r a f f ic  via alternative routes, i . e . ,  v ia  
direct pipelines to  the Mediterranean Sea and/or via  
the Cape route. Hence, it  is  our intention in th is  
chapter to investigate B r ita in ’s success in reducing 
re la tive  reliance on Middle East o i l  and/or in placing 
less dependence on the Suez Canal for o i l  shipments 
which came from that source.
The growth o f British o i l  imports from the Middle 
East.
When it  was generally suggested that o i l  supplies 
from the Middle East should be cut down or should be 
developed at a lower rate than had been held previously  
nobody, whether in Britain  or elsewhere, was decisive  
of how this would be accomplished. The development 
of o i l  f ie ld s  in the African deserts was s t i l l  fa r  
from foreseen. Demands that European governments
should encourage "Industry’s search for possible
, (2 >(energy) deposits in Europe and elsewhere" were
reasonable in the ligh t o f the Suez c r is is  but
459.
(2) Previous reference  
P * -f 3
it  was obvious that they did not o ffe r  any qfei&k
(3)
positive solution.
During the Suez Canal closure o i l  from the U.
and Venezuela played a major part in helping to meet
Europe’s deficiency in Middle Eastern supplies. Yet,
in the second h a lf of 1957 imports from these sources
were d ra stica lly  cut down, although those from Venezuela
were c t l l l  above the pre-Suez c r is is  leve l. Obviously
the Wostern Hemisphere could not be regarded as a
permanent source o f o i l  to Europe because of the extra
d o lla r  payments involved in this way. Furthermore
with the rap id  growth o f o i l  consumption in U.S. i t
was doubtful that any su ffic ien t surplus from this
source would be available for European consumption
in case fcf a c r is is  like  that of 1956-57 would occur 
(4 )
in future. Indeed i t  became c lear in the immediate 
post-Suez period that any search fo r a substitute to 
the "Middle East o i l 31 was in fact a search for sources 
of energy other than " o i l " .  Recognizing the need to
460.
(3 ) In Britain  production o f orude o i l  was s t i l l  very 
small (rose to 82,000 tons in 1957 against 66,000 
in 1956) and it was not expected that th is or 
natural gas production (n eg lig ib le  by then) would 
change s ign ifican tly  during the decade 1957-1966,
(4 ) See Europe’s Need for O il, O .E.E.C., p .44.
work for a new energy policy the B ritish  government 
emphasised that the contribution from indigenous
sources of energy must be expanded as much as possib le .
Table (56) analyses B rita in ’s fue l consumption 
during the years 1954-1964. In 1955 Britain  was s t i l l  
principally  dependent upon coal for her energy require­
ments. Section (a ) in the Table shows that in that 
year net ooal consumption was equal to 213.5m. tons 
or 85.7$ of total energy consumption, whereas o i l  
accounted fo r  34.5m. tons cr 13.9ft o f to ta l. On 
the other hand about h a lf of one per cent o f energy 
consumption was provided by nuclear and hyiro e lec tr ic ity  
and natural gas. This pattern was more or leas the 
same in 1956-57 where o i l  supplied about 14$, or a 
l i t t le  over, of to ta l energy requirements in Britain  
and ooal provided the rest in forms o f coal, coke, 
gas and e le c tr ic ity . That was the main reason which 
prevented the interruption in o i l  imports during the 
Suez cris is  from causing any major dislocation  to 
home Industry. For Instance a reduction in o i l  
consumption by 10$ or 20$ as happened during the 
Suez o r is is  1956-57 meant a reduction of about 
1.5$ or 3$ in total energy supply
4 6 1 .
(5)
(5 ) See Petroleum Press Service, June 1957, p .229.
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Table ( 56)
1- One ton of petroleum (including a ll petroleum gasee and 
liquid fuels from coal) • 1*7 tons of coal#For other 
conversion factors used in the table see Annual Abstract of 
Statistics ,1965*P•137•
2-Deliveries for inland consumption#Liquid fuels derived 
from coal (whioh are included in gross coal cosumption)and 
petroleum products not used as fuels (chemical feedstock, 
industrial and white spirits,lubricants,bitumen and -wax)are 
excluded#
3-Imported and indigenous natural gas including colliery 
methane piped to the surface and consumed at collieries or 
disposed of#
4-To avoid double counting,fuels used in the production of 
other fuels are excluded,only the coal equivalent of the 
seoondary fuel finally consumed being shown#
5-Liquid fuels derived from ooal and methane used at collieries
References Table 156 ,Annual Abstraot of Statistics,1965 • 
Original source,Ministry of Power ,U»K#
a v a i la b le  f o r  industry usage. Moreover i t  was s t i l l  
p oss ib le  in  some eases to use coal Instead  o f o i l
and thus the harmful e f f e c t  o f a reduction  in  crude
( 6 )
Imports w as minimized#
The s t r ik in g  fa c t  In  the post-war energy develop­
ment was the tendency towards le ss  d ire c t  usage o f coa l  
and s o l id  f u e l  in  the industry# D irect consumption o f  
coal f e l l  by 8% between 1948 and 1957# Yet, during  
the same period the e l e c t r i c i t y  and gas industr ies  
whi&h mainly depended on coal fu e l  increased  th e ir  
shares in  t o t a l  B r i t i s h  energy consumption, and th is  
helped to  hold net coal consumption from fa l l in g #  On 
the other hand o i l  consumption increased by 92% between 
1948 and 1967. Estimates presented by experts in  1955 
fo recasted  that o i l  consumption would fu rth e r  increase  
by 140^ by 1970 ( i . e . ,  from 25 m# tons to  61 m# tons )  
and by 50^ between 1970 and 1985. Ooal consumption 
was expected to double between 1955 and 1970 (owing to  
the increased  amounts of investment in  that f i e l d )  but 
to recede a f t e r  that le av in g  a gap to be in c reas in g ly
4 6 5 ,
(6) For the e f f e c t  of the Suez c r is is  on in d u s t r ia l  
production in  B r ita in  see 1956 Economic Survey 
of Europe, U#N#; M inistry  o f  Power, Survey of 
Fuel O il used by Industry , 1957, London; and 
SuE.E.C#, Europe’s Need fo r  O i l ,  Chapter 6.
f i l l e d  by o i l  and atomic power. A fter the Suez 
c r is is  the situation  became d iffe ren t. The Ministry 
of Power’s forecast was that by 1965 fuel consumption 
in B rita in  would r is e  by 50 m. tons of coal equivalent 
above the le v e l of 1955 ( i . e . ,  from 250 m. to 300 m. 
tons of ooal equivalent). Of this the Ministry 
estimated that B ritish  coal industry wouM provide 
10 m. tons and atomic energy the equivalent of another 
14 m. tons of coa l, thus leaving 26 m. tons of coal 
equivalert to  be covered by o i l .  At the o f f lo ia l  
rate of coal to o i l  conversion the increase in o i l  
requirements by 1965 was thus estimated at 15 m. tons 
above 1955 le v e l, a growth of 60^. C learly that was 
considerably slower growth than the post-war develop­
ment and that had been envisaged by o i l  experts before 
the Suez c r is is .
However, during the years following 1957 there was 
no sign that the Intentions to change the pattern of 
energy requirements of Britain  were likely to be rea lised  
in practice. The nuclear crogramme which was conceived 
in 1955, and viiich the government particu larly  
contrived to support a fte r the Suez events aimed at 
providing the E lec tric ity  Boards with at least 5 
m illion KW of nuclear capacity by 1965 was modified
(7 ) See discussion and references given on this 
matter in Chapter 7 in this research.
4 6 4 .
(V)
in  1961 and the p e r io d  fo r  a t t a in in g  th is  ta rg e t
( 8 )
had been extended to  1968, Contrary to  e a r l i e r  
a n t ic ip a t io n  i t  was found that the tech n ica l system  
chosen f o r  the nuc lear  s ta t io n s  then under con stru ct ion  
produced e l e c t r i c i t y  a t  a oost s u b s t a n t ia l ly  h igh e r  
than o b ta in in g  from  modern o i l  -  o r  co a l -  f i r e d  p la n t s .  
In  f a c t  i t  was not u n t i l  1965 when some new system o f  
nuc lear  s ta t io n s  had been designed  to produce e l e c t ­
r i c i t y  at about 10$ or more be low  the co st  of coa l  
(9 )
f i r e d  p la n ts .  To g iv e  some f i g u r e s  on th is  p o in t ;
th is  l a t t e r  techn ique in  the d e s ign  o f  n u c lea r  s ta t io n s
was expected to generate  e l e c t r i c i t y  at a t o t a l  co s t
o f  0.38 -  0.40 pence per k ilow att/h ou r. This compare*
w ith  costs o f  0 .52 -  0.54 pence per k ilow a tt/h ou r  f o r
the advanced coa l f i r e d  s ta t io n s  and o f 0 ,52 pence f o r
the advanced o i l  f i r e d  s t a t io n s ,  But i t  should be
emphasised here that  o i l  f i r e d  s ta t io n s  were burdened
by the f u e l  o i l  tax  -  about £2.2 per ton . Without
th is  tax o i l  f i r e d  s t a t io n a  could produce e l e c t r i c i t y
(1 0 )
at 0.41 pence per K,w.h.
(8 )  U.K. Atomic Energy A u t h l r i t y ’s Annual Report 
1960-61.
(9 )  See Pet, Press S e rv ic e ,  July 1965, p . 250 -  ^ ls o  
White Paper "Fue l P o l ic y "  Comnd. 2798 HRM.S.0 ,,1 9 5 5 .
(1 0 ) F igu re s  from Pet, Press S e rv ice , ftov.,1965, p .412.
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In  the years  fo l lo w in g  1957 the a c tu a l  c o n tr ib u t io n
o f  the coa l in d u stry  to  B r ita in *®  energy requirement
was a lso  c o n s id e ra b ly  le s s  than wa3 intended* To.
rev iew  the s i t u a t io n  we may draw the l i n e  back to
1950 when the iNfational Coal board (N .C .B * )  p u b lish ed
i t s  p roposa ls  f o r  the recon stru c t ion  and development
( 11 )
o f the mining in d u stry *  The programme o u t l in e d  by 
the N.C*B* was d e s ig n e d  to  cover the pe riod  1950 to  
1965, and aimed a t  an annual production  which would  
r i s e  to  240 m* tons from 1961 to 19 55* That was an 
in c re a se  of 37 m* tons over the 1949 f i g u r e *  The 
c a p i t a l  cost for th is  plan was est im ated  to be £335 m*, 
1949 p r ic e s *  In  1955 the N*C*3. recon s id e red  i t s  
programme and in  the l i g h t  of i t s  ac tua l achievements 
decided  th a t  that would take lo n g e r  to  carry  out and 
oost c o n s id e ra b ly  more than had p re v io u s ly  been assumed. 
Thus the N.C*B* dec ided  to embark upon a new p lan  
whioh aimed at r a i s i n g  the u lt im ate  output o f  c o a l  
to  850 m* tons by 1970, and the est im ated  cost was 
f i g u r e d  a t  £1,350 m. The l a t t e r  p lan  envisaged  a 
redu ction  in  the labou r  f o r c e  in  the in du stry  from
720,000 men in  1949 to  672,000 men in  1965, but
(11 ) "P lan  fo r  C o a l11, N .C .B * ,  1950*
meanwhile ooa l output pe r  man was to  be r a i s e d
from 280 tons to  342 tons per annum between the two
(12)
r e s p e c t iv e  d a te s .  However in  1959 the N .C .3 . had to  
modify i t s  p lan once more because o f  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  
encountered in  d ispos in g  o f  coa l output owing to  the  
strong  com petition  of o i l  f u e l .  This s i t u a t io n  was 
not unique to  the B r i t i s h  co a l  in du stry  but a l s o  
ap p lie d  t o  other European producers. Thus in  
s p it e  o f the  f a l l  in  B r i t i s h  c o a l  p roduction  from
226.5 m., tons in  1952 (a  post -w ar  peak which was 
equal to 1938 fs production ) to 223.6 m. tons in  
1957 and fu r th e r  down t o  206.1 m. tons in  1959 
l a r g e  s tocks  were e x c e s s iv e ly  accumulated. The 
N .C .3 . decided  that i t  was no lo n g e r  necessary  to  
p lan  fo r  a continuous in c rease  in  the demand f o r  
c o a l .  Under the t i t l e  the "R evised  Plan fa r  Coal"  
is su ed  in  1959 the N .C .B . had m od ified  i t s  t a rg e t  
to  only 200 -  215 m. tons in 1965. C a p i t a l  expend­
i tu r e  fo r  the decade 1956-65 was planned to  be £175 m. 
l e s s  than had been drawn out in  1950 programme yet
a r i s e  in  p ro d u c t iv ity  to 375 tons per man year was
(1 3 )
a n t ic ip a te d  by 1965. Durirg 1959 and 1961 co a l
467.
(12 ) " In v e s t in g  in  C o a l " ,  N .C .B . -  1956.
(1 3 ) W.A. Robson, "N a t io n a liz e d  Industry  and P u b lic
Ownersh ip", p . 395.
production  was reduced fu r t h e r  by 15.341 m. tons.
In the Parliam ent i t  was d emanded that the government 
should a s s i s t  the coal Industry  by l im i t in g  o i l  imports  
and a lso  that  a p u b l ic  enqu iry  should be held  in to  
c o s t in g  and p r ic in g  p o l ic y  in  the o i l  in d u s t ry .  The 
government re fu sed  these requests but In  A p r i l  Budget, 
1961, and fo r  the same purpose, namely p ro te c t io n  o f  
the n a t io n a l  co a l In d ustry , a t a x  o f  2d. per im p e r ia l  
g a l lo n ,  £2.2 per ton , was imposed upon K eros in e , gas/  
d i e s e l  o i l s  (e x c lu d in g  automatine gas o i l )  and f u e l  
o i l .  This t a * ,  the 2/6d tax a lre ad y  le v ie d  on g a so l in e  
and many other In d ir e c t  taxes were aga in  r a is e d  by 10# 
in  July o f the same yea r . The government never 
r e a l l y  made I t  c l e a r  that these du t ie s  were Intended  
f o r  o oa l p ro te c t io n ,  yet  t h is  had g e n e ra l ly  been  
understood . Now with o i l  du ties  s u b s t a n t ia l ly  r a i s e d
and w ith  a more en e rge t ic  a t t i t u d e  in  r e -o r g a n iz a t io n
(14 )
the coal indu stry  and In  e s t a b l i s h in g  more e f f i c i e n t  
market con tacts , in lan d  ooal s a le s  were expanded and 
i t  was p o s s ib le  then to  expand c o a l  output a g a in .  
However th is  d id  not l a s t  f o r  lo n g  and in  1965 
output was a g a in  low ered  and in  1966 i t  was fu r th e r  
reduced by  12.9 m. tons and stood a t  174.6 ra. ton s.
(14 ) Lord Robens was appointed Chairman to cha 
N.C.B. In  1961.
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I t  was the o i l  in d u s t ry  that was most com petitive  and 
was a b le  t o  expand i t s  share  in  the B r i t i s h  market 
throughout the pe riod  in  s p i t e  o f  government grants  
and p ro te c t io n  g iven  to o o a l  aad atomic programmes.
Between 1957 and 1954 o i l  consumption in  B r i t a in
more than doubled  and i t s  share In  t o t a l  consumed .
f u e l  in c reased  from 14*3;© to  32.4$. The growth In  
f u e l  consumJbion in  the t ran sp o rt  se c to r  was almost 
e n t i r e ly  made by o i l#  Although c o a l  continued to  
be the main f u e l  used by e l e c t r i c i t y  industry  consump­
t io n  o f  o i l  in  power s ta t ion s  in c reased  to 5 -  6 m. 
tons per annum in  1965. In  the Iron  and S t e e l  in du stry  
consumption o f  co a l was l a r g e r  than o i l  u n t i l  1959 
but by 1963 consumption o f  o i l  was 6 .3  m. tons o f  
coa l equ iva len t  aga in st  only 2.4 m. tons o f  c o a l .
A f t e r  the o i l  duty o f  2d. a g a l lo n  (£ 2 .2  per ton )  
was Imposed In  / ipril in  1961, in c reased  by 10$ in  
July o f  the same y e a r ,  the Iron  and S te e l  F ede ra t ion  
p ro te s ted  to  the government th a t  th is  had added more 
than £7^ m. a year to the s t e e l  in d u s t r y ’s c o s ts .
Thus the attempt to reduce o i l  consumption, v i z . ,
r
o i l  Im ports, was de tr im en ta l to  the com petitive  
p o s i t io n  o f  th e  Iro n  and S te e l  Industry  In  world  markets.
O i l  rep la ce d  coa l p a r t ly  because o f te ch n ica l
p rogress  In  machine d e s ign s , which in c re a s in g ly
favou red  the usage ox"' l i q u id  f u e l s ,  and p a r t ly
because o f i t s  a v a i l a b i l i t y  at low er p r ic e s .  To
g iv e  an example f o r  c o a l/ o i l  p r ic e  r e l a t i o n ;  In
1960 f . o . b .  crude p r ic e s  o f  the Middle Bast were
reduced by about 12 -  14 U .S . crude ( f . o . b . )  was
reduced in  the same year by 4 -  5$. Ocean t ran sp o rt
costs  were a l s o  d e c l in in g  and on the average  U.K.
c . i . f .  o i l  p r ic e s  f e l l  oy about 6.5;© below 1959.
On the other hand i n l a i d  c o a l  p r ic e s  were r a i s e d  In
Sep; ember I960 by 7/ - a ton. The fo l lo w in g  f ig u r e s
may a l s o  g iv e  a c l s a r  p ic tu re  fo r  the f a l l  In  o i l
(15)
import p r ic e s  du ring  the years 1958-1934.
Petroleum Import P r ices  -  1961 m 100
1958 1959 19 60 1961 196 2 1963 1964 •
120 111 104 100 98 97 95
470.
(15) The source of these figures is  the board o f  Trade’s 
"Import and export  unit value Inde& numbers".
The index does not specify "petroleum", It  
on ly  g iv e s  * f u e l w import p r ic e s .  Yet f u e l  
Imparts included only a small proportion o f  
coa l and coke in  1957 and 1958. In  the
fo llow ing years Imports o f  f u e l  o th er  than  
o i l  were n e g l i g i b l e .
llxJii, A  M X ?1*
1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 1952 1963 1964
O i l  370.4 440.2 431.8 455.7 479.8 481.3 531.8 556.5 583.1
A H
Others 43.3  25.5 7 .1  1 .4  0 .5 0 .8 0 .7  0 .6  0.5
Bource a Annual a b s t r a c t  o f  S t a t i s t i c s  1965.
This f a l l  in  import p r ic e s ,  be s id es  the f i e r c e
com petition  between marketing companies, which le d
to cuts in  p r ic e s  -  exc lu d in g  ta x e s ,  and the f a l l  in
in land  cost o f  t ran sp o rta t io n  enabled o i l  to in c re a se
i t s  share in  the B r i t i s h  market co n s id e rab ly  in  s p i t e
(15 )
o f  the r i s i n g  l e v e l  o f  taxa tion *
I t  must be mentioned in  th is  context that coal 
p r ic e s  were r i s i n g  throughout the period  as f o l lo w s :
Index Number o f  B r i t i s h  coal w ho le sa le  p r ice s  
Annual Averages 1954 -  100
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
137.6 135.4 137.4 114.9 151.8 153.7 154.3
( Source: Annual A b strac t  o f S t a t i s t i c s  1965)
( 1 6 ) Lower In lan d  costs  of t ran sp o rt in g  o i l  were 
ach ieved  by the use o f  l a r g e r  and b e t t e r  
designed  road  tankers and the r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  
o f  t ran sp o rt  schedules f o r  the d isp a tc h  o f  
the product. See Pet. Press S e rv ice , June 
1935, p . £14. f o r  the in c reased  com petition  
between m arketing companies and e f f e c t  on 
In lan d  p r ic e s  see Pet. P ress , Feb. 1967, 
p . 42-43, A p r i l  1967, p . 122-123 and 127-129.
On the other hand, ta x a t io n  on motor fu e l s  
was r a i s e d  fu r t h e r  by 10$ In  July 1966.
The p r ic e  thus jumped to 5/9d. per g a l lo n  -  
London p r ic e s ,  exc lu d in g  t a x ,  fo r  o rd in a ry  
grade g a so lin e s  were up to l / 5 ^ d  per g a l lo n  
in  e a r ly  1967.
Sources o f  O i l  Supply to B r i t a in ,
During the decade 1957-1966 M iddle hast  production
was expanded more than any o ther producing a re a  in  the
w orld , from 176.2 m. tons to 463.6 m. ton s . W ith the
exception  o f the new f i e l d s  in  the North A fr ic a n  d e se rts
the r a t e  o f  growth o f  M iddle hast p roduction  was a ls o
the h ig h e s t .  The Middle East remained a lso  the l a r g e s t
export ing  area expanding I t s  s a le s  to  var ious  pa rts  o f
the w o r ld  from 157 m. tons In 1957 to 429 m. tons In
1966. In t h i s  re sp e c t  I t  was fo l lo w e d  by the Caribbean
from 130 m. tons to 165 m. tons between the two
re sp e c t iv e  d a te s .  North A fr ic a n  production  in c reased
from 2.4  m. tons in  1957 to  113.2 m. tons in  1966 and
exports from n i l . t o  108 m. tons during the same pB p lo d .
The d is c o v e r ie s  o f the A fr ic a n  f i e l d s  came a f t e r  the
search  f o r  new o i l  d ep o s its  was In t e n s i f i e d  fo l lo w in g
(1 7 ) 6
the Suez c r i s i s .
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(1 7 ) See wFive Years* r in d s  and F a i l u r e s " ,  Pet. Press
S e rv ic e ,  Nov. 1961, The most s u c c e s s fu l  d is c o v e r ie s  
during  the l a s t  decade were in  L ibya , A lg e r ia  and 
N ig e r i a .  Libyan production was deve lop ing  at a 
tremendous r a t e .  Began l a t e  In  1961 w ith 0 .9  m. 
tons I t  reached 41.4 m. tons In 1964 and 72.3 m. 
tons In  1966. A lg e r ia n  production  was s t e p ^ d  up 
from 0.4 m. tons in  1957 to 33.8 m. tons In  1966. 
N ige r ia n  production  was a lso  Inc reased  from 0 .3  m. 
tons In  1959 to  6 .0  m. tons in  1954 and then to 
20.7 m. tons In  1964. F igures  ob ta in ed  from  
" S t a t i s t i c a l  Review o f  the World O i l  Industry  -  
1965", Pu b lish ed  by r .P ,  C o ., 1967.
Throughout the decade under rev iew  the Middle East  
remained the moat Important source o f o i l  supply to  
Western European co u n tr ie s .  In  1966 t h e i r  Imports 
( in c lu d in g  B r i t a i n Ts )  from that s o u r c e ’t o t a l l e d
217.5 m. tons, compared w ith  92 m. tons in  1955. 
However, as imports from A fr ic a ,  which developed  
d ram a t ic a l ly  a f t e r  1959, t o t a l l e d  122.5 m. tons In  
19o6 the r e l a t i v e  importance o f  the Middle East , 
decreased . Of Western European o i l  imports in  1966, 
51.5$ came from  Middle East sou rces , compared w ith  
88$ in  1955. As rega rd s  B r i t a in ,  Tab le  (57) g iv e s  
a comparison between the r e l a t i v e  s i t u a t io n  o f M iddle  
East o i l  in  1955 and In  1966. I t  can be seen that the  
share o f  M iddle East in  t o t a l  imports o f  o i l  In  
B r i t a in  decreased  by 22/» between 1955 and 1966. j\
This would be compared w ith  16,5$ redu c tion  In  the 
share o f  M iddle East in  t o t a l  Wesbern European 
(B r i t a in  in c lu d ed ) o i l  im ports. Hence B r i t a in , j  on 
the average , was more s u c c e s s fu l  in  reducing the 
dependence on the Middle East o i l  du ring  the t tan 
years which fo l lo w e d  the f i r s t  Suez c lo s u re .  Jn 
1966 she was le s s  dependent than most of her European  
partn ers  on Middle East o i l ,  i . e . ,  47.7$ compared 
w ith  W. Europe!s genera l average  o f  51.5$, whereas 
b e fo re  1956-57 c r i s i s  B r i t a in  r e l i e d  on th is  source  
more than most o f  them d id .  However i t  should be
473.
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TABLE (57)
U.K.5 Imports of Petroleum and Petroleum Products
1955
M il .
Tons
%
1966
M il .
Tons ,
’ $
M1441. S a s t .
Kuwait
I r a q .
I ra n
Saudi A rab ia  
Bahrain , <^atar,Aden 
Oman and Others
16*324
3.907
1.336
.376
2.869
45.3
11.0
3.3
1.1
8 .1
16.175
10.402
4.837
6.565
6.135
17.6
11.3
5.1
7 .1  
6.7
To ta l M iddle East 24.832 69.8 43.914 47.7
Other Sources?
A f r i c a :  N ig e r ia  
L ibya
A lg e r ia  ......
7.060
10.030
1^737
7 .6  
10.9  
. 1.9
Tota l A f r i c a 0 .0 0.0 18.837 20.4
Borth and South 
America, Europe 
and Others , 10.812 30.2 29.260 31-.8
T o ta l  Imports o f  
Crude and R e fined  
Petroleum in  O.K. 35.644 100 92.001 100
Source: Annual Statement o f the Trade of the U.K. 1957»
and Overseas Trade Accounts of the U .K # 1966.
emphasised that the share  o f  the M iddle  East in  
B r i t i s h  o i l  imports was r i s i n g  in  the years  1957­
1960 and i t  was on ly  the d is c o v e r ie s  o f  r i c h  o i l  
f i e l d s  in  North A f r i c a  which changed th a t  s i t u a t io n .
B r i t i s h  imports o f  crude o i l  from the Middle  
East ware in c rea sed  from 30.9 m. tons in  1959 to  
36.9 m. tons in  1965 whereas t o t a l  crude imports were 
advanced from 3 9 .2  m. tons to 53.1 m. tons between the  
two respe c t iv e  d a t e s . Thus, the Middle East share  in  
t o t a l  crude imports f e l l  from 79$ in  1959 to 56 in  
1965. Meanwhile imports o f  crude from L iby a  and 
N ig e r ia  in c reased  from 1$ to 27$ o f  t o t a l  crude  
imports in to  B r i t a in  between 1959 and 1965. As
regards  r e f in e d  products the share  of the Middle East
(1 3 )
a lso  f e l l  from 14^ in  1959 to 12> in  1965.
Table (53 ) g iv e s  more d e t a i l s  o f  the development o f  
o i l  imports in to  B r i t a in  by area  o f  o r i g in  between 
1959 and 1965. Thus a lthough  dependence on o i l  in  
B r i t a in  in c rea sed  co n s id e ra b ly  during  the decade 
1957-66 r e l a t i v e  r e l ia n c e  on the Middle East sources  
was s u b s t a n t ia l ly  reduced . Consequently, the r e l a t i v e
(18 ) Meantime Europe in c reased  i t s  share  i a  t o t a l  
B r i t i s h  imports c f  r e f in e d  petroleum from 27%  
in  1959 to  56$ in  1965. Yet th is  in c re a se  in  
European share was p r in c ip a l ly  accomplished  
at the lo s s  o f  North and South America.
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importance o f  the Suez Canal and o th er  iMlddle East  
o i l  t r a n s i t  f a c i l i t i e s  was a ls o  e q u a l ly  reduced* I t  
remains f o r  us now to  in v e s t ig a te  va r ious  t ran sp o rt  
f a c t o r s  which a f f e c t e d  the share  o f  the  Suez Canal 
in  B r i t i s h  o i l  imports from the Middle East.
itop.udano. on the Sues Canal.
Attempts t o  reduce  the dependence o f  the Middle 
East o i l  t r a f f i c  on the Suez Canal were not only  
d e s i r a b le  to  the European consumers but a l s o  to  
Western o i l  companies in  the Middle ^ a s t .  Tne other  
a l t e r n a t iv e s  to the Canal, I f  we may r e c a l l ,  wares 
( a )  pumping o i l  in  p ip e l in e s  d i r e c t l y  to  the M e d ite r r ­
anean co as t ;  and ( b )  sh ipp ing o i l  v ia  the Cape ro u te .
F a i lu r e  o f P ip e l in e  P ro je c t s .
In  our r e v ie w  fo r  the period  which preceded the
Suez c r i s i s  we came to  conclude that attempts to  r e p la c e
the Canal by p ip e l in e s  were by no means as s u c c e s s fu l
as the o i l  companies had p lanned. However du ring  the
Suez c r i s i s  M iddle East p ip e l in e s  were g iv e n  f r e s h
(19)
and se r io u s  c o n s id e ra t io n .  . Yet a t  the same time 
the d e m o lit io n  o f  the IPC p ip e l in e  pumping s ta t io n s
(19 ) Seventeen o i l  companies w ith  M iddle East In t e re s t s  
con fe rred  in London in  May 1957 to  cons ide r  and 
d iscu ss  plans fo r  b u i ld in g  a d d i t io n a l  p ip e l in e s  
to  the Eastern  Mediterranean coast In  o rder  to 
reduce dependence on the Suez Canal. See the 
Economist, May 25, 1957, p . 674, and Pet. re ss  
S erv ice  , June 1957, p . 228.
•
In  S y r ia  promoted the  e x p lo ra t io n  o f  a l t e r n a t iv e  routes
to  the M ed iterranean  Coast , ^mong the  new p ro je c ts
was a scheme to  b u i ld  a la r g e  diam eter p ip e l in e
(30/32 in ch ) from the G u lf  o f  Aqaba to  tho M e d ite r r -
(2 0 )
anean Coast through I s r a e l .  France In  p a r t i c u la r  
took an a c t iv e  in t e r e s t  in  th is  p ro je c t  as an o i l  
supply  rou te  to  Europe a l t e r n a t iv e  o r  supplementary  
to E g y p t !s Suez Canal, uowever the jj?oject was 
u n r e a l i s t i c  and th e re fo re  f a i l e d ,  ^bout £20 -  £83 uu 
Investments were necessary  to b u i ld  such a l in e  and i t  
was c l e a r  that Arab countr ies  would not a l lo w  t h e i r  
o i l  to be c a r r i e d  through I s r a e l . -  Kirkuk -  H a i fa  l in e  
was abandoned in  1948 and there was no guarantee th a t  
a s im i la r  a c t io n  would not be rep ea ted . Most b o ld ,  
however, was tha t  p la n  to b u i ld  a g ig a n t ic  p ip e l in e  
of 38/40 inches diameter g a th e r in g  o i l  from Kuwait, 
P e rs ia  and o ther P e rs ian  Gulf t e r r i t o r i e s  which were  
dependent on the Suez .a n a l  rou te , and t ra n sp o rt in g  
i t  through I r a q  to a Turk ish  port  on the M editerranean .  
This was the b ig g e s t  crude o i l  p ip e l in e  system ever  
s e r io u s ly  con s id e red . I t  was d e s t in e d  t o  c a r ry
(20) This scheme should not be confused w ith the
l in e  which was completed l a t e r  between E i l a t h  
and H a ifa  (16 inch  w ith  a through-put capac ity  
o f  2 .9 m. t / y e a r )  to  s e rve  I s r a e l  in lan d  
requ irem en ts .
* 4 7 8 .
u lt im a te ly  70 m. tons a y ea r ; i t  r e q u ire d  10 to 12
pumping s t a t io n s ,  about m i l l io n  tons o f s t e e l  and
i t s  cost was estim ated  at about £300 m. or more.
C onstruction  pe r iod  o f  th a t  p ro je c t  was est im ated  at
(21 )
about 4 - 5  y e a r s .  N ev e rth e le ss ,  th is  p ro je c t  d id  
not m a te r ia l iz e  owing to  the r e fu s a l  of I r a q  to  grant  
t r a n s i t  r i g h t s  and a lso  because o f  p o l i t i c a l  c i i f f i c u l t i e s  
In vo lved  In  reach ing  agreement w ith  a l l  governments 
concerned. Another p ro je c t  fo r  a p ip e l in e  from C entra l  
I r a n  to the M editerranean  Coast through Turkey was 
a lso  abandoned. Proved o i l  re se rv e s  in  that a rea  
were i n s u f f i c i e n t  to ju s t i f y  the re q u ire d  c a p i t a l  
expenditure  f o r  the p ro je c t .  Thus a major expansion  
in  M iddle ^ a s t  p ip e l in e s  was, as eve r*h in d e red  by  
p o l i t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  I f  the p ro je c te d  P ers ian  
Gulf/Turk ish  M editerranean Coast had been c a r r ie d  
out s u c c e s s fu l ly  dependence on the Suez Canal would 
have been s u b s t a n t ia l ly  minimized. (A ls o ,  see  
Diagram (6 0 )  fo r  f e a s i b l e  reductions In  the u n it  
cost o f  t r a n sp o r t in g  o i l  as a r e s u l t  o f  increasing  
p ip e l in e  s i z e ) .
479.
(21 ) F igu res  obta ined  from Pet. Press S e rv ic e ,  June 
1957, p . 229.
DIAGRAM ( 60 )
( Source: M*Hubbard,Econ*of Transporting O il ,p .55* )
Feasib le Reductions in  the Unit Cost o f  Transporting 
O il as a resu lt o f  Increasing P ipelin e Size*
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In  fa c t  the development o f  M iddle East p ip e l in e  
system was 6nly l im it e d  to  the  improvements accom­
p l is h e d  in  the l in e s  which had a lre ad y  been in to  
op era t io n  b e fo re  the Suez c r i s i s .  The c ap ac ity  o f  
the IPC p ip e l in e s  was expanded from 26 m. tons/year  
to  about 40 m, tons/year  by t e c h n ic a l  improvements 
and by the com pletion o f  another p a r a l l e l  l in e  from  
Kirkuk to  T r i p o l i  in  mgust 1961, The oapa c i t y  of 
the T ap lin e  was in c re a se d  from 16 m. tons/year to  
22 m. tons/year by the end of 1958 and to  about 23 m. 
tons/year by 1966, (p o t e n t ia l  c ap ac ity  of the l in e  
25 m. to n s/ y e a r ) .
N early  f u l l y  u t i l i z e d  the IPC p ip e l in e s  channe lled  
over 70$ o f  I r a q i  p roduction  in  1963, The r e s t  o f  
I r a q i  exports  about 12 m. to n s , o r 20$ o f  p roduction ,  
was gp oduoed in  the southern  f i e l d s  and was sh ipped  
from Fao. The importance of the southern  f i e l d s  was 
In c rea s in g  because o f  the continuous t r o u b le s  w h ich  
the IPC fa ced  in  o p e ra t in g  the northern  p ip e l in e s  
v ia  S y r ia .  The l a t e s t  o f  these t r o u b le s  occurred  
when Syria  shut down com plete ly  the IPC p ip e l in e s  
between mid December 1936 and the f i r s t  week o f  
March 1967. In  September 1966 the Syrian  government
had asked the company to  r a i s e  t r a n s i t  dues to  5/­
10 d .
per ton  o f  c rude , in s te a d  o f  4/ - a ton , and lo a d in g
480.
fe e s  at banias to 2/- In s tead  of 1 / ld . a ton. b e s id e s ,  
the government demanded that these in c reases  shou ld  be  
ap p lie d  w ith  e f f e c t  from January 1st 1966 and thus 
adding £3.75 m. to  i t s  revenues over £7.5mwhich had 
a c tu a l ly  been re c e iv e d  f o r  the f i r s t  9 months o f  1966,
Ihe IPC company re fu se d  these demands and r e g o t ia t io n s  
between the two p a r t i e s  were broken o f f  In  November.
The d ispu te  was f i n a l l y  s e t t l e d  when the IPC agreed  
on Syrian  demands and thus t o t a l  t r a n s i t  and port dues 
were r a is e d  by 50$, i . e . ,  from 5 / ld .  to 7/10d per ton .
L a te r ,  when d is c u ss in g  the economics o f t r a n sp o r t in g  
o i l  by sea  from the Pers ian  Gulf we s h a l l  r e a l i z e  that  
tankers o f fe r e d  not on ly  s a fe r  but a l s o  more economical 
means o f  t r a n s p o r t in g  M iddle East o i l  to Europe. In  
a d d it io n  the r a t e  f i x e d  by tankers t o  co ve r  the Suez 
Canal dues , 6/3d. per ton  ( t h i s  i s  a f ix e d  sum per  
ton o f  o i l  o f which rough ly  two th ird s  were in cu rred  
on the loaded  passage and one t h i r d  on the o a l l a s t  
passage ) was In  1967 low er by 1 / 7 &. per t o n  than 
p ip e l in e  t r a n s i t  dues.
S im i la r ly ,  Tap line  fa c e d  d i f f i c u l t i e s  concerning  
t r a n s i t  dues w ith  the host governments. Yet Tap line  
Company was In a s t ro n g e r  b a rg a in in g  s i t u a t io n  than  
the IPC s in ce  Saudi Arabian  o i l  would be e a s i ly  
r e - r o u t e d  v ia  P e rs ian  po rts  I f  p ip e l in e  t r a n s i t  dues 
in c reased  above the l im i t .  The In c rea se  in  the
481.
amounts o f  o i l  c a r r i e d  by the Tap line was in  f a c t
much sm a lle r  than the in c rease  in  d i r e c t  shipments
( 2 2 )
from the Pers ian  G u lf .  In  196 6 about 70 m. tona  
o f  3. A rab ian  o i l  were exported  to West o f  Sue* o f
4
which on ly  23 m. tons were c a r r ie d  v ia  T ap line  to  
M editerranean c o a s t .
Whether In  the case o f Saudi A rab ia  o r  I r a q  the  
importance o f the p ip e l in e  system was r e l a t i v e l y  
d e c l in in g  s in c e  I t s  capac ity  was not expanded at the  
same ra te  as o i l  exports  to the West. The c ap ac lty  
o f  Tap line was advanced by 46$ du r in g  the pe riod  
w h ils t  p roduction  (a lm ost t o t a l l y  f o r  e x p o rts )  was 
r i s i n g  by about 9 .5$ per annum. S im i la r ly ,  IPC 
p ip e l in e  was in c reased  by  54$ whereas production  
in c reased  an n u a lly  a t  an average  o f 8$. In  1966 
more than 50 m. tons o f  o i l  were exp o rted  from  
I r a q  to West o f Suez and o f  them about the f i f t h  
was sh ipped  from  the Pers ian  G u lf .  In  1955 w ith  
sm a lle r  capac ity  the  IPC c a r r ie d  n ea r ly  a l l  I r a q * s  
o i l  exports  to  the  West. To conclude, du r in g  the
(2 2 )  During the period  1957-1967 some rem arkable  
improvements were achieved in  sh ipp in g  
f a c i l i t i e s  at Has Tanura. A lso  new deep 
w ater lo ad in g  p o in t s ,  in  the Sea Is lan d s  
(P e r s ia n  G u l f )  were brought in to  s e rv ic e s  
in  1967. One o f  these  new lo ad in g  po in ts  
Is  ab le  to take tankers  up to  300,000 d .w t.
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deoade fo l lo w in g  the Suez c lo su re  1956-57 Middle  
East p ip e l in e s  to  the Mediterranean could not 
s u b s t i tu t e  the Suez Canal. However t h i s  was not 
due to t e c h n ic a l  fa c to r s  o r  to  la ck  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
re so u rc e s ,  but to  p o l i t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  reach in g  
agreements f o r  b u i ld in g  new l i n e s .  I t  seems a l s o  
that the t ro u b le s  f a c e d ' i n  f i x i n g  p ip e l in e  t r a n s i t  
dues at p r o f i t a b le  l e v e l s  t o  the companies had  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t e d  the development o f  the e x i s t ­
in g  l i n e s .  Consequently a l a r g e r  p ro p o rt ion  o f  I r a q i  
%nd S, A rab ian  o i l  exports  to  the West was bound to  
go v ia  the Suez Canal or the Cape ro u te .
(jogp.te.ltloq jetw.au the Suez Canal and the Cape Route 
Oyer . q U .T a lkers ♦ ■ •
The t e c h n ic a l  and economic advantages o f l a r g e  
tankers were w e l l  known t o the o i l  w o rld  f o r  many 
years  b e fo r e  the Suez c r i s i s  yet t h e i r  numberwas  
r i s i n g  s lo w ly .  In  1956 the w orld  tan ker  f l e e t  
conta ined  400,000 tons d .w . o f t a n le r s  In  s iz e s  o f
45,000 t .d .w .  and over, compared with 36.0 m. t .d .w .  
o f  sm a ll tankers under the s iz e  o f  25,000 t d .w .
The r e s t  o f  the world t a n k e r  f l e e t  In  that year was 8 m. 
t .d .w .  of ”medium s i z e s "  o f  25-45,000 t .d .w .  S eve ra l  
w ider  economic c o n s id e ra t io n s ,  o th e r  than the mere 
sav in g  In  un it  cost  of t r a n s p o r t  when us ing  a l a r g e r  
c a r ry in g  c a p ac ity ,  prevented any quick  expansion in
483.
the employment o f  l a r g e r  tankers In  M iddle East/Europe  
o i l  t r a d e .  O f these  f a c t o r s  the most important were
( a )  the i n s u f f i c i e n t  number o f p o r t s ,  te rm in a ls  axud 
docks which cou ld  accommodate la rg e  tan k e rs j  ( b )  
f l e x i b i l i t y  which was needed in  o i l  d e l iv e ry  owing 
to the s i z e  o f most o f  European r e f in e r i e s  and to  t h e i r  
l im ite d  s to rage  c a p ac ity .  To b r in g  In  la r g e  q u a n t it ie s  
o f  o i l  to  these  r e f in e r i e s  meant h ig h e r  c a p i t a l  expend­
i t u r e  in  s t o c k p i l in g  and u n n ecessa r i ly  lo ck in g  up o f  
funds f o r  lon g  p e r io d s  o f  tim e) ( c )  the Suez Canal 
which on ly  perm itted  a g rad u a l In c rease  in  the dimen­
sions o f v e s s e ls  pass ing  through i t .  The Canal Improv- 
ment p ro je c ts  were a lw ays  planned acco rd ing  to the needs 
o f  commerce r a th e r  than the la t e s t  technique In  s h ip ­
b u i ld in g  and thus always p ro tected  the "ave rage "  s iz e s  
of ocean go in g  commercial v e s s e ls .
The p o l i t i c a l  and economic c r i s i s  o f  Suez in
1956-57 changed th ese  f a c t o r s .  The c lo su re  o f the
Canal showed that sm a lle r  s iz e s  of tankers or even
the medium s iz e s  were o bv iou s ly  at major d isadvantages
(23 )
when u s in g  the Cape ro u te .  B es ides , s in ce  Western
484.
(23 ) See d is c u s s io n  on t h i s  po int in  Chapter 8 .
European consumers and o i l  companies o f the Middle
East were not su re  th a t  Egypt would s u f f i c i e n t l y
ca rry  i t s  o b l ig a t io n s  towards improvement p ro je c ts
in  the Canal o r  towards f r e e  n av iga t io n  they were
determined to p lay  sa fe  and employ la r g e r  tankers
in  fu t u r e .  To accom plish  t h i s ,  econom ically  i t  was
intended to  In c rea se  the number o f  t e rm in a ls ,  ports
and r e p a i r  docks s u i t a b le  f o r  l a r g e  tan k sh ip s .
B es ides , the o i l  c r i s i s  o f  1956-57 emphasised to  the
Europeans the importance o f  keeping l a r g e r  s tock s
(al though th is  would be achieved at h igh  c a p i t a l
exp en d itu re s ) and b u i ld in g  more as w e l l  as l a r g e r
r e f in e r i e s  at home. Hence b ig g e r  s in g le  d e l i v e r i e s
and low er un it  cost o f  t ra n sp o r t in g  crude o i l  were
matters whioh rec e iv ed  the main co n s id e ra t io n  in  the
post-Suez  pe riod  and favou red  the employment of
(24 )
l a r g e r  tan k e rs .
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(24 ) Among the fa c t o r s  w h ich  a c c e le ra te d  the b u i ld in g  
o f l a r g e r  tankers was the problem o f  crew ing f o r  
sm a lle r  t a n k e rs .  "Ihe  problems o f  crew ing have, 
in  times o f f u l l  employment, become much more 
acute and i t  i s  no ex a g g e ra t io n  to say tha t  i f  
the in du stry  s t i l l  had to r e l y  on tankers o f  
the 12,000 d .w . t .  s iz e  i t  would  be Im possib le  
to  f in d  the necessary  c r e w s .*  M. Hubbard,
The Economics o f  T ran sport ing  O i l  to and 
W ith in  Europe", p . 5 -  London 1937.
. 436.
In  Diagram (6 1 )  va r ious  s iz e s  o f  tankers between
16.000 i .  wt. (T -2 )  and 85,000 d . wt. a re  co n s id e red
f o r  comparison to  show the e f f e c t  o f  in c re a s in g  s iz e
on u n it  o p e ra t in g  co s ts .  I t  can be seen that t a x e s ,
d e p re c ia t io n  charges and running expenses decrease
per u n it  when employing l a r g e r  c a r ry in g  u n i t s .  A
tanker of 85,000 d. wt. cou ld  th e re fo re  "operate  and
prov ide  a r e tu rn  f o r  investment a t  c h a r te r  ra te s
o n e -h a lf  those necessary  f o r  a T -2  tanker to y i e ld
(25 )
an equa l r e t u r n " .  Diagrams (62 ) and (63 ) are  
d e r iv e d  from one of th e  most recent s tu d ie s  on the  
economics o f  t r a n s p o r t in g  o i l  and thus c l e a r ly  
I l l u s t r a t e  the com parative advantages o f l a r g e r
s iz e  tan k e rs .  Diagram (63 ) snows that a tanker o f
(26 )
150.000 d . w t. cou ld  operate  a t  INTa 3GALE -  68% 
whereas a tan ker  o f  10,000 d. wt. would not be ab le  
to  operate  under In ta a c a le  4$8$. Between these  two 
extremes i t  i s  showi in  t h i s  diagram th a t  with e v e ry  
in c rease  in  s iz e  o f  tankers a low er c h a r te r  r a t e ,  
r e l a t i v e  to  In t a s c a le ,  can be accepted . Between 
1956 and 1966 the growth in  the s iz e  o f  tanker was 
tremendous and Table (59 ) i l l u s t r a t e s  th is  f a c t  c l e a r l y .
(2 5 )  P .P . N Ib ley  and D.W, Dreiw, P ip e l in e  Economics 
and Technology, p . 5. Pub lished  by TAPLINE C o .,  
B e iru t ,  Lebanon, 1960.
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Source:Pipeline Economics and Technology in the Middle East", 
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DIAGRAM (62)
( Source:M.Hubbard,Econ. o f Transporting O il .p .48-49 • ) 
EFFECT OF TANKER SIZE ON TRANSPORTATION COST.
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EFFECT OF TANKER SIZE ON UNIT TRANSPORTATION COST
DIAGRAM (63)
COST RELATIVE TO INTASCALE
Size of tanker-dwt x 1.000
Source: M.HubbardjEcon. o f  Transporting O il,P .50
( £6 ) S ince the e a r ly  1960s AFRA has been expressed  
as a percentage above or below 1INIASCALE1, 
In te rn a t io n a l  Tanker Nominal F re igh t  Soa le .  
"INTASCALE developed  from the M.O.T. and 
U.S.M.C. s c a le s  e s t a b l i s h e d  during  the  
war, i s  a t a b u la t io n  of com parative f r e i g h t  
costs  between a very  la r g e  number o f  o i l  
po rts  throughout the w o rld . In ta so a le  
does not purport to r e p r e s e n t  the a c tu a l  
oost but on ly  tne comparative co s ts  so 
that i f ,  f o r  in s tan ce , a tanker i s  chartered  
f o r  d if fe re r fc  voyages at In t a s c a le  minus 
jl'/o i t  shou ld  be earn ing  about the same 
p r o f i t  o r  l o s s  per day whatever the voyage. 
I f  the In t a s c a le  ra te s  fo r  a la r g e  number o f  
voyages a re  p lo t t e d  aga in s t  d is tan ce  i t  w i l l  
be found th a t ,  apart  from those inhere there  
some abnormal c o s ta ,  such as p a r t i c u la r ly  
heavy d redg ing  dues or passage through  a 
c an a l,  a l l  the po ints  f a l l  v i r t u a l l y  on 
a s t r a ig h t  l i n e .  This l in e  Corresponds  
very  c lo s e ly  to the form ula 6/- p lus  
0.08d. per Ton-raile. In other words  
In t a s c a le  corresponds to a term ina l co s t ,  
in c lu d in g  the sh ips co s t  during the assumed 
number of la y -d a y s ,  o f  6/- p . t .  and the 
cost when a c t u a l l y  making the passage o f
0.08d. per Ton -ra ile1',
Mi. l^ b .a g c u  -g£..^E^3^0Efc.lnt.
Q U  to  .and w ith in  kurope" .  p . 9
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Tankers o f s iz e s  o f  85,000 d .w t . and over in c reased  
from 0 .1  m. d .w t .  in  1956 to 10 .2  m. d .w t . in  1966, 
thus c o n s t i tu t in g  10.3$ o f  world tanker f l e e t  in  the 
l a t t e r  date compared w ith  about 0.2$ in  1956.
Tankers of s iz e s  o f  45 -  85,000 d . wt. in c reased  from  
about 0.7$ o f  up t o  34$ o f  w orld  tanker f l e e t  between  
1956 and 1966. According to  London Tankers Brokers  
Panel (which e s t a b l i s h e d  AFRA) tankers above 45,000  
d. wt. were regarded  as " la r g e  t a n k e r s ,f (s in c e  1964). 
Adopting  t h i s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , f o r  p r a c t i c a l  reason s ,  
we can see  that the percentage o f l a r g e  tankers in  
world  tan ker  f l e e t  in c reased  from le s s  than one per  
cent ( i . e . ,  0 .9 $ ) in  1956 to  44.2$ in  1966. Medium 
s iz e  ta n k e rs ,  i . e . ,  between 25,000 and 45,000 d. wt. 
as d e f in e d  by L .T .B . r .  c o n s t i t u t e d  25.5/b in  w orld  
tanker f l e e t  in  1966 aga in s t  18jfe in  1956. Small s iz e  
tan k e rs ,  i . e . ,  o f  25,000 d. wt. and under rep resen ted  
30.3$ o f  w o r ld  tanker f l o e t  in  1936 compared w ith  
81.1$ in  1956.
489.
Improvement Pro .lecta in  the 5uoz Canal.
In  1956-57 doubts ware expressed  by Western  
w orld  sh ipp ing  concerns and o i l  companies that Egypt 
would e f f i c i e n t l y  c o n t ro l  the Suez Canal a f f a i r s  and 
Implement e s s e n t i a l  improvement p r o je c t s .  What 
happened du r in g  the decade fo l lo w in g  the Suez n a t ion ­
a l i z a t i o n  was q u ite  con tra ry  to p revious exp ec ta t io n s .
nefore  n a t io n a l i z a t io n  the Suez Canal company had 
commissioned an American firm  to  make a study of the 
t r a f f i c  which would want to  use the Canal u n t i l  about  
1972. The f i rm  rep o rted  back by e a r ly  1957 that o i l  
t r a f f i c  in  the vana l would r i s e  from 69 m. tons,
1955f t r a f f i c ,  to  254 m. tons in  1968 arri. to about  
335 m. tons in  1972. The average  tonnage o f tankers  
u s in g  the Canal was expected to r i s e  from an "av e rage "  
o f 18,900 d. wt. in  1955, to 27,800 d. wt. in  1968 
and to 32,100 d. w t. by 1972. The Canal company’s 
own prepared  p*ogramme (the 9th) fo r  the 3ame i » r i o d  
was more ambitious than the p lan which would be
envisaged  in  the l i g h t  of the study o f  the American 
(27)
f i rm . The n in th  programme planned fo r  in c re a s in g  
the cap ac ity  of the Canal so th a t  i t  cou ld  accommodate
(27 ) See r e fe r e n c e  g iven  in  Footnote (2 1 ) in  t h is  
Chapter.
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v e s s e ls  up to  55-60,000 d . wt. f u l l y  lo aded  w ith  a 
maximum draught o f  40 f e e t  by 1968. I t  a l s o  prepared  
f o r  in c re a s in g  the c a p a c ity  o f the Canal to  a llow  fo r  
an o i l  t r a f f i c  o f  275 m. tons a year by 1968.
I f  we may r e c a l l ,  the Suez C a n a l ’ s maximum draught  
b e fo re  c lo su re  in  1956 was about 35 f e e t ,  and the 
e ig h ty  improvement p ro je c t  which was in  p rogress  aimed 
at r a i s i n g  th is  to  36 f e e t .  &hen the Canal was re -opened  
in  A p r i l  1957 on ly  v e s se ls  o f draught up to 34 fe e t  were 
perm itted  to use the -an a l,  but soon (September 1st  
1958) the p r e - c r i s i s  cond it ions  were rega in ed . The 
new ad m in is t ra t io n  o f  the Suez Canal had combined 
the e igh th  and the n in th  improvement p» ogramraes in  
one p r o je c t ,  P a s s e r ’s p r o je c t ,  and w ithout any d e la y  
m obilized  a l l  i t s  fo r c e s  to accom plish I t .  by A p r i l  
1961 the maximum perm itted  d raught was in c reased  to 
37 f e e t .  W ith a d raught l im ita t io n s  o f  35 fe e t  
307 tankers o f  the w o r ld ’s 2,800 tankers  In  1960 
were unab le  to  use the Canal. A ft e r  the C a n a l ’s 
l im it  was r a i s e d  to  37 fe e t  ( a  tanker o f  about 50,000  
d. w t. f u l l y  lo ad e d ) on ly  1C7 tankers o f world f l e e t  
could not make the passage f u l l y  loaded . Ouring the  
years  1961-1967 Improvement In  the Canal continued  
at a co n s id e ra b le  r a t e ,  apparently  not on ly  to  
accom plish the o r i g in a l  ninth p ro jec t  prepared  by
491.
the n a t io n a l iz e d  company and whi ;h was fu r th e r  m od ified ,
I . e .  P a s s e r ’s p r o je c t ,  but a lso  to  cope w ith  the 
dram atic in c rease  In  the p ro p o rt ion  o f  l a r g e  tankers  
In world f l e e t .  Thus s ince  the end o f February  1964 
ve s se ls  w ith  a maximum draught o f 38 fe e t  (about
55,000 d. wt. f u l l y  lo aded ) were ab le  to use the Canal. 
Before  the Canal was c losed  f o r  the second time, June 
1967, work was about to f i n i s h  to  a l low  tankers o f  39 
fe e t  draught and l b  was a lso  announced th a t  v e s se ls  
o f  40 fe e t  draught should  be a b le  to t r a n s i t  by 
Deoember 1967 and th o se  o f  draught o f  up to 48 fe e t  
by 1972. B es ides , the Canal was g r e a t ly  widened to  
keep pace w ith  the p ro g re s s iv e  in c rease  in  tne number 
o f t r a f f i c  o f  la r g e  tankers (a id  a lso  other v e s s e l s ) .
Other s e rv ic e s  to  t r a n s i t in g  v e s s e ls  were a l s o  Improved
(28 )
and new docks f o r  sh ip b u i ld in g  and r e p a i r s  were e s t a b l i s h e d .  
Thus, in  s p i t e  o f the d is ru p t io n s  caused by the 1956-57 
events th e  new Canal ad m in is t ra t io n  almost implemented 
a l l  the r a t io n a l i z e d  company’s improvement p ro je c ts  
a y ea r  in  advance and r e v i s e d  1972’s t a r g e t  o f  deep­
en ing the Canal t o  48 fe e t  maximum d rau gh t . Never­
t h e le s s ,  from our rev iew  o f  the growth in  the s i z e
(2 3 )  Improvement p ro je c ts  a re  r e p o r t e d  an nua lly  In  
f u l l  d e t a i l s  in  the 'Suez Canal Report, Suez 
Canal A u th o r ity , U .A .R .
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o f the tanker we found that  an in c re a s in g  p ropo rt ion  
o f the w o r ld  tanker f l e e t  was becoming unable to  
nav igate  the Canal when f u l l y  loaded . I t  can be  
n oticed  from Table (60 ) that In 1966 tankers o f 3 iz e s  
o f 60,000 d. wt. ard over  (which cou ld  not In  tha t  
year  make t h e i r  passage in  the Canal when f u l l y  lo a d e d )  
co n s t itu ted  2,214,000 d. w t. o f  t o t a l  B r i t i s h  tanker  
f l e e t  o f  9 ,321,000 d. w t . ,  i . e . ,  23.8$. The s u i t ­
a b i l i t y  of the Canal f o r  n av iga t io n  by la r g e  tankers  
was most e s s e n t i a l  but not, however, the on ly  f a c t o r  
determ in ing the c h o ic e  o f  rou te . The advantages o f  
the Suez rou te  had to  be weighed a g a in s t  the costs  
In vo lved  in  u s in g  i t .  For tankers t h is  matter may be  
s ta te d  s im ply  as f o l l o w s :  sav ings  in  costs  o f  sh ip p in g
by us ing  the Suez Canal ro u te  ( in s t e a d  of the lo n g e r  
Cape ro u te )  aga in st  the  payments o f Ctenal dues.
.Saa&k .fo m «
In  1956 the Suez Canal r a t e s  o f dues were 34 Egyptian  
P ia s t r e s  per  S. ton in  cargo and 15.5 Egyptian  P ia s t r e s  
per S. ton  in  b a l l a s t .  At average  exchange r a t e  o f  
the pB r io d  these  r a t e s  were equal to 6/11.7d. per S. ton  
in  cargo  and 3/2.2d. per S. ton in  b a l l a s t .  During  
the pe riod  under rev iew  the Canal nu th or ity  fa ced  
d i f f i c u l t  d e c is io n s  In  attem pting to  keep pace w ith  
the in c re a s in g  s i z e  o f  tan ke rs , In c rea s in g  number o f  
t r a f f i c  and at the same time m aintain ing the  ra te s  o f
493.
t a i -t .r f r m
TANKERS OW;*ED AND REGISTERED IN THE U.K.
30th June 1966, ACCORDING TO DEAD WEIGHT.
Deadweight
Tonnage Range No. d. w.t
(000)
Under 85,000 182 2,638
25 -  29,999 21 579
30 -  34,999 28 901
35 -  39,999 23 834
40 -  44,999 15 631
45 -  49,999 14 680
50 -  59,999 12 644
60 -  69,999 17 1,099
70 -  79,999 2 143
80 -  89,999 6 494
90 -  109,999 5 478
TotaJ. 325 9,321
Sources U.K* Chamber o f  Shipping Annual Report 1966-67
dues at t h e i r  o ld  l e v e l s .  The Managing D ir e c to r  o f
the Suez Canal once s ta te d  that i t  oo st  £10 m. to
deepen the Canal hy one fo o t  on ly  du ring  i t s  e n t ir e  
(29 )
len g th . In  1964 the Suez Canal dues were In c reased
by Imposing a genera l surcharge  o f  one per cent over
the e x i s t in g  r a t e s  o f  dues. L a rg e r  v e s s e ls  were
re q u ire d  to pay more, however. The Canal A u th or ity
demanded from v e s s e ls  w ith a draught o f  over 37 f e e t
to pay an a d d i t io n a l  2%  surcharge fo r  eve ry  fo o t ,  o r
a f r a c t io n  o f  a f o o t ,  in  excess o f  th is  f i g u r e .
Vesse ls  o f  over 104 f e e t  in  w idth (a  l im it  which Is
approxim ate ly  in c rea sed  by 3 f e e t  f o r  every  fo o t  o f
draught over  37 f e e t )  were asked to  pay an a d d i t io n a l
1% surcharge  f o r  eve ry  s i x  fe e t  o f excess o f  th is
w idth . Dy th a t  time the b ig g e s t  v e s s e ls  (ta n k e rs )
u s in g  the Canal had widths between 104 and 110 f e e t
and the p e rm is s ib le  maximum draught was 33 f e e t .
Hence maximum surcharge  imposed upon the b ig g e s t
, (30 )
v e s s e ls  was equ a l to  4$ above the o ld  r a t e s  of dues .
The Canal A u th o r ity  j u s t i f i e d  the new su rcharges  on
the grounds that wages and p r ices  were r i s i n g  and
(29 ) Pet. Press S e rv ic e ,  August 1961, p . 311.
(30 ) See the Suez Canal Report -  1964. A lso  Pet.
Press S e rv ic e ,  Ju ly  1964, p .266 fo r  new 
treatment o f tankers which keep t h e i r  washings 
on board .
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that some r i s e  in  g ro ss  revenues became e s s e n t ia l  
i f  e n la rg in g  the dimensions o f the Canal would be 
continued in  fu tu r e  w i th  s im i la r  e f f i c i e n c y  and speed  
as in  the f i r s t  years  o f n a t io n a l iz a t io n .  The Canal 
dues were In c rea sed  a f t e r  that tw ic e ;  f i r s t ,  on 1st  
July 1965, second on 1st  July 1966. In  e a r ly  1967 
Canal dues stood at 7 / 2 .21d. per S. ton in  cargo and 
3/3 .31d. per S. ton in  b a l l a s t .  The in c re a se  In  dues 
had r a i s e d  the cost o f u s ing  the Canal but in  f a c t  
only  s l i g h t l y .  In  the In te rn a t io n a l  Tanker Nominal 
F re igh t  S ca le ,  In t a s c a le ,  a payment of 8/3d. per ton 
o f  o i l  c a r r ie d  was a l lo w ed  fo r  oost o f  using the Suez 
Canal In  a round t r i p  ( i . e . ,  4/3d. f o r  the South- 
North journey laden  and 2/- f o r  the re tu rn  journey  
in  b a l l a s t )  and t h is  f i g u r e  was not a l t e r e d  In  
consequence o f  any o f  the In c reases  vshich took p lace  
in  r a te s  o f  Canal dues* However the burden o f  the 
dues was bound to in c re a s e ,  even I f  these were kept 
constant, because o f  the employment o f l a r g e r  t ankers  
which were c o n t in u a l ly  reduc ing  the oost o f  t ran sp o rt .
This may be i l l u s t r a t e d  c l e a r ly  in  Table (6 1 ) .
The method adopted in  c a lc u la t in g  a c tu a l  duas o r ,  
p r e fe r a b ly ,  a c tu a l  cost o f using the  Canal i s  
exp la in ed  w ith  the T ab le . In  column (3 )  the a c tu a l
cost  o f  u s in g  the Canal i s  expressed as the equ iva len t
*
o f  lengthen ing  the s t r a ig h t  m ileage by a c e r ta in
496.
(19) 
m
x
u
497.
8.J?
§ *
03 
0)
. -  ► rHw g °  ^
< ^ i o<h -h 2 P m 
'-''rH fi (8 Q f- J? _  o  w « fl M
•H (9 0)
! | !  aS*H <J
l l l w
0 8
& - 4*
to
5
S
'S
4»
0)
^ > 5
CM
O
§Eh
U
&
" I03
w
& s 's
•
3 “ 'I  ^a  ©
* 3
M
H
03 1-3
Om
t*—
fH 8 
ITNm o p  o  o  o 
rH ir\ o  m m -f> o
O M T N N  t - K N  4 »«  »  • «  « o
KN KN KN CM CM IfN Q  
CM O  
*  IfN 
rH I
8 & 
m cm 
»  *
KN ITN
O O 
•P 4*
8 8  8, •« ^ 0  CM•  *  *  (k «  «k
rH H  CM CM KN Kt-
K 8 &
c o  c m  m
I co vo i
"co* C— C— C-» NO co
M W i M
fH rH rH rH «H
• . « . « *  •» «k O
O  O  O  O  O  UTN o  
rH CM KN 1/N C— CO rH
•
CM
rH
•
P«
t -
&
rH
•*
a
o
to
5
4*
Sr
EH
<H
O
I
•5
w
a
o
03
,Q P  <H 
•H O
C8 4 *  W  4 *
3 o S S
VO H  H  f i  4 »
3cg _2 C 2 HJ 0)
a  ?«§ . o
° >* U HiVI ri 0) 5 bp
° 5  & 8 5
O 03 4 »  
•H
3^.  $
P< (0
S 5  J ® <♦»
•rH Cfl *H <D 03
«M fi P  03 fH
<0
00
x *  4 » •  m
** . S •  2*4 8 • ,£
“  h  * H  4 *
I ' T S
4 » O  O  P <  O  
CtJ * H  4 *
3 3 3 £
O
1 1 1 1 ^  
C  3  S H  O
S  S  §
(0 Q)33 * _
* ,
H r-K M 0> O $ g
3 1 s t  3 ^ 3  * .a * S3 1O O rH Be
H 0J
5  s l - a
■ g o o
O ft  CO 50 <H
5  3  n  S  3
J5
gj a cj q 
■+3 J3 ®
n^l
i g i ?
• d #4*(m o / ^  4* ra«  o © o S ® <m -3
> » C Q 4 »j3 r -|  H  X) _  r l
I  l |  J  j j  s  1 1 1©+*,-4 H hH  rO
co rH ft ®  ,Qaj 4* U) V0 UtJ . , ^  _  _>* S ^  Pir4 ft S O O
„ «  -*3 5 |H 4» rH O  ft *p ft 
O 03 0) CO *H S
l i l i d s r i  a
C<J*PflC/JOxl*HO s“ "
4 9 8 .
distance#  Thus i t  becomes c le a r  that th e  oost o f
u s in g  the Canal changes d i r e c t l y  w ith  the s iz e  o f
the tanker s ince  the l a r g e r  is  the tanker the more 
capab le  i t  wculd be to  run a longer d is ta n c e  at a 
low er  co s t .  3y comparing the f i g u r e  g iven  at the 
top o f column 4 o f  the  T ab le ,  which rep re sen ts  the  
sav in g  in  d is tan ce  by the Canal over the Cape f o r  
the Pe rs ian  Gulf/London voyage, w ith  f ig u r e s  g iven  
in  column 5 i t  would be r e a l i s e d  that the l a r g e r
the s i z e  o f the tan i© r  the low er would be the r e l a t i v e
advantages o f the Canal over the Cape. For tan k e rs  
which could  not t r a v e r s e  the Canal f u l l y  loaded the  
r e l a t i v e  advantages of the Canal s t i l l  decreases  
fu r t h e r  because o f  the ex tra  co sts  o f u n der load ing .  
However, i t  can be seen that i t  would s t i l l  be 
advantageous to  use a 85,000 d . wt. tanker 10/i 
underloaded v i a  the Canal than using  i t  f u l l y  loaded  
v ia  the Cape s in ce  the costs  o f 1 ,250-1 ,750  m iles  
would be saved in  th is  way. On the other hand i t  
would be d e f i n i t e l y  uneconomic to  send a 100,000 
d. wt. 25}t underloaded  v ia  the Canal when i t  i s  
p o s s ib le  to send i t  f u l l y  loaded v ia  the Cape at 
lower co s ts .  The Canal would only be more advant­
ageous whan th is  100,000 d. wt. tanker has to  s a i l  
in  b a l l a s t  6n i t s  way to  c o l l e c t  o i l  from  the  
Pers ian  G u lf  s ince  on ly  b a l l a s t  dues -  about one
h a l f  o f  cargo  dues -  would be pa id  in  th is  case.
The above a n a ly s is  shows th a t  in  s p i t e  o f  the
decrease  in  the r e l a t i v e  advantages o f  the Suez Canal
(consequent upon the in c rease  in  the s iz e  o f the ta n k e r )
i t  was s t i l l  uneconomic f o r  any tan ker  l e s s  than 100,000
d. wt. to  use the lo n g e r  Cape r o u t e .  To g iv e  a
numerical example; the cost o f  t r a n sp o r t in g  a ton
o f o i l  from tne Pers ian  Gulf to  Europe v ia  the Cape
(app rox . 10,000 m ile s )  by a tanker o f  100,000 d .w t .
has been c a lc u la t e d  a t  2 6 .6 / - .  This would be compared
w ith  19 .5/ - per  ton 6f o i l  i f  a tanker o f 50,000 d.wt
(3 1 )
i s  used v ia  Suez, f o r  the same d e s t in a t io n  (approx .
5,000 m i le s ) .  Now add ing  the Canal dues (c a lc u la t e d  
by tanker companies at about 6 .3 / -  per ton  o f  o i l )  to  
the l a t t e r  f i g u r e  the cost pa r  ton d e l iv e r e d  v ia  Suez 
would be almost equa l to  that o f  a tan ker  o f  100,000
d .w t .  o p e ra t in g  v ia  the lo n g e r  ro u te .
In  1956 any tanker o f  a capac ity  between 55,000 
and 100,000 could on ly  use the Chnal when underloaded. 
Yet the oost  per ton  o f o i l  was s t i l l  cheaper in  t h i s  
way than when us in g  the Cape rou te  f u l l y  lo aded .
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(3 1 )  F igu res  from M. Hubbard Econ. o f T ransport ing  
O i l , p . 47.
Whether a tanker would rou te  v ia  the Canal underloaded  
or v ia  the Cape f u l l y  lo aded , hut a t  h igh e r  coat per  
ton c a r r ie d ,  was a m atter dependent on the supp ly  o f  
w orld  tan k e rs ,  and a ls o  on the cond it ion s  in  the 
f r e i g h t  market. So far as these fa c to r s  were concerned  
(e x p la in e d  be low ) the l a s t  decade was one th a t  was 
c h a ra c te r is e d  w ith  a p e rs is t e n t  su rp lu s  in  tanker  
capac ity  and p ro longed  depress ion  in  f r e ig h t  r a t e s .  
Under these  circum stances la r g e  tankers which cou ld  
not use the Canal f u l l y  loaded  but wnich cou ld  not 
be routed  a t  low er cost per ton v ia  the Cape were  
bes t  used in  runs o ther than that between the P e rs ia n  
Gulf -  Europe. Yet i t  was a lso  more economic to use  
such tankers underloaded v ia  the Canal than f u l l y  
loaded  v i a  the Cape. I t  remains f o r  us to  emphasise 
that during  the decade 1957-1966 the number o f l a r g e  
tankers which cou ld  be used more econom ically  v ia  the 
Cape route in s te a d  o f  S u e z ,  between the P e rs ian  Gulf 
and Europe, never rep resen ted  more than a sm all  
p ropo rt ion  o f  the w orld  tanker f l e e t .  For example 
g ian t  tankers o f  s i z e s  o f  100,000 d. wt. and over 
c o n s t itu ted  on ly  about o f world  tankers  in  1966.
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Tanker Pjceljrtit R a tes .
Hie reasons f o r  the dep ress ion  In  tanker f r e ig h t  
r a te s  during  ard  a f t e r  the  Suez o r i s i s  have been  
analysed  In  Chapter 3 u n t i l  the end o f  the 1950 fs .
We saw then that AFRA and s in g le  voyage r a te s  continued  
to f lu c tu a te  around the extrem ely low le v e ls  which were 
reached at the erd of 1957 (See Liagram 5 3 ).  I f  W6 
may r e c a l l ,  th is  dep ress ion , which r e s u l t e d  from the  
Suez c r i s i s ,  was in t e n s i f i e d  by the high ra te  at which 
world  tanker f l e e t  was in c reased ; by about 50$ between  
1957 and 1962. During  the years 1962-1966 w orld  tanker  
f l e e t  continued to r i s e ,  a lthough  at a s low er  ra te  
owing to the dap? e s s io n  in  the f r e i g h t  mafcket, and 
prevented any r e a l  recovery  In  r a t e s .  The o i l  in du stry  
and a lso  b i g  tankers sh ip p in g  companies were keen to  
keep a s a fe  re se rve  o f  tanker capac ity  over a c tu a l  
requirem ents in  o rd e r  to ensure th a t  no shortage  o f  
ocean tran spo rt  f a c i l i t i e s  would occu r. This new 
a t t i tu d e  was the main fe a tu re  in  the tan ker  market 
s in ce  the f i r s t  Suez c lo s u re .  Table (62 ) shows 
the change in  f r o ig h t  ra te s  during the years  1961-1966 
and in  e a r ly  1967. I t  must be emphasised that a 
recovery  in  r a t e s  was not on ly  prevented by the  
excess o f  tanker cap ac ity  over t ran sp o rt  r e q u i r e ­
ments but a l s o  by the f a c t  that an In c re a s in g  
p ropo rt ion  o f  the newly b u i l t  tankers cons isted  o f
501 #
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TANKER FHEIGHL’ RATES. 
(BsrcentageB Above or Belov Intascale)
TABLE (62)
Year.
1961 
1962 
19 63
AFRA. ♦
bingia Voyage 
Rates (Dirty )++
General
Purpose
Tankers
(up to 24»999 
dwt)
-5.5
-9.3
-13.9
Large Tankers 
(25,000 d.wt. 
and over).
-14.7
-18.0
- 2 2 .2
-57
-50
-364
Gen. Purpose 
Tankers
(up to 24,999 
dwt)
Medium
i.’ankers
(25,000
to
44»999 
dwt )
B
Tankers 
(45,000 dwt 
and over)
1964
1965
1966 
1967
(January 
to May;
- 22.0
-19.4
-18.7
-24.1
Sourcei Pet. Press Servioe.
-30.6
-29.8
-29.0
-36.5
- 35.7
- 39.5 
-41*4
-46.4
-44
-43 i
-48it
-59
♦ Annual Averages of I/PBP* average freight rate assessments which 
cover all tankers trading. Until 1959 there was only one 
index covering long and short term rates for tankers of 
all sizes. However, the growth in the size of the tanker 
necessitated a change in this system in 1959 end the index 
was subdivided so as to provide separate indicators for 
(a) general purpose and (b) large tankers. A second 
change in classification was introduced in 1964 as shown 
above.
la r g e  and g ian t  tankers which could  accept much
low er r a t e s  o f f r e i g h t .  This can be observed  in
Table (62 ) by comparing changes in  r a t e s  o f f r e i g h t
obta ined  by la r g e  tankers w ith  those obta ined  by
medium and g e n e ra l  purpose tan k e rs .  Other reasons
which depressed  tanker f r e i g h t  r a t e s  during the
p e rio d  w ere : ( a )  the marked d e c l in e  in  tankers
b u i ld in g  c o s ts ;  ( b )  the b u i ld in g  o f  tankers  w ish
h igh er  speeds which in  e f f e c t  in c reased  the supp ly
o f  e f f e c t i v e  c a r ry in g  cap ac ity ; and ( c )  the f a l l  in
bunker o i l  p r ic e s  (between 1956 and 1964 bunker f u e l
o i l  p r ic e s  f e l l  by about 20$ and d i e s e l  o i l  by about
(32 )
12$) •
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(3 2 ) Tanker b u i ld in g  co sts  d e c lin e d  from about £85 
per ton f o r  tankers ran g in g  up from 19,500  
to 45,000 d .w t .  in  1956 to  about £50 -  £55 per  
ton f o r  a 19,500 d .w t tan ker , £40 per ton f o r  
a 45,000 tanker  and as l i t t l e  as £32 fo r  v e s s e ls  
o f  l a r g e r  s i z e s  in  1964. A lso in  the ten  
years  1955-1964 the average  speed o f the 
tanker in c reased  by two knots which rep resen ted  
a s a v in g  o f about 5 days on a voyage from the  
P e rs ian  Gu lf to Western Europe. See Tanker 
Mar lasts in  the S ix t ie s .  Pet . P ress  S e rv ic e ,
May 1964.
Xifld le  .East O i l  T r a f f i c  in  the Suez Canal.
A f t e r  an a ly s in g  d i f f e r e n t  fa c to r s  which a f f e c t e d  
the f lo w  of Middle East/Europe o i l  t r a f f i c  through  
the three  e x is t in g  ro u te s ;  the Suez Canal, the Cape 
o f  Good Hope and the Eastern  Mediterranean p ip e l in e s  
we can see  that the Canal s t i l l  h e ld  the s tron gest  
s i t u a t io n  u n t i l  1966. The development o f  the p ip e ­
l i n e  system was h indered  by p o l i t i c a l  f a c to r s  and i t  
became in c re a s in g ly  n ecessary  to r e ly  on tanker  
s e rv ic e s  a t  the Pe rs ian  Gulf fo r  Saudi A rab ian  and 
I r a q i  o i l  exports  to Europe. In  d is c u s s in g  fa c to rs  
which a f f e c t e d  the com petition  between the Canal and 
the Cape rou te  we found that u n t i l  1966, and 1967, 
the ga in  to  the lo n ge r  route  because o f  the ra p id  
development in  the s iz e  o f the tanker d id  not 
rep resen t  aqy se r io u s  th re a t  to  the Canal. Adm ittedly  
an in c re a s in g  number o f  la r g e  tankers  was in  p o s it io n  
to ro u te  v ia  the Cape route a t  a low cost per u n i t ,  
but not however competing e f f e c t i v e l y  w ith v e s s e ls  o f  
the same s iz e  and (but su b jec t  to  v a r io u s  c o n s id e ra t io n s )  
w ith  v e s s e ls  o f sm a lle r  s iz e s  using  the C an a l..
Table (63 ) shows the share o f the : u ez l Canal 
in  Middle East o i l  exports to  Western Europe and
(33 )
America (n o rth  and south ) in  1966 compared w ith  1955.
( 3 3 ) For purpose o f  more accu rate  comparison, 1955
would be cons ide red  in stead  o f  1956 or 1957 s ince  
the f i g u r e s  o f  these l a t t e r  years  were d i s t o r t e d
by the Suez c r i s i s .
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Middle Bast O i l  Exports to  
Europe and America (n o rth  & south )
1955 1966
M i l l io n s ~  % M il l io n s %
o f  Tons. o f  Tons.
Via
( a )
P ip e l in e s
o•o 36.4 62.0 24.0
( b )
Suez Canal 65.0 59.1 166.5 65.0
( c )
Cape rou te 5.0 4.5 28.0 11.0
(d )
Tota l 110.0 100.0 256.5 100.0
( a )  Source of d a ta  P . I . 3 . Memo., F eb *,1964 ,f0 i l  in
the M iddle E a s t * ,  a ls o  Pet. Press S e rv ice  
( r e p o r t s  r e g u l a r l y  on o i l  bu s in ess  in  the 
Middle East and e lsew here  in  the w o r ld )
( b )  Source: Suez Canal Annual Report,
(o )  The share  o f the Cape rou te  is  obta ined  by  
deducting ( a ^ b )  from t o t a l  (d )
(d )  Source: f o r  195 5; the Banker v o l .  I I  1956 and
f o r  1966; B .P . ,  1966, S t a t i s t .  Review o f  
the World O i l  In d u stry .
x  A l l  f i g u r e s  are approximate because o f  the  
va r io u s  sources from which data  
obta ined .
I t  can be seen that  th is  share  in c reased  by about  
d u r in g  the pe r iod  and reached 65$ by 1966.
M idd le  East exports  to  West o f Suez v ia  the Cape 
route  had in c reased  co n s id e ra b ly ,  in d ic a t in g  the  
new trend , but s t i l l  c o n st itu ted  a sm all p roport ion  
of t o t a l  shipments. On the other hand the r e l a t i v e  
importance o f  the Middle East p ip e l in e s  was reduced  
rem arkably by 12.4$. O bta in ing  more d e t a i l s  about 
the d i s t r i b u t io n  o f  th e  Suez Canal t r a f f i c  by d e s t in ­
a t io n  from Table (64 ) we w o u ld  see , however, that the  
in c rease  in  West-bound o i l  t r a f f i c  between 1955 and 
1966 had in  f a c t  been accomplished by the tremendous 
growth in  shipments to European cou n tr ies  o ther than  
B r i t a in .  Middle East o i l  exports  to  th ese  cou n tr ie s  
v ia  Suez inc reased  from 36 .3  m. tons in  1955 to  129.5  
m. tons in  1966 ard  t h e i r  share  in  t o t a l  Canal t r a f f i c  
in c reased  by 21.7 a between the two reaps c t iv e  .d a tes• 
Meanwhile B r i t i s h  o i l  imports through Suez increased  
at co n s id e rab ly  s low e r  r a t e  and th e re fo re  as a p e r ­
centage in  t o t a l  t r a f f i c  they f e l l  from 30.3,5 in  
1955 t o  13.5,. in  1966.
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3 A & E .t g l l
SUEZ CAiiAL TRAFFIC (North-bound O il T ra ffic )
1955 1966
M i l l io n s  % M i l l io n s  %
o f Tons. o f  Tons
To;
U.K. 19.7 30.3 22.5 13.5
Rest o f W. Europe 36.3 56.1 129.5 77.8
T ota l Europe 56.0 86.4 152.0 91.3
America
(n o rth  & south ) 9 .0 13.6 14.5 8 .7
Tota l 65.0 100.0 166.5 100.0
Sources Suez Canal Report, 1966
The following Table (baaed on figurea given in Tables (57)  
and (64)) compares the British and European dependence 
on the ouez Canal in relation to o il  imports from the Middle 
East in 1955 and 1966, .
TABI£_(6£2
1955 1966 Change
e1 "b 0 <T Between
1955 & 1966Mil.Tons Y> Mil .Tons
l) Britain
(C -  a j
o f
Oil Imp* from the 
Middle East., 25.0 100.0 44.0 100.0
7°
75.2
-  VIA -  
I )  The Suez Canal 19.7 78.8 22.5 51.4 14.2
I I )  The Cape Route & 
Eastern Mediterranean 
Pipelines x 5.3 21.2 21,5 48.6 300
2) Other W. Europe
Oil imp. from the 
Middle East P 67.0 100.0 174.0 100.0 160
- VIA -
I )  The Sue* Canal ^ 36.3 54.2 129.5 74.4 257
I I )  Ihe Cape route and 
Eastern Mediterranean 
Pipelines * 30.7 45.8 44.5 25.6 45
Sou rce:
x Approxim ate f i g u r e s ,  ob ta in ed  by d ed u c tin g  the Suez
borne o i l  from t o t a l  o i l  im ports o f  M iddle East o r i g i n  
4. See r e f e r e n c e s  g i v e n  w i th  Tab le  (57)  i n  th is  Chapter, 
See r e f e r e n c e s  g i v e n  w i t h  Tab les  (63 )  and (64)  i n  
t h i s  Chapter,
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Table (66) gives a picture for the gradual decrease in 
the proportion of British imports whioh came via the Suez 
Canal in the period 1955^1966*
TABLE (66)
British Import of Oil from the 
(Mil* Tons)
Total (a )
1955 24.900
1959 52.743
I960 30.530
1961 39.836
1962 40.505
1965 40.948
1964 41.528
1965 39.257
1966 43.784
Middle East*
Came via $
Sue* (b)
19.686 78.8
25.715 78.6
50.214 78.5
31.088 78.1
31.040 76.5
29.970 75.2
29.381 70.8
23.957 61.1
22.528 51.4
(a ) Source 1 Ministry of Bower' Statistical Digest
(b ) Suez Canal Annual He port*
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Thus during the period under review Britain considerably 
reduced the proportion of Middle Bast oil imports which came 
via the Suez Canal and depended increasingly on alternative 
routes. Unfortunately statistics oould not be obtained on British 
oil imports which oame via Eastern Mediterranean and those which 
came via the Cape route from Middle East sources. Yet it would 
be logically deduoed* on the basis of the analysis which has been 
introduced in this chapter* that it must have been Britain*8 
increasing dependence on the Cape route wliioh reduced the 
relative importance of the Canal. (See the discussion concerning 
the development of Eastern Mediterranean pipelines). It would 
be noticed f*om Table (67) that the proportion of Middle East 
oil channeled via the Canal was particularly falling during 
the last few years* i.e.* 1964-1966* when the capaoity of 
Eastern Mediterranean pipelines was almost constant but when 
the number of giant tankers which could route economically via 
the Cape route was rapidly growing. But the question which 
may be posed now is why did not the same factors affect other 
Western European1 s dependence on the Canal? Two reasons may 
account for thief (a) Britain was hit by the 1956-57 crisis 
more than any other European partner %nd her importers were 
therefore more id diversifying sources of oil supply
as well as In piscina mor  ^ dependence on alternative routes 
to the Canal| and (b) the relative advantages of the Canal
were greater for Mediterranean countries such as Greece, Italy and 
France and therefore the economies gained by using larger tankers 
via the Cape • instead of Suez - would be less apparent than they 
were to Britain*
Diaring the years 1963-66 the growth of oil shipments to main 
European destinations was as follows 1-
IABLK C 67)
Mil. of Sena.
1963 1964 1965 1966 i» Change 
1963/66.
Italy 24.3 31.4 41.4 50.3 ♦107
France 16.5 23.3 26.5 24.4 +49
U.K. 30.0 29.4 24.O 22.5 -25
N etherland. 15.3 15.7 16.5 15.2 +36
Belgium 7.9 8.3 10.2 10.7 +13
W. Germany 9.0 8.5 7.6 10.3 +14
Source* Suez Canal Annual Report*
Note that Italy's share in the Canal traffic had grown 
considerably during the four years 1963-66* With the exception 
of Italy, France had expanded her share in the Suez Canal's oil 
more than any other V/. European country.
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Britain* a Oil Import a Via Suez in Relation to Her Total
The importance of the Canal borne oil has been assessed, in 
relation to total oil imports from the Middle East and we saw 
that it had been reduced remarkably throughout the ten years 
following the Suez crisis 1956-57* As has already been 
analysed earlier in this chapter, oil imports from the Middle 
East were also relatively cut down after I960. Hence it would 
be naturally expected that the proportion of the Suez Canal oil 
in total British oil imports was heavily reduced during the 
period under review. Tfable (68) shows this situation dearly*
TABLE (68 )
Year. British Total Oil .&£• .
Mil Tons.
Imp. via Suez jt
1955 56.740 19.688 55.7
I960 58.548 30.214 51.8
1962 67.198 31.040 46.1
1964 78.011 29.361 57.7
1965 86.680 23*957 27.7
1966 92.001 22.528 24.5
S.urees given with previous Tables in this Chapter.
The. Jmportanoe of the aaw Borne Oi l  In Britain 's Total Energy 
Consumption*
In the earliest section of this ohapter the considerable 
expansion in the share of o i l  in total energy consumption has 
been illustrated* Hence i t  may be the case that the relative  
importance of the Suez borne o i l  had increased during the ten 
years 1957-1966 in spite of the decrease in its  share in total 
o il  imports* To assess this matter quantitatively we need to 
knew the amounts of the Suez borne o il  which had been maintained 
for home consumption and used as fuels* Yet, since there are 
no statistics on these matters we may rely on estimation*
It  would be assumed, for eaoh of the years that the proportion 
of total inland o i l  fuel consumption/total o i l  imports was 
equal to the amounts of Sues bome o il used as fuels at home/ 
total Suez borne o i l .  Total amounts of inland o il  fuel 
consumption, as given by the Ministry of Bower, would be smaller 
than total o il  imports bys re-exports, bunker o i l ,  and o i l  
products not used as fuels ( i . e . ,  chemical feedstock, industrial 
and white spirits , lubricants, bitumen and wax) • By volume, total 
inland consumption of o i l  fuel was equal to about 56$ and JOfi of 
total o i l  imports in 1955 and 1964 respectively and to about 7l a/°  
in 1966 .^^  The rise in this percentage reflected an increase
(®4) Source of data: Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1965» (No.102),
Tables Nos. 156, 172 and 174. 1966* figures of fuel 
consumption are obtained from The Ministry of Bowerfs 
White Baper on Fuel Policy, Nov. 1967•
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consumption. Now, applying the same proportions to total imports 
of o il  which came to Britain via the Suez Canal we would obtain 
the following figures«
TABLE (69)
Suez Borne .Oil  Used as Fuels in Britain.
1955 1964 1966
Mil. Tons. °/o Mil. Tons $ Mil. Tons
(a ) Oil Came 
to U.K. via
Suez. 19.7 100 29.4 100 22.5 100
(b ) Refrained
for Fuel Con- 1 1 * °  56 20.6 70 16.0 71
sumption (approx) .
(0) for Re­
Exports 9 Bankers
& Industrial 8.7 44 8.8 50 6.5 29,
Usage other -
than Fuelling
in the proportion of o il that was for inland fuel
In the following Table (70) the amounts shown above in (b ) have 
been oonverted into million tons of coal equivalent (using the 
Ministry of Bower’ s rate of conversiont 1.7 tons of coal -  1 ton 
of o i l )  and are compared with total inland fuel consumption.
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T o ta l B r i t i s h  Trade and Shipping In te re s t s  In  Suez:
Tota l U .K . imports from Commonwealth and fo r e ig n
countries  East o f  Suez a re  shown by country and by main
( 1 )
c a tego r ie s  f o r  1963 in  Table ( F - l ) .  S ev e ra l  fo o tn o te s  
have been in s e r te d  to g iv e  more d e t a i l s ,  p a r t i c u la r l y  
about import t rades  which depended only  p a r t ly  on the  
Suez Canal. However, f o r  a more p re c ise  p ic tu re  about 
Middle East f u e l  which depended on the Canal see Chapter (9 ) ,  
I t  can te  r e a l i z e d  from the Table tha t  B r i t i s h  imports v ia  
Suez co n s is ted  predominantly o f f o o d s t u f f s ,  b a s ic  and 
in d u s t r i a l  m ate r ia ls  and f u e l s .  The in c rease  in  the cost  
o f t ra n sp o r t in g  th is  B r i t i s h  t rade  or the in te r ru p t io n  in  
i t s  a r r i v a l  would d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t  the cost o f l i v in g  and 
i n d u s t r i a l  o u t la y  on raw m a te r ia ls .
Table (F -2 )  p resen ts  a p ic tu re  fo r  t o t a l  B r i t i s h  
import and export t rad e s  conducted w ith countries  in  F a s t
516.
APPTE.DIX F .
(1 )  S im ila r  d e t a i l e d  s t a t i s t i c a l  account as that g iven  in  
th is  Table could not be compiled f o r  the more recen t  
y e a r s .  The l a s t  number o f  the Annual Statement o f  the  
trade  of the U.K. which has been a v a i la b le  in  the 
p r in c ip a l  B r i t i s h  l i b r a r i e s  was pub lished  in  1965 
and concerns 1933. Yet on the b a s is  o f  f i g u r e s  
obta ined  from the monthly accounts o f  B r i t i s h  trade  
there  cou ld  bot be much change in  the p ic tu re  
presented  h e re . •
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*  Other sections in import l i s t  are chemicals,
manufactured goods, machinery and transport 
equipment and miscellaneous manufactured 
artic les.
x Most of this trade came via Suez, in particular 
the f i r s t  section.
y Most of this trade depended on routes other than 
Suez.
Reft Annual Statement of the Trade of the U.K.,
1963., Vol. IV.
liotes to Tbble ( F « l )  (Foreign)
*  Other sections in import l i s t  are chemicals,
manufactured goods, machinery and transport 
equipment and miscellaneous manufactured artic les.
Trade with foreign countries East of Suez other than 
taose shown in the Table was negligible.
•M- Trade with Iraq was partly conducted via Fao (Persian Gulf) 
and partly via Syrian and Lebanese ports. Trade with 
Saudi Arabia vas also carried partly via Saudi ports 
in the Gulf and partly through Eastern Mediterranean 
ports.
Reft Annual Statement of the Trade of the U.K., 19631 
Vol. IV.
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BRITISH TRADE EAST OP SUEZ.**
TABLE (F -  2 )
1966
I/tFORTS 
£  m#
KXPORTS 
£  m#
I  Australia 208.185 258.049
New Zealand 187.119 127.431
I I  Asian Countries 
in the Far East 453.498 487.038
Commonwealth 316.839 331.686
Others 136.659 155-352
4. 4 ♦Countries on 
the Eastern Coast 
o f A frica 72.610 86.356
Commonwealth 65.848 64.741
Others 6.762 21.615
IV Middle East 287.587 146.740
Commonwealth 50.714 31.183
Others 236.873 115.557
Total B rit ish  Trade 
with a l l  Countries 
(East o f Suez and Others) 5,236.040
++ For defin ition o f the Categories see Chapter ( 6 ) -  Figures 
including Ro-exports#
■f Tanzania,Kenya and Countries North o f thorn, and including 
Mauritius and SychGiles#
Basic Data compiled from "Overseas Trade Accounts o f  the U.K"
(December 15)66 with cumulative tota ls )
A t r ic a ,  the M iddle E as t ,  Far Eastern  Asian  countr ies  and 
A u s t r a la s ia  in  196S. By d iv id in g  th is  B r i t i s h  t rad e  
accord ing to  the degree  o f i t s  dependence on the Suez 
Canal we have been a o le  in  Chapter o to  roach  an estim ­
a t io n ,  by v a lu e ,  l o r  the s iz e  which depended on th is  
rou te . On that b as is  it  has been estim ated that in  1955 
about 19/o and 21^ o r  more o f the value o f  B r i t i s h  exports  
and imports (w ith  various  trad in g  areas in  the w orld )  
were shipped v ia  Suez. Using a s im i la r  method, but ta k in g  
account o f  the decrease  in  the p ropo rt ion  o f  Middle East  
o i l  that came to B r i t a in  v ia  Suez in  recen t y ea rs ,  I  have 
come to  the conc lu s ion  that  in  19 only about 14p and 12$ 
r e s p e c t iv e ly  o f  t o t a l  B r i t i s h  experts  and imports used  
the Suez Canal. This is however a low est im ate  (s e e  
chapter 6 ) and i f  we taie in to  accourt a l l  t r a f f i c  which  
p o s s ib ly  used the Canal in  19S6 we may f in d  that p robab ly  
15/i® oi B r i t i s h  imports and 1 dyo o f  exports  depended on the  
Suez rou te . But th is  l a t t e r  estim ate would be compared 
w ith  that o f  1955 whioh showed that about 25> o f  B r i t i s h  
trad e  had p o s s ib ly  been v ia  Suez.
The d e c lin e  in the r e l a t i v e  importance o f the  Canal 
between the two dates which preceded the t i r s t  and second  
c lo su re s  o f the Canal can bo a t t r ib u t e d  to  two n »in  f a c t o r s ;  
f i r s t l y , the d e c l in e ,  bo th  in  ab so lu te  and r e l a t i v e  terms,
521.
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of moat of the main trades conducted with nast of Suez.
Examples? in mil. of £.
BRITISH BRITISH
IMPORTS EXPORTS
1955 1966 1955 1966
Australia 263.9 208.2 286.4 258.1
India 186.6 119.8 168.1 96.8
Malaysia & Singapore 35*2 48.1 74.5 90.9
Kuwait 125.4 92*9 H•00 26.0
The decline in o i l  trade from the Middle East has been 
described with factors behind it in Chapter 9. The decline 
in other Eastern/British trades was due to the growth in 
inter-Eastern trade tojEastern countries (Asian in particu lar) 
making more serious attempts towards Industrial development; 
and to their trade po lic ies . On the side o f Britain there 
was a rapid growth in the trade conducted with European 
countries particu larly  members of the Common Market.
There was also a marked increase in the trade with the 
communist block of eastern Europe durirg the last  decade. 
Secondly, there was the increase in shipments of Middle 
East o i l  via the CapB route, as described in Chapter 9.
The decrease in the volume of B rit ish  trade via the 
Suez Canal during the last  ten years can be seen in the 
light of the following i igures as obtained from Suez 
Canal Annual Reports,
TOTAL BRITISH TRADE VIA THE SUES CAiJiL 
Million of Tons Vi/eight
5 2 3 .
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
31.6 34.2 38.7 39.5 39.8 38.2 37.1 31.6 30.1 Total
24.3 25.7 30.2 31.1 31.0 30.0 29.4 24.0 22.5 O il
Imports
7.3 8.4 8.5 3.4 8.8 8.2 7.7 7.7 7.6 Other
Goods 
(exp. & lap .]
With the exception of 1965 the volume of British  
shipping In the Suez Canal, I . e . ,  vessels fly ing the 
tr it ish  f la g ,  was r is in g . Yet this development was much 
slower than the general r ise  in Canal t r a f f ic ,  and therefore 
the share of British f la g  continually decreased.
The slower growth of British shipping in the Suez Canal 
was partly re flecting  the slower growth in British  trade 
East of Suez. The f a l l  in the share of British f la g  in 
the Canal t ra ff ic  was not however a new phenomenon and 
it  was firmly linked with the decline in the share of 
British  shipping in the world. See Table (F-3) for the 
continuous f a l l  in the percentage of British  shipping in 
the Canal.
TABLE (F -  3) 
SUEZ CAhAL TRAFFIC
1870 -  80 
1881 -  90
1891 -  00 
1901 -  10
1920
1929
1938
1949
1955
1962
1964
1965
1966
U.K. F Isr 
*  o f Total
76.1
78.0
70.0
62.3
61.7
57.1
50.4
36.1 
28.3
21.7
19.5
16.8
16.6
Sources Suez Canal S tatistics .
THE SECOND CLOSURE OF THE SUEZ CAr\iAL. JjNE 1,967 -
The Suez Canal was closed for the second time as a 
result of a short war between Egypt and Israe l in the 
f i r s t  week of June 1967. The Egyptian government declared  
that navigation in the water way would be resumed only 
a fte r  the Is ra e l i  troops had withdrawn from the positions 
whioh they had occupied on the Eastern bank of the banal 
in the June war. The decision has been seen in 3ritain  
and other Western countries from its  p o l i t ic a l  angles 
the Suez route would remain closed until they have put 
suffic ient pressure on the Is ra e li  government to withdraw 
its  troops from Egyptian land. Whether or not that was 
the Egyptian government fs insertion it  is defin ite that 
the Canal could not, and would not be cleared from block- 
ships and other hindrances to navigation as long as the 
I s ra e l i  remained in the Canal zone, i . e . ,  in a state of  
war with Egypt. Since June 1967 several heavy military  
clashes happened across the Canal and therefore even i f  
it  was open ifc would have been of l i t t l e  or no use to 
commerce. The r ise  in maritime insurance rates would 
always discourage, or prohibit, vessels from nawigating 
in areas that are subject to war a c t iv it ie s .
5 2 5 .
A bBEi .DIX q .
Thus fo r  the f i r s t  time since its opening the 
Suez Canal has remained entirely shut (containing 15 
vessels trapped inside) for ten months now. resides, 
judging from the trend of p o lit ic a l events it can not 
be forecast whether or not it  w i l l  be re-opened fo r  
navigation within the coming months o f this year.
It  Is early  yet to make any precise estimation of the 
effects of the second closure o f the Canal on B ritish  
shipping and trade interests in the East. It  Is possible  
however to draw an outline for the outstanding features 
of the presertb c r is is  and in the light of the 1956 
experience we may be able to obtain some useful con­
clusions.
1 -  General Information and provisional s t a t is t ic a l  
records Indicate that the present closure of the Canal has 
not -  so fa r  -  by i t s e l f  caused any notable decrease in 
world o i l  supplies. In 1956 when the Canal was closed 
the productive capacity of the Middle East o i l  f ie ld  was 
also considerably reduced owing to the problem of finding  
su ffic ient tanker tonnage to export the produce to the 
Western market via the Cape route. In 1967 the situation  
was d iffe ren t in that a tanker capacity of about 3.5m. 
tons was employed in the grain trade or la id  up for lack 
of employment when the Suez route was closed. resides, 
about 3 m. tons of vessels designed for both ore and o i l
5 2 6 .
trades were freed and used for carrying o i l .  The fre e ­
ing of tankers from the grain trade and the switching of 
ore carriers to o i l  business was made gradually during 
the few months following June 1967. This process was 
fa c i l ita ted  by tbs surplus of tonnage which existed In 
the dry cargo market, by tne expected delivery of about
4 m. tons of new bulk carriers during the second half of
(1)
1967 and by the r ise  in o i l  freight rates.
The situation would have been further eased i f  the 
rate of addition to world tanker fleet  In the f i r s t  h a lf  
of 1967 (2.5>) had been as high as that in the corres­
ponding period in 1966 (4.3/0 or in the second half of 
1966 (6.9;0. Expressed in millions of dwt, deliveries  
of new bankers in the f i r s t  half of 1967 amounted to 
3.055m. dwt. and thus were over one million dwt. less  
than in the f i r s t  ha lf o f 1966. However about 6m. dwt.
were expected to be added to world tankers In the second
( 2 )
ha lf  of 1967 and about 11m. dwt. for 1968.
Thus the surplus In tanker tonnage prevented a 
shortage in o i l  supplies from developing because of the 
Canal closure and thus o ffset a possible r is e  in f .o .b .  
o i l  prices ( i . e .  conslderirg this factor alone) as 
happened in 1956. Equally Important is  that the
(1 ) The ECONOMIST, July 22, 1967, p .348.
(2) Figures from World Tanker Fleet Review 1967 by
J . I .  Jacobs Sc Co.
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maintenance of Persian Gulf o i l  supplies via the Gape
has 30 fa r  saved Western Europe from rely ing unduly on
(3)
the do lla r  a re a ’s o i l .
2. -  The Increase In demand for availab le  tanker 
tonnage a fter the Canal closure was naturally accompanied 
by higher freight rates, not only In the Persian Gulf/ 
Europe run but also in a l l  other o i l  routes in the world. 
Single voyage rates from the Persian Gulf (iMena A1 
Ahmadi) to U.K./Continent jumped from 23/5d. per ton 
of o i l  carried (via Suez and including dues) by the end 
of May to 144/4d. per ton (via  Cape) by the end of June.
In the Caribbean, single voyage rates rose from a pre­
c r is is  12/Qd. per ton of o i l  carried on the Curacao- 
London route to 55/10d. per ton duping the s&ms f i r s t  
s6nth of the Suez closure. The spot market rates 
continued to r is e  aid showed distinct peaks in July and 
August but since then they started to decline steeply.
Yet the latest information on the situation (January 
1968) shows that spot rates are s t i l l  much above the 
pre -c r is is  leve l. Changes in AFRA (Average Freight Rate 
Assessment) followed more or less the same pattern but 
naturally their fluctuations were considerably less 
violent. Until June 1S67 the LTBP published AFRA every 
s ix  months tut because o f the abnormal situation following
(3) B r ita in ’s heavy purchase of do lla r  area o i l  (U.S. and 
Caribbean) during June-August 1967 was due to the o i l  
embargo imposed by Arab countries.
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the Middle East c r is is  i t  was decided to give a monthly 
assessment. (See Table (G -  1) for changes in tanker 
fre ight rates during 1967). It  w i l l  be noticed that:
(1) fluctuations in large tankers1 rates were re la tive ly  
moderate since the market of these tankers would be less  
linked with the Suez Canal; ana (2 )  thot the r ise  in 
rates In general was much less violent than in 1956 owing 
to the surplus of tonnage existing before June and keeping 
rates at low leve ls . One point to be emphasised here Is 
that these two features, I . e . ,  fcne employment of larger  
tankers and the surplus In tonnage -  were partly e product 
of the 1956 Suez closure. (See Chapter 9 ).
The decline in fre ight rates a fte r  September was a 
sign that indicated that the new additional demand for  
tanker tonnage created by the Suez closure was satis fied  
and that re-routing of Persian Gulf t r a f f ic  via the Cape 
was completed. From that time new tanker deliveries  
began to depress freight rates once again . Yet the f a l l  
in rates a fter  September has not been as steep as before  
the cris is  since a considerable portion of the new 
deliveries must have been planned with the Intention of 
using the Canal and not the Cape route. I t  Is quite 
possible therefore that tanker freight rates may well 
r ise  again should o i l  shipments from the Persian Gulf 
be developed at the san© high rate as before Jure 1957, 
or at a higher rate , while the Canal remains shut.
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TABLb Cd -  1)
TAHKER FREIGHT RATES 
Percentages Above or Below Intascale
AFRA
General Medium Large
1967
Bar pose Tankers Tankers
Jan/Vi&y -28.7 -38.7 •4 6.6
June -  6.8 -13.3 -32.9
July +17.7 +13.9 -  6.9
August 421.8 +16.0 -  9.2
September +26.7 +20.3 -  8.1
October +23.8 +17.1 - 12.3
November +22.4 +12.5 -13.9
December +13.4 +9.2 -14.9
Single Voyage 
(Dirty)
-59 
+13.5 
+73 
+71 
+56 
+15 
+10 
+ 2.5
Source i Compiled from Petroleum frees Service June 1967 -  Feb. 1968
In fact the r is e  In rates during June -  September was 
caused not only by the re-routing o f the Suez o i l  t r a f f ic  
via the Cape but also by the need to ship under this 
condition extra amounts from the Persian Gulf to Western 
Europe in order to compensate fo r  the loss of most of 
Arab o i l  whioh is normally available at Mediterranean 
terminals* After the f u l l  resumption o f o i l  exports 
from Mediterranean terminals -  mainly during September -  
shipments from the Gulf wero reduced to the pro-June 
rate , or possibly a l i t t l e  lower, and that was one of  
the factors that has cheoked the r ise  in fre ight rates.
On the other hand the re-opening o f  the Suez Canal 
would certain ly depress freight rates because it  would 
re -estab lish  a hugh surplus of tanker ton age in the 
world market. However, theoretically  speaking, this  
link between the re-opening of the Canal and freight 
rates would be growing weaker with the increase in the 
number of tankers that can be used best via the Caps 
route. In 1967 any tanker of 100,000 tons and over 
was de fin ite ly  used best via the Cape in its return  
voyage from the Persian Gulf (see CMapter 9 ).  Since 
last June maintenance and improvement jro jects In the 
Canal have been completely stopped whilst the number 
of new orders fbr tankers of sizes above 100,000 tons 
has been continuously ris ing*
3. - Unlike 1956 the stoppage of Arab exports from 
Mediterranean o i l  terminals In 1967 was partly due to 
po lit ica l reasons (Arab o i l  embargo against Western 
countries which allegedly supported Israe l during the 
June war) and partly because of disputes between o i l  
companies and Arab governments about posted prices a fte r  
the Canal closure. The la tte r  case is our concern here. 
After the June war, o i l  supply was completely stopped 
from Libya until the f i r s t  week of July and from Saudi 
Arabia 's Tapline until the third week of Sejfeember.
The governments of these two countries had demanded 
from their o i l  companies sn Increase o f posted prices 
at the Mediterranean terminals since the re la tive  
advantages of these (freight savings) have considerably 
increased by the closure of the Suez Canal and the 
necessity to route Persian Gulf o i l  via the Cape.
In September Aramco reached a compromise with the Saudi 
government by agreeing to eliminate -  so long as the 
Canal remained closed -  the OPEC'S 6.5^ allowance o ff  
posted prices at SIdon (Tapline terminal) whilst leaving  
It as before the crisis  at Persian Gulf ports. This 
allowance has been given in the past to o i l  companies by 
a l l  members of OPEC (the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries) because it was recognised that 
posted prices were rather high. Being deducted before 
tax It  has reduced the o i l  companies royalty and tax
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payments. Libya obtained a similar solution to that 
of Saudi Arabia also during September but it  was to be 
applied retrospectively since o i l  exports had actually  
started in the f i r s t  week of last  July. The Libyan 
government estimated that the dropping of 6.5% allowance 
would Increase Its revenue by 8.5 J.S. cents per barrel 
(or by #85 m. a year).
Thus a price d if fe ren tia l was established between 
the Mediterranean terminals and the Persian Gulf because 
of the Suez closure and this subsequently raised  c . i . f .  
o i l  prices in Western Europe.
To sum up* the effect of the second closure of the 
Suez Canal on o i l  trade has oeen confined so fa r  to 
Increases in c . i . f .  prices In Western Europe consequent 
upon two main factors ; f i r s t ,  the r is e  In the oost of 
transporting o i l  from the Persian Gulf, and second, the 
r ise  in f .o .b .  prices at the Mediterranean terminals as 
a result of the Increase In their re la tive  advantages 
due to the f i r s t  factor.
It  is  not easy however to determine tbs contribution  
of the Suez closure to the r ise  in Inland o i l  prices of 
2d. per imperial gallon  which took place in Britain a fte r  
the start of the emergency last summer. On the one hand 
this r ise  took place not only because of the Suez closure 
and the consequent r ise  In freight rates every where In
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the world but also because of the Arab o i l  embargo 
Imposed on shipments to Britain  until the f i r s t  week 
of September and the Interruption in Nigerian o i l  supplies. 
(The la t te r  factors necessitated heavy Imports of o i l  from 
the Western Hemisphere at higbdr cost). But,on the other 
hand, o i l  companies in Britain retained the surcharge of 
2d. a gallon a fte r  September when the Suez closure became 
about the only factor that continued to affect import 
prices. In fact they further asked tne government to 
allow for a second surcharge as the f i r s t  In their opinion 
had been Inadequate to cover the whole additional expend­
iture incurred by the o i l  Industry during the c r is is .
In Ita ly  the government refused to authorise any immediate 
increase in o i l  prices a fte r  the Suez closure and promised 
the companies some r e l i e f ,  a fte r  January 1969, from the 
proceeds of the special gasoline tax of 10 l i r e  per l i t r e .  
In Prance which has not suffered from any Arab boycott and 
whose Mediterranean imports from Algeria and Iraq continued 
almost without interruption, o i l  companies were granted
a surcharge of 2 f r .  per hectolitre (about l&d. per
(1 )
Imperial gallon) to cover extra expenditures due to the 
Suez closure. The surcharge was considered Inadequate
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(1 ) Quotations of exchange before the Sterling devaluation.
by companies. In V,est Germany where o i l  companies are
free to f ix  their market prices these were up by 5 pfennigs
( 1 )
per l i t r e  (about 5d. per imperial gallon) because of the
Suez closure and the interruption of Mediterranean supplies.
In January 1968 the OECD produced a provisional
estimate of the direct effects of the Suez closure on
the cost of o i l  shipments into the main countries of
Western Europe. This is given in Table (G -  2).
TASLE (Q -  2)
ESTIMATED EFFECT OF SUES CA1AL CLOSURE ON 
COST OF OIL IMPORTS.
July -  December 1967.
(A l l  figures in jt mil. -  Imp. c . i . f . )
Hypothetical Estimated Difference 
Non-Crisis Actual in Cost.
Import Cost. Import Cost.
U .K . 950 1,150 200
W. Germany 540 630 90
Ita ly  550 630 80
France 730 770 40
( 2 )
Source: OECD (formerly OSEC)
According to this estimation the U.K. has had by fa r  
the highest cost increases although its  o i l  t r a f f i c  in 
the Canal was less than ha lf  by 2.5m. tons than that of 
Ita ly  (and also was smaller than the French t ra f f ic  -  
see Chapter 9 ). The main confusion seems to have r is e n  
from the inclusion of the costs aris ing  from the Arab
o i l  boycott and the interruption in Mediterranean supplies.
( l l  Quotations o f exchange be fo re  the S t e r l in g  d eva lu a tio n .
(2 ) OECD -  O rgan isa t io n  fo r  European C o -operation  & 
Development, fo rm erly  O rgan isa tio n  fo r  European
Econ. C o -o p e ra t io n .
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Thus the U.K. suffered most* followed by V»eat Germany 
and then came Ita ly  whilst France which suffered  
principally  from the Sues Canal closure has had the 
least r ise  In costs* The OECD also estimated the 
additional cost lik e ly  to arise I f  the Canal should 
remain closed during the whole of 1968* The estimates 
are given in Table (G «* 3 )«
TA3LE {G -  3)
ESTIMATED EFFECT OF SUEZ CAnAL CLOSURE ON 
COST OF OIL IMPORTS*
Jan* ~ December 1968*
U.K.
W* Germany
Ita ly
Franco
Oil Imports 
Re-routed 
Round Cape 
(M il. Tons)
40
27
40
17
Additional Total
Freight Additional 
(/  per ton) Cost
( *  411.)
1 . 2
1 . 6
2.2
1.7
50
40
90
30
(Sourcei OECD)
It  can be seen that the additional fre ight oost per 
ton varies between one country and another acoording to 
the distance saved by the Canal over r/hs Cape. Thus 
the lowest Increase In cost per ton Is In the case of 
U.K. and the highest in the case of Ita ly . In 
calculating additional freight oost I t  has been estimated 
that tanker freight rates would continue to f a l l  during 
1908 and would even revert to the ir  p re -eris le  level.
The f in a l point for comment ia the small figure of 
Ita lian  o i l  Imports via the Cape estimated for 1968,
The OECD must have assumed that not a l l  Ita lian  imports 
which normally came via the Canal (41.4 and 50.3m. tons 
in 1965 and 1966 respectively) would be re-routed via 
the Cape. In theycase of U.K. 40m, tons o i l  Imports 
Included shipments which came via Suez and via tbe Cape 
before June 1967 (Total U.K. imports from the Middle 
East in 1966 were 43.8m. tons).
I I .  Merchandise Other Than O ils
1. -  Before the closure of the Canal In June tramp 
rates were generally depressed and lower than those 
prevailing In the trade in any of the previous three 
years. As in the case of tankers there was a large  
supply of tonnage existing in the market aid that 
prevented rates from recovering. The routing of the 
Eastern t r a f f ic  via the Cape a fter June gave excellent 
opportunities to tramp owners. The withdrawal of a 
large volume of tanker tonnage from the grain trade for  
o i l  and the chartering of a good number o f ore/bulk/oil 
carriers for the same purpose raised dry cargo rates 
steeply during June and July. But due to the p re -c r is is  
situation and the continuous additions to world f lee t  
at a rather high ra te , the r is e  In tramp rates could not 
be as sharp as in 1956. Indeed tramp rates f e l l  in
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August, increased anew In September and then in the 
following months fluctuated in each trade according to 
the normal seasonal demand, with a general tendency 
downwards. However until December 1967 both voyage and 
time charter rates were much above the rates which ruled  
In the corresponding month In 1936 or Indeed in any year 
since the 1953 c r is is .  (See Index number of tramp 
shipping rates constructed by the U.K. Chamber of Shipping 
and published annually In its  Report (or in Annual Abstract 
of S ta t is t ic s ),  aid see also quotations from this index in 
Table (0 -4 ) ) .
As In 1956 the closure of the Canal created a 
different situation for cargo liners which in fact  
carried the major part o f British and European trade 
with the East of Suez. (See p. 388 to 395). To keep 
their shipping schedules between various Eastern and 
Western ports and to f u l f i l  their normal commitments to 
East African and Mediterranean ports while the Canal Is 
closed an additional number of vesse ls  has been chartered.
The r ise  and the f a l l  In tramp shipping rates since last  
June have therefore raised or reduced -  but did not 
eliminate -  the additional expenses which lin e r  firms 
have borne. Until the Suez route is re-opened this 
situation w i l l  remain. Besides unlike tankers or ore 
carriers , lin e r  cargo ships have not grown much in size  
since the 1956 c r is is .  The a.\alysi3 of the U.K. shipping
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f le e t  on 30th June 1967 showed, that only 3 cargo liners  
were In the largest size of 14-14,999 gross tons. 
Passeriger/cargo liners were re la tive ly  of larger sizes  
but again there were only 7 of these vessels in the 
largest size of 30,000 gross tons and over. Thus 
unlike large tankers and ore/bulk carriers, the 
re-routing of cargo liners round the Cape during the 
present c ris is  increased considerably the outlay of 
shipping companies and involved them In a problem 
similar to that of 1956.
2. -  The structure of British  non-oil trade via Suez 
remained almost unchanged a fter 1956. Table ( 6 - 5 )  
shows the quantities of the principal commodities which 
Britain Imported in 1965 via the Canal. B ritish  non-oil 
imports via the Canal were generally affected by changes 
in trade pattern. Yet imports of cereals and ore 
particu larly  from Australia were affected by the growth in 
the employment of larger vessels. As in 1956 B ritish  
exports via Suez consisted mainly of machinery, iron and 
stee l goods, chemical products, motor vehicles and tex tiles  
aid were distributed over a wide range of countries in 
^ast A frica , Arabia, the Far Bast and Australia. It  is  
too early to estimate the effect of the present closure 
of the Suez Canal on these trades. Judging by 1956 
experience would not help much because of the difference  
in the course of fre ight rates and the lengtn of the closure
5 3 9 .
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TABLE ( a -  4) (contd.)
INDKX NUMBER OF TRACT RATES ( i 960 •  100)
1966 1967
Jan. 124.1 100.5
Apr. 123.4 103.7
Jun. 110.9 113.5
Jul. 107.8 138.0
Aug. 108.0 113.2
Sept. 104.2 125.8
Oct. 10$.8 139.8
Nov, 104.1 146.3
Dec. U5.5 145.8
Year 113.5 120.5
Time Charter (i.Iotor Ships)
1966 1967
Jan. 148.6 117.9
Apr. . 142.2 121.3
Jun. 135.2 121.3
Jul. 115.4 133.1
Aug. 136.1 129.9
Sept.' 132.2 146.5
Oct. 118.3 146.9
Kov* 117.9 148.6
Bee. 118.3 138.2
Year 132.4 130.4
Source 1 Chamber of Shipping of the U.K.
Annual Heports 1966-67 and 1967-68
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TABLE (G  -  5)
HUHCIiAL COMMODITIES IMPORTED INTO BRITAIN VIA 
THE SUEZ CANAL in 1965.
Commodities 00Q Tons
Metals and Ores
Manganese J2
Ilmenite 2 JO
Zinc 135
Sugar 727
Cereals 799
Fruits 232
Oil Seeds & Veg. Oils 106
Oil Seed Cakes 415
Textile Haws 223
Rubber 104
Timber 146
Tea 152
Meat 106
(Compiled from Suez Canal
Main Sources
India, U.A.R. and Australia
Mauritius, Australia, India and 
Philippines.
Australia, Burma, China and 
South Afrioa.
Australia, East Afrioa, Arabian 
Gulf, India, Ifckistan and 
Ceylon.
Philippines, China, Sudan, 
Indonesia and India.
India, Sudan, Philippines, 
Indonesia and Burma.
Pakistan, Australia, L. Africa  
and India.
Malaysia and Indonesia
Philippines, Malaysia, Burma 
and Indonesia
India and Ceylon
Australia and East A frica.
Seport 1965).
CONCLUSIONS
The revolution of oceanic transport between the 
East and the West In 1859 and In the following years 
of the 19th century was a product of two factors; 
the opening of the Canal and the substitution of steam 
ships for  sa ilin g  vessels. The Suez Canal performed the 
principal ro le  in that it  greatly shortened the distance 
between the East and the West and also hastened and 
fostered the employment of steamships. The revolution  
of transport was manifested in considerably quicker, 
cheaper and more regular shipping services; and under 
these conditions a new era was begun in the trade 
relations between East and West of Suez. The building  
of telegraphic communications between these two separated 
regions of the world since 1869 had also strengthened the 
links between their markets and promoted the growth of 
their trade• British imports for home consumption from 
the East gained considerably a fte r  the opening of the 
Canal. Fresh foodstuffs and cheaper raw materials which 
never came from the East before 1869, or came in very 
small amounts, were now imported in progressively increasing
x The sole purpose of these conclusions is to present the 
main line of the research project with the principal 
results which have been established. For a detailed  
picture see conclusions that have been reached within 
the foregoing Chapters.
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volumes and at cheaper prices than any where else In 
the world. The sharp reductions in freight rates also  
cheapened the co s t lie r  commodities of the East and 
stimulated the ir  importation.
The opening of the Canal however was unfavourable 
to B rit ish  import* from the East which were used for 
re-exports. Until 1869 European countries imported 
most o f their needs from the East via Brita in . This 
British entrepot trade was particularly  prosperous 
during the quarter of century or so which preceded the 
opening of the Canal in spite of the adoption of free  
trade and the abandonment of Navigation Acts in Britain  
and her empire. Now a fte r  the Canal was bu ilt  European 
countries were w illin g  to develop their direct trade 
with the Eastern world and they were encouraged by the 
saving in the time and the cost of the Eastern voyage 
as well as by the elimination of the commissions of 
the British  middleman. Besides, the substitution of  
steam for s a i l  played an important role in encouraging 
the Europeans to build their own fleets and this factor 
in turn greatly served the growth of the ir  direct trade 
with the East. The only gain -  yet quite considerable -  
which accrued to Britain  from this development came 
through the major contribution of her shipyards in the 
building of the new European flee ts . The development 
of European direct trade with the East was not however
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of any significant influence fa r  the growth of Britain*s  
entrepot trade during the fifteen  years which followed 
the opening of the Canal. That was due to two main 
factors; f i r s t ,  Britain*s well established monopolistic 
situation in the Eastern trade before 1869 which enabled 
her to gain considerably and immediately from the opening 
of the Canal; and second, the continuing dependence on 
the Cape route for the Australian trade which gained 
however from the competition between sa ilin g  and 
steamships.
These la t te r  two factors were also quite essential 
to the rapid growth of B rit ish  exports of home and 
foreign manufactures to the East during the 1870s and 
the early 1880s. The growth of B rit ish  exports to the 
East a fter 1869 was also promoted by free trade (which 
was adopted by the largest part of the Eastern market) 
and by the r ise  in the purchasing power of the Eastern 
consumers consequent upon the great growth in their  
exports to West of Suez. However in tne late 1880s 
the rate of growth of British  exports to the East 
began to slow down as a result of the growing European 
competition. No doubt this competition was backed by 
the r is e  in European industry operating under free trade 
conditions. Yet in fighting to gain from Britain  some 
increasing portion of the Eastern market the European 
competitors were most certainly helped by factors which
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revolutionised transport. An important factor which 
particu larly  depressed the share of Britain  in the 
Eastern market during the late  1880s and the 1890s was 
the policy of the Shipping Conference. Consequent upon 
this policy B ritish  goods were carried to the East at 
high rates of freight whilst European and American goods 
exported to the same destination continued to benefit 
from the favourable conditions prevailing in the free  
freight market since the opening of the Canal.
The in fluentia l ro le  played by the Suez Canal in 
changing freight rates and in affecting the volume, the 
pattern and the geographical distribution of the Eastern 
trade was nearing ai end by the early years of this  
century. New factors became more important in affecting  
the development of British trade in the East. The f i r s t  
War circumstances reduced European trade in the East but 
at the same time paved the way fo r  the growth of Japanese 
and American trades and stimulated the development of 
modern industry in India. The American trade in the East 
was particularly  encouraged by the opening of the Panama 
Canal in 1914. These factors -  besides the general 
circumstances arising from the monetary c r is is  of the 
1930s and the mounting tnreat of a second major war -  
exerted depressing effects on British/Eastern trade 
during the inter-war period. But, however, the growth 
of this trade was s t i l l  protected by the strong p o lit ic a l
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and economic relations between Britain  and her Empire 
in the East, a link  which was s ign ificantly  strengthened 
in 1932 -  a fter  the abandoning of free  trade and by the 
signing of the Ottawa Agreements fo r  Imperial Preference.
The dependence o f British/Eastern trade on the Suez 
Canal during the inter-war period was influenced by a l l  
the above factors as w e ll as by others which determined 
the choice between the Canal and other alternative routes.
The cutting of the Panama Canal opened a new route to 
British/Australasian trade. Compared with other Eastern 
trades this trade was least dependent on the Suez Canal 
but its growth was much faster than them. British/New 
Zealand trade was de fin ite ly  attracted to the new route 
but the British/Australian counterpart continued to flow  
mainly via Suez an d the Cape route as before 1914. Yet 
the flow of Australian t r a f f ic  in the Suez Cahal beoame 
particu larly  sensitive to a l l  factors which would a ffect  
the re lative  advantages of this route. Thus, during the 
1930s the Australian t r a f f ic  in the Suez Canal was more 
affected than any other Eastern t r a f f ic  by the r ise  in 
the "actual Canal dues11, the increase in maritime insurance 
rates during the Ita lian  campaign in Abyssinia and the 
Spanish C iv il War, and the a v a ila b i l ity  of cheaper 
bunkering fue l on alternative routes.
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The spectacular growth in B ritish  o i l  Imports via 
the Suez Canal during the post-Second War period changed 
completely the importance of this route to Britain .
The growth of this trade which by any measure exceeded 
that of any other single trade Britain  conducted East of 
Suez was closely linked with the continuous discoveries 
of r ich  o i l  resources in the Middle East area. Since 
the late 1930s the production of o i l  in North Iraq was 
most economically exported to Europe via pipelines to 
the Eastern Mediterranean coast. During the post-war 
period attempts of o i l  companies to export their Persian 
Gulf produce to Europe in the same way were of very 
limited success due to p o lit ic a l factors which either 
completely prevented the building of p ipelines, closed 
them a fter being b u i lt ,  or considerably reduced their  
re lative  advantages over the longer route via the Suez 
Canal. Of B ritish  o i l  imports from the Middle East in 
the f i r s t  ha lf of the 1950s only 15 to 20$ came via  
Eastern Mediterranean pipeline terminals (mostly from 
Iraq) and the remaining portion via Suez.
The dependence of the trad itiona l B r it ish  trade in 
the East (part icu larly  that with Australia ) on the Suez 
Canal was also strengthened in the post-war period by 
the growth of the Middle East o i l  industry since that 
offered ships using the route much cheaper bunkering 
fu e l.  Yet, the development of British/Eastern trade -
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other than with the Middle East -  via the Suez Canal 
became generally influenced by various wider p o lit ic a l  
and economic factors such as the dissolution of the old 
British  Empire in the Far East; the growth of inter­
East ern and inter-Europe an trades; and the more serious 
attempt on the part of the underdeveloped countries East 
of Suez to industria lise  their  economies.
When Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal Company in 
July 1956 something between a f i f t h  and fourth of the 
value of B rit ish  trade was dependent on the Suez route. 
About 54$ of total o i l  imports (crude and refined products) 
into Britain  came via Suez. That considerable dependence 
on one route and the prospects of placing more in future  
was one of the main factors behind the British  governmentrs 
opposition to the nationalisation decision. Yet the main 
anxiety arose because o f the fear that the Egyptian 
nationalistic  policy might Jeopardise other British  
interests in the East (particu larly  the Middle East) and 
might interfere with tho international character of the 
Suez Canal in future. With the exception of France which 
had sim ilar interests in the Middle East, the British  
government fa i le d  to build a d o se  co-operation among 
Western a l l ie s  over the Suez dispute. The U.S., whose 
help was particu larly  needed, was most reluctant to 
co-operate in the internationalisation of the Suez 
Canal -  the only solution which the British and the
549.
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French governments accepted. The U.S. has had an 
absolute control over another international route:
Panama Canal. Besides, the U.S. administration wanted 
to disassociate American interests in the Middle East 
area from those of Brita in  and France. The co-operation 
of other Western powers or maritime nationaiwith Britain  
over Suez was greatly  affected by their individual interests 
in the Suez route and with Arab countries. The Briwish- 
French dispute with Egypt ended with an attempt by the 
f i r s t  parties to restore control over the Suez Canal by 
force. The m ilitary campaign in the f i r s t  week of 
November 1956 fa i led  to achieve its  purpose and the 
Canal was blocked during the figh t and remained unsuitable 
for navigation for five  months.
The re-routing of the same volume of the Suez t ra f f ic  
via the Cape within a given period of time required a 
substantial increase in tanker and dry cargo tonnage.
That was the major problem arising from the Suez closure 
in 1956 since the world f le e t  was almost in f u l l  employ­
ment. Compared with tankers the shortage in dry cargo 
tonnage was less c r i t ic a l  and was substantially reduced 
after the withdrawal of a number of vessels from the 
American reserve f le e t  and the derequisition of vessels 
which the B ritish  and the French governments used during 
the Suez campaign. Besides, the British/Australian  
t ra f f ic  in the Suez Canal, which represented a fa i r ly
large proportion of non-oil trade In the East, was 
re-routed round the Cape and the Panama routes with very 
small Increase in tonnage. On the other hand the shortage 
In tankers was only minimised by close co-operation between 
the governments and the o i l  companies of B rita in , other 
Western European countries and the U.S. Sources of o i l  
supplies were re-arranged; imports from the Middle East 
were out down and more preference was given to the nearer 
sources of the Western Hemisphere in order to obtain 
maximum possible usage of available tanker tonnage.
This measure was completed by a world wide co-ordination 
of the timing and movement of o i l  companies ownafl tankers, 
and by additions to the world f lee t  from the American 
reserve f le e t .  The gap in British  -  and Western European -  
o i l  Imports whioh the closure of the Suez Canal created 
was considerably reduced although it  could not be completely 
covered. Freight rates which had risen substantially  
a fter July 1956 -  in expectation of a Suez Canal closure -  
continued to r ise  during November and December and 
surpassed the Korean war peak records. From January 
1957 they began to decline, a sign that indicated the 
removal of the extra demand on world tonnage. The r ise  
in freight rates s ign ifican tly  affected import prices 
particu larly  in the oases of o i l  and tramp carried  
commodities. But, with the exception of o i l ,  freight  
rates exerted l i t t l e  effect on market prices. Oil
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prices were also affected by the r ise  in f .o .b *  prices 
of Western Hemisphere sources and by government taxation  
to enforce rationing during the c r is is#  Market prices 
of other commodities which normally came via Suez were 
more affected by existing stocks, short run disturbances 
in supplies due to irregu lar shipping arriva ls  and market 
speculations. The effect exerted by the Suez closure on 
Brita in 's  balance of trade was mainly restricted  to the 
severe disturbance in the figures of the three months 
November 1956 -  January 1957. The fear that B ritish  
exports to the East would be badly depressed proved to 
be quite excessive. Yet the situation could have developed 
d iffe ren tly  i f  the Canal had remained closed fo r  a longer 
period o f time than actually happened. B rita in 's  balance 
o f payments was burdened by the purchase of o i l  from the 
dollar area, by withdrawal of accounts held in Britain  
by some countries friendly  with Egypt and by the increase 
in the Indebtedness of B rit ish  shipping during the r ise  
in tramp dry cargo and tanker fre ight rates . Yet the 
main effect on the balance of payments came about through 
the f a l l  in the Sterling rates of edchange, as a result  
of the c r is is ,  and the consequent huge f a l l  in the gold 
and do lla r  reserves. The balance was restored only a fte r  
the British  government obtained massive external support 
of the currency and took strong measures to re-in force  
the reserves in December 1956.
After the c r is is  had passed Western European 
countries, particu larly  Britain , were w illin g  to reduce 
their dependence on the Suez borne oil#  B r ita in 's  
success in importing more of the Middle East o i l  via 
the Mediterranean coast was quite limited# The o i l  
companies’ new pipeline projects which planned fo r  
channeling the Gulf and Iranian o i l  via some Is ra e l i  
or Turkish port at the Mediterranean were never rea lised
i
for p o lit ic a l reasons. 3esides, the expansion in the 
capacity of the Iraq i and Saudi Arabian lines via the 
Eastern Mediterranean was re la t iv e ly  slow# The dependence 
on the Suez Canal fo r  British  o i l  imports from the Middle 
East decreased only gradually with the growth in the size  
of the tanker and the a b i l i t y  to place more reliance on 
the Cape route# This trend was particu larly  notable 
after 1963. Yet the decrease in the proportion of 
Middle East o i l  imports which came to Britain via Suez 
could have been much larger i f  the Egyptian administration 
had not continually expanded the dimensions of the navigable 
channel of the Canal. In fact the Suez Canal had 
Increased its share in Middle East o i l  exports to West 
of Suez during the same period. B rita in 's  reliance on 
the Canal was reduced not only by developing the use o f  
alternative routes but also by placing less reliance on 
the Middle East o i l  as such. This could not be achieved
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however by encouraging the coal industry at home and/or 
by stepping up atomic energy programmes# Consumption of 
Middle East o i l  in Britain  continued to Increase almost 
in the same explosive way as before the Suez c r is is  until 
new and rich o i l  f ie ld s  were discovered in A frica  
(particu larly  In Libya) and British  importers switched 
to them#
When the Suez Canal was closed fa r  the second time 
in June 1967 only 24.5# of total B ritish  o i l  Imports were 
dependent on that route against 54$ in 1956# That was 
clearly  the resu lt  o f the continuous e ffo rts  towards 
that end during the decade separating the two crises*  
Consequently the e ffects of the second Suez closure 
have been less serious than the firs t#  Nevertheless, 
there have been two other factors whioh have so far  
kept down the costs of the present cris is#  These are 
the surplus in world tanker aid dry cargo tonnage wnich 
grew almost continually since, and partly as a resu lt  o f,  
the 1956 cris is ;- and second, the considerable growth in 
the size of the tanker and ore carrier during the last  
ten years#
At present the re-opening of the Suez Canal Is 
apparently dependent on the withdrawal of the Is ra e li  
army from the positions which they occupied on the 
Eastern side o f the waterway since last  June# In future
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after the present c r is is  has ended -  i t  would be 
essential fo r  Egypt to remove a l l  p o ss ib il it ie s  of war 
in the Suez zone in order to protect her interests in 
the Canal as well as the interests of the trading world. 
Leaving po lit ics  aAide, the fa ilu re  in achieving this  
aim would considerably affect the Suez t r a f f ic  -  In 
particular o i l  -  and make more acute the d i f f ic u lt  task 
of the Canal administration in trying to catch up with 
the rapid Increase In trade and in the size of the tanker# 
To Britain  the Suez route, in spite of the decrease in 
its  re la t ive  significance a fte r  1956, has by no means 
become unimportant fo r  to ta l trade conducted with the 
Middle and the Far .ast as well as fo r  B rit ish  shipping 
Interests, particu larly  l in e r  firms# Therefore, It  may 
be to B r ita in 's  advantage i f  and when a permanent solution  
fo r  the A rab -Israe li dispute is found In order to safeguard 
the economic and commercial future o f the Canal#
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